Vortex of Genocide: Banyamulenge Identity Formation in Pursuit of the Genocidaire, Zaïre (1996- 1997) by Davey, Christopher P.
 
 
 
A VORTEX OF GENOCIDE 
 
 
 
C. P. DAVEY 
 
Ph.D 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD 
 
 
 
2019 
  
 A Vortex of Genocide 
 
Banyamulenge Identity Formation in Pursuit of the Genocidaire, Zaïre (1996-
1997) 
 
 
 
Christopher Peter DAVEY 
 
 
 
Submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Faculty of Management, Law and Social Sciences 
University of Bradford 
2019 
  
 iii 
 
Abstract 
Christopher Peter Davey 
A Vortex of Genocide 
Banyamulenge Identity Formation in Pursuit of the Genocidaire, Zaïre (1996-
1997) 
Keywords: AFDL, Banyamulenge, Congo, destructive crises, genocidaire, 
genocide, identity, intermediate space, narratives of insecurity, RPF 
 
Genocide is conventionally seen through the mutually exclusive 
characterisations of perpetrators and victims. Attempts to understand this 
phenomenon in the 1990s postcolonial African Great Lakes region suffer 
from this same limitation. This dissertation critiques the limiting binary of 
perpetrator and victim identities. By examining the messy formation of 
identities in genocide, this research demonstrates that the latter are layered 
and fluid. Using relational sociology, identities are examined through the 
narrative analysis of interviews with Banyamulenge soldiers who participated 
in the early 1990s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and the short-lived 
Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL). 
These soldiers witnessed first-hand the violence and devastation of the 
Rwandan civil war and 1994 genocide. The AFDL, under Rwandan 
leadership, went on to obliterate 233,000 Rwandan refugees spread across 
Zaïre form 1996 to 1997. A heuristic device of a vortex is used to 
conceptualise a process of identity formation framed by three features of 
genocide, namely narratives of insecurity, destructive crises, and 
intermediate space. RPF and Banyamulenge narratives, power relations, and 
relational journeys are traced through an exploration of the networks and 
histories of these features. Banyamulenge soldier identities are formed in 
movements through this vortex with each experience of genocide. Such 
movements resulted in violence against the refugees. A specific relation to 
the idea of the enemy as a guilty genocidaire was constructed through the 
deployment of multiple narratives. The genocidaire was essential to 
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Banyamulenge identities as they went on to perpetrate genocide against the 
Rwandan refugees.  
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Chapter I: Introduction: Between Tides1 
The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty 
oars, and was preserved by the Athenians . . . , for they took away the 
old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their 
place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the 
philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side 
holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending 
that it was not the same.  
-- Theseus, Plutarch2 
 
Introduction 
Genocide in the African Great Lakes region (see Figure 1) is nominally 
understood through the tragedy of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In three 
months, least half a million Rwandans were murdered. Radical Hutu power 
forces obliterated both Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The genocide and civil war 
ended with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) taking power.3 This far-
reaching tragedy shaped a region already haunted by colonialism. Under 
conventional wisdom, Rwanda was for the Great Lakes what the Holocaust 
was for Europe. The immediate impact of the 1994 genocide came in the 
upheaval of the region. Over a million refugees, predominantly Hutu and 
thousands as perpetrators, fled mostly into eastern Zaïre. In the vocabulary 
of the RPF, and the international community, this Other grouping became 
synonymous with the genocidaire: the perpetrator of the 1994 genocide.  
In North and South Kivu, Zaïre’s two adjacent provinces to Rwanda, 
Hutu and Tutsis had already been present for decades and in some cases 
centuries. By the time these refugees and armed groups arrived, the civilians 
                                            
1 This phrase is taken from the title of V.Y. Mudimbe’s book fictional account of 
Pierre Landu, a Catholic priest who becomes a soldier in communist wars of the early 
1960s. Landu struggles with the relational journey of his multiple identities, and recounts his 
struggle through this geo-political context, see V.Y. Mudimbe, Between Tides, trans. 
Stephen Becker (Simon & Schuster, 1991).     
2 Plutarch, Theseus, trans. John Dryden, The Internet Classics Archive 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology), accessed on 15 October 2018, from 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/theseus.html. 
3 The titles Rwandan Patriotic Front and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) will be used 
to refer to specific elements. RPF will refer to both the rebellion movement from 1990 to 
1994, as well as the past and present political organisation. The RPA refers to the military of 
the new Rwandan state post 1994. These will be used in connection with the AFDL, chiefly 
during the 1996 to 1997 period when the AFDL and RPA were temporarily merged together, 
with RPA officers leading the AFDL.   
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among them had already been subject to massive violence. The emergence 
of the RPF state saw this scenario as a continued existential threat. 
Banyamulenge, or Congolese Tutsis, in the east had joined the RPF cause, 
and adopted this narrative of threat. They considered themselves victims of 
an ongoing effort to remove Tutsis from existence. When the time came, 
however, to finally remove this threat in 1996, Congolese Tutsis joined with 
the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) to obliterate refugees and armed actors 
as guilty genocidaires. 
 This dissertation examines this history through the narrative analysis 
of Banyamulenge soldier interviews. A process of identity formation is 
conceptualised through the heuristic device of a vortex. Integral to this 
process are three features of these genocide persisted in the region, namely 
narratives of insecurity, destructive crises, and intermediate space. Similar to 
this occurrence of extreme weather, this vortex resulted from the situational 
and structural forces. As these features swirled around these actors, a vortex 
of identity formation would land like the funnel of a tornado, surrounded by 
high pressure and turbulence. This system would occur as these features 
moved participants through experiences of genocide. During, and in 
response to, these experiences, participants engaged in narrative and 
performative identity construction. Each time they moved through the vortex, 
they became increasingly tied these narratives and the actions that logically 
followed. The obliteration of Rwandan refugees from 1996-1997 is taken as 
the peak of this vortex; yet, this was just one moment in a series of 
interactions and formation within experiences of genocide. As such, identity 
formed in the vortex innovates beyond perpetrator and victim exclusivity, and 
demonstrates how identities in genocide are performative, layered and fluid. 
This relational approach appreciates actor narratives, without endorsing 
them as justification.  
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Figure 1: The African Great Lakes region, Google 2018. 
* * * 
In May 1997, the final Rwandan refugees were chased to the Congo River’s 
western reaches. Most were trying to make their way through the port town 
of Mbandaka, in the Equateur province. Hundreds, corned at the docks, were 
shot or drowned. The survivors, who congregated across the river in 
Republic of Congo, had traversed one of the most dangerous environments 
in Africa at the time. Hundreds of thousands had died, whether by artillery, 
disease, gunshot, hunger, or blade. These were the genocidaires. They 
became the disappeared of Congo’s new regime unveiled just several weeks 
later by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the leader of the alleged liberation movement.  
Populating the ranks of Kabila’s victorious Alliance des Forces 
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) were soldiers whose 
deep and recent past was interwoven between Congo (and later Zaïre), and 
Rwanda. In an evolving manner, they aimed to topple Mobutu Sese-Seko, 
drive out the security threats to regional sponsor parties, and stake a claim in 
the new Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).4 These Congolese Tutsis 
                                            
4 Tom Cooper, Great Lakes Holocaust: The First Congo War, 1996-1997, 
Africa@War Series, vol. 3 (Hellion and Company, 2013), 23. 
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(alongside Rwandan soldiers), both Banyarwanda from North Kivu and 
Banyamulenge from South Kivu, were heralded as the instigators of the 
rebellion. As soldiers of the liberation they were the executors of the 
genocidaire. Although these problematic characterisations are used in this 
dissertation, they are but a keyhole view to the myriad of conflicts and 
identities present in 1990s Great Lakes region. This work focuses on one 
particular conglomeration of narratives and identities: the Congolese Tutsi 
group known as the Banyamulenge.  
The Banyamulenge 
My personal search for Banyamulenge soldiers started indirectly with Patrick, 
who was born and raised in Uganda. His parents had fled Rwanda in the late 
1960s. In the early 1990s, he decided it was time go to Rwanda. For him the 
only way to make this journey was as part of the “liberation movement”.5 In 
Patrick’s view, the RPF had brought people together, and made Rwanda a 
safe place for Tutsi and Hutu alike. This political project inspired a sense of 
belonging that would spread throughout the region. The RPF’s reach 
extended to the Banyamulenge.  
When asked about who the Banyamulenge were, Patrick expressed a 
mixture of disdain and amusement.6 These were brothers in the same 
liberation project, but they warranted suspicion. He claimed some Rwandans 
referred to themselves as Banyamulenge, as this made it easier for them to 
migrate to Europe. Some Banyamulenge described themselves as 
Rwandans in order to come across the border, and others identified as 
Congolese. However, Patrick was convinced that one could easily tell the 
“real” Banyamulenge apart from the pretenders. The trick to telling them 
apart was where and when they claimed to have arrived in Rwanda. Despite 
taking me to a Banyamulenge church in Gisenyi, one of many dotted around 
                                            
5 Patrick, interview in Kigali, 14 May 2017.   
6 Journalist Howard French, in his search for the origins of the growing 1996 
rebellion, asked who the “mysterious Banyamulenge” were after finding little information 
from usual Western sources, see, Howard French, A Continent for the Taking (Vintage 
Books, 2005), 128-129. See also this discussion on how the Banyamulenge were framed in 
the recent Jean-Pierre Bemba case at the International Criminal Court, Felix Mukwiza 
Ndahinda, “The Bemba-Banyamulenge Case before the ICC: From Individual to Collective 
Criminal Responsibility,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 7 (2013): 476-496.  
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Rwanda and eastern Congolese cities, and meeting members of the 
congregation there, it was still unclear who the Banyamulenge were and why 
they were shrouded in apparent mystery. Patrick was certain that I needed to 
cross the border to find them in their own places. South Kivu was where the 
real Banyamulenge lived: in the hills with their cows.7  
 When asked in an interview, a prominent expert on the region gave an 
equally perplexing response: “The Banyamulenge? They don’t exist. It’s an 
RPF invention”.8 They claimed the term had gained some currency, but only 
as result of the protection of this community being the stated reason for the 
1996 invasion. A Trojan horse for Rwandan expansion. By this point, I had 
already met self-identified Banyamulenge in North and South Kivu. 
Conversely, interviewed Banyamulenge soldiers and political actors 
lamented the fact that their name had been used for the AFDL mission, and 
by subsequent armed groups. Nominally, Banyamulenge associated these 
groups with Kigali as the sponsor or puppet master for such troublemakers.9 
From these early field visits, it was apparent that despite Patrick’s vision of 
Rwanda as a sanctuary, individuals on both sides of the border saw 
themselves through a layered set of narratives and connections. The 
Banyamulenge added a further level of complexity. What was the 
connection? How had Rwanda become so embroiled in these people’s lives, 
and how was it that the Banyamulenge had done the same? Like Patrick, 
many rationalised that the only future for them was to join the RPF’s 
liberation movement. During the early 1990s, hundreds of young 
Banyamulenge men left their homes in the Minembwe hills for battlefield 
Rwanda. 
Genocide? 
Genocide and its perpetration, perception and lived experiences, is at the 
centre of this research. Consequently, this dissertation aims to address a 
twofold problem. First is the ingrained notion of victim and perpetrator 
identities in genocide discourse. Second, is the conundrum of seemingly 
                                            
7 Patrick, 2017.   
8 Interview by phone, 25 January 2018. 
9 French, 125-129.  
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cyclical or never-ending conflict in eastern Congo. Both problems are 
examined in the context of the Banyamulenge. The first problem, if 
unanswered, leaves the second an unsolvable riddle. In eastern Congo, the 
application of the traditional notions of victim and perpetrator does not even 
approach the level of subjectivity in how persons see themselves, let alone a 
variety of perceived Others. The colonial and postcolonial context of these 
problems further increases the need for innovative theory and analysis. 
Therefore the proposed question driving this research is, by what processes 
did genocide in the Great Lakes region produce socially constructed 
identities for AFDL/RPA soldiers? 
 Raphael Lemkin’s construction of the term genocide described a 
process where a social group’s foundations are targeted and “annihilated”.10 
His later research, following international agreement on the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), would 
include a variety of cases, inclusive of European colonial empires in the 
Americas, Africa and Australia.11 The underlying theme of Lemkin’s work was 
the colonial context of cultural groups and their social destruction. Thrown 
under the bus of post-World War Two victor’s justice, this specifically cultural 
notion was to be erased from the final negotiated document. The US, UK, 
and the Soviet governments were unsurprisingly reluctant to incriminate 
themselves in any past or present violence against minority groups.12 The 
product of treaty negotiations was a legal definition of genocide limited to 
acts of killing and physical subjugation of the group, and has bounded 
popular, political and academic discussions ever since.13 This dissertation 
purports a social model of destruction, as embedded in Lemkin’s own 
                                            
10 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Powers in Occupied Europe (Washington D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.   
11 Michael A. McDonnell and Dirk Moses, “Raphael Lemkin as historian of genocide 
in the Americas,” Journal of Genocide Research. 7, no. 4 (2005): 501-529.   
12 Johannes Morsink, “Cultural Genocide, the Universal Declaration, and Minority 
Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly vol. 21 (1999): 1017-1018.   
13 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? (Polity, Press, 2007), 28-32; Mark Levene, The 
Meaning of Genocide, vol. 1, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State (I.B. Tauris, 2005), 35-
51. 
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approach.14 To this end, the following features of genocide are proposed not 
as a definition, but as a utilisation of genocide as an ideal type.15 These 
features conceptualise the perceptions and experiences of genocide in this 
case study. The features are namely narratives of insecurity, destructive 
crises, and intermediate space. Addressed in chapters three and five, each is 
briefly defined here to carry initial discussion forward. 
Narratives of insecurity are communal narratives, expressed by 
individuals within a group (and about their group), where the frame of 
reference is a keen sense of an absence of security and the elusive nature of 
such. Throughout this dissertation, narratives are given an in-depth 
evaluation. This approach is further discussed in this introduction and in 
chapter four. Destructive crises are moments that define and shape 
forthcoming events, conditioning the responses of actors utilising narratives 
of insecurity. This label of destructive crises defines the importance and 
consequence of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the arrival of Rwandan 
refugees and armed groups following the genocide. These actors had the 
effect of reaggregating existing power relationships in eastern Zaïre against 
Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda Tutsi. Intermediate space as defined by 
V.Y. Mudimbe is the social, political and economic space in the margins of 
the postcolonial state.16 Similar to Mahmood Mamdani’s “bifurcated state”, it 
is where decolonisation has left specific inclusive and exclusive postcolonial 
structures.17 These features of genocide will enable the capture and 
restructuring of actor identity through the heuristic tool of a vortex, as 
discussed in the next section. 
Outside the “critical orthodoxy” of Holocaust scholarship, which 
dominates popular and academic discourse, there is a deeper conception of 
                                            
14 The social model is articulated in some recent genocide studies work, but is best 
captured by Damien Short, Redefining Genocide: Settler Colonialism, Social Death and 
Ecocide (Zed Books, 2016).  
15 Shaw, 88-96.  
16 V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of 
Knowledge (Indiana University Press, 1988), 4-5.   
17 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of 
late colonialism (Princeton University Press, 1996), 19-23.   
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actors within genocide.18 This is presented by Primo Levi in The Drowned 
and the Saved.  His description of the “Gray Zone” begins by reminding 
readers of the impotency and troubling objectivity of most actor-centred 
accounts of violence,  
Nevertheless, perhaps for reasons that go back to our origins as 
social animals, the need to divide the field into “we” and “they” is so 
strong that this pattern, this bi-partition - friend-enemy - prevails over 
all others. Popular history, and also the history taught in schools, is 
influenced by this Manichean tendency which shuns half-tints and 
complexities: it is prone to reduce the river of human occurrences to 
conflicts, and the conflicts to duels.19  
 
Addressing the human condition from the perspective of “social animals”, 
Levi recognised the foundational level from which one should build the 
sociological analysis of the human.  More often than not, the description of 
actors within genocide as perpetrators or victims belies the presence of 
human relations even in cases of mass suffering and violence.  It was the 
social construction of functionaries, guards, prisoners, Sonderkommando 
and capos alike, that resulted in the blending of identities and the “moral 
collapse” of all those involved.20 According to Levi, “It is a gray zone, with ill-
defined outlines which both separate and join the two camps of masters and 
servants. It possesses an incredibly complicated internal structure, and 
contains within itself enough to confuse our need to judge.”21  Action is a 
product of knowledge and experience connecting an actor’s present and 
past, and as such requires a social and structural level of analysis.     
 Banyamulenge soldiers, who joined the RPF in the early 1990s, 
followed their brothers, colleagues and commanders on a journey that would 
be an intensely gray experience. Both 1994 and 1996 were seen as years of 
genocide in the views of these actors. This dissertation takes on the often 
politicised notion of double genocide in Rwanda, and expands the scope 
beyond the 1994 genocide and concurrent RPF violence, to 1996’s 
                                            
18 Brian Cheyette, “Appropriating Primo Levi,” Robert Gordon, ed., Cambridge 
Companion to Primo Levi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 68.   
19 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 
36. 
20 Ibid., 39. Sonderkommando and capos were the prisoners who were pressed or 
socially pressured into serving as part of the camp structure and production of violence.    
21 Ibid., 42.   
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continued genocide of Tutsis and the genocide of Rwandan refugees. What 
happened in the latter case constitutes a hidden genocide in and of itself. Of 
the Rwandan refugees and armed actors present in eastern Zaïre, 233,000 
were systematically encircled and killed by Rwandan, Banyarwanda Tutsi 
and Banyamulenge soldiers.22   
Sensing Identities in a Vortex 
Speaking before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), Dragan Obrenović pleaded guilty to charges of torture 
and murder at Srebrenica in 1995. In describing his actions, he identified a 
“vortex”, dragging him into perpetration, “There was no choice. You could be 
either a soldier or a traitor . . . . We didn't even notice how we were drawn 
into the vortex of inter-ethnic hatred and how neighbours were no longer able 
to live beside each other, how death moved into the vicinity, and we didn't 
even notice that we had got used to it. Death became our reality.”23 
Obrenović recounts in his full statement how he was socialised and 
deterministically pulled towards mass violence. The vortex he describes 
overtook him and acted upon him; all structure, no agency. Yet, his brief 
eight-minute statement pulls together some key factors of self-perception, 
narratives of threat, and associated structures.24 This attribution to an 
encompassing vortex could still yield a compelling tool for describing the 
formation of identity in genocide if tested in a specific context. What role 
does self and group perception and actor narrative play in perpetration and 
identity formation? How do actors interact with and reproduce the structures 
around them? 
The heuristic device of a vortex is used in this dissertation to show 
how actor identities are formed, re-formed and layered. This process occurs 
                                            
22 Emizet F. Kisangani, “The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN 
Peacekeeping Failure and International Law,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 38, no. 
2 (2000): 178-179. 
23 The Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenović (IT-02-60/2), Guilty Plea Statement, 2003, 
accessed on 23 May 2018, from http://www.icty.org/en/sid/219.  
24 For example, Obrenović further notes the impact of war in destabilising 
communities, as well as the gender dynamics of male rites of passage, ‘it was normal for 
every man, every male child, to put on a uniform, take up a weapon, and go to protect his 
homeland, his nation, and ultimately his family. This was expected of him. This was his role, 
a sacred role,’ Ibid.  
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through exposure to, and participation in, multiple cases of genocide.25 
Considering the latter as a continuum of historical processes, they include, 
but are not limited to communal violence in Eastern Zaïre during the mid-
1990s, the Rwandan civil war and genocide, arrival of the Rwandan exodus 
in that same area in 1995, attacks on Congolese Tutsis in the Kivus, and the 
obliteration of Rwandan refugees from 1996 to 1997.26 Although the terminus 
point for this research is the attacks on refugees, after 1997 and up to the 
present, the features of genocide were still embedded in the participants’ 
view of their present realities. For RPF and AFDL actors, their narratives of 
insecurity interpreted these events.27 Actors deployed these narratives to 
articulate existential threat, as well as the intermediate space and the 
destructive crises they perceived around them.28 Understood as a vortex, this 
interplay of perception and environment is about more than a simplistic 
cyclical or deterministic story of genocide actors.29 It should be clear here, 
and throughout this dissertation, that this research is not an attempt at 
comparatively analysing genocides across space and time, but a limited case 
study of postcolonial genocide and identity formation. How else is this 
heuristic device used in studies of violence, and how might it be applied in 
this case study? 
A similar device is used by Randall Collins to describe upsurges in 
violence following violent victory. He describes a “tunnel” effect that captures 
a “frenzy” of violence or “overkill” that “is like a tunnel into which the 
                                            
25 Gérard Prunier also uses this term in specific reference to the emerging situation 
in Zaïre at the cusp of the outbreak of war, see Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, The 
Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford University Press, 
2009), 75-80.  
26 The notion of an “event” while quite nominal here, is developed later in the 
context of Gilles Deleuze’s approach to deep-level social analysis.  
27 See the Epilogue for a brief discussion on these dynamics and participants views 
of their current insecurity.   
28 In a likewise complex case of layered participation in mass violence, Karl Jacoby 
describes the “violent storm” surrounding the long-term build-up of a massacre of Apache 
during the 1870s. As a result of multi-generational experiences of violence, as both 
perpetrators and victims, Anglo-Americans, Mexicans, Tohono O’Odham Indians, 
participated in the execution of 150 unarmed Apaches. From underneath the apparent chaos 
of this event Jacoby draws out the narratives and structures at play in this case, Karl Jacoby, 
Shadows at Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the Violence of History (Penguin, 2009), 277-
278. 
29 The term vortex used incidentally in some genocide studies literature, but only 
adjectively, not utilising it as a full concept. Notable uses include Gregory Stanton’s original 
8 Stages of Genocide briefing paper presented to the State Department in 1996.  
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aggressors have fallen, entrained by their own emotional resonance with the 
reciprocal emotions and gestures of the fallen, strength egged on by 
weakness. Eventually the perpetrators emerge from the tunnel, sometimes 
not recognizing themselves in what they had done while they were inside 
it.”30 The propulsion of the tunnel is so encompassing, that violent actions 
consume actors until they abate. On a micro and interpersonal level, Collins 
sees less-violent “pathways” into and out of the tunnel, exemplified by 
“quarrelling” and “blustering”.31 While this interactive level of analysis 
presents a plausible model, it would require further development to address 
the meso and macro levels inherent to this case study. 
Deployed in a context of domestic violence, a vortex indicates the 
“increased intensity and decreased duration” of actor experiences. 
Continuous movement through violent acts shapes the self-perception of the 
actor and possible future action.32 Repeated, direct exposure to, and 
experiences of, genocide have an increasingly intense impact on identity. 
This layering builds and mingles an actor’s perpetrator and victim 
perceptions, including sensing these categories in the Self and the Other. In 
the particular case of the Rwandan refugees, we can see actors moving in 
and out of the vortex with each of the genocidal processes they experienced. 
Moving through the vortex, actors relied on interpretations of intermediate 
space using narratives of insecurity, thereby reshaping perception of the Self 
and Other.  
Perpetration in the genocide of Rwandan refugees was a result of 
these compounding movements. The mobilised Tutsi of the Great Lakes 
region would come to traverse multiple exposures to genocide. Previous 
experiences being at least victim or perpetrator oriented, formed the 
identities of these soldiers as they passed through the vortex. The vortex 
captures how the above features of genocide frame the movement of and 
change within actors and groups. At the centre of the vortex, experience with 
                                            
30 Randall Collins, Violence: A Micro-Sociology Theory (Princeton University Press, 
2009), 360; a similar notion is used by Christopher Browning: “euphoria of victory”, see The 
Origins of the Final Solution (Random House, 2014), 309-314. 
31 Collins, 361-367.   
32 Ann M. Carrington, “The Vortex of Violence: Moving Beyond the Cycle and 
Engaging Clients in Change,” British Journal of Social Work 44 (2014): 456-457.  
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genocide forms identity through performance. Use of this movement-oriented 
heuristic device offers a sense of how intense forces shape and compress 
identity and can perpetuate perceptions and involvement in genocide.  
Narrating Identities 
Narrative identity analysis is the methodology used in this study. This 
approach facilitates the understanding of how actors and groups perceive 
themselves and then perform these perceptions. This is a multiway process: 
the narratives we subscribe to, and those ascribed to us, and those we 
produce and reproduce. These all tell something about identities as 
perceptions and aspirations. To this end, I undertook a process of 
intersubjective interviews with Banyamulenge soldiers. Self-portrayal meant 
that these soldiers, and by some inference their Banyarwanda and Rwandan 
colleagues, were like the ship of Theseus. The accumulation of ascribed and 
subscribed identities proliferated as soldiers were exposed to the vortex of 
genocide. With each experience of genocide, powerful and new inward and 
outward looking identity planks were laid. The interview process provided a 
live, as it were, performative space for narrative presentation. Simply put, the 
stories we tell about ourselves shape who we are. 
 This dissertation attempts to continue the path constructed by prior 
researchers in assessing or seeking to understand violent actors through 
self-perception and narrative. These elements reflect the key dynamic of the 
Other: a distinction made about those around us, reflecting a 
conceptualisation and sensing of the Self. Foremost among these prior 
works is that by Christopher Browning as he retells the stories of so-called 
ordinary Germans, middle-class men who become the foot soldiers of the SS 
campaign against Jews on the eastern front.33 What made this piece of work 
such a significant contribution to perpetration studies was how it brought to 
life and contextualised of these violent actors.34 The analysed narratives offer 
                                            
33 The Order Police formed a significant presence in occupied Poland’s General 
Government, in 1942 these forces amounted to 15,186 responsible for policing the frontier of 
the Third Reich, see Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and 
the Final Solution in Poland (Harper Perennial: 1998), 6-8, 38-54. 
34 Timothy Williams and Susanne Buckley-Zistel eds. “Perpetrators and Perpetration 
of Mass Violence: An Introduction,” Perpetrators and Perpetration of Mass Violence: Action, 
Motivations and Dynamics (Routledge, 2018), 1.   
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a view into the dynamics of threat perception and identity construction of the 
Self and Other under extreme conditions. For Browning, this was not an 
exercise in excusing the actions and proclaimed thoughts of mass 
murderers, but an attempt at understanding these actors.35 Appreciating 
Levi’s gray zone, this research likewise captures and analyses how actors 
sense themselves and the Other.  
Narratives will be addressed herein as a series of layers. Foremost 
will be the above-noted narratives of insecurity expressed communally and 
individually by participants in their identified groups. A typology of narratives 
will cover the range of those expressed by participants. This will include the 
varied personal views of participants, and political and legal ones produced 
by the RPF and the AFDL. Here the postcolonial context is indeed king. Anti-
colonial identities and interpretations were a mainstay of RPF ideologies and 
formed the backbone of Banyamulenge training and worldviews. These were 
built into the AFDL and the encounter with genocidaires in the camps. 
Paradoxically, contemporary Rwanda’s legal and political narratives that 
sought to bring about a tribal-free haven, as described by Patrick, would 
reproduce and reorder colonial identities of Hutu and Tutsi. These would be 
shaped into new categories that fit the narratives of insecurity and the 
intermediate space in both Rwanda and eastern Zaïre. By seeking out and 
utilising the narratives of participants, it is the aim of this study to outline how 
identity is shaped and formed through this vortex-like process.  
Outline of Chapters 
The body of this dissertation proceeds in four parts: literature and theoretical 
considerations, and research methodology; historical background; narrative 
analysis; and, a conclusion. Chapter two reviews literature from the 
disciplines touching this work: genocide studies; sociological perspectives on 
performance; Great Lakes area studies; and, civil war participation. These 
sections address views that advocate a process-centred approach to actor 
identity formation and participation in mass violence. This literature review 
will also address some non-field-based sources of data for this largely 
                                            
35 Browning, xx.   
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historical study. An overview of humanitarian, journalistic, and existing actor 
accounts will be given. Although much is already known about this case 
study, an overarching narrative in the context of genocide is yet to be deeply 
explored. A process-related research question is then posed that will guide 
discussion in the next chapter. 
 Chapter three addresses with greater depth the theoretical framing of 
this study. It develops the critique of some elements of genocide studies 
raised in chapter two. A discussion of relational approaches to genocide and 
identity formation uses Christopher Powell and Nick Crossley’s distinct but 
complementary approaches to relational sociology. The individual features of 
genocide are further defined and discussed and put into the context of the 
proposed heuristic tool of the vortex, with an accompanying diagram (see 
Figure 2). Overall, this case and the processes tracked in the vortex retain a 
measure of messiness and entanglement that cannot be unravelled by this 
type of intersubjective study.  
 Chapter four gives an overview of the narrative analysis approach 
used in this study. Foremost is Caroline Riessman’s schema of 
intersubjectivity from interviewee to researcher, and Margaret Somers’ 
narrative typology. The latter captures the layers of narrative produced by 
groups and individual actors, including myself as re-interpreter of 
participants’ narratives. An account of ethical and practical considerations 
and outcomes of the fieldwork is discussed. An assessment of the interview 
process and the challenges faced is given. Interviewed participants include 
actors who are former RPF and AFDL soldiers, as well as political actors. 
These all identified themselves as Banyamulenge. Additional persons were 
interviewed, offering a personal recollection of these events as UN 
employees or journalists.  
 Chapter five presents the historical background to the case. Laid out 
in this chapter is an outline of events and trajectories from the colonial period 
to the attacks on the refugees in the camps from 1996 to 1997. This chapter 
traces the distinct and later intertwining paths of RPF, and Banyarwanda 
Tutsi and Banyamulenge history. In particular, the features of destructive 
crises and intermediate space structure this historical background. Chapter 
six is dedicated to the notion of double genocide and a mapping of 
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interpretations of RPF violence. Dirk Moses’ development of the concept of 
the terror of history is discussed and applied to the RPF’s framing of 
genocide, creating a perpetual narrative of insecurity. The construction of 
RPF memory is framed an aegis of atrocity, granting specific dividends and 
protections. 
 Chapters seven and eight present the narrative analysis portion. The 
detail from the participant voices is structured by the outline of historical 
background from chapter five. Chapter seven starts with some fractured 
narratives from existing literature, including those of Bosco Ntaganda and 
Laurent Nkunda. Discussion moves into Banyamulenge males as they 
interpreted the intermediate space of their parents and themselves as young 
persons in Mobutu’s Zaïre. Their recruitment and training with the RPF, from 
1990 to 1994 is then traced, as well as the impact of their exposure to 
genocide in 1994 Rwanda. The chapter follows these soldiers into the 
formation and early movements of the AFDL. The relational and physical 
networks formed in this period, prior to the attacks on Rwandan refugees, 
are assessed. These gave shape and identification to the notion of the 
genocidaire.  
Chapter eight picks up this re-constructed narrative with the 
destruction of the Mugunga refugee camp, which led to the massive return of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees. Some further concepts are introduced 
around space, violence and refugee camps. Additionally, a reflection on the 
numbers of refugees disappeared and/or killed is included, along with a brief 
note on the dynamics of disease and hunger in this case. Banyamulenge 
soldier narratives are followed into the southern front from Kamanyola (South 
Kivu) to Kinshasa. The northern front from Goma (North Kivu) to Mbandaka 
(Equateur) is also traced, relying not on participant accounts, but on a variety 
of other actor and humanitarian witnesses. Both fronts demonstrate a distinct 
pattern of violence against the perceived genocidaire. The documented 
encounter of the genocidaire by these AFDL and RPA soldiers is central to 
this chapter. Trajectories of RPF violence into AFDL trends are then 
assessed and considered in terms of purpose and meaning.  
 The concluding chapter addresses a summary of the arguments, 
narratives, and the vortex of genocide. Furthermore, the theme of narratives 
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is explored briefly in terms of potential next steps for this research, by 
considering what place narratives hold for transforming perceptions of 
conflict in eastern Congo. The epilogue gives a glimpse into the story that the 
participants wanted to tell beyond their RPF and AFDL days. This brief note 
discusses the people and places that came to symbolise, for Banyamulenge 
actors, the present threat of genocide. The spectre of the genocidaire was 
raised in the ashes of 1994 Rwanda, and continues to haunt and challenge 
how this group sees and frames their contentious present.  
* * * 
If killing is a strange flowering of identity, then it is the purpose of this work to 
understand the historical, political and sociological processes RPF 
Banyamulenge soldiers were involved in.36 This group is recognised as 
participants in the obliteration of Rwandan refugees from 1996 to 1997. Like 
Theseus’ ship, they underwent a set of exposures and experiences that 
shaped and formed their identity beyond who they were when they left South 
Kivu in the early 1990s. The traditional labels of victims or perpetrators, and 
even self-identifications as such, are not sufficient to capture this fluidity of 
identity.  
                                            
36 The notion of identity as an outcome of violence is from Donald Bloxham, 
“Working on Perpetration: Do We Need to Justify It?” Encountering Perpetrators of Mass 
Killings, Political Violence and Genocide, 1-3 September 2015, University of Winchester.   
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Chapter II: Towards a Processual and Relational Account of Genocide 
Introduction 
This literature review aims to assess the knowledge gaps at the intersection 
of genocide studies and Congo area studies.1 There is a disparity in 
explanations of how identity is formed within genocidal processes that led to 
the destruction of Rwandan refugees in the First Congolese War.2 This case 
study is demarcated by the first international report by Robert Gersony 
investigating the attacks on displaced persons camps within post-genocide 
Rwanda and the conclusion of the First Congo War with Kabila taking power 
in Kinshasa, in May 1997.3  The label of genocide has been successively 
applied by various UN commissioned reports and debated by various 
scholars, but little further attention has been paid to the actual processes of 
destruction, the factors of perpetration, and the process of identity 
construction in genocide.4 It is the aim of this review to generate a question 
that will help fill these knowledge gaps: by what processes did genocide in 
the Great Lakes region produce socially constructed identities for AFDL/RPA 
soldiers? 
 Considering the breadth of literature and fields applicable to this topic, 
the following clusters of literature will be briefly examined in order to 
understand current trajectories: genocide studies; a selection of philosophical 
and sociological approaches to identity using Anthony Giddens and Judith 
Butler; area studies in the Great Lakes region; and, civil war participation. An 
assessment of relevant NGO and humanitarian reports, and existing actor 
accounts on the period of 1994 to 1997 will be included.  
                                            
1 Due to the appellative transition of this country, the label Congo will be used for 
general purposes, but chronological references will be made to “Zaïre” from 1971 to July 
1997, and then the “Democratic Republic of the Congo” (DRC) from July 1997 onwards. 
2 The first war is typically characterised as starting in the summer of 1996 with the 
formation of the AFDL through to the arrival of Laurent D. Kabila in Kinshasa in May of 1997, 
see Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), 47, 57; Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of 
Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (Public Affairs, 2011), 
165-168.  
3
 Prunier, 5-17. 
4Adam Jones refers to this case “intensely little-studied”, see Adam Jones, 
Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 3rd ed. (Routledge, 2017), 488.  
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Genocide Studies 
Both Dirk Moses and Christopher Powell discuss genocide in terms of its 
liberal and post-liberal trajectories.5 The liberal perspective emphasises the 
individual agent intent and takes the politically negotiated limitations of the 
UNCG as a framework for assessing when and where cases of physical 
destruction are valid or not.6 The post-liberal perspective draws from 
Raphael Lemkin’s notion of broader social group destruction. This school of 
thought attempts to reclaim the sociological roots of Lemkin’s study of a wide 
range of genocides.7 Powell claims that a group is destroyed as an 
“emergent social structure, irreducible to the individuals who make it up. 
Genocide is the murder or destruction of this structure. Thus genocide might 
or might not involve any actual homicide.”8 The possibility of non-physical 
destruction gives the post-liberal view a chief point of departure from the 
liberal perspective. He adds that genocide must be an “essentially contested 
concept”, meaning that there may well be feasible arguments for different 
definitions, and that any appeal to history is done in order to identify “events 
that produced and sustain a classifying practice.”9 The crux of genocide as a 
sociological concept is one based on the “identity-difference relation of 
violent obliteration . . . because social groups do not exist in themselves but 
are constituted as social identities connected by relations of difference.”10 
The post-liberal perspective serves to open up genocide as a concept of 
social group destruction, beyond the legal, liberal view, to accept cases of 
civil wars, colonial oppression and the targeting of political and cultural 
groups. Scott Straus’ work demonstrates an assessment genocide through 
                                            
5 Christopher Powell, “What do Genocides Kill? A Relational Concept of Genocide,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 4 (2007): 528; A. Dirk Moses, “Conceptual blockages 
and definitional dilemmas in the “racial century”: genocides of indigenous peoples and the 
Holocaust,” Patterns of Prejudice 26, no. 4 (2002): 19-20.  
6 A recent example includes Benjamin Madley, An American Genocide: The United 
States and the California Indian Catastrophe, 1846-1873 (Yale University Press, 2016). 
Madley’s book won the 2017 L.A. Times Book Prize, as well as field-specific 2017 Raphael 
Lemkin Book Award. 
7 Steven L. Jacobs, “The papers of Raphael Lemkin: a First look,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 1, no. 1 (1999): 109-111; McDonnell and Moses, 502. 
8 Powell, 528. 
9 Powell, Barbaric civilization: A Critical Sociology of Genocide (McGill Queen’s 
University Press: 2011), 66-70. 
10 Ibid., 84.   
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the group-selective destruction. What he refers to as “mass categorical 
violence” draws attention to the targeting of “groups as inherently dangerous, 
uncontainable, and unwinnable.”11 Using this conception, he suggests a data 
set of group-selective and non-group-selective cases of mass violence and 
genocide.12 
Embedded in the genealogy of genocide scholarship is the work of 
Zygmunt Bauman, whose approach foreshadows the post-liberal view. He 
offers some generalisations, albeit Holocaust-centred, about genocide and 
modernity.13 Any given programme of social improvement, when endowed 
with unbridled power could create levels of destruction intended to purify and 
cleanse society.14 Bauman succinctly describes this destruction as another 
“face” of modernity; the “ingredients” of the Holocaust were integral to 
modern society.15 Genocide is an integral part of modernity. However, 
drawing this discussion back to the nuances of an account of individual 
action Bauman’s critique breaks down, because, according to Powell, he 
resorts to a moral “essentialism”. Individuals are inherently pre-programmed 
moral agents that are able to choose, sociologically speaking, between an 
objective, universal right and wrong.16 This position then mystifies how the 
agents of modernity can act in such destructive concert if the good or evil of 
their actions is so apparent. Either modernity is so blinding in its ability to turn 
ordinary men into willing executioners, expunging human agency, or both 
humanity and modernity are so flawed to frequently resort to genocide 
without any reasoning whatsoever. Powell argues that the morality of 
engaging in genocide is far more subjective.17 In the mind of the social agent, 
actions can then be moralised as right or wrong, making genocide 
permissible. Bauman’s macro perspective presents an easy parsing of actors 
                                            
11 Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations: The Origins and Dynamics of 
Genocide in Contemporary Africa (Cornell University Press, 2015), 17-18.    
12 Ibid., 89-122.  
13 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of enlightenment: philosophical 
enlightenment (Stanford University Press, 2002), xiv. 
14 Christopher Powell, “Genocide Moralities: A Critique,” in New Directions in 
Genocide Research, edited by Adam Jones (Routledge, 2012), 76-95; see also Jacques 
Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (2009).  
15 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 8.   
16 Powell, “Genocide Moralities,” 40-41.   
17 Ibid.  
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as either victims or perpetrators, without accounting for the discrete 
reasoning that renders moral decision-making integral to identity formation. 
In the case of the RPF state, this simple distinction facilitates specific 
memorialisation and exclusion of elements of Rwandan society. Similarly, the 
RPF rejects alternative historical interpretations as derivative of genocidaire 
propaganda or colonial divisionism as failed modernity.    
 Martin Shaw goes further in how genocide is limited by the liberal 
conception and its application. By using intent as a discursive end, genocide 
is not fully utilised as a broad sociological ideal type. Shaw seeks to reframe 
intent as the starting point.18 The argument here is for a structural account 
that acknowledges the trend of “degenerative warfare” in intra and inter-state 
violent conflict, and the primary targeting of civilians.19 Powell’s relational 
concept of genocide supports Shaw’s distinction of a structural approach as 
“a recurring pattern of social conflict, characterized by particular kinds of 
relationships between actors, and with typical connections to other conflict 
structures in society.”20 The key relation then is between those engaged in 
destructive actions and civilians as the targets of such actions, and the 
process of identity-difference and social group construction of the Other. 
Despite this emerging node of consensus, a theoretical framework for actor 
identity in genocide has yet to follow the conceptual epiphany of the post-
liberal view.21  
 Missing from this relational account is a theoretical underpinning as to 
how victim and perpetrator identities are formed. Additionally, does a 
relational account allow for micro level analysis of the social actor? 
Consequently, this understanding may not be sufficient to explain how 
individuals or groups move from overlapping environments and experiences 
into developing unique self-perceptions. Is there a layering of identity that 
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can occur when persons are subject to forms of mass trauma and violence, 
and then participate in such actions themselves? What is the role of actor 
agency in the variations of this scenario? These questions require a deeper 
response, beyond that of genocide studies.  
Two Philosophical Approaches to Identity: Performativity and Agency 
Judith Butler’s work on gender identity and performativity serves as a brief, 
but crucial, point of reference to a much wider body of ontological work on 
gender and personhood. Butler uses Foucault’s approach to structure and 
power as a departure point for how identity is formed by judicial systems.22 
Butler’s discussion offers some parallel points of valuable comparison when 
thinking about the production of victim and perpetrator identities. Genocide 
studies often constructs identities without rigor and to satisfy the need for 
clear intent and victim-oriented justice. This is often done to understand 
who’s who and offering deceptively concise explanations of a given case.23  
The gendering of actors occurs across the spectrum of international 
and local contexts of any given case. The Congo holds its own unique 
traditions and productions of gender identities that have evolved and been 
disrupted over time.24 The gendering of actors in genocide and the Congo 
has been treated in a variety of different ways. The high prevalence of sexual 
violence further entrenches the gendering of the battlefield through 
assumptions about male combatants/perpetrators, and female victims, 
missing the feminising of opponents by using rape as a weapon of war. 
Studies also show that there is no exclusive determination of women as 
victims and men as perpetrators, despite the chorus labelling the Congo as 
the “rape capital of the world” and “the worst place in the world to be a 
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23 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge University Press, 
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woman”.25 According to Paula Drumond, militias and soldiers in the Congo 
use sexual violence target men almost as frequently as they do women.26 
Research among soldiers in the Congo also reports an internationally higher 
incidence of female recruits.27 Any binary gendering of female victims and 
male perpetrators is increasingly being abandoned in fields of peace, conflict 
and gender studies; however, these brandings of identity remain central to 
popular discourse and news media reporting.28 
Butler offers some clear tools for how we can start to understand not 
only gender identities, but also genocide identities, “The consequence of 
such sharp disagreements about the meaning of gender . . . establishes the 
need for a radical rethinking of the categories of identity within the context of 
relations of radical gender asymmetry.”29 For Butler, discussion and analysis 
of identity has to transcend debate and be grounded in social relations. 
Identity is created through performance, agency, thought and action. This 
produces culturally significant personages with salient transformative 
qualities. She notes, “gender’s performative character and the performative 
possibilities for proliferating gender configurations outside the restricting 
frames of masculinist domination and compulsory heterosexuality.”30 As with 
gender, actor identity within genocidal processes is at once relational, 
structural, performative and fluid.  
 Anthony Giddens offers a structural approach to the social agent, 
through a micro level account of action that can be then built-up to an 
analysis of macro level interaction. Central is the “social agent” as a vehicle 
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for knowledge and capability.31 Knowledge amalgamates individual 
reflexivity, purposiveness, and intentionality.32 His discussion of intent takes 
attempts at moving past dolus specialis in genocide studies beyond the need 
to define the inner thoughts of a single perpetrator, let alone the hundreds of 
people it takes to execute the vast structures employed in any destructive 
process.33 Whilst there is a distinction between intentional and unintentional 
acts, the result is still dependent on agency. Giddens states that “the 
consequences of what actors do, intentionally or unintentionally, are events 
which would not have happened if that actor had behaved differently, but 
which are not within the scope of the agent’s power to have brought about 
(regardless of what the agents intentions were),” whereas capability includes 
the social agent’s power relations and self-perceived “choice”.34 Adam 
Jones, in a brief survey of structural violence and genocide, argues that 
structures are an extension of collective consequences of agent action that 
can create genocidal processes where one can determine a “short causal 
chain”.35 This establishes genocide as an outcome of action with or without 
specific intent to destroy a group.36 Giddens’ structural social agent and 
Butler’s performativity offer some ontological possibilities for conceptualising 
the identity of actors in genocidal process not yet offered by genocide 
studies.  
Nick Crossley’s work on relational sociology offers a further venture 
into Giddens' above contribution. Relational sociology itself articulates a 
middle path through the dichotomies of individualism and holism, structure 
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and agency.37 Crossley defines his approach as an analysis of actors and 
environments through their relations and constitutive networks. He rejects 
the notion of prime movers in both individualism and holism.38 This bridges 
important gaps for genocide studies in the structure and agency dichotomy, 
framing agency as “initiative and intelligence of purposive actors” and 
structure as “constraints and opportunities”.39 The vital contribution of 
relational sociology to this research is that within figurations and networks, 
identities are shaped by actors and the social worlds they create. Relational 
sociology, therefore, “posits that individuals, or rather actors are formed and 
continually re-formed in and through interaction . . . , certainly the actor will 
take on different identities in their interaction with others, as the demands of 
situations vary”.40 Identity, as highlighted by Butler, is performative and fluid. 
In many senses, this view can liberate analysis of actors in genocide from set 
characterisations of perpetrator and victim.  
Area Studies in the Great Lakes Region 
The literature trail following Rwandan genocide and the Congolese wars is 
extensive and spreads across several fields. This review will offer some 
connections between scholars that lead in this area: Mahmood Mamdani, 
Gérard Prunier, Filip Reyntjens, René Lemarchand, Jean-Claude Willame, 
and the continuing work of Jason Stearns. Congolese scholars, Georges 
Nzongola-Ntalaja, Emizet F. Kisangani, T Y Okosun and Naupess Kibiswa 
will be mentioned, as they have tackled discussion of the claims of genocide 
in the Congo.  
 Mamdani’s When Victims become Killers is a seminal monograph in 
post-genocide Rwandan research that accounts for the emergent conflict in 
the Congo. The colonial legacy in the region is one of citizenship and land 
rights that became highly contested politically, and were used in the 
construction of postcolonial elites. Mamdani critiques regional area studies 
for academic tribalism, with scholars not willing to work across 
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epistemological boundaries, and of the propensity of area studies to present 
supposed fact without any reference to or framing of theory.41 With the rise of 
the wars in the Congo, and the mass of popular, journalistic, and scholarly 
accounts, many still fall into the trap that Mamdani observed. Few scholars 
have borrowed from emerging thought in genocide studies, as described 
above, and many rely on the citation of fact without clear demonstration of 
theoretical framework.  
 Both Prunier and Reyntjens offer a critical narrative of the 
AFDL/RPF’s culpability in mass crimes, but do not utilise much in the way of 
theoretical analysis of the destruction and mass violence perpetrated by this 
alliance of political convenience. Prunier classifies the attacks on Rwanda 
Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians in the eastern Congo as systematic 
and political, and spends but a few pages discussing the findings of both 
Robert Gersony and Roberto Garretón’s reports.42 Reyntjens’ major work on 
the conflict, The Great African War, likewise dedicates several pages to the 
refugee “massacres”.43  
Lemarchand, whose work pioneered analysis of the 1972 genocide in 
Burundi, has likewise offered little in terms of addressing the claims of 
genocide and the possible processes that contributed to the destruction of 
groups from 1996 to 1997. In National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st 
Century, he describes this violence as “xenophobic” and “ethnic”.44 However, 
in recent co-authored work with Reyntjens he provides a concise narrative of 
the destruction of refugee camps and the rise of the AFDL in the eastern 
Congo. The story told here offers a coherent rendering of the events in the 
context of applicable theory classifying the violence.45 Frameworks that can 
assess the micro level social actor participation in such processes are 
lacking from these area studies perspectives.  
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Offering the most in-depth history of the Banyamulenge group is 
Willame’s Banyarwanda et Banyamulenge. Willame, a Congo-based Belgian 
scholar, possess both an extensive bibliography and a specialised 
perspective on the dynamics of violence and identity. This work brings in a 
detailed accounting of the historical processes that are key to this research, 
such as the emergence of Banyamulenge political consciousness, exclusion 
from democratisation, and persecution under Mobutu.46 
Jason Stearns, a humanitarian worker turned author and scholar, 
makes a distinct appeal to theory and robust fieldwork in addressing the 
intractability of the conflict in the Congo. His Dancing in the Glory of 
Monsters (a publication more aimed at popular consumption) came with a 
theory-lite approach, giving an overview of events from 1994 to present in 
the Congo conflict, “through the eyes of its protagonists” on both an elite and 
grassroots level.47 Stearns’ recent work was facilitated through the Rift Valley 
Institute’s (RVI) Usalama Project and the Congo Research Group. These 
examine the Congolese conflict and the dynamics of participation and 
intractability.48 A recent report discusses and frames the interviews of 265 
conflict participants, taking an inductive approach and works through existing 
theories of conflict intractability and causality. Stearns observes, “existing 
assessments often lack the methodological rigour that characterises cross-
country comparisons and fail to take on board insights from qualitative 
methods, in particular process-tracing and comparative analysis, which can 
be useful when dealing with complex causation within a single case.”49 
Considering the similarity here to Mamdani’s caveat from over 10 years ago, 
this reflects poorly on the progression (or lack thereof) within Great Lakes 
region area studies to incorporating theory and findings from other fields.   
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 Congolese scholars Kisangani, Nzongola, Okosun and Kibiswa add to 
this emerging case study, utilising existing IGO/NGO evidence and 
international law to discuss the claims of genocide during the period in 
question.50 Not only do these authors represent scholarly perspective from 
the region, but they tackle in more detail what Kisangani calls the “systematic 
and deliberate killing” of 233,000 refugees and AFDL/RPF opponents. He 
does this by tracking the range of refugee numbers that were declared as 
missing, and were dispersed further westward into the Congo by the 
AFDL/RPF. He observes that increasing numbers of refugees never arrived 
at the next displacement camp.51 His narrative examines the evidence 
brought forward by years of humanitarian reporting of such massacres and 
the processes involved in identifying targets (by both gender selectivity and 
perceived ethnicity), and herding and obliterating them.52 Nzongola, in his 
widely referenced history of the Congo, briefly addresses the attacks on the 
refugees and the process of building the AFDL. Although these attacks are 
described as unverified “acts of genocide”, this is in the context of transition 
of power from Mobutu to Kabila.53 Further research and theory is still needed 
to pinpoint by what process Banyamulenge Tutsis and existing soldiers in the 
RPF engaged in these processes of destruction, and what constituted these 
processes in the context of identity formulation.  
 This is not to say that the fields of study engaged in analysis of the 
Congo over the last twenty years are totally devoid of theoretically justified 
research, and even if that were the case, a far more exhaustive literature 
review would be required to substantiate this claim. Ruddy Doom takes a 
more balanced approach with field knowledge, narrative and theory-based 
framework. Discussing the intersections of identity, violence and global 
systems, Doom establishes that are layers of analysis should consider the 
rise of anti-system movements, movements that rejected global systems 
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during the Cold War period and in the era of US hegemony, or that have 
responded during the political and economic transition between the two.54 
Also relevant are forces and groups that have embraced elements of 
globalisation, including global culture and the emerging economics of warfare 
through looting and plundering natural resources. In the case of the Congo 
wars, foreign interveners (such as Uganda and Rwanda) extracted natural 
resource wealth to cover the cost of involvement, domestic economic 
development, and continued support of militia violence in the eastern 
provinces.55 Attempts at assessing the Congo wars have in part offered 
explanation with fact and theory; however, it is the work of Prunier and 
Reyntjens that makes the largest impact on popular discourse and external 
political actors. Work from the likes of Stearns and Doom is only recently 
managing to breakthrough into mainstream academia and policy.56  
Civil War and Participation 
The capacity of wider civil war and conflict studies does offer a more robust 
theoretical framing of interviews and grassroots level perspectives. Civil war 
studies presents to others, such as genocide studies, the missing elements 
of micro-level analysis and contextualizing cases with local patterns of 
violence rather than a schema of genocidal steps.57 A foremost example is 
the work of Danny Hoffman on the civil war in Sierra Leone. Hoffman utilises 
materialist global systems analysis from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to 
analyse the absorption of labour in violent conflict and global capital.58 In this 
environment, violence is commoditized into the production of politics, identity, 
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and material and social goods.59 Hoffman demonstrates that a 
comprehensive theoretical approach can be brought to bear on qualitative 
interview data.  
 Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein argue that particular 
theories can shed such light on otherwise entangled and seemingly 
indecipherable political violence and armed conflict. Ironically, a broad 
approach to theory is required in order to present sharpened analysis of a 
given case or comparison. Reviewing existing thought on motivation, 
mobilisation, and continued participation, these authors generated multiple 
hypotheses in order to make a specific deductive theory about involvement in 
the Sierra Leonean civil war.60 By claiming that social sanctions, grievances 
and incentives were influential in mobilisation and participation in the 
different groups of conflict participants, they were able to critique the 
contemporary analyses that are more theoretically homogeneous.61 Such 
findings enable a conclusion that advocates localised analysis of recruitment 
and larger socio-economic and political factors, therefore any inductive or 
deductive approach to understanding a given conflict require balanced use of 
theory, local contextual factors and robust participant data.  
Stathis Kalyvas goes even further by pointing to micro-level dynamics. 
While Kalyvas’ “master cleavages” may present options for networks and 
identities to form, and the mobilisation of identity labels in conflict, the “mix of 
identities and actions” on the ground are far more significant in the use of 
violence.62 Kalyvas’ extensive work on civil war dynamics and participation 
are addressed throughout this dissertation. They indicate a preference for 
the fluidity and relational aspects already advocated above. His work is a 
response to that of prior trends in civil war studies, including notable 
contributions by Paul Collier and Mary Kaldor.63 Although addressing distinct 
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views, these perspectives draw attention away from the micro-level dynamics 
important to this research and use of individual and group narratives.  
An important trend in recent civil war studies is evidenced by Straus’ 
work. In Making and Unmaking Nations, he argues for the analysis of elite 
level discourse to provide a more robust picture of genocidal tipping points of 
civil war. Straus departs from the trajectory of earlier micro-level analysis of 
convicted Rwandan perpetrators.64 This elite turn distracts from the 
assessment of under-researched cases through a micro-level analysis, like 
the one chosen for this research. In doing so Kalyvas’ accepted notion of 
avoiding master cleavages is abandoned. Another example of this trend is in 
recent work crucial to a developing understanding of the making and then 
breaking of the AFDL. Philip Roessler and Harry Verhoeven’s meticulously 
researched book, Why Comrades go to War, on the AFDL as an African 
liberation movement, presents a series of interviews with notable actors from 
the movement, as well as Congolese, Rwandan and other partners.65 In 
many ways, this book presents a somewhat shallow analytical replication of 
the ideological liberation stance expressed by many elite level participants. 
Again, they rely on master cleavages to explain a broad movement with 
multiple actors, most of whom are not represented by elite interviews.66  
Straddling genocide and civil war studies is recent work by Max 
Bergholz on the local dynamics of violence in the Kulen Vakuf region, during 
the World War Two Croatian state. Taking a “thicker” level of analysis, he 
claims that “endogenous” factors drive participation in violence and 
massacre.67 Rejecting master cleavages, as does Kalyvas, Bergholz seeks 
to uncover the dynamics of social relations and how identity is formed 
through violence, and perpetuated by the same, “How do identities and 
social relations change in the midst of such violent conflict?”68 According to 
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his critique of studies examining the causes of such violence, this question 
remains significantly under-addressed. Similar to Bergholz’s work is that of 
Kieran Mitton. His study examines participation in the Sierra Leone civil war 
and atrocities against civilians by rival factions. Mitton examines and 
identifies the relational and identity journeys of child soldiers. In a rejection of 
Collier’s greed or grievance thesis and “new barbarism”, Mitton posits that 
participation in violence for these young soldiers (who were in many cases 
pressed or abducted into service) was a result of a complex matrix of 
rationality, shame, disgust and brutalisation.69 The model proposed by 
Mitton’s field-based, semi-structured interviews with soldiers, offers a similar 
one to that pursued in this research.  
 Recent studies on participation in violence in the Congo demonstrate 
this format of qualitative evidence and theory on a micro-level. Joanne 
Richards examines the dynamics of coerced and voluntary recruitment in the 
context of social and economic endowments held by the Mai-Mai militias.70 
The traditional greed, grievance and opportunity theories are critiqued for a 
lack of clear definitions of coercion and an over-abundance of “anecdotal 
evidence”.71 Richards offers some helpful definitions and tailored theory used 
to decipher ex-combatant interviews. Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, 
discussing the participation of men and women recruited into the Congolese 
armed forces, note how actors were often recruited from deprived 
circumstances. They saw their commission of violence as an opportunity to 
secure economic and social power.72 Such studies utilise the voices and self-
perceptions of participants in the process of establishing fresh, combined 
theoretical approaches. Furthermore, they take into account the 
underappreciated gender identity and role aspects of soldiering and violence 
in Congolese conflicts.  
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Humanitarian Reporting and International Law Perspectives 
The international humanitarian reporting mill has no end of synthesised data, 
collated by researchers on the ground often within months of atrocities being 
committed. These are certainly not without strong bias and institutional 
agenda. Reports can be elevated or suppressed in tandem with international 
politicking, especially within the UN itself. Likewise, Humanitarian NGOs are 
subject to their own internal perspectives, constraints and outside pressures. 
Considering the historical nature of the First Congo War, a vast mound of 
reporting was produced with its own controversy. From the previously-
mentioned Gersony Report to the 2010 UNHCR Mapping Report, contention 
has largely been due to the ongoing nature of the conflict and the complicity 
of regional powers, and their international allies, in the fighting itself. 
Prominent within UN reporting are also the various documents and oral 
testimony by Chilean lawyer Roberto Garretón. The common thread 
throughout these reports is that atrocities committed in the Congo do 
constitute crimes against humanity, genocide being one of them.  
The 2010 Mapping Report makes this claim with the most distinction 
to date, but with the caveat of a requisite “full judicial investigation” in order to 
justify their initial, albeit detailed findings.73 The report also states that the 
uncertainty of intent on the part of AFDL/RPA to destroy Hutu groups would 
probably lead to a failure in proving genocide took place.74 However, this 
statement must be seen in a context of an international community with a 
political and legal system where assessments are limited by political, state 
negotiation and established international law, and years of case law from the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ad-hoc courts. Any legal decision on the 
measure of intent and whether or not claims of genocide are valid is perhaps 
not as important here, as the fact that these claims are based on over a 
decade’s worth of documented evidence.  
Other UN documentation that acted as a prelude to the massive 
project of the Mapping Report, includes Roberto Garretón’s investigation 
from 1997. From 1998 to 2009, these findings were widely reported to both 
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the UN Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice.75 
Despite the hampered nature of the investigation, this work was able to 
uncover massacres of Rwandan refugees, and offer explanations for the 
mass graves that consistently emerged as aid agencies were allowed back 
into areas where the camps had been violently emptied.  
As a continuance of the initial work conducted by UNHCR in the 
Mapping Report, Spanish Judge Andreu Merelles conducted a series of 
witness interviews, including some of those listed below, focusing on 
survivors of the camps and RPF dissidents.76 Most witnesses cited in this 
indictment of RPF and RPA leaders are anonymous, and used herein 
cautiously and as they complement other sources. The indictment lists the 
names of 40 current or former Rwandan officials responsible for committing 
crimes against Spanish nationals, and Rwandan and Congolese citizens.77 
Despite the potency of this document, it is overly broad in its reach and 
therefore its claims require further verification that is beyond the scope of this 
work. 
 Human Rights Watch reports also rank among the most prolific and 
detailed in highlighting and documenting atrocity in the Congo from 1995 to 
1997. In addition to the Mapping Report, these documents form the evidence 
base for varied claims about the involvement and level of political violence in 
the Congo.78 Cautiously using this grouping of reports a deeper picture can 
                                            
75 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report on the situation of human 
rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaïre), submitted by the Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with Commission resolution 1997/58, 
E/CN.4/1998/65, (30 January 1998); United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the joint 
mission charged with investigating allegations of massacres and other human rights 
violations occurring in eastern Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) since 
September 1996, A/51/942 (2 July 1997); United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 
Report on the mission carried out at the request of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
between 25 and 29 March 1997 to the area occupied by rebels in eastern Zaire, 
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2 (2 April 1997); United Nations, Security Council, Report of the 
Secretary-General's Investigative Team charged with investigating serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/1998/581, (29 June 1998). 
76 Commentator, “The Spanish Indictment of High-ranking Rwandan Officials,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 6 (2008): 1003-1011.  
77 Juzgado Central De Instrucción No. 4' Audiencia Nacional, Sumario 3120008 - D, 
Madrid, 6 February 2008.  
78 Scott Campbell, “What is Kabila hiding? Civilian Killings and Impunity in the 
Congo,” vol. 9, no. 5a, October 1997, access from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/c/congo/congo97o97o.pdf.  
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be built around the controversial claims made by the Mapping Report of 
specific cases of genocide. A brief overview of participant studies and these 
humanitarian reports reveal an absence of work done within this period. This 
may well be a result of the continued conflict and politically sensitive nature 
of how these claims were to be addressed, especially for Rwanda. Alison 
Des Forges’ seminal book on the Rwandan genocide also documents early 
trends in RPF violence from the civil war through to the post-genocide 
period.79 
 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) similarly have documented the 
attacks on the refugees through extensive field reports and interviews with 
personnel on the ground at the time. The core report includes a cataloguing 
of interviews from their Speaking Out series, entitled, The Hunting and Killing 
of Rwandan Refugees in Zaire-Congo: 1996-1997. This massive document 
integrates the pitfalls of delivering aid in the combat zones of this period, and 
the combination of structural (starvation because of blocking aid) and direct 
violence (the cordoning to camps, emptying them with gunfire, and the 
execution of suspected genocidaires).80 A journal publication written by two 
MSF staff also documents the violence against the refugees from 1996 to 
1997. This piece echoes some of the above humanitarian pieces in its 
content, and draws from field experiences.81 
 Various news media articles are referenced and originate with a core 
group of reporters active in the Congo at the time. Foremost among these 
was New York Times reporter Howard French. Most of his articles are 
included in a book covering this period: A Continent for the Taking. Other 
newspapers include both US-based outlets, and some African-based ones. 
Also reporting in the area at the time was Judi Rever. Her recent book In 
Praise of Blood, takes another long view of the trajectory and history of RPF 
violence. Although heavily based on interviews with RPF/A dissidents, her 
work offers a credible and well-evidenced accounting for violence otherwise 
                                            
79 Alison Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda (Human 
Rights Watch, 1999).   
80 Médecins Sans Frontières, “The Hunting and Killing of Rwandan Refugees in 
Zaïre-Congo: 1996-1997,” in MSF Speaks Out, September (2013).   
81 Jean-Hervé Bradol and Anne Guibert, “The time of the killers and the 
humanitarian space, Rwanda, Kivu, 1994-1997,” Herodotus: Review of the geopolitics of 
agriculture 86-87 (1997): 116-149. 
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denied by Kigali and its allies.82 The interviews in this book are an important 
contribution to this case study, although these are only used as reference to 
support claims made in narratives analysed in this dissertation. Another utility 
of Rever’s study is that she interviews several of the anonymous witnesses 
cited in the above-noted Spanish indictment.  
Actor Accounts 
Aside from this dissertation’s fieldwork with self-identified AFDL/RPA 
Banyamulenge soldiers, existing accounts from this group are limited. As 
with Rever’s book, many published first-hand accounts of RPF violence in 
both Rwanda and Congo are by dissidents or survivors.83 Notable former 
RPF voices include that of Theogene Rudasingwa, 1990s Rwanda 
ambassador to the UN, now in exile in the US. His book, Healing a Nation, 
represents the political dissident view once shared by the external opposition 
group Rwandan National Congress (RNC).84 Books by other dissidents 
include former Rwandan Prosecutor General and RNC member Gerald 
Gahima, Transitional Justice in Rwanda, and the controversial book by the 
deceased RPF intelligence operative Abdul Ruzibiza, Rwanda l'histoire 
secrète.85 These are critical in their own ways, and largely based on the 
individual's observations of the RPF during their service. Paul Rusesabagina 
has also voiced scathing criticism of Kagame and the RPF, and has 
published a catalogue of alleged RPF crimes. The evidence base of this 
                                            
82 Judi Rever, In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(Random House, 2018). Rever was interviewed as part of this research. A similar account to 
those documented by Rever is that of Faustin Ntilikina. This former Kigali-based RPF 
battalion commander witnessed what he describes as excess and confusion on the part of 
the RPF, and then the massacres of refugees, see Faustin Ntilikina, Rwanda: la prise de 
Kigali et la chasse aux réfugiés par l'armée du Général Paul Kagame : récit du secrétaire à 
l'état-major de l'ex-Armée rwandaise (Editions L'Harmattan, 2008).  
83 An example of a vocal high-profile dissident is the former Rwandan economy 
advisor David Himbara, whose polemic works are hereby noted, see David Himbara, 
Kagame’s Economic Mirage ((CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016), 
Kagame’s Killing Fields (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017), Kagame Ate 
Rwanda’s Pension ((CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018).  
84 Theogene Rudasingwa, Healing A Nation: A Testimony: Waging And Winning A 
Peaceful Revolution To Unite And Heal A Broken Rwanda (CreateSpace Independent 
Publishing Platform, 2013). In addition he was also interviewed by phone as part of field 
work for this research.   
85 Gerald Gahima, Transitional Justice in Rwanda (Routledge, 2012); Abdul 
Ruzibiza, Rwanda l'histoire secrète (Editions du Panama, 2005).   
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document is hard to identify, and has drawn increased criticism to this exiled 
hero of the genocide.86  
Other actor accounts acknowledged in this research include some 
former soldiers, a few of whom identify as Congolese Tutsi, interviewed by 
other authors including Stearns and David Van Reybrouck.87 A presumably 
ghost-written biography of Laurent Nkunda also offers some insights into, if 
not a very reliable account of, this individual's actions.88 This biography 
traces Nkunda’s upbringing to his involvement in various rebellions, and 
portrays the protagonist as the defender of the discriminated, Tutsi or 
otherwise. Another fascinating account is Lieve Joris’ fictionalised biography 
of a leading Banyamulenge soldier, now a ranking member of the FARDC. 
She conducted extensive interviews with this soldier as well as family and 
close associates.89 Based on information with field contacts it is highly likely, 
but not confirmed, that I unknowingly conducted a field interview with this 
same individual.90 A full discussion of fieldwork will follow in chapter four. 
This account, although fictionalised, appears consistent with the narratives 
and plots shared by other participants. Due to its unverified nature, it will not 
be directly referenced in this work.  
 As this research is grounded in genocide perpetration, survivor 
accounts from the refugee camps have only been lightly used in order to 
triangulate experiences and events. Published in either French or English, 
these books verify the routes documented in the above humanitarian and 
international documents. Some have been used in works such as the 
                                            
86 Paul Rusesabagina, Compendium of RPF Crimes - October 1990 to Present: The 
Case for Overdue Prosecution (Brussels, November 2006), accessed on 15 April 2015, from 
http://www.taylor-report.com/articles/Compendium_of_RPF_Crimes.pdf. For a critical view of 
Rusesabagina see Linda Melvern, “Hotel Rwanda - Without the Hollywood Ending,” The 
Guardian, 17 November 2011, accessed on 1 November 2018, from 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/17/hotel-rwanda-hollywood-ending.  
87 Stearns, 73-78, 136; David Van Reybrouck, Congo: The Epic History of a people 
(London: Fourth Estate, 2014), 418-424. Similar to those interviewed here is the account by 
Junior Nzita who has abducted as a child in South Kivu and forced into AFDL training and 
combat, see Junior Nzita, If My Life As a Child Soldier Could Be Told (Canada Self-
Publishers, 2016).  
88 Stewart Andrew Scott, Laurent Nkunda et la rébellion du Kivu : au coeur de la 
guerre congolaise (Paris: Karthala, 2008).   
89 Lieve Joris, The Rebel’s Hour (Atlantic Books 2006).  
90 This observation is supported by an anonymous gatekeeper used in my field 
research, who is also a former AFDL soldier, and self-identified Banyamulenge.  
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Mapping Report and the Spanish Indictment. Foremost among these is 
Beatrice Umutesi’s contribution, which casts a narrative that takes from 
displacement during the Rwandan civil war, through the 1994 genocide, to 
the camps and ultimately being chased through Congolese forests.91 
Umutesi also testifies as a named witness in the Spanish indictment, without 
offering anything particularly new to her published account. 
Three further French-published accounts by other refugees who were 
pushed across Zaïre document the circumstances of the camps and the 
attacks on refugees. These recounted how it was that many came across the 
border and chose to remain as refugees into the late 1990s. Maurice 
Niwese’s book, Le Peuple Rwandais un pied dans la tombe, recounts his 
flight fearing being targeted as a secretary for a Mouvement démocratique 
républicain (MDR) student group. After remaining in South Kivu camps from 
1994, he fled with thousands of others towards Kisangani. From there he 
was repatriated, but then fled again into exile.92 Pierre-Claver 
Ndacyayisenga, a history teacher prior to the war and now in exile in 
Canada, left Kigali with his family for Cyangugu in May 1994. After entering 
South Kivu in September, he made it to Ndjoundou, in The Republic of 
Congo, with his wife and children in May 1997.93 Théophile Ruhorahoza, a 
University student in Butare at the time of 1994 genocide, similarly fled to 
South Kivu at this time. Despite losing many fellow refugees, he made it all 
the way to the western border of Zaïre and escaped via Brazzaville, and is 
now exiled in Europe.94 This account, in particular, offers an arching narrative 
of refugee trails across the Congo and the constant attacks on new and 
impromptu camps established across the country. Aside from these 
published accounts, journalists reporting from the camps have captured 
                                            
91 Beatrice Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of A Rwandan Refugee in 
Zaire (University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); René Lemarchand, “Bearing Witness to Mass 
Murder,” Africa Studies Review 48, no. 3 (December 2005): 93-101.  
92 Maurice Niwese, Le Peuple Rwandais un pied dans la tombe: Récit d'un réfugié 
étudiant (Editions L'Harmattan, 2001). 
93 Pierre-Claver Ndacyayisenga, Dying to live: A Rwandan family’s five-year flight 
across the Congo, trans. Casey Roberts (Baraka Books, 2012).  
94 Théophile Ruhorahoza, Terminus Mbandaka: Le chemin des charniers de 
réfugiés rwandais au Congo (juillet 1994 - mai 1997) Témoignage d'un rescapé (Editions 
Sources du Nil, 2009). 
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some other voices of survivors or refugees on the ground from 1996 to 1997. 
However, a comprehensive account for these narratives and experiences is 
yet to be written.  
A Processual Account 
The lack of theoretical development in both genocide studies and Great 
Lakes area studies limits further exploration and understanding of the Congo 
wars. A more constructive approach would be to establish an epistemological 
and theoretical framework could to shape fresh analysis of the level, scope, 
and participation of genocidal violence from 1996 to 1997. How should a 
theoretical approach to the social construction of identity be formed in the 
context of existing literature and theory gaps within both area and genocide 
studies? Post-liberal and sociological perspectives on genocide present 
researchers with a broader sociological concept that can be used in the 
study of genocide in the Congo, whereas typical liberal and legal 
interpretations are limiting and less reflective of a thorough analysis of 
destructive processes.  
Initially Giddens and Butler offer a promising model for the 
incorporation of agency and transformative identity in cases of mass 
violence, thereby moving discourse beyond participants being 
characteristically either victims or executioners. Should this also necessitate 
a layering of identity within genocide participation to be defined and applied? 
Were Rwandan Tutsi and Congolese Tutsi experiences of oppression and 
destruction in both Rwanda and eastern Zaïre sufficient to motivate would-be 
participants into engagement in systematic processes of destruction? How 
does such knowledge establish a social actor then armed within a highly 
militarised and violent environment? This review of relevant literature clusters 
around genocide in the Congo and presents some apparent gaps in both 
theory and historical narrative that can be addressed through this research. 
Fundamentally, it should be asked: by what processes did genocide in the 
Great Lakes region produce socially constructed identities for AFDL/RPA 
soldiers? 
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Chapter III: Genocide Identities and the Vortex of Genocide 
In some cases, victims became perpetrators, while perpetrators were 
themselves sometimes subjected to serious violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law, in a cycle of violence that has not 
yet abated. 
--UNHCR, Mapping Report.1 
 
It is true that the Tutsi killed . . . . But we all had brothers, 
schoolmates, uncles who had been killed. It's all part of a whole . . . . 
Can you make them understand why someone would kill? 
--Deogratias Bugera, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters2 
 
Introduction 
The formation of identity in genocide is inherently problematic, making this 
pursuit difficult using existing literature, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
What are the implications of victims killing, or killers becoming victims? How 
does this shape identity and participation in genocide? The binary 
characterisations inscribed into the field of genocide studies results in a 
parsing of actors into either victim or perpetrator categories.3 The origination 
of these popular categories in genocide studies sits with Raul Hilberg. His 
monumental contribution to a participant-centred study of mass violence has 
not been developed since his work was published in 1992. What remains is a 
caricature of a functionary perpetrator who knew their role. This “modular” 
approach was intended to be a shorthand, not a lasting unit of comparative 
analysis.4 This chapter proposes a conceptualisation of actor identity 
                                            
1 UNHCR, 1.  
2 Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 71. This comment is excerpted from the 
author’s interview with Deogratias Bugera, one of the four AFDL founders.  
3 Scott Straus reflects on this problematic application of the perpetrator label as well 
what useful outcomes this categorically focused research actually yields, in Scott Straus 
“Studying Perpetrators: A Reflection,” Journal of Perpetrator Research 1, no. 1 (2017): 28-
38; Bergholz, 307; Margaret Somers writing around the advent of “identity politics” in the 
1990s describes this as the “false certainties imposed by categorical approaches to identity,” 
in Margaret Somers, “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network 
Approach,” Theory and Society 23 (1994): 605.  
4 Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators Victims Bystanders: A Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945 
(New York: Harper-Collins, 1992), ix-xii; Jonathan Petropoulos, John K. Roth, Gray Zones: 
Ambiguity and Compromise in the Holocaust and its Aftermath (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2005), 78-79. A further example of this entrenchment, and lack of actor or participant 
analysis can be seen in the following work where “actors” are only superficially treated on 
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formation. This process is takes into account the context of postcolonial 
genocide. This dissertation will attempt an understanding of perpetration and 
participation in the genocide of Rwandan refugees by AFDL/RPA forces 
during the so-called War of Liberation.  
This chapter utilises post-liberal approaches to genocide as well as 
relational sociology. Particular attention will be paid to the fundamental 
position of the social actor and the formation of identity. Three features of 
genocide that frame this case will be specified and discussed: AFDL/RPA 
narratives of insecurity; destructive and permanent crises for Tutsi political 
leaders and groups in the region; and, the intermediate space, or social 
marginalisation of Congolese Tutsi in the postcolonial Zaïrian state.5 These 
features of genocide highlight a relational formation of identities of 
AFDL/RPA actors as layered victims and perpetrators across Rwanda and 
eastern Congo. The heuristic device of a vortex will show how actor identities 
are shaped through exposure to and participation in multiple cases of 
genocide and mass violence. It is proposed that exposure to and 
participation in events of mass violence and genocide formed and reformed 
identities.6 These events, or historical processes, specifically include the 
Rwandan civil war and genocide, communal violence in Eastern Zaïre during 
the mid-1990s, arrival of the Rwandan exodus in that same area in 1995, 
attacks on Congolese Tutsis in the Kivus. Perpetration of the genocide of 
Rwandan refugees was a result of the compounding processes in these 
events where the mobilised Tutsi of the region continuously moved through a 
volatile system of genocide. Previous experiences oriented towards victim or 
perpetrator actions and situations informed the identities of Rwandan and 
Banyarwandan Tutsi, and Banyamulenge, as they passed through the vortex 
with each of the above historical processes.  
                                            
macro, international organisation or interstate level, see Samuel Totten and Paul Bartrop, 
Dictionary of Genocide (Greenwood Press, 2008). 
5 The generalisation in this chapter and most other research refers to 
Banyamulenge or Congolese Tutsi predominantly from South Kivu and Banyarwanda in 
North Kivu, both with historic ties to Rwanda. 
6 The notion of an “event” while quite nominal here, is developed later in the context 
of Gilles Deleuze approach to deep-level social analysis.  
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Necessarily Messy 
Questions of genocide identities are usually neatly pressed into categories of 
perpetrator, victim and sometimes bystander or upstander.7 All are 
conceptually loaded with baggage from case-based perspectives canonised 
by comparative genocide studies. Shaw describes the implication for identity 
in this present arrangement: “Perpetrators are assumed to be single 
hierarchically organised collective actors typically centred on state power, 
victims to be socially coherent collectivities typically (in terms of the UN 
Convention) ethnic, national, racial or religious groups. Bystanders, in 
contrast, are sociologically anonymous.”8 Kalyvas further adds that 
assumptions of a “dichotomous world populated only by victims and 
perpetrators” reproduce such views and “mutually exclusive categories”.9 
Echoing Levi’s gray zone, these characterisations displace processes of 
violence and how actors themselves shape such processes.  
If the process of the social construction of actors is framed by 
academic discourse (i.e. how we see and describe actors), and we must then 
acknowledge that the incarnations of actors will necessarily be messy.10 It is 
a complex endeavour that requires acknowledging the subjectivities of how 
actors see and sense themselves. How does one distinguish between 
possible perpetrator-victims or victim-perpetrators who engage in violence, 
with situated knowledge of a group’s threats and experiences? The 
conceptual weakness of most descriptions of identity categories and 
attempts at understanding the formation of genocide identities fall into Levi’s 
                                            
7 As a snapshot of these western developed terms the Holocaust museum of 
Houston Texas, USA, offers a simplified conceptualisation of the interconnected relations 
between these labels and their presumed meanings, “The Holocaust of World War II made it 
clear that there are several roles any individual can play in our society. If we are not to be 
victims, then our only choices are to be perpetrators of evil and injustice, indifferent 
bystanders who allow it to exist in our world or rescuers or upstanders who act to end it,” 
Holocaust Museum Houston, “Be an Upstander,” accessed on 15 September 2015, from 
https://www.hmh.org/ed_be_upstander.shtml. Ervin Staub’s standard work in the field has 
led to the moral demarcating of these labels, in Staub, The Psychology of Good and Evil: 
Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others (Cambridge University Press, 
2003).      
8 Martin Shaw, Genocide and International Relations: Changing Patterns in the 
Transitions of the Late Modern World (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 34.  
9 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 21.  
10 This notion of messiness of history was indicated to me in the Congolese context 
thanks to Emery Kalema, and it originates in Luise White Speaking with Vampires: Rumour 
and History in Colonial Africa (University of California Press, 2000), xii.   
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Manichean tendency categorising actors as morally good victims and evil 
perpetrators. Levi’s historicisation of a gray zone offers a far more 
sociologically useful conceptualisation of a violent structure that form, reform, 
and layer identities.11   
The typecasting of such actors, generally for legal, political or 
historical purposes by academics, activists, and the protagonists themselves, 
also blinds analysis to the role of moral agency in the actors themselves.12 
Furthermore, isolating actors via existing conceptual frameworks in an 
assembly-line fashion, discounts the vital social connections and 
intersubjective perceptions at both intra and inter-group levels. The 
messiness of actor relations in any social environment is thrown out in the 
name of “making sense” of violence. Leaving too little attention being paid to 
the “sense” that actors have about themselves and genocidal violence.13  
This trend permeates scholarship as well as popular discourse on 
genocide. Alex Hinton’s work on perpetration in Cambodia highlights how 
“iconically” depicting the “savagery” of perpetrators serves to frame such as 
“evil acts” (skulls, nationalist symbols, etc.). This exceptionalist approach 
abstracts perpetrators as simultaneously animal-like and anti-civilization. 
Hinton continues, “In this framing, horrible acts of cruelty are perpetrated by 
sadistic individuals who derive an often sexualised gratification by inflicting 
pain and harm upon others. Here, genocide is naturalised as psychological 
dysfunction.”14 This approach of understanding the superficial and non-
sociological “why they do it” objectifies actors as “atavistic”, easily creating a 
                                            
11 Levi, 36.  
12 Powell, “Genocide Moralities,” 76-95. 
13 Michael Staudigl, “Towards a Relational Phenomenology of Violence,” Human 
Studies 36, no. 1 (March 7, 2013): 43-45, 55; Cathy J. Schlund-Vials and Samuel Martínez, 
“Interrogating the Perpetrator: Violation, Culpability and Human Rights,” The International 
Journal of Human Rights 19, No. 5 (2015): 551-552.  
14 Alexander Laban Hinton, “The Paradox of Perpetration: A View from the 
Cambodian Genocide,” in ed. Mark Goodale, Human Rights at the Crossroads (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 154-155. Examples can be found in the following: Richard Rhodes, 
Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust (Knopf 
Doubleday Publishing Group, 2007); Patrick Desbois, The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest's 
Journey to Uncover the Truth Behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews (St. Martin’s press, 
2009), the latter in particular makes continuous references to German soldiers, police and 
SS forces as a monolithic group of “assassins”.  
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“civilized” critique of those who committed genocide as “barbaric”.15 As 
categories, perpetrator and victim are teleological explanations of genocide 
that ascribe uniform agency and broad culpability. This is done without a 
context of how identity is formed and participation in violent destruction 
occurs.  
When scholars and commentators approach the Congo wars, 
including antecedent violence in 1993 North Kivu, victims and perpetrators 
are sought out based on personal ideological allegiance, the “righteous” 
demands of militarised humanitarianism, or the limited historical context of 
the moment itself.16 In the 1996 invasion of Zaïre, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame 
and the battle-tested, genocide-exposed RPF, glutted itself on spending its 
“genocide credit”.17 Previously, the massacre at the Kibeho refugee camp, 
and subsequent counter-insurgency operations in the northwest provinces, 
were conducted with the explicit support of the US and UK. This provided, in 
turn, tacit acknowledgement or acceptance of the RPF narrative that, in 
Rwanda, the RPF was the party best suited to solve the region’s troubles, 
vis-à-vis the Rwandan refugees and the genocidaire in eastern Zaïre.18 As 
such, the RPF, with allies in Burundi and Uganda, merged disparate groups 
to form a new “African solution” to an “African problem” in the AFDL.19 This 
rebel grouping, strategically and politically led by RPA officers conducted a 
multi-pronged campaign. It was the Rwandan, Banyarwandans, and 
                                            
15 Powell, Barbaric Civilization, 308-309; Moses, 22-28; a compelling example of 
this portrayal of perpetration is found in Daniel J. Goldhagen’s documentary for his book of 
the same title Worse than war, with an interview of former Rwandan militia who participated 
in the killings of 1994 leaves the viewer with a foggy sense of why he killed, but a visceral 
account of how the actual work of killing was carried out, see PBS, Genocide: worse than 
war, PBS Documentary, accessed on 26 May 2015, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7cZuhqSzzc.   
16 Mahmood Mamdani, “The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,” 
London Review of Books, March 8, 2007, accessed on 15 September 2015, from 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n05/mahmood-mamdani/the-politics-of-naming-genocide-civil-war-
insurgency.  
17 Johan Pottier defines this credit: “make political capital out of the empathy and 
guilt that exist within the international community” in Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: 
Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 47; Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship,” 
African Affairs 103, no. 411 (2004): 177–210; Gahima, 234.  
18 Pottier, 82, 148-150; Amnesty International, “Rwanda: Alarming Resurgence of 
Killings,” 12 August 1996, 3-8; Colin M Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, 
Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Jefferson: McFarland, 2004), 98-99.  
19 French, 141, 243.  
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Banyamulenge in this group that proceeded to destroy the remaining 
Rwandan Hutu refugees as an existential security threat. In this case study, 
the dynamics of genocide are approached through these groups. 
On face value, this investigation seems oriented towards a perpetrator 
perspective. Yet, it is precisely the contention of this work that, because of 
the delineated caricatures in genocide studies, where identities blur or 
converge into individual actors or social groups, that such a 
misconceptualisation or simplification is repeated. It is proposed that what 
can be perceived or understood in this case, and the events and social 
movements around it, is that individuals are first of all social actors that have 
been ascribed and subscribed with layers of victim and perpetrator identities.  
What can sociology offer to shape this conceptual shift for genocide 
studies?  This notion of social actors presents a perspective that leans on 
Fiona Clark and Claire Moser’s broader explanation,  
Actors . . . face alternative ways of formulating their objectives, 
however, restricted their resources.  The strategies and cultural 
constructions they employ are drawn from a stock of available 
discourses that are shaped with other individuals and contemporaries. 
Rather than simply being synonymous with individuals, actors are 
“socially constructed” in the light of social relations and their 
environment.20  
 
Actors are dynamic and emergent entities constructed in a fundamentally 
social environment. Norman Long argues for an “actor-oriented paradigm”, 
that stresses the connection between structures and individuals.21 This 
alternative paradigm can form a Weberian ideal-type concept for building an 
understanding of individual and group action in genocide. Long states that 
“the notion of agency attributes to the individual actors the capacity to 
process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under 
the most extreme forms of coercion.  Within the limits of information, 
uncertainty and other constraints that exist, social actors are ‘knowledgeable’ 
and ‘capable’”.22 Agreeing with Anthony Giddens’ two-part understanding of 
                                            
20 Moser and Clark, 5.    
21 Norman Long, “From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained?: the Case for an 
Actor-oriented Sociology of Development,” European Review of Latin American and 
Caribbean Studies 49 (1990), 6.    
22 Ibid., 8.  
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agency (knowledge and capability), it is a social conception of the human 
actor that demonstrates to the observer the manifold complexities of social 
life and by extension genocidal destruction.23 Furthermore, agency, whilst 
simply described here, has its own set of complex dynamics.  For example, 
capacity is at least either intellectual or material.  These nuances endow an 
actor with space in which to formulate responses and gather resources.  
Therefore, social actors in genocide possess, at least, agency as a non-
defining or primary quality.24 A social actor’s agency (knowledge and 
capability) is key to engagement with structures and experience: an active 
link with others and environment. It is the identity of social actors more so 
than the substance of the exchange, interactions and relation to others and 
self, that is important. This primary delineator of social actors drives other 
features, such as agency. 
Florence Bernault and Jan-Georg Deutsch indicate some of the 
problems of this approach. Blurring group identities, whether it be on the part 
of academics or the actors themselves, belies the context and purpose of the 
action in question, “Repetitive violence and multi-layered stories can 
sometimes blur the distinction between perpetrators and victims. For both 
groups, contingent violence is often difficult to read, creating the urge to 
create convincing explanations and retrospective interpretations that can 
obscure the original meaning of past actions.”25 Attempting to redirect inquiry 
towards some a priori identity or intent again reflects the problematic nature 
of victims and perpetrators. This is compounded by the mismatching of the 
acquired baggage of the terms themselves especially within genocide 
studies. As discussed earlier, emerging genocide scholarship shifts focus to 
inferred intent, or the accidental nature of some genocides. Furthermore, by 
dismissing the interpretive dynamic and the need for alternative explanatory 
frameworks, the processes of identity formation are cast by the wayside. 
Original meaning itself is an interpretation on the part of the storyteller and 
therefore subjective. This may result in the covering or uncovering of layers 
                                            
23 Ibid. 
24 This extended thought derives from critique and conversation with an esteemed 
colleague and mentor Michael Minch.     
25 Florence Bernault & Jan-Georg Deutsch, “Introduction Control and Excess: 
Histories of Violence in Africa,” Africa 85, no. 3 (2015): 388.   
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of intersecting identities within genocide.  
Donald Bloxham’s work on genocide actors, distinguishing a set of 
actions (perpetration) from the identity label (perpetrator), offers some 
general lines of inquiry that are helpful in finding a path towards the 
necessary messiness of social actor identities.26 His focus is turned to the 
environment of the actor, indicating a structural approach, identifying the role 
of institutions in shaping action, but ensuring that actors retain agency. This 
argument reflects Browning’s centring of socialisation and brutalisation 
leading “ordinary men” to be faced with a series of choices, action and 
accumulated experiences that engaged them in the process of genocide in 
wartime.27 Brutalisation and hatred are then “in-process” conditions of 
genocide, not causes.28 Max Weber’s “instrumental rationality”, combined 
with the “ethic of responsibility”, facilitates an understanding of why people 
kill in genocide. Action is derived from incidences and intersection of self-
interest and normative values, supported by “organizational power 
structures” that contribute to or shape actor narratives.29 In-process actions 
have an instrumentalised or performative value in rationalisation. Institutions 
of power engender the sense of moral duty and loyalty to a group or political 
ideology.  
Browning’s response to mono-causal and essentialist explanations of 
participation and perpetration are widely accepted and shape contemporary 
genocide studies.30 Notwithstanding the fundamental nature of Browning’s 
contribution to the field, a question remains about the impact of the 
characterisation of ordinariness on how we interpret and understand 
perpetration. Alexander Hinton, in his ethnodrama of the trial of Duch (the 
                                            
26 Donald Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide (Oxford University Press, 
2009), 296.    
27 Browning, 164-165; Bloxham, 289.  
28 Ibid., 265.   
29 Ibid., 266-267.   
30 The Browning and Goldhagen face-off was captured in a at the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1996, see Daniel J. Goldhagen, Christopher R. Browning & 
Leon Wieseltier, “The ‘Willing Executioners’/’Ordinary Men’ debate,” United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum Symposium, 8 April 1996, accessed on 1 November 2014, from 
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conclusions have reverberated into genocide studies, and is largely accepted as a closed 
debate, see Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction 3rd ed. (Routledge, 
2006), 347-349; Williams and Buckley-Zistel, 1-2.   
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commander of the Khmer Rouge torture and execution facility S-21) posits 
how the evil-ordinary dichotomy is problematic. The latter has a certain 
“insipidness” that belies the complexities of perpetration, “While a corrective 
to reductive psychological theories of psychopathy, including those 
suggesting that perpetrators are ‘monsters,’ the notion of ‘ordinariness’ tends 
to flatten out the complex dynamics of human lives. It also has ethical 
implications, suggesting that situations define and shape the actions of 
perpetrators, thereby potentially mitigating their agency and responsibility.”31 
As highlighted by Powell in the previous chapter, the question of morality is 
an important and subjective actor process in perpetration.  
More often than not, complex moralisation undergirds actions and 
participation. Situational psychology explanations, that support Browning’s 
conclusion and are present in many other accounts of perpetration, relegate 
actors to engaged agents.32 To move past this misleading dichotomy of man 
or monster, relational sociology offers not only a path through the debates of 
structure and agency, but also an insight into the performative aspect of 
situational-based explanations.33 Philip Zimbardo’s work on the role-based 
production of violence raises the contingency of environmental conditioning. 
In this view performance distinguishes participation and internalisation of 
roles, and therefore the impact on identity.34  
The dynamic of gender identities is also present in many approaches 
to perpetration, as indicated in the previous chapter. Notwithstanding Adam 
Jones’ contribution, the aspect of gender in genocide is largely limited to 
targeting and binary identity in narratives of sexual violence: female victims 
and male perpetrators.35 These approaches, in turn, create their own specific 
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Press, 2016), 293.  
32 Browning, Ordinary Men, 167-169.   
33 Guenter Lewy’s recent work demonstrates the shallow reproduction of 
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connections between male perpetration and female victimhood. Elisa von 
Joeden-Forgey attempts to bridge this gap in her discussion of “genocidal 
masculinity”.36 Here perpetration emerges out of rebellion against existing 
patriarchal status quo and attacking the reproductive social relations of the 
Other as a response to existential threat.37 How identity, gender and 
genocide relate, remains to be tackled with serious empirical vigour. In this 
dissertation masculinity in soldiering and the role of sexual violence are 
addressed in chapters seven and eight.  
The approach of this theory incorporates multiple exposures to 
genocide, Bloxham’s perpetration, and the in-process brutalisation of the 
actor. It must be noted that such factors are not relegated to a causal status, 
but are a dynamic, flowing between incidents, impacting knowledge and 
capability, and forming identity. Careful attention must be paid to social 
actors as the populace of social structures. The agent and their identity are 
socially constructed within the structures around them. Some efforts have 
been made by genocide scholars to break through the barriers of type-cast 
genocide actors, drawing crucial attention to structures and environmental 
shaping of knowledge and capability. This sociological perspective therefore 
offers an appropriate starting point for the accounting of the messiness of 
actor identity formation and relations.  
A Relational Approach to Genocide 
As suggested by Shaw, genocide is a “sociological crime”. Both legal and 
historical approaches bypass this root of the discipline.38 Instead, genocide 
studies has been sequestered into the limited conceptual landscape of the 
UNCG. Shaw argues for a structural approach that accommodates a 
“relational process” of actors in genocide and the “structural contexts” that 
can direct analysis beyond a simplistic “perpetrator-victim relationship”.39 
This relationship is not just a violent asymmetrical exchange of power, as 
Shaw defines genocide; it is a nexus of power relations between perpetrators 
                                            
36 Elisa von Joeden-Forgey, “Genocidal Masculinity,” in Jones, New Directions in 
Genocide Research 2012, 76-94.     
37 Ibid.,, 80-83.   
38 Shaw, What is Genocide?, 3-4.  
39 Ibid., 94.  
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and victims: “victims have no choice but to orient their actions to the 
overwhelming power of the enemy that attacks them. Yet victim's’ actions, 
too, affect those of perpetrators.”40 However, Shaw seems to fall back on the 
tired framework of polarised actors, as perpetrators engaged in degenerate 
warfare against “civilians”.41  
This coalesces with Larry May’s approach to identity. His view is that 
group identity crystallises into specific categories as perpetration becomes 
imaginable.42 Group identity transitions from the subjective to objective, 
making the Other definable as a target and protected under international 
law.43 Whilst these views approach the processes of identity formation and 
genocide, in terms of structures and networks, the impact of context and 
environment on perpetration identity is still underappreciated. With little 
effort, one can find this narrative slipping towards a one-way system of 
perpetrator ascription of victims. May’s objectification of both groups does 
not appreciate the relational quality of destructive interactions. The process 
of forming identity, once absorbed into genocide, does indeed create lethal 
identities and even perpetration groups. Yet, the nuances of the fluidity of 
identity, perceptions of the Self and Other, and Powell’s notion of destructive 
relations, are missed.  
Powell’s relational approach frames “genocide [as] an identity-
difference relation of violent obliteration.” 44 The identity-difference relation 
recognises the collaborative and fluid construction of identities; central to the 
indictment here of “barbaric civilization” genocide is both destructive and 
productive, “it works to produce relations of identity-difference through a 
                                            
40 Ibid., 95.  
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process of annihilation”.45 The production of difference is a result of a full 
complement of social, economic and political dynamics. In this particular 
case study, these dynamics specifically translate into indigeneity, colonial 
classifications with their postcolonial reifications, and the identification of 
actors in relation to the emerging, crisis-ridden state.46 It is through engaging 
with the group and individual AFDL/RPA participant narratives, that one can 
identify the relations of genocide, and how identity-difference relation frames 
action and identities along the with the specific features of this genocide: 
narratives of insecurity, destructive crisis, and intermediate space.  
Norbert Elias’ figurations, as discussed by Powell and Crossley, form 
the networks and the fabric of human societies, therefore the core of what 
genocide as a concept tries to capture. For Elias these “social figurations” 
were the “interweaving of countless individual interests and intentions”.47  
Figurations represent the dynamic and process-oriented nature of how the 
social world exists and perpetuates.48 Genocide can then be examined 
through social figurations. On the one hand, it is the production of figuration: 
genocide is a generative project of building identities and polities. On the 
other hand, existing social figurations become the target of perpetration. This 
adds a further level of analysis to Lemkin’s assertion that genocide is the 
displacement of one social pattern by another.49 According to Powell, 
genocide is its own set of figurations, carrying with it a “dynamic network of 
functional . . . power relations”.50 Figurations of actors simultaneously 
exercise agency in their actions and reshape the social world.51 
Powell’s “obliteration” also entails the dual action of perceiving and/or 
ascribing identity in the Other, with the deployment of violence to “erase this 
identity” dismantling the group ontologically. Andrew Woolford demarcates 
                                            
45 Ibid., 82.  
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(UBC Press, 2010), 15-16.   
47 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, vol. 2, State Formation and Civilization 
(Basil Blackwell, 1982), 160.  
48 Norbert Elias, What is Sociology? (University College Dublin Press, 1970), 123-
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this level of destruction as being “experienced and made sense of by 
targeted collectivities”; a relational approach to genocide must at least 
function along Shaw’s lines of experiential, asymmetrical exchanges of 
power between groups. The approach presented in this dissertation seeks to 
understand the layering of identities in a relational context, demonstrating the 
gathering of experiences and perceptions that lead to genocide. This 
certainly is not then a comprehensive approach to explaining the whys of a 
given genocide, but an attempt to situate and understand the how of 
AFDL/RPA involvement in the genocide of Rwandan refugees.  
Using Crossley’s rejection of the dichotomies of individualism and 
holism, and structure and agency, a relational approach to networks 
emerges is key to the analysis of social figurations. Monocausal approaches, 
like Daniel Goldhagen’s deterministic eliminationism, miss the constitutive 
elements of the social world, and the macro perspectives of society or culture 
as the shapers of social behaviour or outcomes.52 Further, Crossley states, 
“Action is always oriented to other actions and events within the networks in 
which the actor is embedded.”53 Therefore, tracing the networks connections 
of actors in genocide to experience, perception, and the structures that 
support the interpretation of these social things are crucial to understanding 
the relationships, and the generation of identity-difference relation. 
Powell sets out a criterion of what is relational as being threefold, and 
crucial to this dissertation’s approach: the substance of the relational world is 
both human and material, forming entropic networks; reflexivity is social 
action; and, social interaction is necessarily contradictory and oppositional.54 
The formation and re-formation of identity, akin to the ship of Theseus, is the 
actor’s ability to adapt and adjust in varied environments. While this 
reincarnation of structures proffers a more interconnected account of agency 
and environment, without “individualising structures”, how does one deal with 
the issue of intent?55 Anthony Giddens' structuration theory answers this 
                                            
52 Daniel J Goldhagen, Worse than War: Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing 
Assault on Humanity (London: Hachette, 2010).  
53 Crossley, 2.   
54 Powell, Barbaric Civilization, 43.  
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question. As noted in chapter two, Giddens situates intent within outcomes, 
not by deciphering hidden meaning. Crossley places a relational spin on 
intent by repositioning it under both agency and relations as “practical 
involvement in the world”, operationalising perception and purposeful 
action.56 
Reworking structure and agency (the former as constraints and 
opportunities, and the latter as initiative and intelligence) reinvigorates these 
aspects of perpetration. Genocide can be seen as a series of networks that 
frame “properties and figurations [as] they generate specific opportunities 
and constraints”.57 Networks are then sites of performative action where 
actors engage with and exchange power. It is then feasible to consider 
violently interacting networks, both in terms of the experiences and 
perceptions of actors that use destructive violence within an inter-group 
asymmetrical power exchange. The Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge 
experienced genocide in parallel to their Tutsi brothers in Rwandan 1994. 
The second epigraph at the start of this chapter is taken from an interview 
with Déogratias Bugera, himself a Banyarwanda RPF political operative in 
the mid-1990s, who recruited, often forcibly, for the RPF and then AFDL in 
South Kivu. He perceived a clear need to avenge collective wrongs.58 As the 
Congolese and Rwandan Tutsi networks merged narratives and relatable 
experiences of violence, overlaid with the violent exodus of refugees, the 
above features of genocide shaped opportunities and constraints. These 
features propelled actors towards the production of identity-difference and 
violent obliteration of the source of their problems, the genocidaire.  
Features of Genocide: Narratives of Insecurity, Destructive Crisis and 
Intermediate Space 
What are the features of genocide during the First Congo War that can tease 
out these relations and the process of destruction? To support a relational 
approach to genocide, three key features of genocide are discussed. 
Narratives of insecurity shape the perceived existential security threats acted 
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upon by the AFDL/RPA.59 Destructive crisis is a process-oriented approach 
to states in flux and permanent crisis. Intermediate space is an encapsulation 
of social marginalisation in the postcolony.  
These approaches to genocide circumnavigate the tailoring of 
histories of genocide into the likes of Gregory Stanton’s “10 Stages of 
Genocide” as a symptomatic approach to the identification of genocide.60 
Such liberal theories support the gatekeeper status of the UNCG and the 
preservation of the canon of “maximal standard” typology (think Holocaust 
and Rwanda), and frames the West as “the cavalry that rescues victims from 
genocidal elites”.61 What Lemkin suggested was that genocide is a set of 
destructive relations between groups in the contexts of warfare and 
colonisation.62 Tony Barta, emphasising the differences in the approaches, 
states: “relations of destruction . . . removes from the word the emphasis on 
policy and intention which brought it into being.”63 Norbert Finzsch, 
discussing settler violence in colonial genocide, uses Gilles Deleuze’s 
construction of an “event” to describe a deeper analysis of genocide, as a 
“Deleuzian event, genocides are the result of simultaneous and largely 
invisible interactions of a multitude of rhizomatic actors that construct an 
event horizon.”64 Accounting for actors in a deeply contextualised manner 
enables an improved understanding of these largely dispersed but essential 
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relations. These post-liberal notions convey that genocide is a process, and 
what is perceivable in genocide is only the tip of the iceberg.65 The elements 
of this phenomenon are the complex social relations, networks and 
perceptions of the Other. This understanding is reduced by accepting the 
fixed caricatures of an agency-free victim and an ill-intending perpetrator 
fulfilling evil intentions.66  
Narratives of Insecurity 
Narratives of insecurity that inform actor and group relations and perceptions 
often facilitate the implementation of the politics of fear. Such narratives 
about threats and their embodiment in the Other “become a tool for 
governing and disciplining societies”.67 Dirk Moses describes this political 
introspection as a “security syndrome [leading] to mass deaths in violent 
counterinsurgency” where “national elites [are] constantly worried about 
security on their peripheries”.68 In the militarised atmosphere of tenuous 
political domination, achieved and sustained by violent force, borders are 
loaded with existential threats and perceived genocidal possibilities.  
This perspective underscores the communication and “speech acts” 
that create environments for genocide, whilst not necessarily singularly 
conditioning societies for such.69 Abdelwahab El-Affendi’s conceptualisation 
of “killer narratives”, synonymising narrative and ideology, implicates 
ideology as a primum movens. This perspective, or supposed cause of 
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genocide, is already widely advocated.70 Ideology forms only part of the 
picture or in Finzsch’s terms a “layer of micro-politics”. In his view, a given 
ideology itself can have differing meaning on local and national, or urban and 
rural levels.71 Whilst anticolonial and security-based narratives formed a 
particular part in the mechanics of RPF and AFDL recruitment and support 
networks, it must be noted that RPF ideology held varying value for different 
segments of the Tutsi diaspora.72  
 Proposing the notion of “cultures of insecurity”, Jutta Weldes et al, 
describe such as “mutually constituted . . . social and cultural productions”.73 
Any construction of identity within cultures or communities of insecurity rely 
on the identification of differences. In these environments, “there is always a 
politics of identity and difference through which difference can, but need not 
be transformed into otherness. When it is, it becomes a source of 
insecurity.”74 Insecurity and the Other become both the raison d'être and 
looming demise of the community.75 Joining such insecurity with the state, 
significant biopower and authority is imbued into both the process of 
articulating insecurity, and the imagining and realising of possible solutions.76 
States hold an unquestioned position to produce Othering for security 
purposes. Narratives of insecurity are purposeful social constructs and must 
be understood as such.77 
 Constitutive communities of insecurity held both performative and 
interpretive value for the RPF and AFDL. For the Banyarwandans, and 
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increasingly the Banyamulenge, caught in the crosshairs of the 1993-1996 
violence that persecuted, deported and called for their extermination, the 
message of the RPF was one of self-defence and deliverance. Vanquishing 
the Hutu armed militias was supported by the notion that insecurity could be 
responded to with overwhelming force, providing grounds for performative 
empowerment against the perceived enemy.78 Narratives of insecurity also 
functioned for Kagame and his neighbouring allies in convincing tired 
Western powers and the UN that there was no need for intervention in 
November 1996 to divide supposedly good from bad refugees or facilitate 
returns.79 With the massive return from the Mugunga refugee camp in the 
same month, the problem of the refugees was then easily interpreted as a 
regional security issue, further implicating the Rwandese that remained in 
Congo as culpable for the 1994 genocide. As a result of non-intervention and 
the credit afforded to Kigali, the RPF was able to craft a continuing narrative 
for its new populace and the wider world. This narrative was undergirded by 
security threats that were fundamentally existential, and therefore required 
the maximum militarised force in their amelioration. The RPF deployment of 
political violence and targeted assassinations during their 1994 consolidation 
of Rwanda and protection of its borders in this period provided a schema for 
such “military solutions” to political problems.80 The violence and force 
implemented was imbued with justification based on this narrative of 
insecurity and a strong sense of victimhood.81 
 Omer Bartov, in Mirrors of Destruction, lays out a nexus of victim 
identity formation through the process of the glorification of war and the 
construction of the Other in relation to the Self who belonged. In terms of 
identity formation, “identity is seen as the product of violent action against 
groups defined as outside the national, racial, or ideological collectivity.”82 In 
the case of the RPF and AFDL, the genocidaire was seen for its security 
relation and perceived non-allegiance to the RPF programmes of national 
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unity and reconciliation. Bartov further describes the “victim trope” as a key 
feature of genocide connecting actor relations in both perception and 
environment, “it is both a trope and a reflection of reality. Yet, at the same 
time, it is a dangerous prism through which to view the world, for victims are 
produced by enemies, and enemies eventually make more victims.”83 For 
those within the community of insecurity “a sense of victimhood and 
alienation breeds an urge to look for culprits.”84 Whilst burdened with the 
cumbersome use of this problematic terminology, Bartov’s approach to 
victimhood underscores the relational nature of actors in genocide.85 
 What several scholars describe as “subaltern genocide” fits alongside 
this feature of insecurity and victimhood.86 Moses, in the same vein as 
Finzsch, identifies the subaltern genocide in these terms, “the genocidal 
impulse and national liberation impulse are effectively the same: to preserve 
the endangered genus or ethnos against an Other that supposedly threatens 
its existence. This is the origin of what we might call subaltern genocide: the 
destruction of the colonizer by the colonized.”87 The framing of insecurities in 
the context of liberation and vanquishing of perceived threats drove the 
construction of the new RPF state. It inverted the colonial distortion of a 
tribally divided Rwanda, imagining a community of Rwandans led by a 
political, economic elite.88 The output of this state-foundation was a drive 
towards the obliteration of identities incongruent with RPF narratives of 
nation and security.89  
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Destructive Crises 
The subaltern layers of perception and interaction of the early 1990s indicate 
a particular typology of destructive crisis: a crisis that is genocidal in practice 
and in terms of narratives. When histories are produced in response to 
crises, the social relations are likewise conditioned by crisis. Mark Levene 
describes genocide as symptomatic of the crisis of nation-state formation. In 
his global systems approach, the emergence of the model of the Jekyll 
nation-state poses a Hyde as “crisis ridden polities”90. The integrity of the 
fragile nation-state can therefore “best” be maintained and developed 
through the violence found in its crisis-ridden ascent.91 Thus, subaltern 
genocide was the background of regional Tutsi communities’ postcolonial 
state-building and creative destruction: carving new peace and security from 
the threat of continued genocide. 
This notion of destructive crisis derives from Antonio Gramsci’s 
conceptualisation of crisis as a process, involving intertwined social relations. 
Fabio de Nardis and Loris Caruso describe Gramsci’s approach as such, 
“The origin of these processes of crisis, for Gramsci, lies primarily in the 
nature of the relationship between social forces. The crisis affecting 
parliamentarism, representation, and parties, which he observes in the 
tangible historical development of his times, is the result of a static 
equilibrium in the conflict between hegemonic groups and subordinate social 
group.”92 Whilst Gramsci deliberately unhinged crisis from a specific 
historical moment, or a causal chain of events, such processes are historical 
and social in nature.93 Also prominent in Gramsci’s framing is the crisis of 
hegemony. Political crises at their root are propelled by relationships around 
hegemony, and the use of consent and/or coercion by political elites.94 
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Mobutu’s mobilisation of elites in North and South Kivu (both Kinyarwanda 
speakers and self-identified autochthons95), the invasion of the Rwandan 
exodus, and the AFLD/RPA, exercised degrees of consent and coercion in 
where hegemony was questioned or challenged. He did so in order to retain 
power and respond to perceived existential security threats. 
In Zaïre, these elements embodied the processes of democratisation, 
socio-economic and citizenship marginalisation, and mobilisation for violence 
throughout the 1990s. This produced a destructive crisis, presenting a deadly 
situation for Rwandan refugees as they were sought out and killed by the 
AFDL/RPA. Reshaping power relations in this context meant that such 
relations had already formed with political, violent consequences in eastern 
Zaïre, and were successively reaggregated by two crises (the 1994 genocide 
and arrival of the refugee/armed group exodus). These ultimately led to the 
genocide in question. It is this reaggregation of power that forms a pillar in 
the historical process leading up to the invasion and genocide. This is 
addressed in depth in chapter five. 
Eastern Zaïre’s destructive crisis has been described by Prunier as a 
culmination of regional and neighbouring conflicts, like “overripe toxic fruits” 
spilling into the Congo basin.96 He attributes Africa’s “World War” more to the 
folding of regional conflicts (Angola, Burundi, The Central African Republic, 
Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda) into Zaïre, than exclusively local factors. 
David Newbury also refers to the “convergent catastrophes” of the region: 
varied elements that came together in the fatality of Zaïre. He claims that the 
ethnicised politics and the rotting state underpinned by Mobutu’s patrimonial 
networks, Rwandan irredentism and invasions, and massive-scale 
humanitarian crises following the arrival of the Rwandan exodus in the East 
collided on a deep level resulting in the multifaceted collapse of eastern 
Zaïre into warfare.97 
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Intermediate Space 
Fostering a contextual understanding of the collision of crises and subaltern 
narratives of insecurity requires a review of Mudimbe’s take on postcolonial 
marginalisation. The “intermediate space” of a postcolony is the social, 
political and economic situatedness, resulting in the exclusion of those 
identities reproduced from the colonial into the postcolonial.98 Both the Hutu 
power movement and the RPF destructively reified Hutu and Tutsi identities. 
The RPF publicly banned such labels as tools of colonial oppression and 
division, but privately retained their synonymy with “perpetrator” and “victim” 
or “survivor”99. Congolese elites, seeking to reverse the 1970s gains of 
Rwandaphone communities in eastern Congo, likewise aggressively 
reproduced the autochthon and Banyarwanda/Banyamulenge divisions in 
eastern Zaïre on a local level. This also arose on a national level through the 
Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS) and Mobutu’s gaming of emerging 
political groups in the 1990s.100 This decade saw the exclusion and 
marginalisation of Kinyarwanda speakers. Violence, against Banyamulenge 
or Banyarwanda Tutsis, radicalised with the entrance of the Rwandan post-
genocide exodus in 1994.  
This space, or “bifurcated state”, wherein the postcolonial is 
deracialized, but the institutions of ethnic, or tribal division remain, burnt 
holes in the construction of the postcolonial state intrinsically excluding and 
favouring particular groups over others.101 The everydayness of this violence 
bleeds through via Finzsch’s “event horizons” of war and genocide. Slavoj 
Žižek’s distinction of “objective violence” or structural violence “embodied in 
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language and its forms,” is helpful characterising what happens in this social 
space.102 The quality of violence is that it “works in the obvious” and in “the 
relations of social domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms”.103 
Intermediate space provides the setting for subaltern perceptions and 
violence, fomenting narratives of insecurity and crisis. These perpetuated to 
shape the social actors engaging in the destruction of Rwandan refugees as 
the embodiment of genocidal threats. The latter was defined by lived 
experiences of both the 1994 genocide and the violence of the early-mid 
1990s in eastern Congo.  
To emphasise the performativity of the subaltern relation between the 
social actors who perceive themselves as victims of whom violence is 
demanded to rectify the power inequality, Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of 
symbolic violence is instructive. Whilst symbolic violence describes those 
who might be more easily considered as victims, marginalised by social 
institutions that reproduce symbolic violence upon the subject, this view 
offers a type of “sense” to the so-called perpetrator action.104 The symbolic 
violence of the intermediate space perpetuated and reshaped identity with 
colonial tropes, these in turn being manipulated by elites, convincing the 
actor of their disempowered position. J. Daniel Schubert describes this 
relation as “hierarchies and systems of domination . . . then reproduced to 
the extent that the dominant and the dominated perceive these systems to 
be legitimate, and thus think and act in their own best interest within the 
context of the system itself.”105 The above social entanglement, however, 
moves towards presenting the actor as entrapped by circumstance, 
diminishing agency and presenting a totalising structure. The notion of 
symbolic violence therefore is helpful, but lacks a relational level of analysis 
of actors’ self-perception and identity formation.  
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Vortex of Genocide: Identity Formation through Genocide Experience 
 
Figure 2: Vortex of Genocide diagram. 
How then should these features come together in a relational approach? 
Perhaps more importantly, how is one to describe the forming, re-forming 
and layering of identities of the actors who participate in identity-difference 
obliteration? The above graphic representation shows how these features of 
genocide flow together (see Figure 2). They create the movement in which 
actors pass through experiences of genocide. Herein lies the vortex: the 
pressure of the surrounding elements shape and re-shape identity. The 
intermediate space of the postcolony, and reproduced violence, provides the 
environment for a vortex-like process. Narratives of insecurity interpret this 
space, while destructive crises serve to trigger responses and accelerate 
movement through the vortex. Experience with and engagement in genocide 
over multiple occurrences can be observed from the mobilisation of the 
AFDL and RPF/A during the 1990s.  
 The RPF was exposed to the environment and aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide. In violent response to their transition to being returnees 
and liberators, they engaged in mass deportations and the deconstruction of 
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zones and communities suspected of involvement and participation in 
genocide. The RPF killed tens of thousands in Rwanda during 1994 with 
thousands more subjected to the total institution of crude and squalid 
imprisonment.106 Michael Dorsey described this internalisation of violence 
within the RPF: “Even before the genocide, resorting to repression and 
military force for achieving objectives was linked to internal development 
within the RPF. It became possible as a reaction to an even more violent 
enemy. Whatever violence the RPF used, it was less important than the 
violence exercised by its principal opponents.”107 This reflective baseline 
approach was formative for the RPF, and was later applied in the AFDL. In 
North Kivu, the Banyarwanda were engaged in mass inter-communal 
violence, which saw the realignment of homogenous communities, 
particularly in the area of Masisi.108 This violently postcolonial environment 
(intermediate space) was then catalysed by the reshaping of power relations 
against Tutsi Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge in the Kivus.109 
Marginalisation of this group had morphed into forced expulsions and 
localised massacres by 1996.110 Back over the border, the unsteady national 
unity government in Kigali was emerging as an exercise in circling the 
wagons around the perceived victims. Such actions were further pressured 
by the incursions from the refugee camps where Hutu armed groups were 
stationed.111 The Tutsi diaspora formed the kernel of growing networks 
across this chaotic and porous border. Narratives of insecurity became 
dominant and easily related to, through a decade of interpreted Tutsi-lived 
experience.  
These colliding experiences shaped perceptions of the Other, forming 
an identity-difference relation along the lines of existential security threats. 
The heuristic device of the vortex offers a framing of the destructive relations 
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at play. The vortex visualises the situational pressure, creating a funnel that 
then moves the surrounding environment through the system. Within the 
intermediate space’s violence, or pressure, participants in the AFDL/RPA 
brought subaltern, victimhood identities into the unfolding crises.112 This 
propelled them into these narratives of insecurity and their own engagement 
in mass violence.113 Akin to Bourdieu’s symbolic violence, a closed loop 
forms. As actors move through multiple experiences of genocide, they 
shaped their identities to accommodate and make sense of experience and 
violence. It is less the case that the vortex of genocide creates categories of 
identities (i.e. perpetrator, victim), but more so that it facilitates the flow of 
narratives and reflexivity that actors engage in to frame their circumstances 
and the identity-difference relation. Again, genocide is a relational process. 
In this particular case, the AFDL/RPA’s existential security threat, 
embodied by the starved and deserted refugees, as genocidaires funnelled 
these Tutsi soldiers through the vortex as they engaged in the relational 
exchange of power. In Shaw’s words, they attacked the “real or imputed 
power of the enemy group.”114 The only power remaining in the refugee 
columns, and makeshift camps spread across the Congo, was their identity 
vis-à-vis this existential threat. Identity was relationally perceived and in part 
constructed by the threat facing Tutsi groups. Deprived of material support 
and aid, these groups were encircled on the westward roads and summarily 
executed with a targeted and strategic process. Simultaneously, the RPA 
officers, Banyarwandan and Banyamulenge AFDL already exposed to the 
terrors of mass violence and genocide, brought into the vortex the agency 
(knowledge and capability) and narratives of insecurity, facilitating 
participation in further genocide. In the words of Bergholz, “Memories of past 
violence and immediate military concerns trumped . . . ideology in how local 
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fighters chose to employ violence.”115 He further adds that when identities 
and narratives are layered together they carry significant weight, “Their 
importance and unimportance was never frozen; they were shaped by 
violence, and constantly reshaped by it as time unfolded.”116 
A relational approach to genocide and identity, as framed by the 
vortex, offers an intersectional perspective to the identities and features of 
genocide. Intersectionality approaches the individual as a site of multiple and 
produced identities, notably gender and race.117 The vortex gives a relational 
understanding of how identities are constructed and layered, affected by the 
identity-difference relation of violent obliteration. In Mamdani’s terms, victims 
become killers. Yet, this layering was not unidirectional, and has perpetuated 
continued violent conflict between the parties of the DRC state, the Forces 
démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), and the phoenix-like 
Rwandan led resistance in eastern Congo: both Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la démocratie (RCD) movements, Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple (CNDP), and the March 23rd Movement (M23).118 At the core of this 
vortex is the violent relation between the Self and the Other and the 
production of obliteration.  
Some approaches to intersectionality propose the coagulation of a 
single identity, offering an objective version of the ideal type of social actor, 
which is used as the analytical starting point in this chapter. However, it is 
difficult to determine the emergence of a single identity given its fluidity, as 
posited by Crossley. Likewise, it is not necessarily the purpose of this 
dissertation to classify categorical identities as such, but to understand the 
processes of formation as a missing first step in this field of study. What must 
be taken into consideration is the historical layering of identity, especially in 
terms of the experiences and participation of genocide of the actors 
themselves. Yet, this perhaps only leads to the unhelpful label of perpetrator-
victim, or conversely the victim-perpetrator. Again, the relational approach 
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offers a sensical viewpoint: all identities are relational as they are the product 
of the constant juxtaposing by the actor and the Other.119 Identities are 
assumed for different purposes, in accordance with varying relations and 
interactions, and result in the co-constitutions of the inner Self and the Self 
we see in the Other as discussed by Bartov.120 Identities are the substance 
of understanding perpetration in that they perpetuate the Self and hold utility 
in self-understanding and situational adaptation.121 Understanding actors in 
the process of the vortex of genocide are emerging and adapting, utilising 
narrative and identity to do so. The reproduced violence is then an outcome 
of these pressured identities. As a heuristic device, the vortex captures a 
visualisation of this case, and the process of identity formation for social 
actors. As such, this model, without further exploration, is not intended to 
serve as a model of analysis for all cases of genocide. Yet, it may shed light 
on other cases of postcolonial genocide, where multiple experiences of this 
kind of violence are present. 
Conclusion: Not Untangling the Gordian knot 
Popular accounts of violence in the Congo commit a variety of fallacies in the 
name of humanitarianism and simplified, consumable narratives. Certainly 
then, the reality of Žižek’s “subjective violence”, that produces such 
grotesque Hollywood-ish narratives of popular notions of good and evil, 
misses the “objective violence” that underlies the systemic and symbolic.122 
Objective violence itself is driven primarily by language, the very language 
that constitutes narratives. If we accept this theory, what can be done to 
approach violence in the Congo and the question of genocide, especially 
where conflict is multifaceted and essentially complex?  
 The features of genocide highlighted in this chapter demonstrate 
some elements of genocide as an ideal type that can transcend simplistic 
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narratives about genocide identities. This is particularly relevant in protracted 
cases where actors experience a layering of exposure and experiences in 
atrocity. Relational approaches emerging out of this discipline move our 
understanding closer to the narratives used in perpetration, especially in 
framing responses to existential crises. Postcolonial cases of genocide 
similarly underscore these gaps in the literature. In the case of the 
AFDL/RPA and the Rwandan refugees, the reproduction of colonial identities 
for both Congolese and Rwandan Kinyarwandan speakers, and the 
channelling of these identities into evolving marginalisation and violence, 
demonstrates an escalation of threat and violent response.  
Situating identity formation within genocide as a vortex offers one an 
approach to this violence. Networks and relations can be sufficiently 
connected to make educated guesses about the role of the postcolony and 
how the layering of experiences of genocide forms identities. Violence is 
reproduced and narratives are constructed around the soldier within these 
arrangements, building the pressure necessary for the vortex. It is clear that 
attempts to comprehend actors in the AFDL/RPA as strictly victims or 
perpetrators is limiting at best. At worst, it distracts from the discrete relations 
and production of identity-difference moving towards violent obliteration. 
What then makes this Great Lakes genocide peculiar is the effect of multiple 
events of mass violence and genocide, and its impact on how actors made 
sense of themselves and their victim and perpetrator experiences. 
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Chapter IV: Finding Narratives of Identity  
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology of narrative analysis and the 
method of field research used in this dissertation. Use of narrative analysis 
will produce an understanding of interviews with AFDL/RPA participants. The 
deductive theoretical framework identified in the previous chapter, 
underpinned by Crossley’s relational sociology, helps execute this approach. 
As participant narratives are the substance of this research, constructing a 
space for interpretation of the identities ascribed to, sensed and subscribed 
to by actors is a key objective of this study. It is the stories, reflections, and 
internalisation of experiences that constitute the relational formation of the 
Self. Narrative analysis will help restructure this process of layered 
interpretation. The latter engages both the participants performing their 
narrative and myself as the researcher. The method discussed below will 
detail participant involvement, interviews, production of transcripts and 
coding, and use of transcripts. This will further demonstrate the 
intersubjectivity and interpretation of this research and the utility of narrative 
analysis. Reflections on the fieldwork itself will also be discussed. 
Narrative Analysis 
Crossley offers a caveat regarding a reliance on narratives in presenting a 
relational view, “individual self-narratives tend to recast interaction in 
individual terms, ripping the intersubjective fabric into distinct pieces and 
ignoring the dynamics and contingencies of discourse by projecting its 
outcomes back into one or more of the actors involved.”1 Indeed, it will be 
impossible to dig out from expressed actor narratives, now more than twenty 
years on from the genocide of Rwandan refugees, a detailed, factual 
representation of these events. Additionally, the narratives of participants 
tended to reach back into the early 1960s; for some this period was nothing 
more than learned memory reproduced by parents and family. These events 
stretch in content and temporality from the marginalisation of the late Zaïrian 
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period, to the execution of refugees during the 1996 to 1997 war and 
beyond, to their current reflections on security and identity. From the 
interpretive perspective of this work, such moments do not objectively exist in 
the historical flow except as layers of reinterpretation. Taking in the view of 
relational sociology, actors are emergent, constantly redefining themselves; 
thus, any narrative analysis will foreground the reflections and perspective of 
the actor.2 In addressing Crossley’s concern, the analysis of interviews will 
be layered with other documented accounts, including humanitarian 
reporting, existing interviews with AFDL and RPF participants, and published 
works on this period. Individual narratives will be treated as representative of 
a collective experience of moving through the vortex.3 Doing so will create a 
fractured, intersubjective collage of historical and identity forming processes. 
 According to Steph Lawler, narratives are “interpretative devices 
through which people represent themselves both personally and 
interpersonally.”4 Narratives produce plots upon which the actor pins and 
orders their self-perception and reflective experiences, incorporating a 
variety and succession of events and retrospection from the actor’s memory. 
This interpretative device involves the following elements: “sequence, theme, 
structure, temporal order, [and] evaluation.”5 Paul Ricoeur similarly states, 
“The narrated story as a temporal totality and the poetic acts as the creation 
of a mediation between time as passage and time as duration.”6 This makes 
emplotment the active construction of a narrative around distinct plot points. 
This produces what Ricoeur calls “narrative identity”. 7 This identity is two-
fold, consisting of the inner-Self, and the reflexively understood or 
narrativised Self.8  Crossley concurs with this position: “I” as the “actor in the 
process” and “me” as the “historical reconstruction of itself that the “I” forms 
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in self-reflection.”9 When a narrative is produced, it “constructs the identity of 
the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing 
that of the story told.”10 For Ricoeur story and identity become symbiotic.  
 Vital in Ricoeur’s rendering of narrative identity is the use of 
emplotment in temporal underpinnings to the story. Emplotment, for Ricoeur, 
serves two purposes. The first purpose is that emplotment offers some 
temporal “permanence”, bringing together what would otherwise be disparate 
elements.11 This temporal anchoring, according to Ricoeur, moves narrative 
elements from being contingent on one another to being necessary. 
Ricoeur’s importance placed on key plot points makes them, “confined to 
thwarting the expectation created by the prior course of events; it is quite 
simply the unexpected, the surprising. It only becomes an integral part of the 
story when understood after the fact, once it is transfigured by the so-to-
speak retrograde necessity which proceeds from the temporal totality carried 
to its term.”12 Necessity, emphasised by emplotment, is not only a placement 
in a temporal chain, but adds retrospective value. This further underscores 
the interpretative and performative nature of narrative in this dissertation.  
The second purpose of emplotment follows from this reflective 
practice of narrative construction, and connects emplotment to narrative 
identity as Ricoeur describes it above. There is transference from action, 
captured by the emplotment, to character, “producing a dialectic . . . of 
sameness and selfhood”.13 The substance of character is the interpretation 
by I or me, to use Crossley’s phrasing.14 Actor-performer narratives produce 
a reflection of the Self and constructs identity. This reflection also 
incorporates and builds into narrative identity the perception of the Other. 
The identity-difference relation, proposed by Powell and discussed in the 
previous chapter, can be assessed using a narrative analysis of identity 
formation. Hayden White’s examination of historical narrative construction 
indicates a measure of performativity by the narrator. The use of emplotment 
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creates overarching type of story (i.e. Epic, Comedy, Romance, Satire or 
Tragedy). This general typology carries with it a range of discrete and overt 
intentions and uses of history.15 This supports Ricoeur’s emplotment as a 
presently situated reflection on the Self, creating particular identities as well 
as contexts. Combining the approaches of Crossley and Ricoeur allows the 
identifying of participant emplotment to generate an understanding of how 
identity is formed.  
A question should be raised as to whether or not discourse analysis 
would present a more appropriate model for this study. Discourse analysis 
would offer a space for proposing and assessing a dialectic present in 
participants’ self-perception of their involvement in the conflict and reasoning 
for doing so (i.e. sensing themselves as the victim necessitating a defence 
against discrimination and violence). This model could also offer a window 
into group discourse, beyond individual perspective, and possibly support 
analysis of identity formation. Discourse analysis is not without its own 
problems. It is less suited to the core thesis of analysing the formation of 
social actor identity within genocide. Whilst I am analysing participants as a 
group, I am seeking out individual narratives or stories about their 
experiences and perceptions, and then drawing out common features, where 
they are present.16 Discourse analysis may well presume these connections, 
and be reliant on additional discourse supporting materials, such as 
institutions and textual tools, which may well not exist or be unavailable.17 As 
this research is more focused on actor identity formation in the processes of 
genocide, individual narratives are the more appropriate data source. This 
model provides a window into the self-reflection of the subject on past events 
and provides a viewpoint of identity formation on an actor level.  
Pursuit of narrative analysis reflects the relational character of this 
research in that any narrative cannot be considered in isolation or singularly 
                                            
15 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century 
Europe (John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 54.  
16 Discourse analysis may also present an inappropriate burden on the narratives 
produced by participants. Furthermore, this approach places less emphasis on the authors 
themselves to distinguish their contribution to interpretation, see Paul Sullivan, Qualitative 
Data Analysis Using a Dialogical Approach (SAGE, 2011), 9-10.  
17 Mark J. Smith. Social Science in Question: Towards a Postdisciplinary 
Framework (London: SAGE Publications, 1998), 247-262. 
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situated. If the Self is at least a product of the interaction between the inner 
Self and the Other, then narratives are constructed in relation to those of 
Others’.18 The networks within which narrative identities formed provide the 
situatedness and constraints of this process. Participant interviews are a 
space for the presentation of narratives of insecurity, at a subaltern level. 
They also allow for the presentation of participants’ perceptions of historical 
processes. In addition to subjective interpretation and narrative performance 
engaged in by the participants, as a researcher I inevitably involve my own 
interpretation and narrative construction.19 This results in a very fragmented 
and inherently layered approach. 
 Allowing participants to reconstruct narratives through open questions 
and semi-structured interviews invites a performance of their situatedness 
and sense of self. According to Caroline Riessman, the use of narrative 
analysis is subject to all the shortcomings mentioned so far. Yet, it taps into 
the individual and cumulative process which facilitates “structure perceptual 
experience, organize memory”, and “mesh with a community of life stories.”20 
While there is no single model to this practice, a generalised mechanism is 
possible. This would acknowledge the layers of interpretation and 
reconstruction of narratives by the researcher. Riessman articulates this 
process in a two-way flow of interpretation, based on the five key interactions 
of reading, analysing, transcribing, telling, and attending (see Figure 3). 
Primary experience is fed into the bottom of this double trapezoid, where the 
interviewer encounters the participant’s narrative, indicating the importance 
of environment and power relations between the parties. Performance 
reconstructs the participant’s narrative for the observer. The top three stages 
of this process (reading, analysing, and transcribing), convey the further 
fragmentation and reconstruction of the narrative, and its analysis by the 
researcher.21 Narrative analysis therefore captures the intersubjectivity of the 
                                            
18 Claudia Holler and Martin Klepper, eds., Rethinking Narrative Identity: Persona 
and Perspective (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013), 5.  
19 Somers, 606.   
20 Riessman, 2.   
21 Ibid., 8-14.   
 89 
process of social research, and the activities of interpretation and 
reconstruction engaged in by the researcher and participant.  
 
Figure 3: Representations of experience and narrative analysis, from 
Riessman, 8. 
 If narrative-based interviews offer a voice and space for the 
reconstruction of narrative, what does this process tell us about identity and 
how such is formed? In response to the rise of 1990s’ identity politics, 
Margaret Somers critiques the gap in social analysis where categorisation 
obscures fluid identity.22 She argues that if one accepts the breakdown of a 
universal social actor (being synonymous with white patriarchy) and adopts 
alternative labels (for example: gender, sexuality identity), there is still a 
fundamental problem in understanding these “particularistic categories” 
across contexts and structures.23 Somers proposes an ontological narrative 
approach that situates the latter as the generator of identity or, more simply 
put where “stories guide action.”24 An ontological approach overcomes 
seeing identity as embedded or as “categorical rigidities” by “linking narrative 
and identity to generate historically constituted approaches to theories of 
social actions, agency and identity.”25 
 Ontological narratives can create an understanding of identity by 
considering “relationality of parts”, “casual emplotment”, “selective 
                                            
22 Holler and Klepper, 3. See prior discussion of performative identity in chapter two 
with Judith Butler’s critical gender studies.   
23 Somers, 606-608.   
24 Ibid., 614.   
25 Ibid., 607, 611.   
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appropriation”, and “temporality, sequences and place.”26 The relational 
aspect is necessary in seeking and establishing connections between would-
be RPF and AFDL soldiers in the early 1990s. Through networks of 
recruitment, training, and experience with genocide, narratives are adjusted 
and adopted (“selective appropriation”), shaping identities. In this sense, 
networks are an ordering principle for narratives, both for the participants and 
researcher. When conveyed through emplotment (temporality and identity 
dialectic as noted above), a narrative can disclose particular identities, but 
more importantly, how such are formed. Networks of both the physical and 
relational journeys layer into the formation of these identities. The features of 
genocide, discussed in the previous chapter, serve to frame the movement of 
soldiers through the vortex of genocide. This heuristic device captures the 
dynamic narratives offered by participants. It gives an insight into how 
layered experiences of genocide and mass violence play out through fluid 
and performative identities. As discussed in the previous chapter, networks 
constitute the social arrangements of power and relations, or figurations. The 
narratives and identities of young Banyamulenge and RPF recruits’ were 
shaped by the parameters of the relational and physical networks they 
participated in. They further capture connections between position and 
interests.27 These dynamics were fundamental to the journey soldiers’ took 
from their situatedness in intermediate space to being perceivably 
empowered to liberate their home and resolve an existential threat. Whilst 
formal network analysis is not engaged in this research, networks are 
understood in a soft or relational form, as connections and spaces that 
facilitated the development of narratives and identity. These soft networks 
are not discerned through quantitative plotting, but through a host of 
relational exchanges.28   
 I use the term “narrative” throughout this research and it deserves 
some further parsing. Within the theoretical approach, narratives of insecurity 
are fundamental to the vortex. Further, participant narratives constitute the 
                                            
26 Ibid., 616.   
27 Crossley, 33-34.   
28 Crossley introduces social network analysis as a quantitative, data gathering tool 
in the following, in Nick Crossley, “Social Networks and Relational Sociology,” in ed. Seth 
Abrutyn, Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory (Springer, 2016), 167-183.  
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primary source material. How then are these to be ordered or categorised? 
Somers identifies a typology of narratives. These stratify and offer a deeper 
analysis of the sometimes-competing narratives found among participants. 
Considering narratives as a whole and in relation to each other is essential in 
representing the stories being told. Yet, the complex and competing nature of 
participant narratives, both among and in comparison to additional accounts, 
requires deeper examination. Decontextualising all these narratives and 
assessing them through the features and vortex of genocide, allows for 
careful dissection and reconstruction of the process of identity formation.29 
Somers’ four types are namely ontological, public, metanarrative, and 
conceptual. Participant interchangeably presented the first three types. The 
ontological here refers to the performative: what the actor has done and how 
they interpreted themselves across space and time.30 This is the above 
ontological narrative argued for by Somers. This narrative conveys identities 
in the most detail. Public and metanarratives, although closely related, are 
distinguished by who uses them and how.  
Public narratives are those conveyed by political or social 
organisations. Metanarratives more closely related to paradigms of 
understanding, and is deployed by actors to create order across space and 
time.31 The following chapters discuss how RPF public and metanarratives 
influenced and shaped ontological narratives. The RPF’s anti-colonial 
ideology and narrative of regional Tutsi insecurity was key to tapping into 
Banyamulenge identity and interests. Additionally, and as discussed in 
chapter six, the RPF has also been able to harness international norms and 
legal discourse in creating a metanarrative against genocide revisionism and 
the genocidaire. This archetypal actor is an output of the identity-difference 
relation engaged in by participants. This occurred through the interpretation, 
framing of Banyamulenge narratives and persecution in eastern Zaïre, and 
genocide as reality in 1994 Rwanda and as a threat in 1996 North, and 
South Kivu. Genocidaire, as a narrative tool, was essential for how 
                                            
29 Judith Verweijen, The Ambiguity of Militarization: The complex interaction 
between the Congolese armed forces and civilians in the Kivu provinces, eastern DR Congo, 
Utrecht University PhD Dissertation, August 2015, 30-32.   
30 Somers, 618.   
31 Ibid., 625.   
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participants explained the occurrence and justification of attacks on 
Rwandan refugees. It also guided how the Other was described and labelled 
as a combatant, or ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR)/Interahamwe.  
The conceptual narrative connects with the fragmentary process given 
by Riessman. Involving her top to bottom three elements of reading, 
analysis, and transcribing, the research reconstructs narratives using a 
conceptual framework. This typology categorises both participants’ 
performed narratives and narratives of insecurity understood from these 
performances. The individual narratives at times will coalesce to shape a 
generalisable set of experiences for the Banyamulenge and other Tutsi 
actors in the region. Within the participant narratives, one can sense the 
individual's own ontological narrative, and elements of the public and 
metanarratives. The public narrative most often represented the narratives of 
insecurity regionally, yet, was supported by the metanarratives of genocide 
as utilised by the RPF. The intermingling and influencing between narratives 
is a crucial element identified by Somers’ model. 
Lastly, what is the impact of this methodology on interviews with 
participants of mass violence and genocide? When approached through the 
conceptualisation of the vortex, the decontextualisation of narratives will help 
in understanding the formation of identity. Research previously carried out on 
perpetration nominally does so with participants who are post-confession or 
conviction.32 This strand of genocide studies use narratives in the form of 
direct conversation, court case material, or biographical confessions.33 Such 
narrative reconstructions have their own fractured and heavily interpretative 
nature. In some cases, convicted actors will typically adopt the State’s public 
narrative, or even orient their narrative through notions of forced 
collaboration or obedience to former authority.34 This research explores a 
different, and perhaps more complex, route of asking perpetrators to sense 
                                            
32 These include but are not limited to Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, Scott 
Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, And War in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 
2006), and more recently, Kjell Anderson, Perpetrating Genocide: A Criminological Account 
(Routledge, 2017).  
33 Recent work by Hinton on the trial of the leader of S-21 torture facility, “Duch”, 
presents the complexities of the interaction between social and legal framing of genocide 
perpetration, see Man or Monster?.  
34 Straus, “Studying Perpetrators,” 33-35.  
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themselves and their own identities prior to the advent of the post-conviction 
paradigm. In this case, such a change would normalise the individual 
perpetrator, international or scholarly acceptance of the genocide of 
Rwandan refugees. Throughout my field research, participants would often 
avoid direct questions about participation in genocidal violence. Beyond 
Rwandan dissidents, Banyamulenge voices in this period have not yet been 
thoroughly explored. The impact of participation will be identified using 
supporting sources and analyses of the language used. This challenge is 
mitigated through decontextualising interviews using the features and vortex 
of genocide.    
Method 
The field research method used in this dissertation involved semi-structured 
interviews, providing a platform for narratives to be reconstructed and 
performed by participants. The following section discusses the elements of 
field research framed by Riessman's levels of interpretation (see Figure 3). 
Working from a core set of questions (see Appendix I), interviews were 
largely conducted in person within the target group of former or current 
Banyamulenge soldiers (see Table 1). Most of these traced their careers 
back to the RPF, and all were in the AFDL from 1996 to 1997. The second 
core group of participants were AFDL political actors during the same period. 
Many of these were also involved in RPF networks in eastern Congo going 
back to the early 1990s. A third group of participants are described as 
witnesses and did not wish to further disclose their involvement; however 
most identified as Banyamulenge now living outside of eastern Congo. The 
fourth group are further removed, and are best classified as having a more 
humanitarian or international role, but were present in the region during the 
late 1990s.  
In order to avoid selection bias, all the interviews obtained have been 
used, retaining any inconsistent content.35 This use of soldier and political 
actor interviews is an outcome of the limited availability of participants, or 
degrees of willingness to talk openly about their pasts. Several potential 
                                            
35 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 48.   
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contacts did not translate in participants because of security concerns. In this 
challenging environment the core Banyamulenge gatekeepers, one an expat 
in Europe, another in Bukavu, and the other in Goma were key in navigating 
the suspicion of most contacts. These gatekeepers emerged through 
networks of other Congo researchers and the fieldwork assistant. In Bukavu 
and Goma, use of multiple gatekeepers allowed for the selection of 
participants to move beyond any one of the formers’ social network. Of the 
previously interviewed participants found through existing researchers very 
few had been rigorously asked about their early 1990-1994 careers, or about 
the 1996-1997 camp attacks.  
Table 1: Breakdown of interview participants in various locations (2017-
2018). 
Actor Group Number of 
Participants 
Medium: Phone (P), In Person 
(IP) 
Humanitarian Actors 3 P 1, IP 2 
Journalist 1 P 1 
Political Actors 7 P 2, IP 5 
Soldiers (Former RPF, 
AFDL) 
19 P 1, IP 18 
Witnesses (undisclosed 
involvement) 
4 IP 4 
 
The planned questions covered key points of the anticipated narrative: 
life and views on Banyamulenge persecution prior to 1996; recruitment into 
and experiences with the RPF in early to mid-1990s Rwanda; formation of 
the AFDL; impact of the presence of ex-FAR and Interahamwe militants in 
the refugee camps; actions during the war; attacks on the refugee camps; 
and, views on any successes of the AFDL as well as on current security (see 
Appendix I). Most participants had a single interview. I did speak three core 
participants on three or more occasions, not including brief follow-ups. Most 
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interviews were in French or Kinyarwanda, with the fieldwork assistant 
interpreting. The interview process marked the first and second levels of 
interpretation. Further aspects of attending interviews are addressed in the 
below review of field experiences. 
Transcribed narratives went through a third level of interpretation. 
Transcriptions were produced from English interpreted recordings of most 
interviews. Six individual transcribers were hired as part of this process. 
Each were briefed on the research, and instructed to produce 
pseudonymised verbatim transcriptions. As the researcher, I then initially 
read and corrected specialised language or labels used in the interview, 
referring back to the original audio where necessary. The fourth level of 
interpretation then took place with the coding of interview transcripts. Coding 
emerged by reviewing field journals and rereading the transcripts 
themselves. Such immersion was necessary to sense what was being said 
beyond either my own framing of questions or coding I had developed whilst 
in the field. The interview questions did not directly inform open coding, but 
inevitably shaped the trajectory and content of the presented narratives. The 
primary nodes within the coding included: perceptions of current security of 
participants, attacks on refugees, Banyamulenge culture, the UN Mapping 
Report, perceived threats from the refugee camps in North and South Kivu, 
and the persecution of Banyamulenge. An additional node captures 
standalone quotes (or “soundbites”) helpful in generalising narrative plot 
points. Using Microsoft NVivo software, these parent nodes expanded into 
two further layers of child nodes (see Figure 4).     
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Figure 4: Interview Node Map, NVivo 12. 
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Parent and child nodes provided a guide for the fourth level of 
interpretation in constructing the conceptual narrative from the fragments of 
participant narratives. The breakdown of these nodes provides the 
emplotment resonating from the transcripts. The actual deployment of the 
transcripts in many cases is in lengthy quotes. This minimises any fracturing 
of the original performer’s narrative fracturing as much as possible. Some 
quotations of participants appear as shorter excerpts; in these cases, they 
offer a generalised point, bringing together a summary of the collective 
Banyamulenge soldier experience. Whilst the narratives do coalesce around 
certain plot points, views and particular lived experiences do vary somewhat, 
giving a nuanced perspective of the plot point in question. For example, 
when participants spoke about returning to liberate their communities, their 
views varied significantly on whether or not this was a motivational factor, or 
even if this commitment was RPF reinforced. The fifth and final level of 
interpretation comes with the reading of the conceptual narrative constructed 
in this dissertation. Continued engagement in this work, including the 
potential for adaptation, publication, and further research, indicate a vast 
range of possibilities for interpretation, taking intended use and analysis of 
the interview beyond my deductive theoretical framework.  
Review of Field Experiences and Ethical Considerations 
Field research went from May 2017 to July 2018, with three trips to Rwanda 
and DRC. Most interviews were conducted in person in Kigali, Bukavu, 
Goma, and Kinshasa. Several additional interviews were made by email and 
phone (see Table 1). The use of social media private message platforms, 
such as Facebook and WhatsApp, were crucial to initial networking and 
follow-up with contacts. The planning and execution of this element of the 
dissertation entailed various considerations. These primarily include: 
participant, researcher, and assistant safety and security; physical location; 
as well as, power relations between the participants and researcher. The 
following overview will address these three aspects of the fieldwork. 
A snowball approach was taken to the pre-field identification of 
contacts. Potential participants were issued an Information and Consent 
Document (see Appendix II), which was discussed and, upon request, 
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physically signed.36 In most cases, participants only wished to express 
consent verbally. This document explained the nature of the research whilst 
omitting any description of explicit labelling of genocide, as a reference to the 
attacks on the refugees. However, if participants volunteered this label and 
context, then this language was utilised in the discussion. This document 
also guaranteed the option of anonymity for participants; subsequently all 
names were removed from the transcripts produced following the interviews. 
Most participants took this option, especially those still actively serving in the 
FARDC who would only speak on the condition of anonymity.  
Interview locations were agreed upon beforehand with the participant, 
taking place in a public building, but often in a closed-door room (i.e. 
restaurants, churches, hotels). Only one interview was carried out in a 
domestic residence, as a matter of convenience for the participant at the 
time. Locations were varied to ensure the security of participants in case of 
perceived suspicion, or because of repeated use.37 These measures aided 
my own security, in addition to having in place appropriate letters and 
immigration documentation supporting my field research. Measures were 
taken to ensure that participants understood I was not responsible for any 
trauma revisited during the interviews; yet, I identified local resources in case 
signposting to health professionals was required (see Appendix II). All audio 
files and notes generated from field research are securely held and are 
scheduled for destruction within three years of completion of this dissertation. 
To assist in the facilitation of this work in both Rwanda and DRC, a 
fieldwork assistant was vetted and contracted to act as a guide and 
interpreter. The cost of the fieldwork assistant was negotiated and paid prior 
to the delivery of services. Anonymity was also guaranteed to this individual, 
who was given a full briefing of this research’s scope. Daily debriefs were 
held between myself and the assistant to review progress, security and any 
concerns about their overall wellbeing. Additional paid research assistants 
                                            
36 Copies of this document were available in English and French, and further 
translations were possible upon request into Kiswahili and Kinyarwanda.  
37 This was a matter of participant perception, as well as genuine security concern. 
One terminated interview was a result of the participant being convinced that a foreign 
government representative was listening to our conversation. The latter followed us from the 
hotel in a vehicle, but was not seen after several minutes nor again during that trip.   
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were also hired to support the process of transcription, as mentioned above. 
The transcriber, following completion and payment, deleted interview audio 
files. Interviews were identified based on the date, town or city location and 
consecutive numbering of interviews.  
Carrying out interviews in the varied security and political contexts of 
Rwanda and DRC necessitated differing approaches in each of these 
countries. Minimal interviews were carried out in Kigali, because of the 
politically sensitive nature of the research and past involvement of still active 
government and military officials in the events in question. Extra care was 
taken in pre-arranging meeting places that offered confidential space. The 
fieldwork assistant facilitated this selection of locations. Interviews carried out 
in Goma, Bukavu and Kinshasa required less intense vigilance and more a 
focus on the participants’ own sense of comfort and security. On two 
occasions in Bukavu, we moved interview locations upon the request of the 
participant.   
In terms of the power relations inherent in this process (as a 
Westerner arriving in the Global South to speak with former soldiers about 
past trauma and violence experiences) care was taken in using open and 
closed questions as deemed appropriate in the semi-structured interview 
format. This provided an open enough platform for participants to perform 
their narratives, decreasing some chances of them just saying what they 
perceived I might have wanted to hear. Crucially, interview structure was 
dependant on their input, and, not solely, on my questioning. In keeping with 
this open format, each interview ended with an offer for the participant to add 
anything else they deemed relevant. Compensation was offered to in-person 
participants to cover their travel expenses, and meals were purchased if the 
interviews took place during a midday or evening meal time. This happened 
consistently, as many did not have their own transport and relied on buses, 
taxis or motorbike taxis. The direct giving of gifts was avoided, so to not 
adversely affect the power relationship between the participant and myself.  
As a mzungu, my presence was conspicuous in the various locations 
visited, especially where interviews were held.38 It was in these moments, 
                                            
38 Mzungu, or muzungu is the Swahili for a white person.  
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when I was verbally addressed with this label, that I felt most conscious of 
the expectations of a white Anglo person in both Rwanda and Congo. This 
ascription of my own identity played into the power relations present around 
and during interviews. Participant age and socio-political standing weighed 
into this dynamic. Despite my best redirecting and authoritative interview 
skills, older participants with considerable standing in the Banyamulenge 
community would take command of the flow of the interview and give a full, 
longue durée narration of their views uninhibited by my questions. Although 
time consuming, these visits offered a deep historical perspective and an 
insight into Banyamulenge communal memory.39   
Conclusion 
The methodology identified in this chapter recognises the intersubjective and 
interpretive nature of this research. The use of narrative analysis facilitates 
the exploration of participant narratives contextualised in their own 
background and stories, as well as being decontextualised for detailed 
analysis. Riessman’s general approach to narrative analysis frames the 
method used in this research by identifying the levels of interpretation used. 
Additionally, Somers’ typology of narrative will help in the decontextualisation 
of participant narratives into ontological, public, and metanarrative elements. 
The overarching historical narrative produced by this methodology and 
method constitute the conceptual narrative. The latter utilises the theoretical 
framework of the specific features and vortex of genocide identified in the 
previous chapter. Although logistically challenging, the field research carried 
out for this dissertation was structured with a coherent plan that considered 
the wellbeing and security of the researcher, participants and others 
involved, including the fieldwork assistant. 
                                            
39 Stearns refers to this as the Banyamulenge’s “obsessive sense of history”, see 
Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 59-60.   
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Chapter V: Intermediate Space and Destructive Crises: Historical 
Background of a Great Lakes Genocide 
Atrocity cannot be its own explanation. Violence cannot be allowed to 
speak for itself, for violence is not its own meaning. To be thinkable, it 
needs to be historicized 
--Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers.1 
 
Introduction 
Recent Great Lakes history is composed of complex and competing stories 
of violence (see Appendix III). Considering the tangled nature of these 
stories, this work, in part, seeks to explore the historical background of the 
genocide of Rwandan refugees in the First Congo War. The prelude to this 
destruction is the systematic nature of RPF violence against real and 
perceived opposition and collaborators. This violence can be traced back to 
the initial invasion of Rwanda in 1990, and followed through to late 1997. 
Whilst the violence produced and facilitated by the RPA in the Congo did not 
abate in 1997, it demarcates the partnership and institutional coherence of 
the AFDL and participation in the genocide against Rwandan refugees. The 
broader picture of this genocide and its perpetration is situated in a narrative 
of the Kivu provinces in what was eastern Zaïre, focusing on Banyarwanda 
and Banyamulenge experiences. The RPA soldiers involved in this episode 
are posited as secondary actors; this chapter does not include an 
examination of the history of the RPF as such, but will acknowledge this 
important element.  
This chapter offers an account of the events of the early 1990s in both 
Rwanda’s civil war and genocide, and the consequences of failed democratic 
reforms in the Kivus. The focus then narrows into Banyarwandan and 
Banyamulenge experiences in the 1990, RPF/A recruitment and the 
formation of the AFDL, followed by a preliminary account of the genocide of 
Rwandan refugees across Zaïre. My narrative draws on various secondary 
sources and humanitarian literature examining this episode within the context 
of the Rwandan conflict, or the larger so-called Congo Wars.   
                                            
1 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 228-229.   
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Historiographically, I will approach this history using the three features 
of genocide discussed previously: narratives of insecurity, destructive crises, 
and intermediate space, as analytical tools. These aspects help illuminate 
the realignments, or reaggregations of power relations in Zaïre by the 1994 
exodus of refugees and the 1996 invasion of the AFDL/RPA.2  Doing so 
creates an arena where the features and vortex of genocide formed identities 
and fostered perpetration.  
In eastern Zaïre, this dire situation was the ongoing effect of pre-
1990s exclusion of Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge as well as power 
relations between these groups and their neighbours in the Kivu provinces. 
Within the political and economic factors of these relationships are the core 
nodes of citizenship and land rights/usage. This analysis seeks to create 
focus on the process of genocide of the Rwandan refugees, not to paint the 
broad strokes already offered by others explaining the wars in a larger 
regional context.3 This narrowing aims to generate an environment within 
which participant narratives are explored in subsequent chapters. 
To emphasise the actor-level impact of crisis and focus on the 
formation of genocide identities, Mudimbe’s notion of intermediate space and 
violence will be reviewed, and then used to capture the impact of colonialism 
on Banyarwandan and Banyamulenge as potential AFDL recruits and 
subjects of social, economic, and political marginalisation. Intermediate 
space is an “amorphous space . . . . It is also a site of violence and 
designates both an explanation and illustration of the extent of the dangerous 
precariousness of the continent’s colonial past and its present-day 
marginality.”4 Mudimbe characterises this space as the “marginality” of the 
“colonizing structure”, where the interactions of the colonial and postcolonial 
are caught “between the so-called African tradition and the projected 
modernity of colonialism.”5 The colonial heritage of the intermediate space, is 
                                            
2 Bergholz, 205. The phrase “exodus” is originally used by Willame, 88.  
3 See also Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality (Zed Books, 
2007); and Congo (John Wiley & Sons, 2013).   
4 Wai, 130.   
5 Mudimbe, 4-5; Morten Bøås, “Marginalised Youth,” in Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn, 
eds, African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 27-
28.  
 103 
one of destructive, disruptive force, a ground zero of violence, “It should be 
stressed that the ‘post’ in postcolonial does not refer to an ‘end’ of colonial 
violence, but a reproduction and reformulation of the regimes of oppressive 
power relations, often misunderstood as a temporal category designating an 
‘end’”.6 This concept captures the impact of this reproduction on the 
perceptions, identity and actions of the AFDL/RPA within eastern Zaïre, 
especially in the execution of the hunt for the genocidaire. For Zubairu Wai, 
this structural axis hinges the violence on an everyday level,  
The structural violence that creates conditions of physical and 
emotional distress colours the nature of social interaction in the form 
of everyday violence, in terms of existential struggles over access to 
resources, anger and frustration, all of which frequently manifest 
themselves in, for example, domestic abuse, substance abuse, 
communal and interpersonal violence, open conflict and so on.7  
 
It is this commonness of violence, leading up to and during the genocide 
from 1996 to 1997, which constituted this intermediate zone. This is where 
colonial heritage (notions of ethnicity, citizenship, and land), especially the 
Belgian creation of Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in eastern Zaïre, 
created the contemporary marginality of such communal groups.  
“When storms come up from East . . . and make war”8 
Journalists, academics and NGOs alike have exhaustively covered the 
history of the Rwandan civil war and genocide. However, the following 
account draws out the strands RPF production of systematic violence against 
those considered genocidaires, or collaborators. In Prunier’s discussion of 
the RPF killings, he describes these actions as systematic, especially when 
considering the highly organised and structured nature of this force. Yet, he 
argues that after the RPF gained a foothold in the northeast prefecture of 
Byumba, their violence could be seen as habitual responses to the perceived 
intentions of RPF leadership, or “an adaptation of free market economics to 
                                            
6 Wai, 140.   
7 Ibid., 151.   
8 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Hobbit (Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 52.  
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political assassination.”9 These were not mirror atrocities to the Interahamwe 
and FAR, but “a policy of political control through terror”.10 
 Following the downing of Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994, a 
prepared genocide of Rwandans began. This targeted those considered by 
Hutu elites to be antithetical to their group’s perseveration.11 Localised 
killings in Kigali spread throughout the region via a network of militias, 
including the Interahamwe, government officials, and the FAR. The execution 
of 10 Belgian peacekeepers by FAR soldiers forced the reduction of United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) troop numbers and their 
retreat into defensive positions.12 Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM) broadcasts called Rwandans to order and supported the mobilisation 
of thousands in this work of death.13 The tightly packed geography and 
population density of Rwanda enabled the killings to spread quickly.14 The 
majority of these deaths took place between the second week of April and 
the third week of May. This works outs at a rate five times that of Nazi death 
camps.15 Women were raped in their tens of thousands. Tropes of 
“beautiful”, but “arrogant” Tutsi women fuelled this violence.16 Weapons used 
in the genocide were typical day-to-day manual labour tools, in many cases 
these were purposefully distributed to the populace for this task. In some 
cases, people were just as likely to be shot, depending on their age, gender 
and locality, as they were to be hacked to death by machetes.17 In the 
framing of the vortex, this series of events would have massive impact, for 
not only all Rwandans, but also those considered attached to Rwanda living 
across the border in eastern Zaïre. As a destructive crisis in this schema, it 
proved to be the most ruinous.  
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 Parallel atrocities by the RPF were documented at the time. The 
controversially silenced Gersony Report, Alison Des Forges’ Leave None to 
Tell the Story, and other humanitarian NGO reports offer an account that 
questions Prunier’s analysis that RPF violence was limited in scope and 
scale.18 Aside from the important business of classifying this destruction, 
these describe a clear, distinct pattern of achieving political objectives 
through violence at great human cost. Commencing the invasion on 1 
October 1990, the RPF was only able to gain a temporary foothold in 
Byumba, before promptly retreating. Kagame then took the reins of the 
invasion a week later. From their redoubt in the Virunga Mountains, the RPF 
launched small-scale attacks, resuming its Byumba position in June 1992.19  
According to Mamdani, the “liberation turned out to be a combination of 
occupation and displacement.”20 The RPF killings that accompanied this 
period peaked in 1993, and continued as the RPF spread west and routed 
the genocidaire forces by mid-1994.21  
A multifaceted approach simultaneously displaced refugees, exposed 
would-be recruits and future RPF subjects to political teachings, courtesy of 
the abakada, or political operatives. Additionally, the looting and targeting of 
Hutus was carried out based on stated or suspected party and “ethnic” 
affiliation.22 Abakada were drawn from local communities, and supported the 
effort of reorganising the occupied territory and ensuring the dispersal of anti-
colonial and pro-national unity ideology.23 In order to facilitate legitimacy for a 
future government, RPF sought out and then secreted pro-RPF Hutu 
community leaders behind their 1994 lines.24 This meant the recruitment 
drives within Rwanda, which began in earnest following the re-entrance in 
Byumba included both Hutu and Tutsi, and ranged from welcoming FAR 
deserters and pro-Hutu militia members. This included pressing young Hutu 
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23 Rever offers an account from a former abakada who was involved in various 
operations prior to and around 1994, in Rever, 107-110.  
24 Des Forges, 535-537. Prunier, 7. 
 106 
males in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps into RPF soldiery. 
However, once the events of April to July 1994 unfolded, those considered 
Hutu and capable of using any lethal weapon were arrested, imprisoned, 
tortured, disappeared, and frequently executed in an extra-judicial manner. 
These efforts also included blocking NGO and humanitarian access to areas 
where such actions were taking place.25 During this civil war period, a trickle 
of new recruits was also arriving from Zaïre, as discussed below. These 
recruits would later form the backbone of mid-1990s recruitment and AFDL 
invasion.  
 The harbinger of RPF military power and production of politically-
based violence was the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). This RPF 
organ, whose existence of which was previously denied, trained and 
equipped so-called technicians as part of the Network Commando.26 
Knowledge about this group comes from former RPF actor accounts, and the 
technicians themselves.27 Foremost among these is the confessional 
monograph published by Ruzibiza. He maps out various acts of violence 
committed by the RPF, whilst abdicating responsibility to politicians and all 
the way to Kagame himself.28 The most comprehensive picture of the DMI 
and the Network Commando now comes from Rever and the Spanish 
indictment, relying heavily on RPF dissidents. The Network Commando 
operated in the early 1990s Rwanda with up to 300 technicians.29 The group 
was allegedly established in 1992 and formalised the work of eviscerating 
any remaining elite level opposition to the RPF, activities also included 
reconnaissance, and infiltration of Hutu extremist units.30 Technician and 
commando training included use of various means of execution and 
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assassination.31 Particularly disturbing claims made by the Spanish 
indictment and Rever, described the practices of luring out civilians or other 
potential targets with promises of food, protection and safe passage, as well 
as false flag attacks. The latter involved attacks conducted by commandos, 
later claimed to be Interahamwe attacks.32 The purpose of this alleged 
strategy was to foment discord and foster support for the RPF, where they 
would then retaliate against supposed genocidaire attacks. According to one 
former operative, testifying as a witness in the Spanish indictment, their aim 
was to “eliminate as many Hutu people as possible from Rwanda . . . [and] 
seize power by force - even sacrificing the Tutsis who had remained in 
Rwanda [who were] considered traitors”.33 Notwithstanding further 
investigation and any revived activity from the Spanish case, what is 
specifically known about the Network Commando can only be pieced 
together from linking the actual network of actors, and accounts from former 
RPF soldiers, including those discussed in chapters seven and eight.34 It can 
be presumed that the violence analysed in this section most likely involved 
this organ of the RPF machine.  
The RPF drained areas under their control from 1992 to 1994 as part 
of a “systematic regrouping policy”.35 Mamdani asserts that under the RPF, 
northwest Rwanda, populated by a million Rwandans prior to 1994, was left 
with only 2,500 residents.36 Many fled in the opposite direction to RPF zones, 
compounding the internal displacement crisis, where thirty camps were filled 
with 950,000 Rwandans by mid-1993, with a third of this number being 
displaced multiple times by the end of 1993.37 Whilst some remained in 
Byumba and the growing RPF zones, foreign visitors consistently described 
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these areas as empty and “eerily calm”.38 Robert Gersony similarly reported 
areas being “virtually deserted” as late summer 1994.39 As the genocide 
began, the RPF opened a corridor from Kigali, allowing for an influx of nearly 
200,000 IDPs by the end of April 1994.40  
Following the expansion of the RPF zone, civilians disappeared and 
were ultimately killed in a process lasting into 1995, with the infamous 
massacre of the Kibeho IDP camp. According to a source at the UNHCR, 
Gersony’s findings indicated that between 25,000 and 45,000 Rwandans 
were killed by the RPF from April to August of 1994.41 The report describes a 
“scene of systematic and sustained killing and persecution of Hutu civilian 
populations by the RPA”, as observed during their 1994 fieldwork. He goes 
on to characterise the nature of such as involving the gathering of suspected 
opponents and genocidaires by means of ruses, conducting house-to-house 
executions, and “well-coordinated” attacks on those reported to be hiding in 
swamp areas. Refugees trying to flee towards Burundi during 1994 were 
stopped, harassed and sometimes killed.42  
Byumba, the hub of the RPF invasion, became a recurring site for 
disappearances and killings.43 As early as February 1993, thousands had 
been subject to RPF attacks across both Byumba and Ruhengeri.44 Yet, 
these incidents, like others from 1990 to 1994, are hard to corroborate.45 On 
20 April 1994, some 300 displaced persons from outside the RPF zones 
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were “denounced” as genocidaires and shot. Whilst commanding officers 
were reportedly not present, legitimacy was not lent to such actions. As with 
many other cases it is hard to imagine actions like this going unsanctioned 
within the highly structured nature RPF. Five days later, under the guise of 
protective relocation, 60 political leaders and civil society members from 
Byumba and Rutare were executed en route to a supposed refuge.46 On 23 
April, a further massacre occurred of over two thousand persons crowded 
into the football stadium in Byumba. As supposed genocidaires, the 
prisoners were sprayed with automatic weapons fire. The bodies were then 
loaded onto a truck and taken for incineration.47 
After the RPF advanced south, engulfing eastern Rwanda and 
avoiding the remaining FAR military presence and major centres of the 
genocide, they proceeded to march west. The RPF was seeking a military 
victory, following the now total failure of negotiated peace, only indirectly 
ending the genocide.48 Killings escalated as the front advanced during the 
months from May to August. According to reports, the DMI detainment camp 
at Kami, just north of Kigali, became a killing centre for both Hutu and Tutsi 
prisoners.49 Run by Karenzi Karake, as early as May 1994, its use continued 
into 2016. Here inmates were tied up, tortured, and then executed for alleged 
connections to the genocide, the FDLR, or political opposition.50 Alan 
Kuperman, in a short revisionist account of the RPF, ventures so far as to 
state that the evidence from top RPF commanders points toward the pursuit 
of a military victory at all costs, even that of Rwandan Tutsis being 
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slaughtered in the West. A cultural distance and “high tolerance” of civilian 
deaths emerged, facilitating a strategic logic of all or nothing.51 
The pattern of being called for public meetings offering sanctuary or 
resettlement, or being moved to another location, appears consistently in the 
reported attacks on civilians suspected of being involved in the genocide. 
Des Forges describes this as “a practice which gave rise to the bitter joke 
that kwitaba imana, meaning to die, had come to mean the same as kwitaba 
inama, to attend a meeting.”52 In Mututu, Butare prefecture, during early 
June, local children were found by the RPF and asked to bring their parents 
out of hiding. Days later, men, women, and children assembled for supposed 
relocation in the Mututu commercial district. Many of the young men were 
then singled out and shot, whilst others were tied up in the market. This 
group was then released and sent towards the centre of Muyira. The RPF 
soldiers again turned on the column, firing at males within the group.53 Half of 
those interviewed in late 1994 by Gersony’s team in camps in Zaïre, cited 
eye-witnessed violence by the RPA against Hutu civilians on this scale in 
Kibungo, Butare, as well as in and around Kigali, eastern Ruhengeri and 
Byumba as a reason for not returning to their homes in Rwanda. Interviews 
contained stories of the RPF using kwitaba inama to draw out those in hiding 
and suspected genocidaires.54  
Mass arrests were another element of RPF systematic violence and 
use of terror. In the process of “triaging” all they discovered, the RPF would 
use new allies and local recruits to identify genocidaires. In Butare, RPF 
operatives called on witnesses to the genocide to make accusations of those 
already detained.55 The number of those arrested exploded from 30,000 in 
July 1994 to 80,000 in November 1996. Many of those imprisoned 
experienced beatings and torture. Some even suffocated to death due to the 
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deplorable conditions.56 At the Huye football stadium of Butare, in July 1994, 
hundreds were gathered from the Ntyazo, Ngenda, and Runyinya 
communes.57 Some were released after length questioning in nearby 
buildings. However, many of the men were kept in detention for further 
interrogation, and then reportedly taken out to the local woods, where 
screams were heard by local residents for the following two days. These 
detainees remained missing, presumed dead.58 In the wake of the RPF, the 
network of abakada appointees remained, directing the work of accusation, 
denunciation and political order. Officials unpaid by the RPF were given free 
rein to plunder for their compensation.59 
The RPF’s steady stream of massacres and disappearances 
continued into 1995, peaking at Kibeho. This location, supported by 
UNAMIR, housed up to 150,000 Rwandans. Accounts acknowledge that 
some of the inhabitants were armed, and had participated in the genocide. 
Over the course of several days, from 19 to 24 April, the RPF marched into 
the camp with the intention of clearing it, undoubtedly in search of 
suspects.60 During these six days, 4,000 Rwandans, mostly Hutu inhabitants, 
were believed to have been killed by the RPF. The RPF leadership and the 
international community were increasing the pressure to close the many 
camps in the southern half of the country. As a result of the refusal of 
refugees to go anywhere for fear of being killed outside the camps, RPF 
soldiers on the ground engaged in increasingly aggressive measures to clear 
this camp in particular. Those wounded or killed were victims of mortar fire, 
gunshots, and machete blows. In front of international aid workers and UN 
medics, RPF soldiers dragged men and women out from their hiding places 
in the camp and shot them in broad daylight.61  
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Whilst this scale of violence may qualify under Prunier’s general 
characterisation of RPF violence as “decentralized [and] limited”, this period 
demonstrated the modus operandi of an embattled RPF, with soldiers on the 
ground functioning in a civilian-filled warzone, doing more than just 
terrorising to secure control over a suspect population. Extra-judicial arrests, 
executions and disappearances were systematic. RPF conduct and 
treatment of those essentially deemed as foreign in their homeland, is telling 
of the future measures taken in the handling of refugees in Zaïre. Kibeho 
was not a “speed bump”, but a sure sign of future operations against 
perceived genocidaires.62 Kibeho would become a cautionary tale for 
refugees inside Zaïre thinking of returning to Rwanda, a wedge in the 
National Unity government, and a rallying call for ex-FAR and Interahamwe 
leaders.63  
 Characterising Rwanda as a zone of crisis is not the purpose of this 
section; however, this brief slice of RPF history shows the kinds of practices 
and power used by this group to achieve its aspirations of security and 
political power. The collapse of local structures because of the genocide only 
deepened the intermediate space. Violence was reproduced along colonially 
inherited lines and in response to the genocide: identification of suspects on 
changeable criteria, gathering Rwandan (mostly Hutu) together by means of 
the public meeting ruse, disappearing of suspects, and executions. This 
indicates that RPF action was situated within the structural and direct 
violence of warfare.64 Their own refugee culture, militarised through the 
return by force, diminished potential empathy with civilians caught in a civil 
war and then genocide. This facilitated the easy suspicion of all not 
perceived as loyal to the RPF cause. The colonial structures that influenced 
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the RPF ideology on national unity and their anti-colonial discourse, presents 
somewhat of a paradox, still rife in Rwanda today.65 On the one hand the 
political agenda and legitimacy of the RPF was, and is, founded on all being 
united as Kinyarwanda speakers, not as Hutu and Tutsi. On the other hand, 
Hutus, the perception of whom was strongly influenced by RPF exile culture, 
were progressively targeted as genocidaires. The fact that most Rwandans 
were treated with distrust and suspicion only compounded the civilian 
casualties of the RPF offensive, seizure of power and, actions against 
refugees.    
How the Other Half Lived: Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge in Zaïre  
The history of Kinyarwanda-speaking communities of eastern Zaïre, where 
they arrived from and when, is rehearsed in various places and is not 
repeated in detail here.66 It is possible to generalise that those Rwandans, 
identifiable in the past, or presently, as Hutus or Tutsis, migrated under 
political push factors, whether these were colonial or more recently as a 
result of massacre and genocide. Many of these groups assumed political 
identity in connection with their new locales, underscoring the settled and 
permanent nature of the migrations. Those who arrived with the 1994 post-
genocide exodus would be the exception. Integral to the understanding of the 
lives and fates of these waves of migrants and refugees has been the 
development of colonial and postcolonial notions of national and indigenous 
identities. The Congolese Banyarwanda group can be divided into discrete 
categories, each label loaded with its own political and historical significance. 
Banya itself means people from, thus these waves of migrants and refugees 
sought to establish their own identity through association with new settled 
places: Banyamulenge of the Mulenge hills in present South Kivu, with both 
Banyarutshuru and Banyamasisi from respectively Rutshuru and Masisi 
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areas of present North Kivu.67 The Banyamulenge are historically more Tutsi 
in their cultural, economic and social traditions and perceptions. At the time 
of the First Congo War, the Banyarwanda groups in North Kivu made-up 50 
percent of the province’s population, with three quarters identified as Hutu 
(mostly Banyarutshuru) and the remaining as Tutsi (mostly Banyamasisi).68 
The implications and labelling of Hutu and Tutsi in these two provinces is 
discussed below. 
 The first wave of migrants from Mwami Rwabugiri’s kingdom (the 
precolonial kingdom of Rwanda), came in the mid-1800s as political exiles. 
Historians offer a variety of accounts, from describing these mostly Tutsi 
elites arriving and negotiating settlement rights with local tribal leaders, to 
Tutsi elites bringing with them their own Hutu labourers to settle the area for 
pastoral use, or “aristocratic” elites who were fleeing attempts to centralise 
power and avoid taxation.69 Regardless, this wave arrived and settled prior to 
the establishment of colonial rule in the region now defined as South Kivu. 
From this point on, these Tutsi pastoralists became autonomous, without any 
separatist leanings.70 During the colonial period of the 1920s to the 1930s, 
these existing migrants spread deeper into the Congo due to local political 
and economic oppression, and were added to by waves of further labourers, 
those the Belgians “transplanted” from Rwanda to the arable lands of the 
Congo, and also into present day North Kivu.71 The latter group, brought in to 
meet white settler demand for labour, occupied and settled on land seized 
from traditional hunting use by the Hunde in Masisi.72 Push factors of famine 
in Rwanda would compel further thousands to cross the border in search of 
land and survival into the 1940s.  
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 It was the 1960s and early 1970s that saw the first postcolonial wave 
of political refugees. Elites fleeing the conflict between emerging political 
groups in Rwanda as products of decolonisation (both Hutu popular parties 
and militias and Tutsi “restorationist parties and militias”).73 Hutus fleeing 
Burundi, during the early 1970s, also contributed to the growing number of 
Kinyarwanda speakers now occupying eastern Congo. The earlier twentieth 
century movements saw 85,000 migrants from Rwanda. During the 1960s a 
further 120,000 came over the border.74  
During this period, the Banyarwanda groups in Zaïre experienced a 
political awakening and became involved in domestic politics. Through the 
appointment of Banyarwanda Tutsi Barthélemy Bisengimana as a chief 
cabinet officer, Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge groups experienced some 
of the political and economic benefits of patrimony within the Mobutuist 
state.75 This was following their allying with the national army because of the 
Mulele Rebellion, or Simba War. It was at this point that those traditionally 
(i.e. prior to the 1960’s wave) present in the Kivus started to distinguish 
themselves from the newcomers by using the self-identification 
Banyamulenge.76 This trend continued with the reception of Burundian 
refugees, prompting a drive to claim legitimacy through residency rather than 
ethnicity. Further Burundian refugees - about 50,000 - also arrived in 1993 in 
the wake of the violence that followed the assassination of President 
Melchior Ndadaye.77  
 The legal and political reverberations of this nearly 100-year-old 
stream of Kinyarwanda speakers intersects with the development of 
citizenship, customary law and land use. Under the indirect colonial rule of 
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the Belgians, those deemed native or autochthonous at the point of 
establishment of the Congo Free State in 1885, received semi-autonomous 
status under customary law. Belgian authorities, in support of the movements 
westward from Rwanda, allowed the Banyarwanda of Masisi to establish 
their own Native Authority, giving them power of land use and ethnic 
citizenship.78 This Native Authority only lasted until 1957 when it was 
disbanded, removing the political influence of Kinyarwanda speakers in the 
area who had been present for over a generation.79 This distribution of power 
further underscored the divergences in land ownership conflicts not only 
between Banyarwanda and groups such as the Hunde, but between the 
waves of migrants, labourers and refugees.80 It was this conflict and steady 
erosion of power that led to Banyarwandan involvement in the Mulele 
Rebellion.81 
 The 1972 Citizenship Law then granted citizenship to “all immigrants 
from Rwanda and Burundi”, another benefit to the Kinyarwanda speakers of 
Bisengimana’s appointment.82 The Banyamulenge were not as benefited by 
this move as other Banyarwanda groups. For those in North Kivu, this gave 
official recognition and some level of parity and possible intervention in 
localised disputes over land in the densely populated areas of Rutshuru and 
Masisi, and undoubtedly turned popular tides against these Kivutian 
minorities.83 Population density in these parts of North Kivu was grounded in 
the immigration and settlement policies practiced by the Belgians from the 
1920 to 1950s.84 During this period, the approach shifted from filling once 
sparsely Hunde populated forests with Rwandan labourers and white 
settlers, to placing Hunde local authorities over Rwandan immigrants as new 
                                            
78 Judith Verweijen, “From Autochthony to Violence? Discursive and coercive socio 
practices of the Mai-Mai in Fizi, Eastern DR Congo,” African Studies Review 58, no. 2 
(2015):159-160; here Verweijen explains in a localised context the “plastic” but socially 
organising principle of ethnicity, where membership, in some cases multiple memberships, 
of associations and groups is a key social currency.  
79 Ibid., 238, 241.  
80 Court, 423; Koen Vlassenroot and Chris Huggins, “Land, Migration and Conflict in 
Eastern D.R. Congo,” Eco-Conflicts 3, no. 4 (October 2004): 2.    
81 Mamdani, When Victims Becomes Killers, 241-242.   
82 Kisangani, Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960-2010, 122.   
83 Ibid.; Prunier, 50.   
84 Mararo, 507-518.   
 117 
landowners. The combination of ill-defined civil and land-ownership law and 
diminishing land holdings created constant tension between the autochthon 
and Banyarwanda groups. 
The fall of Bisengimana and the realignments of patrimony under 
Mobutu in favour of the various non-Banyarwanda groups (such as the 
Nande and Hunde), especially in North Kivu, led to the promulgation of the 
1981 Citizenship Law.85 This legislation cancelled the citizenship of those to 
whom it had been granted to in 1971, if they could not prove pre-1885 
residency. However, this law was inconsistently enforced due to the 
weakness of the state.86 Anthony Court describes this trajectory as 
representative of growing distrust of Kinyarwanda speakers by their 
neighbours within the Kivus, “This reflected a deep-seated conviction in 
Congolese society that no Banyarwanda had been present on ‘Congolese’ 
soil during the pre-colonial period, many even refuting the organised and 
spontaneous migrations of the colonial period.”87 
 The swelling of domestic opposition to Mobutu’s kleptocracy, notably 
under the illegally formed opposition Union pour la démocratie et le progrès 
social (UDPS) and growing student movement, meant that people began 
publicly questioning their leader’s infallibility.88 Inflation was on the rise, and 
would become hyperinflation by 1993. Foreign aid was suspended after the 
massacre of University of Lubumbashi students in May 1990, and consumer 
prices were growing in the thousandth percentile. It became clear to all, 
including the kleptocrat himself, that Mobutu was sailing a sinking ship.89 
These pressures prompted the unveiling of a multi-party state in April 1990. 
Yet the CNS stalled at several points in 1991, and was often stacked with 
Mobutuist delegates. It was at this point that enforcement of the 1981 
Citizenship Law was brought to bear.90 The schism and rhetoric between the 
subscribed indigenous and ascribed non-indigenous labels, increasingly 
                                            
85 Kisangani, Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960-2010, 123; and 
Mamdani, When Victims Becomes Killers, 244.   
86 Ibid. 
87 Court, 429.   
88 Nzongola, 185-187.  
89 Kisangani, Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960-2010, 26-27.   
90 Ibid.; Willame, 63-64.   
 118 
targeted at Banyarwanda, became a core issue of the CNS. Mobutu 
manoeuvred for survival and proposed the rejection of any citizenship claims 
outside of the pre-1885 benchmark. In 1995, parliament striped citizenship 
from non-indigenous minorities. At this point Mobutu had already sowed the 
seeds of discord, in his attempts at manipulating various groups and 
ethnicities. By 1996, North Kivu had seen what Kisangani refers to as three 
separate “ethnic wars”: in 1993 in Walikale and Masisi; across the summer of 
1995 in North Kivu; and, again in April 1996. In late 1996, local authorities 
order Banyamulenge in South Kivu to leave or face massive retaliation.91 
This period of violence targeted Banyarwanda, and saw the realignment of 
political actors against Tutsi Banyarwanda with power relationships 
reaggregated by the arrival of the Rwandan exodus in 1994. In over 498 
days of violence, from 1993 and 1996, 33,500 to 49,000 died, and 570,000 
people became displaced.92 Kisangani’s use of the word “ethnic” 
underscores not a primordial sense of conflict, but reflects the complexity of 
violent politicisation of ethnicity and identity in Zaïre.93  
 Independent and postcolonial Congo inherited and absorbed the 
colonial classifications and stratifications of indigeneity and citizenship, 
creating an intermediate space. As Crawford Young laments, “The silent 
incorporation of many defining attributes of the colonial state in its post-
independence successor for three decades validated the ‘postcolonial’ 
characterisation.”94 Young goes on to describe the consequences of this 
incorporation as “corrosive” and “eviscerating”. 95 For 1990s Zaïre, this was 
the brutal reality, especially for the various Banyarwanda groups in the Kivus. 
Tied into these politico-legal tropes of belonging (i.e. autochthons) were 
specific indications of inclusion and exclusion with the state. For the 
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Banyarwanda people of eastern Congo since the late 1800s, this meant a 
struggle for power, achieving the privileges of citizenship, and a complete 
reversal of their indigenous status. The intermediate space of postcolonial 
Congo was filled with the violence created by this colonial inheritance and its 
modern politics of ethnicity, indigeneity and citizenship. Mamdani goes as far 
to sum this inheritance:  
The great crime of colonialism went beyond expropriating the native, 
the name it gave to the indigenous population. The greater crime was 
to politicize indigeneity in the first place: first negatively, as a settler 
libel of the native; but then positively, as a native response, as a self-
assertion. The dialectic of the settler and the native did not end with 
colonialism and political independence. To understand the logic of 
genocide, I argue, it is necessary to think through the political world 
that colonialism set into motion.96 
  
 A clear example of this trend in domestic politics is the so-called 
Vangu Report. Submitted to parliament in 1995, it was a chief propaganda 
piece for the swelling anti-Banyarwanda bloc. The purpose of the report was 
to establish legitimate, but exclusive, claims to citizenship in the Kivus, 
consequently ruling out Banyarwandan and Banyamulenge rights to national 
belonging. According to Lars Huening, the commission’s “analysis of the 
situation in the Kivus was informed by strong mythico-historical visions that 
entailed a profound reinterpretation of Zaïre’s past.”97  The favoured story 
was one of a pure colonial past, betrayed by colonial and neocolonial 
invaders, purporting an existential threat to the whole of Zaïre and 
recommended the expulsion of perceived foreigners. National and local Kivu 
news media, largely without hesitation, reproduced the claims and 
revisionism of the Vangu Report, further feeding into the instability of the 
eastern provinces.98 These violence-prone movements in the East ironically 
and tragically adopted the legacy of colonial politicisation of ethnicity.  
Violence in the Kivus was not a unique occurrence; it was sporadic, 
but spread throughout Zaïre. Where it did occur, it was a result of conflicts 
around the CNS spilling over into mass violence, particularly in the Katanga 
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province. Between 1992 and 1993, over 5,000 people were killed and a 
further 1.3 million people would become internally displaced in this province 
alone.99 However, the formulation of identity for Banyarwanda and 
Banyamulenge in the Kivus led to violence that would escalate into a ripe 
ground zero for the future arrival of opposing Rwandan groups in two 
successive waves (1994 and 1996). Historical accounts vary on the 
relevance and importance of this period, with some tending to focus on the 
arrival of the Rwandan refugees and armed groups in 1994 as the immediate 
starting point that led to massive violence and the threat of genocide. The 
1996 arrival brought violence against Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, and 
in defence of these maligned groups.100 As a destructive crisis, the 1994 
arrival had a profound impact. It was this organised violence against 
Banyarwanda, as reaggregated under the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, that led 
to the formation of the AFDL. This meant that the AFDL’s subsequent drive 
against these groups targeted those previously opposed to Banyarwanda 
and Banyamulenge legitimacy and, in some cases, their existence in Zaïre.  
 In 1993, Hunde, Nande and Nyanga communal groups in North Kivu 
formed local militias, Mai-Mai, and gangs of looters, bagirima. From March to 
July, Human Rights Watch reports estimated 6,000 died and 250,000 were 
displaced;101 Kisangani’s count differs little on IDPs (200,000), but estimates 
that up to 16,000 were killed during this conflict. The setting for violence in 
North Kivu continued to revolve around growing population density and 
conflict over agricultural land.102 The impact of the CNS enforcement of the 
1981 Citizenship Law contributed. Organised groups of Nande, Hunde and 
Nyanga lobbied officials for the expulsion of Banyarwanda no longer deemed 
legal residents of Zaïre. Judiciary and police were stacked with 
autochthonous groups, and was paired with the removal of Banyarwanda 
from civic or political positions.103 Provocation for communal attacks then 
started coming from the local authorities. In March, the Nande governor of 
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North Kivu, Jean-Pierre Kalumbo, publicly called for the “extermination of 
Banyarwanda”, then in Walikale the vice-governor similarly stoked the flames 
of violence against Banyarwanda in his locality. Both incidents led to spikes 
of violence against Hutu Banyarwanda.104 While Governor Kalumbo was 
removed later in the summer, other forms of state intervention from Kinshasa 
only led to exacerbate tensions, notably with the arrival of the Forces Armées 
Zaïroises (FAZ) in July.105 These soldiers engaged in contradictory alliances 
against locally competing groups and proceeded to increase the scale of 
looting and civilian displacement.106 Despite valiant efforts to negotiate and 
create inter-group settlement on the key issues of land and citizenship by 
local intermediaries and international NGOs, these conflicts, at best, were 
consciously ignored, only to be revived by the destructive crisis of an 
incoming wave of exiled Rwandans.107 
Hutu Banyarwanda, the majority section of Kinyarwanda speakers in 
North Kivu, established a political organisation of Mutuelle des Agriculteurs 
des Virunga (MAGRIVI) in the late 1980s.108 With the escalation of violence 
against them in 1993, MAGRIVI produced localised militias of its own, and 
engaged in counter attacks against various Mai-Mai groups.109 In both 
Rutshuru and Lubero, areas that were once a mix of Nyanga, Hunde and 
Hutu, became homogenised to a single ethnicity because of violence in 
1993.110 Attacks against the Tutsi minority by allied Hutu and Hunde groups 
also begun in from March and July of 1993. MAGRIVI’s links to the 
Habyarimana government, and its growing Hutu ranks typified this shift from 
anti-Banyarwanda violence to anti-Tutsi violence.111 Habyarimana attempted 
to use MAGRIVI and other Hutu Banyarwanda militias to prevent the leak of 
young Tutsi recruits across the border into the RPF, yet in the process only 
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increasing their incentive to flee into the arms of the RPF.112 Although 
MAGRIVI was a predominantly Hutu group in its inception and period of 
collusion with Rwandan Hutu forces, it did, during 1993 serve as a strategic 
ally for Tutsi Goma-based elites in conflict with the Hunde, especially in 
Masisi.113  
 While the Banyamulenge in South Kivu did not experience the same 
level of anti-Tutsi and general violence as those in North Kivu, because of 
lower population density and less localised political tension, the arrival of the 
1993 Burundian refugees brought Hutu/Tutsi tension with them. In the streets 
of the urban centre of Uvira, Banyamulenge were stoned and threatened with 
further violence, usually instigated by Burundian Hutus.114 The level of 
political organisation among the Banyamulenge minority offered some 
resilience, and with the arrival of the Rwandan exodus, an impetus for armed 
organisation.  
The Destructive Crises of Eastern Zaïre and a Great Lakes Genocide 
According to Nzongola, it was the decay and ineptitude of the state under the 
wily, but ageing kleptocrat, Mobutu that birthed the Congo Wars. The Zaïran 
state itself served as the “major determinant” of “conflict and instability” in the 
east.115 Whilst this provided the structure for destructive crisis, along with the 
above experiences of the Kinyarwanda speakers (Rwanda 1994, Zaïre 1996-
1997), it was the successive reaggregations of power relationships that 
created an environment of intermediate space in eastern Zaïre and ultimately 
the genocide of Rwanda refugees. These reaggregations came first with the 
destructive crisis and arrival of the exodus of refugees and armed element of 
ex-FAR and the Interahamwe. Second, was the infiltration of the RPA and 
the formation of the AFDL. These two realignments of power reproduced and 
perpetuated the intermediate space of violence across Zaïre. With the RPF 
across the border in Rwanda closing in on FAR strongholds, Hutu armed 
groups fled west into Zaïre.  
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This incident has attracted much attention and analysis.116 The 
refugees entering into North Kivu, through Goma, numbered up to 850,000, 
those entering South Kivu, through Bukavu and Uvira were, respectively up 
to 300,000 and 62,000. Within these refugees were up to 25,000 ex-FAR, 
and up to 40,000 Interahamwe and other militias; these armed groups were 
mostly found within the North Kivu arrivals.117 
The First Reaggregation of Power: 1994 
Prunier describes this multitude as having a massively detrimental effect on 
both the environment and local political relations. Further, the now ex-FAR 
and Interahamwe had partly mobilised Hutu civilians to leave. Many of these 
civilians had already experienced RPF violence or had heard rumours of 
such and were prepared to flee under alleged protection of these armed 
groups. However, protection was not the priority for these actors. According 
to Prunier, “the refugees were seen by their leaders as a political trump card 
that could be used to manipulate the international community, seduce 
President Mobutu with opportunistic redemption, and threaten the new 
government in Kigali.”118 
 This bait was gobbled up by the UN Security Council, who approved 
the French led Operation Turquoise, which lasted from June to August in 
1994. During this time the French “aided and abetted” the rearming and 
reorganisation of Hutu elites within the refugee camps spread across the 
border.119 The French patrolled the outside of the zone, without entering to 
interfere with the regrouping of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. Arms 
shipments originating in France, South Africa and Zaïre were easily 
redirected from Kigali to Goma. By 1995, this accumulation of weaponry 
resulted in a sizable collection of artillery, helicopters, armoured vehicles and 
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thousands of light weapons.120 Mobutu, ever the opportunist, seized his 
moment as arbitrator with one hand, and with the other supported the 
building of a Rwandan redoubt in the Kivus.121  
MAGRIVI also opportuned an advantage from the arrival of the 
Rwandan exodus in 1994. Bolstered by their better-armed and organised 
allies in the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, they relaunched their anti-Tutsi 
campaign, escalating casualties and displacement beyond that of 1993. This 
is where the first reaggregation of power took effect. During July 1994 to 
March 1995, a further 200,000 Banyarwanda Tutsi fled North Kivu, albeit with 
some seeking opportunity in the new RPF-led Rwanda.122 In the coming 
months alliances along the nodes of ideology, opportunity for enrichment, 
and revenge saw the alignment of non-Banyarwanda groups in North and 
South Kivu, both with and against the dominantly allied Hutu forces (both 
Rwandan and Congolese).123 Despite the complex ambiguities of the 
realignment that occurred with the entrance of the extremely volatile 
Rwandan forces, what was certain was that Banyarwanda Tutsi and 
Banyamulenge came under increased attack. Up and down the populated 
areas of North and South Kivu these groups were targeted by mixtures of ex-
FAR, Interahamwe, local Hutu militias and FAZ troops prior to the AFDL/RPA 
invasion. The spreading of extremist Hutu propaganda also fuelled violence, 
further displacement, and forced removal of Tutsis into Rwanda. It was 
claimed that due to the rise of the RPF, that there were now distinct 
ethnopolities termed Hutuland and Tutsiland, respectively in eastern Zaïre 
and Rwanda.124 This narrative had an effect on the non-Banyarwanda, 
although these diverse groups themselves were not immune to FAZ and ex-
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FAR/Interahamwe attacks, and on the Rwandan Hutus caught in the refugee 
camps spread across the Kivus. From 1995 to 1996, which Kisangani refers 
to as the period of the second and third ethnic wars in the Kivus, up to 
33,000 Zaïrians were killed and another 370,000 displaced.125 UN 
investigations revealed that in North Kivu, within Goma and north into 
Rutshuru, Banyarwanda Tutsi property was looted, with people forced across 
the border into Rwanda, and massacres of dozens at a time became a 
monthly occurrence, into late 1996.126  
In South Kivu, local authorities started enforcing citizenship laws and 
instigating violence against Banyamulenge in 1995.127 In Uvira, in October 
and November, property was systematically seized, and the rhetoric of 
Banyamulenge as the foreigner escalated. Here again, local militias and FAZ 
groups were on hand to harass and attack the Banyamulenge.128 On two 
separate occasions in the locality of Fizi, in South Kivu, during September 
1996, Banyamulenge were rounded up, the men were divided out from the 
women and children, tied together and drowned in Lake Tanganyika by 
Babembe militias and FAZ soldiers. One survivor of these incidents reported 
the following, “It was midnight and they came to take all of the men, and the 
women were put apart, with two young boys . . . . They took the men on the 
river and far from the shore they pushed them over into the water, everyone 
from a boat that was full. They took all the other young boys, refilled the boat 
and went another time to push them overboard.”129 Such attacks by local 
militias and FAZ troops began to escalate in relation to the growing armed 
resistance of the Banyamulenge.  
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Ex-FAR and Interahamwe cross-border raids, supported by 
recruitment in the camps, and a reliable supply of arms and sustenance, tied 
in together with a growing violence against Banyarwanda up and down 
eastern Zaïre, led to a trickle of new recruits into the RPF. Active recruitment 
of RPF soldiers in Zaïre can be dated back to 1991, in connection with the 
failure of the first offensive in the Rwandan civil war, and with political cells 
established in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi as well as in the Kivus.130 During 
the escalation of tensions around the CNS in North Kivu, many Catholic and 
Protestant leaders within the Banyarwanda community began recruiting for 
the RPF in response to the civil war across the border. This level of 
recruitment also contributed to localised spikes in tension between Hutus 
and Tutsis experiencing the oppression of Hunde violence and exclusion.131  
The Second Reaggregation of Power: 1996 
Many of the Banyarwanda recruited during the early 1990s, later seeing the 
dire situation against their families and community, returned as early as 1995 
to stoke the fire for a new recruitment drive. Past Banyamulenge recruits 
from South Kivu also started returning to arm and train their communities 
with RPF weapons.132 Returnees were propelled by their experiences during 
the civil war and genocide in Rwanda. They were morally and ideologically 
supported by the new Rwandan government’s interpretation of events in 
North and South Kivu as a continuance of the Rwandan genocide.133 Prunier 
questions the ambiguity of the Banyamulenge, who in 1991 left to join the 
cause in Rwanda. Was this an expression of solidarity or a prescient move 
on the part of young men to prepare with “military experience and to acquire 
weapons for a possible future showdown with their neighbours”?134 
Undoubtedly, the motivations were varied, but as MAGRIVI grew in response 
to this leak of RPF recruits, and many began seeking out the RPF. As the 
violence of 1993 and 1995 to 1996 escalated, one can clearly see the 
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spiralling impact of Banyarwanda choosing sides. Caught in this intermediate 
space of state rejection through the divisiveness of the CNS, and then the 
reaggregation of power relations and subsequent violence of the arrival of 
armed Hutu extremists, it was not difficult for any Kinyarwanda-speaking 
Tutsi to assume the worst about their situation.  
The decision to overthrow Mobutu and forcefully take their rights to 
citizenship and now traditional lands was not one made singularly by the 
Banyarwanda or Banyamulenge. It was the RPF’s securitisation and 
militarisation of domestic and foreign affairs that led to this second 
reaggregation of power and the total collapse of eastern Zaïre. Faced with 
the fracturing of northwest Rwanda due to ex-FAR/Interahamwe incursions 
and mine planting, and the possible destabilisation of Burundi, courtesy of its 
own Hutu militant insurgents, Great Lakes-wide Tutsi elites perceived their 
survival to be at stake. This turned the emerging Banyarwanda and 
Banyamulenge resistance in the staging area of these insurgencies into the 
ideal ground zero for an offensive against anti-Tutsi forces. As described 
earlier, to consider all Tutsis everywhere in the Great Lakes as a 
homogeneous block would be misleading. Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda 
sought to reassert their rights and security within Zaïre, the RPF sought to 
impose its own Rwanda onto the survivors of the genocide, considering any 
not standing with them to be as guilty as those who fled. The marriage of 
these interests in a massive ambitious cross-border military operation would 
be a product of violence experienced by Tutsis on both sides of the Great 
Lakes, and an indicative outcome of the intermediate space occupied by 
these peoples. The colonial politicisation of ethnicity, deemed as heresy by 
the RPF, would continue to inform the political identification of security 
threats and enemies in the Kivus and beyond. These threats, whilst 
solidifying around the security agenda of the RPF government, were deeply 
rooted in the existential threat to Tutsis as perceived by the RPF and its 
Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda allies. The early 1990s conditions of 
eastern Zaïre and the 1994 Rwanda genocide reinforced this crisis-inducing 
logic. 
Among the groups that went to form the AFDL were a variety of 
smaller clusters of political and militia organisations among the 
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Banyarwanda. Bugera’s Alliance démocratique du peoples (ADP) typified the 
above recruitment interactions between the Banyarwanda and the RPF. 
Many of the ADP’s fighters were former RPF soldiers from the civil war and 
genocide in Rwanda, retrained in Rwanda in 1995, and returned in 1996 as a 
well-armed 2,500 strong force, containing a significant number of RPA 
officers.135 Bugera had been involved in RPF recruitment dating back to 
1993, sending truckloads of young Banyamulenge men and funds raised by 
the community for the cause in Rwanda.136 He also facilitated early RPA 
incursions as early as 1995 into North Kivu. Another constituent group of the 
AFDL was the Mouvement Revolutionnaire pour Libération du Zaïre (MRLZ) 
led by former RPF soldier Masasu Nindaga originally from Bukavu.137 Also 
included were the Conseil National de Résistance pour la Democratie 
(CNRD) a mix of eastern Congolese soldiers led by Kisase Ngandu, with 
about 300 Libyan-trained Congolese nationals, not considered 
Banyarwanda, and Kabila’s tiny Parti de la Révolution Populaire (PRP).138 By 
1997, Kabila had added 25,000 kadogos, or child soldiers, ranging from 12 to 
18 years-old; this number was a result of the establishment of camps 
throughout AFDL/RPA territory in the early months of the war.139 Conditions 
in these camps were brutal for young recruits, who were desensitised by 
directing them to execute prisoners and trained with live ammunition.140 
Overall, the bulk of AFDL forces and arrived from Rwanda. They had 
experienced the onset of collapse in eastern Zaïre and the violence of the 
intermediate space of the early 1990s as disenfranchised and persecuted 
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge. A UNICEF survey reported that among 
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AFDL soldiers interviewed in 1997 Bukavu, 57 percent had enlisted due to a 
total lack of economic opportunity elsewhere. During 1996, Kabila, in 
recruitment drives was offering $100 a month to new recruits. Jason Stearns 
interviewed one young recruit who claimed, “I had no future in Bukavu. They 
were offering me a future.”141  
 Interviewed participants confirmed the AFDL’s composite constitution 
of groups and significant RPA officer presence. Banyamulenge recruits, 
regardless of when they joined the RPF, made up the southern front 
contingent and were involved in the early incursions during the summer of 
1996. Participants confirmed that the more numerous contingent of historic 
Banyarwanda recruits from North Kivu made up the northern front, which 
moved from Goma across to Kisangani, then on to Kinshasa by the summer 
of 1997.142 Similarities and differences exist between the participation in the 
AFDL of Banyarwanda Tutsi and Banyamulenge soldiers. According to 
research and analysis of Banyarwandan participation in armed groups since 
the early 1990s, land scarcity and access, along with political marginalisation 
were central motivations.143  
Regional leaders installed Kabila, himself a Katangan and a relic of 
the 1960s rebellion, as a supposedly easily directed figurehead of the so-
called Banyamulenge rebellion. He was a “neutral” candidate between those 
Kagame and Museveni considered their first choices to lead the AFDL.144 
According to Prunier, Kabila’s selection was a product of negotiation that 
followed Kagame's decision to invade the Kivus sometime in the first half of 
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1996.145 The final additions to the coming war would be contingents from 
Uganda and Burundi. What became clear was that there were two purposes 
of the AFDL: first, overthrow Mobutu and install Kabila in Kinshasa, second 
to deal with the Rwandan Hutu refugees and armed groups all classified with 
the same genocidaire guilt. To ensure the second purpose was achieved, 
early 1990s RPF soldier Colonel James Kabarebe was installed at its head, 
coordinating the RPA officers that filled the ranks of the AFDL.146 
Incursions into North and South Kivu involved the deployment of 
6,000 soldiers, backed by a line of heavy artillery on the Rwanda border. On 
22 September RPA artillery opened fire on a FAZ base in Bukavu. The 
AFDL/RPA seized another base in Rutshuru, and had taken both Bukavu 
and Goma by early November.147 FAZ, and ex-FAR and Interahamwe, 
resistance was ineffective in the face of swift pincer movements, mortar and 
artillery fire, and pre-assault infiltration of targets.148 Following the initial 
attack on the Mugunga camp in November, 800,000 refugees were claimed 
to have fled back towards Rwanda.149 
This mass return, the last of its kind, came at a crucial juncture as the 
UN Security Council debated a joint French-Canadian led Multinational 
Intervention Force (MNF) to protect the return of civilians and deliver 
humanitarian aid.150 The debating waned, eased by US platitudes, 
reassuring the UNSC that only 200,000 refugees remained, and that it was 
more than likely, that these were the guilty ones.151 As if scripted by Kagame 
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himself, the UN stood back and played into the hands of Rwanda, Uganda, 
and Burundi.152 Later Kagame, in an interview with the Washington Post, 
would reveal the key involvement of Rwandan forces in the AFDL operation, 
stating three important objectives: “dismantle the camps”, “destroy the 
structure” of armed Hutu groups in eastern Zaïre by “dealing with them here 
or scattering them”, and disposing of Mobutu as head of state.153 In sum, the 
consideration of a political resolution of the refugee crisis, topped with the 
failure to prevent the ravages of disease in the early months of the camps, 
came too late to overcome the jus ad bellum claims of the RPF-backed 
AFDL and its allies.154 
The immediate and enduring legacy of what happened on the ground 
in Mugunga, and the mass fleeing of refugees back across the border, would 
reveal a pattern for how the AFDL/RPA would fulfil this post-hoc description 
of aims by Kagame. As the camp was surrounded, the international press 
were escorted from the area, and mortar fire commenced on 13 November. 
Bloated by successive displacements from attacks on nearby camps, the 
population of Mugunga had exceeded 200,000.155 These adjacent camps 
had been attacked in the days prior. At the entrance to the national park near 
Mount Nyiragongo camp, males were separated out from the population and 
executed; this was the first of many instances of this type of targeted 
massacre.156 These survivors from earlier attacks on the Kahino and Katale 
camps faced orders to return to Rwanda or die by the hands of the 
AFDL/RPA.157 After bombarding Mugunga with mortars, AFDL/RPA troops 
reportedly entered and fired indiscriminately on refugees. The latter then 
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formed up into a column from the camp, and headed in the direction of 
Rwanda.158 Attacks continued in the coming week and occurred in the 
northwest toward Sake as some other refugees attempted to escape 
westward, and massacred by AFDL/RPA using machetes and knives. Others 
fled towards Lac Vert and were separated out according to sex, with the 
males drowned in the lake or shot in the head. Mass graves in the area 
surrounding Mugunga were widely reported.159 
As the FAZ faded, and the ex-FAR and Interahamwe retreated or took 
refuge in more remote parts of the eastern Zaïre, the AFDL/RPA advanced 
on the trail of refugees that spread northwest from Goma and Bukavu. The 
invasion had a massive effect on the realignment of power relationships 
within the Kivus. This reaggregation turned the world created by the 
intermediate space violence of the early 1990s upside down, whereby 
Kinyarwanda speakers were emboldened by opportunity to regain their 
fortunes. In North Kivu, the AFDL established a provincial government, 
removing power from authorities that had been trusted with distribution of 
land, and placing this in the hands of the new Goma-centred government.160 
Despite mirroring the RPF attempts to preserve a multi-ethnic character of 
the new political leadership, loyal AFDL/RPA appointees were installed in 
areas of military and security significance.161 This phase of the second 
reaggregation of power due to the AFDL/RPA invasion brought with it an 
element of power that was “necropolitical”, that of total dominance over the 
lives of the populace especially those already at severe health and security 
risk in the refugees camps themselves. Achielle Mbembé describes this total 
power over life and death, adapting Foucault’s biopower, in the context of 
occupation.162 Whilst the AFDL/RPA was not explicitly colonising 
settlements, they were engaged in a massive, security-driven project that 
totally redistributed power in the Kivus. It was this level of destructive power, 
established following the immediate seizure of Goma and Bukavu and the 
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camps north of Goma, which enabled the perpetuation of the genocide of 
Rwandan refugees. The necropolitical element affirms the security and 
existential threat posed by Rwanda Hutus in Zaïre. 
As refugees spread northwest from the Kivus, many of those fleeing 
from South Kivu did not reach any further than Kindu, Maniema; yet, in the 
north, where the majority of fleeing refugees were, some reached as far as 
Kinshasa, and across the border into Congo-Brazzaville and the Central 
African Republic.163 Outside of the nearly 10,000 that died as a result of 
“severe malnutrition, dehydration, exhaustion, malaria, yellow fever, and 
other diseases”, Kisangani calculates that an estimated number of 233,000 
refugees were killed by the AFDL/RPA onslaught against the camps and 
hiding places riddled throughout Zaïre.164 He adds, “The massacre of 
refugees went on concomitantly with the clean-up of grave sites . . . the 
perpetrators of the massacre of refugees made concerted efforts to conceal 
the evidence by cleansing massacre sites, burning corpses and killing or 
intimidating witnesses.”165 In January 1997, the occupants of the Kabakita 
camps were expelled, unknown numbers were killed on the road leading 
from the camps, and the fleeing FAZ, ex-FAR and Interahamwe were 
captured. A group of refugees surviving this encounter had gathered in 
February on a river bridge outside of Shabunda, the nearest major town. The 
refugees were discovered by the AFDL/RPA, on 5 February, and killed. Local 
Congolese civilians, pressed into service, dumped the bodies in the rivers. 
Further escapees were tracked down and either taken in to the forest in 
groups of 50-100 or back to the Kabakita sites and executed. East of 
Shabunda, in the locality of Kigulube, RPA repeated their tactics from 
operations in eastern Rwanda of using promises of supplies and safe return 
to Rwanda. This lured more refugees from the Kabakita camps to their 
deaths.166 
 Further north, an area between Kisangani and Mbandaka, at a 
distance exceeding 1,000 kilometres from the centre of Zaïre towards its 
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western border was littered with massacre sites. The AFDL/RPA was able to 
coordinate refugee locations using intelligence gleaned from aid workers, 
allowing units to set up roadblocks and surround fleeing groups. AFDL/RPA 
soldiers would identify Kinyarwanda speakers to target refugees, by calling 
out in other languages for people to get on the ground.167 Almost halfway 
along this massive stretch it was reported that about 2,000 refugees found 
themselves cornered in Boende, Equateur province, following the defeat of 
the ex-FAR and Interahamwe that had led them deep into Zaïre. Massacres 
of refugees in the Boende area started in April and continued until May.168 
Having arrived on 22 April, at a small port in Boende on the Tshuapa River, 
many were shot as they tried to board the next boat, others drowned as they 
attempted to escape. Survivors of this group were then attacked again two 
days later as they successfully crossed the river but were shot at from the 
bank of the river. From May to July, diminishing groups of less than a dozen 
at a time were then hunted down, or brought out of hiding with promises of 
protection and safety by the AFDL/RPA. Once revealing themselves they 
were shot. In late April, refugees hiding in a village near Boende were bound 
together, wrapped in plastic sheets and set alight.169 Of the hundreds that 
reached Mbandaka in an attempt to cross the Congo River, most were killed 
in the city centre itself, around municipal buildings, the airport and the 
docks.170  
Conclusion: Genocide Situated in the Destructive Crisis 
In an attempt to understand the process of violence that washed through 
from Rwanda into Zaïre and the genocide of Rwandan Hutu refugees, it 
remains foremost, that a crisis of state structures, power relations and 
human security occurred in the Kivus. Coupled with this assault on refugees, 
deemed a threat to Rwanda and RPF hegemony, hundreds of Congolese 
Hutu, or Banyarwanda Hutu in North Kivu were also targeted. Both as result 
of the use of indiscriminate and overwhelming force in capturing cities such 
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as Goma, and targeting civilians that had either aided Mai-Mai groups who 
had previously attacked Banyarwanda Tutsi, or hid fleeing Hutu refugees, 
this companion campaign, whilst smaller in scale, was just as systematic.171 
The intermediate space, as a ground zero for where colonial past, modernity 
and the postcolonial met, reproduced forms of violence and classification 
both within Rwanda for the Tutsi dominated RPF, and for the Banyarwanda 
who were considered foreigners in their own homes. The reproduction of 
colonial labels in terms of the indigenous legitimacy, became fodder for 
Mobutu’s continued power grabs, and fatally shaped the growing tensions in 
North Kivu, and to some extent South Kivu. The denial of citizenship and 
land rights, both in terms of empowering localised anti-Banyarwanda 
sentiment, drove the groups’ insecurity and turn towards the RPF/RPA. This 
fomented a domestic situation that resulted in the deaths of thousands with 
hundreds of thousands being displaced as early as 1993. 
 It was the reaggregations of power, brought about by the arrival of the 
1994 Rwandan exodus and the 1996 AFDL/RPA invasion that catalysed 
these conflicts into massive violence, genocide, and the collapse of Zaïre. 
Whilst groups such as MAGRIVI were already reflecting the Hutu-Tutsi 
conflict alignment of the Rwandan genocide, it was the 1994 summer arrival 
of the refugees, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe that proved to be a massive 
escalation. The influx of weapons and a political agenda of regional 
destabilisation, combined with the humanitarian crisis and straining of local 
resources, turned out to be a significant and existential security threat to the 
Tutsi dominance in both Rwanda and Burundi. This prompted the second 
reaggregation of power with the invasion in October 1996. Even according to 
Kagame himself, the motives for such a military operation were manifold. 
Participation of Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge situated most with dire 
perspective, shaped by the violence of the earlier 1990s, and involvement in 
the RPF’s activities in the civil war and genocide. The slow trickle of recruits 
from 1991 onwards would return home and engage in a brutal manhunt of 
more than 200,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees. This genocide was at the heart 
of the destructive collapse in Zaïre. This episode represents the development 
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of systematic RPF and AFDL violence against civilians in the name of 
establishing hegemonic security and dealing with existential threats since 
1990. 
 137 
 
Chapter VI: RPF Memory and the Aegis of Atrocity 
Introduction 
The historical context laid out in the previous chapter is another account in a 
long list of critical perspectives of RPF/A actions since their arrival to power 
and rise in esteem in the eyes of Western observers. This chapter discusses 
the debates around the legacy and history of the RPF, including the double 
genocide theory. The problems of historicising this period will be touched on 
in the context of Dirk Moses’ terror of history. 
Denial and Double Genocide 
The undercurrent thread of revisionist discourse is of an RPF that is not a 
saviour of its nation, but a force that perpetuated its own set of crimes, 
perhaps even a double genocide. This theory, according to Lemarchand, 
originates in part with Ruzibiza, whose two strongest claims were that 
Kagame planned and ordered the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane, 
and that there was likewise a planned strategy to conduct massive killing 
campaigns against remaining Hutus in RPF occupied zones.1 Most recently, 
this thesis was represented in the 2014 BBC documentary Rwanda: The 
Untold Story. The documentary not only included commentary from other 
former RPF notables, such as Theogene Rudasingwa and Kayumba 
Nyamwasa, supporting claims similar to that of Ruzibiza, but was also 
academically grounded in the controversial work of Christian Davenport and 
Allan Stam. Their research is based on the reconceptualisation of the 1994 
genocide as three types of violence: politicide of moderate Hutus, random 
acts of revenge violence, and mass killings resulting from civil war fighting 
between the FAR and RPF forces.2 They conclude that the majority of killings 
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during the 1994 period were of Hutus, not Tutsis. In addition to interviews 
and secondary sources, the lower number of Tutsi victims (200,000) arrived 
at by Stam and Davenport is mainly a product of the census data used as a 
population baseline. Marijke Verpoorten argues that their reliance on 1952 
census data creates a lower projected population of Tutsis due to 
Habyarimana’s politicisation of the census at that time.3  
 As an unintended piece of counter-research, Philip Verwimp engages 
a 1989-1992 household survey, and revisited 352 of those previously 
interviewed.4 Verwimp establishes that “Of all violent deaths of Tutsi, 85 
percent were caused by execution by Interahamwe and 7.5 percent by FAR 
soldiers. The majority of violent deaths of Hutu (48 percent) were by RPF 
execution.”5 Other mortalities were also included in the statistics, in addition 
to violent deaths, which means that the larger number of Hutu deaths 
reported were a result of disease, not murder. This assessment included 
Rwandan deaths from inside Congo as well.6 Crucially, through this revisited 
sample, Verwimp establishes that,  
The marginal effect shows that the probability of Hutu to die violently 
after the arrival of the RPF decreased by 1% for each month after 
April 6, 1994. The probability for Tutsi to die violently increased by 2% 
for each month after April 6, 1994, and when the RPF arrived at the 
survey site. From the size of the marginal effects, it can be derived 
that the “Tutsi-saving” effect of the arrival of the RPF at the survey site 
was two times larger than the “Hutu-killing” effect of that arrival.7 
 
Although admittedly, not a complete and robust sample, and not 
representative of areas with existing reports of RPF violence, this qualitative 
assessment demonstrates that a double genocide approach is an 
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oversimplification at best. Yet, this does not rule out the indirect and direct 
impact of the RPF’s arrival into an area in respect of violent deaths. Not 
questioned here is the systematic and targeted nature of RPF violence, as 
less destabilising and massive when compared to the Interahamwe and FAR 
forces. 
Whilst Davenport and Stam have yet to publish their findings and 
analysis, citing ongoing research, anti-Western writers Edward Herman and 
David Peterson have latched onto this research and used it in support of 
their argument against perceived Western involvement, inverting the 
accepted paradigm of Tutsi victims and Hutu perpetrators. In The Politics of 
Genocide, Herman and Peterson describe a conspiracy of US sponsorship of 
Uganda and RPF. They line up a golden thread of regional, foreign neo-
imperial hegemony with the 1996 invasion of Zaïre is in the name of resource 
exploitation.8 Shaw describes this decrying of Western propaganda as 
amounting to nothing more than “genocide denial”.9 Following Lemarchand’s 
critique of competing narratives in post-genocide Rwanda, Shaw asserts that 
such revisionism plays into the hands of Hutu-Power propagandists.10 
Other scholars have also sought to question what they see as the 
common discursive ground between accepted scholarly accounts of the 
genocide and the RPF’s violence, and Rwandan government-interpreted 
accounts. Barrie Collins and Robin Philpot are among those that challenge 
this so-called accepted discourse, deploying some of the similar notions as 
described above. Collins’ 2014 book, Rwanda 1994: The Myth of the Akazu 
Genocide Conspiracy and Its Consequences reflects the claims of inflated 
Tutsi deaths during 1994, and that hundreds of thousands were actually 
Hutu. His boldest, but not unique claim is that the Akazu pre-planning and 
coordination of the 1994 genocide is, in fact, overstated, “To claim that those 
individuals who were well connected with the office of the Presidency 
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constituted an informal and clandestine network, and branding that network 
Akazu is one thing. To claim that such a network met, planned and 
implemented the genocide of Rwanda’s Tutsi population requires evidence 
that remains absent.”11 Responsibility for this period again rests with the civil 
war conditions created by the RPF, as suggested by Stam and Davenport. 
Furthermore, and according to Keith Somerville, Collins sets those who 
disagree apart as being “taken in by US and other Western accounts or as 
apologists for the RPF”.12 Here, we see a return to Herman and Peterson’s 
critique of Western hegemony in central Africa.  
Robin Philpot, a Canadian journalist and writer, challenges who shot 
Habyarimana’s plane down, and frequently critiques Kagame as being an 
instrument of US power in the region.13 He contends, in various places, that 
US hegemony in the international arena has shielded Kagame and the RPF 
from an uncovering of truth, and that the CIA was partner in the conspiracy 
regarding the shooting down of the plane. He even claims that the US was 
involved in ensuring that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) served false convictions of Rwandan leaders such as Jean-Paul 
Akayesu.14 
 A central issue consistently raised by critics is the shooting down of 
Habyarimana’s plane. It is not the purpose of this research to weigh in on this 
matter, but it should be addressed in the context of trends of RPF violence. 
Where the RPF is named as the executors of this act, the DMI and Network 
Commando are pointed to for organising the strike.15 The Spanish indictment 
concurs, based on some claims of witnesses already mentioned, such as 
                                            
11 Barrie Collins, Rwanda 1994: The Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and 
Its Consequences (Palgrave MacMillan: 2014), 132.  
12 Keith Somerville, “Review: Rwanda 1994 – The Myth of the Akazu Genocide 
Conspiracy and Its Consequences,” African Arguments, 24th September 2014, accessed on 
21 November 2014, from http://africanarguments.org/2014/09/24/review-rwanda-1994-the-
myth-of-the-akazu-genocide-conspiracy-and-its-consequences/.    
13 Robin Philpot, “Rwanda: the 11 year cover-up,” New African, April, 2005, p31.   
14 Robin Philpot, Rwanda 1994: Colonialism dies hard (Taylor Report: 2004), this is 
an online, English translation of Philpot’s original French book, Ça ne s’est pas passé 
comme ça à Kigali (The Intouchables, 2004), accessed on 6 May 2015, from 
http://www.taylor-report.com/Rwanda_1994/. See also his more recent work, Rwanda and 
the new scramble for Africa: From tragedy to useful imperial fiction (Baraka Books: 2013).     
15 See above on Ruzibiza, his account of the shooting down of the plane is probably 
the most comprehensive. See also Rever, In Praise of Blood, 61-62, 235; Rudasingwa, 413, 
420;   
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Ruzibiza, that the RPF was behind this attack.16 The French legal case in 
particular reflects the highly political and contentious nature of these claims, 
having itself yo-yoed through court, being opened and closed on different 
occasions.17 As noted by Reyntjens, the dropping of the case itself is not a 
negation of the amassed evidence, but another phase of an ongoing 
argument.18 If the chorus of RPF accusers and dissidents are to be believed, 
then the shooting down of the plane would fit into the narrative of drastic 
measures taken by Kagame and the High Command to maintain control and 
direct the situation to their advantage. Yet, inasmuch as this might fit with the 
portrayal of RPF violence in this work, an RPF assassination is still 
inconclusive. 
 There are, as well, many voices, some close to Kigali, that defend the 
accomplishment and integrity of the RPF in dire circumstances. Colin 
Waugh’s book Paul Kagame and Rwanda reflects the author’s closeness to 
Kagame himself, as demonstrated in the unrivalled collection of personal 
photographs of Kagame's life. This hagiographic piece tends toward 
whitewashing, when compared to scholarly works like that of Roessler and 
Verhoeven. Waugh replicates many of pro-RPF public narratives that are 
indeed the subject of this research, and are highlighted in chapters seven 
and eight.19 Other accounts of the RPF and the 1994 genocide come from 
Thomas Odom and Stephen Kinzer. Odom, as an attaché to the US 
Embassy in Kigali in 1994, had worked for the US military in Zaïre in the year 
prior. He returned to Kigali after the genocide and has widely published 
positive views of the RPF as a sound military organisation. In many ways, 
Odom expresses the Western perspective that the RPF represented 
                                            
16 Juzgado Central De Instrucción No. 4' Audiencia Nacional, 8-9.   
17 RFI, “Habyarimana case: the investigation finally closed in France,” 22 Dec 2017, 
accessed on 12 October 2018, from http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171221-rwanda-affaire-
habyarimana-enquete-definitivement-close-france.   
18 Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda’s Untold Story. A reply to ‘38 scholars, scientists, 
researchers, journalists and historians’ – By Filip Reyntjens,” African Arguments, 21 October 
2014, accessed on 12 October 2018, from 
https://africanarguments.org/2014/10/21/rwandas-untold-story-a-reply-to-38-scholars-
scientists-researchers-journalists-and-historians-by-filip-reyntjens/.  
19 René Lemarchand, “Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 2 (2006): 223.   
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constructive African solutions to African problems.20 The perspective 
presented in his work is captured by his view of the Gersony report. Working 
on the ground in post-genocide Rwanda, around the time of the report’s 
emergence, he qualifies any RPF violence in this period as unintended and 
unsurprising excesses, replicating the RPF’s official interpretation of this 
violence, which he quotes in Journey Into Darkness.21 He argues that the 
RPF should not be blamed for a few thousand killings, when such numbers 
pale in comparison to the hundreds of thousands in a genocide they ended.22  
With access to Kagame, much like Waugh, Kinzer’s interviews with 
Kagame frame his own interpretation and adoption of the overall positive 
value of the RPF project. The priority of national unity conflicted with that of 
trying to build an army with “teenagers whose families had just been killed 
and who were burning with homicidal rage” resulting in a certain tolerance of 
any excesses committed by these young soldiers.23 Much as described by 
Odom, Kagame and the RPF are lone rangers to be admired as they 
stepped in, ensuring peace and security where the UN and the West had 
failed.24 Although representing an important perspective and RPF public 
narrative, these claims are presented with very little analysis. These 
accounts foster an environment where attempts at historical revisionism of 
this period or analysis of RPF violence are seen as politically and morally 
questionable.  
Conversely, core features to the anti-RPF revisionist argument centre 
around anti-Western, neo-imperialist critiques, and the wholesale rejection of 
rigorous scholarship. Most troubling is that both these trajectories of analysis 
miss the spaces in debates about the nature of RPF violence, and what, if 
any, are the shared threads from the emergence of RPF power in the early 
1990s to the genocide of Rwandan refugees in Zaïre. The prevalence and 
extent of RPF violence is not necessarily a matter of if these things 
                                            
20 See Odom, “Guerrillas from the mist,” and Journey into Darkness: Genocide in 
Rwanda (Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 159-160.   
21 Ibid., 173-175.   
22 Ibid., 176.   
23 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man who Dreamed 
it (Wiley, 2008), 189. 
24 Ibid., 198-200.    
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happened, but a question of who is framing them. The notion of double 
genocide, whilst rejected by some and still contested by others, in terms of 
proportions of Hutus and Tutsis killed during 1994, does not address the 
scale and structures of the violence perpetrated by the RPF as described in 
the previous chapter.25 Collins, Philpot, and others, who engage ideological 
or quantitatively overbearing claims, miss the security centred approach of 
the RPF’s deployment of violence, and its conceptualisation of threat. As 
noted earlier, there are emerging exceptions to this trend, although these rely 
on those RPF dissidents willing to speak, and carry their own political 
agendas that vary across the spectrum from all-out revolution, prophets of 
further genocide, and advocates of increased democracy and deeper 
national reconciliation.26 Furthermore, the dismissal of critics under the 
double genocide label, misdirects important questions about patterns and 
evolution of RPF violence from 1990 to present.27 
 How genocide is conceptualised by these arguments and even that of 
mainstream scholarship, neglects the post-liberal trends of genocide. 
Genocide is for many, simultaneously bounded by the legalisation of the 
UNCG and the “maximalist” standards that sanctify mainstream genocides 
against others, Rwanda being one such case.28 The Rwandan government 
has created a metanarrative that supports such interpretations of genocide, 
being a legally defined, distinct event, and not a process of identity 
difference-obliteration, as argued by Powell. This has been accomplished 
through its criminalisation of denial and revisionism with the legal tools of 
“divisionism” and “genocide ideology”.29 What sometimes provokes these 
extreme attempts at explaining the RPF is the latter’s own iron-fisted grip on 
historicisation.30 Its management of Rwandan society and politics is rooted in 
                                            
25 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 356; Adam Jones, Genocide, 492-493.  
26 Rudasingwa, interview by phone, 1st February 2018. Rudasingwa’s split from the 
RNC and Kayumba Nyamwasa demarcates some of the political divisions between leading 
dissidents. Nyamwasa was also contacted for interview, but as of this writing has not 
responded to the invitation.  
27 Gahima, 223-224.  
28 Shaw, What is genocide, 37-47. See also Lemarchand’s assessment of this 
comparison with the works of Mark Levene and Robert Melton, in René Lemarchand, The 
Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 109-128.     
29 Begley, 2014.    
30 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 28.   
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narrative monopolisation that prevents, or discourages, discussion and 
analysis of ruling party violence both at home and abroad.  
The Terror of History 
Dirk Moses describes such politicisation of memory and genocide as the 
“terror of history”, that “locks groups into escalatory mechanisms of post-
traumatic reality out of which it is difficult to escape.”31 Trauma becomes the 
fuel of political violence. The RPF, trained in Ugandan civil conflict, 
institutionally solidified in the Rwandan civil war and genocide, responded to 
crisis through their trauma and understood history. The security dilemma and 
existential threat represented by the first reaggregation of power in Zaïre, 
with the arrival of the Hutu exodus, presented a scenario that was responded 
to with the same structure of organised violence against civilians as they did 
during the civil war, genocide and post-genocide. Moses continues, “Radical 
political action becomes an automatic reflex in these circumstances. As we 
will see, the terror of history is refracted through ideologically interpolated 
subjects and groups in specific times and territories, and operates in various 
modalities under a general structure of traumatic repetition.”32 Here the 
concepts of intermediate space violence and destructive crises experienced 
in eastern Zaïre and Rwanda culminated in the framing of security and 
existential threats to Tutsi identity, and RPF political hegemony. 
In his most recent work, In Praise of Forgetting, David Rieff makes the 
bold, if possibly reckless claim that “collective memory can deform a 
society”.33 In situations where atrocity has shaped society, such as Rwanda, 
he argues the following: “When collective memory condemns communities to 
feel the pain of their historical wounds and the bitterness of their historical 
grievances - and all communities have such wounds, whether at a given 
point in history they are oppressors or the oppressed - it is not the duty to 
remember but a duty to forget that should be honoured.”34 Aside from Rieff’s 
                                            
31 A. Dirk Moses, “Genocide and the terror of history,” Parallax 17, no. 4 (2011): 
100.  
32 Ibid., 101.   
33 David Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting: Historical memory and its ironies (Yale 
University Press, 2016), 139.  
34 Ibid., 121.   
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core claim of the underrated, transformative power of forgetting such atrocity, 
it is the nurturing and development of the subaltern trope and self-
perpetuation of violence that is most compelling. As an example, he 
references Rwanda’s post-genocide switch from victim to perpetrator.35 Yet, 
the longue durée of Rwandan, even Great Lakes history demonstrates how 
this simplification is both a reality and the tip of a complex iceberg. The 
enabling power of collective memory becomes a tool in realigning power 
relationships and utilising historic grievances for the benefit of the dominant. 
The subaltern element is demarcated by the self-perception of victimhood or 
atrocity as a justification for pre-emptive violence against the threatening 
Other.36 The similarity in perception of threat between the RPF and the 
radical political forces within Habyarimana’s regime, and even in 1994 in 
eastern Zaïre between various groups and the incoming genocidaire forces, 
is an example of this widespread phenomenon.  
Rieff rebukes philosophers and historians for their naiveté and 
misplaced faith in collective memory as having a redemptive power or peace 
dividend. This is most popularly recalled by the refrain “Never Again” of anti-
genocide activism, or the “Lest we forget” of British World War One 
memorialisation. While forgetfulness is inevitable, exhortations against 
“radical evil” have done little to prevent similar atrocities.37 In addition to 
memory not yielding the peacebuilding or transformative effect hoped for 
from the often-banal “lessons of history”, Rieff argues that our pursuit of 
memory has damaged our capacity to record history in a way that 
approaches objectivity. The example cited, and echoed by other historians, is 
that of the moral and legal crime of denialism: i.e. to outlaw the denial of a 
given genocide. Whilst the good intentions and necessity of recognition of 
atrocity are components of reconciliation processes, it is the formation of 
specific narratives and political authorising of versions of history that is 
                                            
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid., 118.  
37 Ibid., 57.   
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ahistorical. This creates alignments of power around acceptance of these 
particular versions.38  
This cautioning of the long-term damage of remembrance and 
collective memory yields a potent call to action. Further, it demonstrates in 
some extreme cases how narratives and officially sanctioned memory can 
create fertile ground for enacting, justifying or covering atrocity. Rieff 
describes the cases of Israel and the former Yugoslavia where the immense 
baggage of collective memory was used to interpret present threats through 
the lens of past subaltern oppression.39 Yet, Rieff gives short shrift to 
Ricoeur’s injunction of “duty of memory”, dismissing the latter’s work as too 
victim-centred. It is in fact Ricoeur’s perspective that offers a fuller account of 
the process of utilising memory in power relationships.40 
Ricoeur, in his seminal work Memory, History, Forgetting, conveys the 
“duty of memory” as a Kantian moral imperative.41 This duty is to build history 
through the memory of the Other not the Self. It is in reversing this principle 
that the abuse of memory emerges: when memory builds history at the 
expense of the Other. The intersection of identity and memory creates a 
threefold problematic: one, identity is increasingly framed as an “inflexible 
rigidity of character” in place of more fluid identities; two, interaction with the 
Other is increasingly adversarial; and three, the positioning of collective 
memory, “real and symbolic wounds”, as “the heritage of founding 
violence”.42 Founding narratives are a violent product of a process where 
memory births a history that creates more violence to justify or fit versions of 
the past.  
For Ricoeur, there is a further ideological element, where ideology is 
constructed in response to the subaltern, threatened identity. This formation 
of ideas answers a very basic human need to be identified and process 
                                            
38 Ibid., 69. Shaw further adds that legal and political quests that have established 
official recognition of genocides by making denial illegal, damage the capacity to develop 
historical research and nonpartisan education, see Martin Shaw, “The Holocaust and 
genocide: Loose talk and action,” Open Democracy, 21 March 2012, from 
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40 Ibid., 56.   
41 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (University of Chicago Press, 2009), 
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memory.43 Ideology, or a violent founding narrative, can then be wielded in a 
power relation. This is Ricoeur’s stand on the abuse of memory: it 
oppresses, subjugates or even obliterates the Other. Here “imposed memory 
is armed with a history that is itself ‘authorized,’ the official history, the history 
publically learned and celebrated”.44 The practice of “forced memorization” 
becomes a tool of state discipline.45 Despite the rigidity of identity that is 
placed upon social actors, there is an apparent structure of narrative, “the 
characters of the narrative are emplotted at the same time the story is told . . 
. [and] contribute to modelling the identity of the protagonists of the action as 
it moulds the contours of the action itself”.46 Adding to earlier discussion in 
chapter four, what Ricoeur then presents is a model to describe the RPF 
construction of a founding narrative that results in a power relationship with 
its loyal, disciplined subjects, and those identified as enemies of the state.47 
This is the process that yields the dividends experienced by the RPF: 
formation of a post-genocide (public and metanarrative) narrative and a 
shield for atrocities in eastern Zaïre. 
Moses’s iteration of the “terror of history” and Straus similarly describe 
this utilisation of memory within a power relation. Rieff shares this position of 
doubting the humanitarian, cosmopolitan benefits of victim-centred 
memorialisation. The group embedding itself in such memory and producing 
history and the present does so from a place of imminent threat and “fear of 
collective destruction”.48 This set of actors responds to this past by seeking 
redemptive solutions that appeal to culturally embedded tropes (“traditional 
man”) and/or novel projects of group construction (“modern man”). Trauma, 
shame and threat collide in a lethal political cocktail driving the group, almost 
deterministically toward increasingly violent responses and scenarios.49 The 
destination, which can be seen in Rwanda, and experimented with in eastern 
DRC, is a formation of a nation-state that is coherent and unified with the 
                                            
43 Ibid., 83.   
44 Ibid., 85  
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48 Moses, “Genocide and the terror of history,” 90-91.   
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founding narrative. Mark Levene describes this condition as a “sense of 
nation-state oneness [that] could only be enhanced by the conditions of 
relentless crisis in which it as forged, [with] external military threat ramming 
home [this] message”.50 This notion of unity provides little room for difference 
and is a product of the severe situational framing and the necessity of 
maintaining the power derived from the narrative.  
For Straus, founding narratives that are exclusionary and based on 
historic, adversarial power relations are “inherently antagonistic and zero-
sum”, thus making genocide more likely.51 This scenario develops into 
genocidal relations when the enemy is perceived as increasingly 
“uncontainable and unwinnable”.52 This describes an adversary that is seen 
as equally threatening and intractable in their positions. A subaltern relation 
also permeates the founding narrative. Where the enemy group forms 
ideology and stories about identity around this threat and the absolute need 
to deliver the perceived vulnerable group from existential threat.53 In Straus’ 
model, the RPF interpreted and acted on the threat to the Rwandan state, 
and Banyarwanda Tutsi and Banyamulenge in eastern Zaïre. The targeting 
of the civilian refugee population across the expanse of Zaïre, from the Kivus 
to Mbandaka on the Congo River, occurred not only through this process, but 
was reinforced by recent past experience with genocide in Rwanda and 
violence against Banyamulenge populations in South Kivu especially. The 
founding narrative in this case developed in an evolving, not linear path, 
building momentum toward escalating violence.  
The inheritance of RPF memory and history, and their interpretation of 
colonialism as the root of all Rwanda’s ills, shaped post-genocide narratives. 
Going back to the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity, the first iteration of 
the RPF in Uganda, division in Rwanda was considered to be a result of 
extreme Hutu politics and colonial meddling.54 Formation of the narrative 
then gathered around the ideal type of loyalty to this unity, and less so 
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51 Straus, The Making and Unmaking of Nations, 58.  
52 Ibid., 20.   
53 Ibid., 28.   
54 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 124.   
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around an inclusive society. Although the first months of the new Rwanda in 
1995 were hallmarked by symbols of power sharing and cooperation, this 
crumbled with events such as the murder of Seth Sendashonga and the 
Kibeho camp massacre.55 Distinct structures and practice around this 
narrative became tools for disciplining and organising the populace as early 
as 1995. The DMI networks of abakadas used these narratives to influence 
an emerging justice system.56 From returnee screening camps in 1996 to the 
recruitment and training of the new RPA, care was taken with political 
education and reinforcement of the narrative of unity and military response to 
threat.57 The development of a historical, pre-colonial founding myth built on 
their standard of unity. The new Rwanda would be rejuvenated and the RPF 
would defend it as the alternative to the genocide.58  
 This period of normalisation from 1994-1996, saw political education, 
military responses to threat, and national unity, used the selective memory of 
a past Tutsi Kingdom to shape a post-genocide narrative for the new 
Rwanda. Subsequently, this period was followed by inscribing on state 
practices a merging of specific survivor and perpetrator identities, and 
memorialisation of the 1994 genocide. Jennie Burnet demonstrates this shift 
through how the 1996 memorial of the genocide involved the disinterring of 
the dead for ceremonious reburial. In contradiction to traditional Rwandan 
concepts of leaving the dead undisturbed, the RPF-led proceedings also 
underscored the distinction between survivor/victims and perpetrators, 
increasingly understood as respectively Tutsi and Hutu.59 National level 
mourning overshadowed and consumed local level mourning, which, 
depending on the area, paid respects to all the victims of civil war and 
genocide. Rhetoric against the Catholic Church as collaborators and 
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perpetrators, along with the international community, further centralised 
memorialisation in the hands of the RPF state.60  
Conclusion: Dividends of Memory 
Rwanda’s destination of a unified and coherent state, under the RPF’s 
narrative and identity of belonging, became further realised in the 2000s. A 
dividend of RPF memory was the codification of their metanarrative narrative 
into law, with the illegalisation “Genocide Ideology” in 2001 and of 
“Discrimination and Sectarianism” in 2008.61 This phase endowed the 
government with further power, beyond memorialisation and political 
education and socialisation, and a set of tools for state discipline. The 
second dividend of memory that unfolded for the RPF was the framing of the 
mass violence response to the existential threat against Banyamulenge in 
eastern Zaïre, and from increasing incursions from the genocidaire forces 
across the border in North Kivu. The decision to overthrow Mobutu and 
forcefully take back rights to citizenship and now traditional lands was not 
one made singularly by the Banyarwanda or the Banyamulenge. The RPF’s 
securitisation and militarisation of domestic and foreign affairs shaped the 
narrative to be used in response.62  
The purpose of this chapter and chapter five was the unmasking of 
RPF violence in the context of genocide. This review went beyond the 
genocide enshrined and protected by RPF memory. It highlighted the 
violence that served as a refiner’s fire, in turn structuring responses to threat 
coming from a crisis ridden-Zaïre. Critiques made by ideologically driven 
researchers and writers, or assessments written in praise of the RPF, create 
an impasse for further research. They miss both the important process of 
destruction and connections across RPF/A practices in Rwanda and Zaïre, 
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and are therefore unable to push analysis beyond the traditional 
conceptualisations of genocide. 
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Chapter VII: Formed in the Vortex: A Soldier’s Journey 
War criminal, General, infamous killer, revolutionary, fugitive, 
strongman, Rwandan born, Tutsi, Congolese citizen, humanitarian, 
rebel, leader, husband, abductor, father, rancher, witness to genocide, 
defendant, patriot, murderer, vandal, persecutor, pillager.1  
 
Introduction 
This chapter, in conjunction with the following chapter, produces a 
conceptual narrative of participant experiences.2 The notable figures of 
Bosco Ntaganda and Laurent Nkunda serve as a departure point before 
looking at three vignettes of existing RPF/AFDL actor narratives. Using the 
features of genocide (narratives of insecurity, destructive crises, and 
intermediate space) participants’ ontological narratives are viewed through 
their physical and relational journeys up to the 1996 invasion. This leads into 
the next chapter, which picks up the conceptual narrative from the point of 
the 1996 invasion to the erasure of the Rwandan refugees.  
Usual Suspects: Ntaganda and Nkunda 
The above epigraph contains terms used by news media, lawyers, and 
NGOs to describe Bosco Ntaganda. Popularly, he is known as “The 
                                            
1 Marlise Simons, “Congolese Rebel Commander Tells War Crimes Court He Was 
Just a ‘Soldier’,” New York Times, 26 March 2013, accessed on 22 March 2018, from 
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2 As discussed in chapter four, the analysis in chapters seven and eight relies on 
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reconstruction by the researcher. 
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Terminator” since starting as a soldier with the RPF during the Rwandan civil 
war and genocide.3 This Western pop culture imagery conjures a caricature 
of a perpetrator that kills sociopathically, robotically; an inhuman. Such 
imagery ignores any narrative that might yield an understanding about basic 
biographical and historical questions of who, what, when, where or perhaps 
even why. The complexities and subjectivities of Ntaganda’s life captured by 
these other identities are lost. 
Ntaganda attempted to assert his personal narrative in his own words 
during his unsworn statement to the ICC on 3 September 2015, rebutting the 
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against him, 
I know that the allegations against me, as reported in the press, are not 
beneficial to me. I have been described as The Terminator, as an 
infamous killer, but that is not me. I had that reputation not because I 
did any such thing, but it was because of the hatred against Rwandans 
. . . . I am a soldier and I was trained by Ugandan and Rwandan military 
experts. I, myself, have trained a large number of soldiers. I am a 
seasoned instructor. I have always respected military tactics and 
strategies and I have always considered discipline as the foundation of 
my service . . . . And I know that since 1990 and in 1994 I was fighting 
and I was one of those who put an end to the Rwandan genocide.4 
 
Ntaganda’s career began as he left North Kivu at 17 years-old to join the 
RPF in 1990.5 Liberation and ending the genocide were his stated 
motivations, supported by an ethic of military discipline. According to 
Ntaganda, this guiding set of principles remained with him through the period 
in which he was accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ituri 
from 2002 to 2003. To Ntaganda, the identities ascribed to him outside of his 
own framing misconstrue his training and professionalism. Varied reports, 
witnesses and evidences give a contrasting view of The Terminator wading 
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on 5 April 2018, from https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/04-02/06-T-
24-ENG   
5 Ntaganda, although born in north-west Rwanda, fled to Masisi and grew up there 
until joining the RPF, see Penny Dale, “Profile: Bosco Ntaganda, the Congolese 
‘Terminator’,” BBC News, 28 August 2015, accessed on 19 May 2018, from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17689131.    
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through successive conflicts in the Great Lakes region, and at different times 
converging with genocidal processes, notably in 1994 Rwanda and 1996 
Zaïre.   
Following Ntaganda’s participation in the 1994 RPF victory, he 
remained in the new Rwandan Patriotic Army, eventually joining the AFDL 
march to another RPF victory in Kinshasa.6 It is even possible that he was 
present at Tingi-Tingi during the most widely accepted massacre of 
Rwandan refugees.7 Ntaganda’s career can then be traced through the 
genealogy of armed movements and militaries in Congo, from the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) in 1998, Union des 
Patriotes Congolais (UPC) in 2002, Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple (CNDP) in 2005, with integration into the Congolese army in 2009, 
and then mutiny under the March 23rd movement (M23) in 2012. The 
Terminator’s journey is similar to that of many other soldiers who joined the 
RPF in the early 1990s, and then were again at arms from 1996 to 1997 in 
Zaïre. Involvement in these foundational conflicts is often described as 
Ntaganda did, as “one of those who put an end to the Rwandan genocide”, 
or in reaction to “an announcement to kill all Tutsis.”8  
As a response to existential threat and genocide, this journey is the 
plot by which the Banyamulenge RPF/AFDL soldiers pinned their narratives.9 
Regardless of their present security or perception of threat and community, 
Ntaganda and countless other combatants began and solidified their military 
careers and shaped their identities during this period. Yet, these fractured 
pieces of Ntaganda’s own narrative and journey in the 1990s do not shed 
much light on the intermediate space within which Congolese Banyarwanda 
or Banyamulenge RPF soldiers were situated.10 Within this narrative are 
                                            
6 Alphonse a 1991 Banyamulenge recruit into the RPF, recalled meeting Ntaganda 
as a trainer during this period, noting his expertise and knowledge, Alphonse, second 
interview, Kinshasa, July 2018.  
7 McDowell, first interview by phone, March 2018.  
8 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 2015. This description was an explanation for 
joining the UPC, but one similar to that given about the AFDL by most participants.  
9 This plot against which many of these narratives hang is captured in Joris’ 
fictionalised account of the Banyamulenge soldier who embarks on a similar journey from 
Haut Plateau to Rwanda and back again.  
10 Another suspected war criminal who had followed a similar trajectory, currently a 
Major-General in the FARDC, previously part of the CNDP, and also the RPF and AFDL, is 
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discernible connections between the features of genocide. Ntaganda’s 
performative responses to destructive crises demonstrate the 
operationalisation of narratives of insecurity. This pattern can be seen from 
the commencement of his career to more recent activity in North Kivu. In his 
courtroom recitation, he demonstrates the production of identity resulting 
from these features of genocide. He viewed any undertaken violence through 
the justifying frame of historically vindicated threats against the Tutsi.  
Made infamous in the same way as Ntaganda, Laurent 
Nkundabatware (a.k.a Laurent Nkunda) represents a response to 
intermediate space and anti-Tutsi sentiment. One of the main documentary 
sources on Nkunda is a hagiographic pseudonymised biography, which 
includes interviews with the “rebel” himself as well as CNDP colleagues and 
various family members.11 Diverging from the numerous Western news 
media interviews given by Nkunda, describing him as a “warlord”, this 
ontological narrative explores Nkunda’s own self-perception.12 Undoubtedly, 
it overlaps with the public and metanarratives that make up the frequent 
claims to anti-Tutsi discrimination and the existential threat posed by the 
genocidaire. Raised in Rutshuru, North Kivu, the biographer describes him 
as a young student with a great sensitivity towards any “discrimination”, and 
“a defender of Tutsi rights in North Kivu”.13 This narrative provides examples 
of how he would “rebel” against the targeting of classmates because of their 
perceived Tutsi ethnicity.14 After a failed attempt to enlist in the FAZ, he 
                                            
Eric Ruhorimbere. According to a former AFDL political operative and family friend, 
Ruhorimbere was “one of the first” to join the RPF in the 1990s; Eugene, second interview 
by social media, April 2018; see Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: EU, US Sanction Top 
Officials,” 1 June 2017, accessed on 19 April 2018, from 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/01/dr-congo-eu-us-sanction-top-officials; RFI, “DRC 
Exclusive report Part 2: Experts point out army role in Kasai massacres,” 16 June 2017, 
accessed on 19 April 2018, from http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20170616-DRC-Exclusive-report-Part-
2-Experts-point-out-army-role-Kasai-massacres. Ntaganda’s successor and the last leader 
of M23, Sultani Makenga, is a further example of another former-RPF who joined at some 
time in the early 1990s. Originally, from North Kivu, he is believed to be from a Congolese 
Tutsi group in the area, see Timo Mueller and Christoph Vogel, “Congo's Most Powerful 
Rebel Speaks,” Thinking Africa, 15 May 2013, accessed on 11 May 2018, from 
http://thinkingafrica.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/congos-most-powerful-rebel-speaks.html.  
11 Scott, 8-9.  
12 Nicholas Kristof, “Dinner with a Warlord,” New York Times, 18 June 2007, 
accessed on 11 May 2018, from https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/18/opinion/18kristof.html.   
13 Scott, 54-56  
14 Ibid. Nkunda was apparently briefly expelled, specifically for standing up to a 
teacher who threw books at a Tutsi classmate. 
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became involved in smuggling gasoline from Uganda, and associated with 
National Resistance Army (NRA) networks in the region.15 Pursuing a career 
as a teacher, he left Rutshuru for Gisenyi, across the Rwandan border and 
enrolled in the Adventist University of Mudende.16 Nkunda joined the RPF in 
Goma in 1991 as a recruiter and fundraiser at a time when local “educated 
leaders” were needed. He then worked in the Masisi area undercover as a 
teacher, but operated as a node in an RPF network.17  
Following increased violence, in 1993, Nkunda was moved to the 
Gabiro camp for military training, and was then placed in the DMI for “special 
operations”.18 This biographical account, while very brief on the period 
between the Rwandan genocide and the end of the First Congo War in 1997, 
specifically identifies Kagame and the RPF as the parties responsible for 
violence against Rwandan refugees. This violence, he claims, stems from 
the attacks on the Kibeho camp in 1995. He also describes the 
indistinguishability of RPA and AFDL soldiers, of whom Nkunda was one, but 
behind the frontlines.19   
Nkunda then transitioned into the new DRC military, along with a host 
of other AFDL soldiers. There he continued to work in intelligence, stationed 
in the Walikale area. In 1998, he rose to prominence eventually commanding 
two battalions as part of RCD-Goma.20 From this point on, both Congolese 
authorities and international actors became aware of the war crimes 
committed by Nkunda’s soldiers from his RCD days and up to, and including, 
his time leading CNDP.21 Although he is now under house arrest, rumours of 
                                            
15 Ibid., 62.   
16 Ibid., 65.   
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid., 73-75; Aiden O’Donnell, “Who is Laurent Nkunda?” RFI, 14 November 
2008, accessed on 25 November 2017, from 
http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/107/article_2083.asp. Gabiro, located in the North-East 
prefecture of Umutara, became one of the key staging grounds for the RPA led AFDL 
invasion force, commissioned with the mission of forcing returns of refugees or killing them, 
see Ruzibiza, 402.      
19 Ibid., 102-104.   
20 Jason Stearns, “Laurent Nkunda and the National Congress for the Defence of 
the People (CNDP),” L’Afrique Des Grandes Lacs (2007-2008): 246-248. 
21 Ibid., 115; O’Donnell, 2008; Chris McGreal, “‘The soldiers didn't ask any 
questions. They just shot him’”, Guardian, 8 November 2008, accessed on 5 April 2018, 
from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/08/tutsi-rebels-congo-laurentnkunda; 
Human Rights Watch, Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, vol. 19, no. 17, October (2007): 13.  
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Nkunda’s current whereabouts place him anywhere between Goma and 
Kampala. This hearsay also included possible connections to the supposed 
Mouvement chrétien pour la reconstruction du Congo (MCRC).22 Such 
competing narratives of Nkunda show a similarity to Ntanganda’s own 
defence of himself: a rebel fighting against the discrimination of an 
oppressed people. In response to one of many western journalists, Nkunda 
claimed that reports of his alleged war crimes “cut my voice and speak on my 
behalf. Journalists tell what they think will be sensational.”23 Whether it was 
through disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programmes, 
seeking new opportunity through ethnic and ideological networks, or 
responding to perceived needs for communal self-defence, Nkunda is an 
embodiment of Banyarwanda actors’ exposure to genocide and mass 
violence. The biographical features of genocide coalesce in Nkunda’s story, 
seen through a layered exposure and identities. His narrative’s consistent 
deployment of discrimination offers a sense of how actors perceived the 
intermediate space, as well as how narratives of insecurity were used to 
interpret this space. The destructive crises encountered by Nkunda and 
Ntaganda, provided ripe performative ground for response and action, in turn 
shaping identities in a powerful, violent way. In both these brief sketches, the 
interaction and overlap of public and metanarratives can be seen in the 
actor’s individual ontological narrative. For Banyamulenge and other soldiers, 
this narrative tapestry formed their identities and framed their perceptions of 
circumstance and the identities of others. 
Nkunda and Ntaganda indeed share many of the narrative plot points 
with the Banyamulenge that joined the RPF in the 1990s and then went on to 
                                            
22 Trial International, “Laurent Nkunda,” 27 September 2016, accessed on 11 May 
2018, from https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/laurent-nkunda/. The MCRC has come 
and gone as somewhat of a spectre of the ever-present threat of new insurgencies in 
eastern Congo. Keith Harmon Snow, “Western-Backed Terrorism in The Congo: Where Is 
General Laurent Nkunda?” Global Research, 21 June 2015, accessed on 11 May 2018, from 
https://www.globalresearch.ca/western-backed-terrorism-in-the-congo-where-is-general-
laurent-nkunda/5457170; Congo Research Group, “A New Insurgency? Navigating Rumours 
and Hype in Eastern Congo,” 4 May 2015, accessed on 11 May 2018, from 
http://congoresearchgroup.org/a-new-insurgency-navigating-rumors-and/.  
23 Georgianne Nienaber, “Exclusive Interview: Congo Rebel Leader Accused Of 
War Crimes Tells His Story,” Huffington Post, 9 February 2009, accessed on 5 April 2018, 
from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/exclusive-interview-
congo_b_156374.html.   
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conquer in Zaïre as part of the AFDL. Crucially, this contingent was the 
backbone of the AFDL, with a mandate to coerce the return of refugees or 
erase them. No single participant of this research considered himself a 
perpetrator. In fact, many said they had not even been present in the camps, 
or claimed that refugees were unharmed and protected in their safe return to 
Rwanda. Whilst the documented evidence around the first war does support 
the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees up to November 1996, 
233,000 did not survive. Those camp inhabitants who did not return found 
themselves hunted by two columns of AFDL/RPA soldiers (including 
Banyarwandan and Banyamulenge). These soldiers were indeed participants 
in the perpetration of genocide.  
Yet, the narratives of these soldiers reveal a journey composed of 
persecution, forced removal, opportunity, violent military training, liberation, 
halting genocide, and continued threat of genocide. Their march from the 
Kivus to Kinshasa also placed participants at the camps that were affected, 
and under the command of those leading the removal or erasure of Rwandan 
refugees. However, the caricatures of Nkunda and Ntaganda obscure these 
journeys and narratives. Further hidden are the perceptions and identities of 
such actors. Beyond the binary of perpetrator or victim (the latter reflecting 
the categorisation of the victims of war crimes undoubtedly committed by 
both men, as well as common perpetrator self-perceptions), other layers are 
present. This dichotomy is apparent in the many descriptions given about 
Ntaganda by himself and others. Foremost among these, and in his own 
language, is that he was “a soldier” and not “the Terminator”.   
Some Theoretical Considerations 
This chapter considers these narratives, highlighting both the documented 
physical and relational journeys of the three other AFDL soldiers, and by 
focusing on interviews with Banyamulenge soldiers and political operatives 
now residing in DRC. Assessing participant narratives together, offers a 
collective account or a conceptual narrative of the impact of experiences of, 
and exposures to, genocide. As this violent set of social relations is 
encountered and reinterpreted by these actors, movement through the vortex 
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of genocide is demonstrated and perceptible.24 The journey of these soldiers 
is both unique in each participant's own peculiarities, but also similar to that 
of other violent actors in the region and in some cases, universally. A pointed 
reminder should be given of the position laid out in chapter three: this 
approach to participation and identity formation is not an attempt at positing a 
generalised theory. It is an effort to bring understanding to this complex case.  
Researching the perspectives of similar soldiers in the Congo, 
including those fighting against the AFDL and later Rwandaphone 
movements, Justine Brabant argues that such journeys are varied and 
cumulative. Armed actors chose from a range of possible motivations and 
aspirations, ranging from revenge to economic opportunity, seeking 
revolutionary fame or being socialised into soldiering through generations of 
communal self-defence.25  Brabant cautiously points to the work of 
Christopher Browning on voluntary involvement and brutalisation.26 Focusing 
on the narratives of these actors offers a contextualisation of participation in 
conflict, and a narrative of performative identity. D.C. Gill, who analyses the 
written narratives of US soldiers, charts “an evolution rather than a 
disintegration of identity following the traumatic event”.27 Using the 
Foucauldian “gaze”, Gill analyses how through gazing upon the enemy Other 
an identity-difference relation is performed through violent action.28 Soldiers’ 
letters and diaries underscore the progressive building of identities in relation 
to the Other, families at home, and a disinterested US public.29 In a similar 
model, but using armed actor interviews, Mitton, as identified in chapter two, 
likewise saw a relational journey in young soldiers. This trajectory of micro-
                                            
24 What is meant by this kind of intersubjective interpretation is best described by 
Judith Butler when speaking about responsiveness to inevitable vulnerability of all actors, 
“Interpretation does not emerge as the spontaneous act of a single mind, but as a 
consequence of a certain field of intelligibility that helps to form and frame our 
responsiveness to the impinging world (a world on which we depend, but which also 
impinges on us, exacting responsiveness in complex, sometimes ambivalent forms)”; in 
Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (Verso, 2009), 34.   
25 Justine Brabant, “Qu'on nous laisse combattre, et la guerre finira": Avec les 
combattants du Kivu (La Découverte, 2016), 68, 91-94, 102.   
26 Ibid., 190; Browning, Ordinary Men. 
27 Gill, 104. 
28 Ibid., 269; this is similar to the discussion of Bartov’s concept of the mirror of 
destruction discussed in chapter two.  
29 Ibid., 10-14.   
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level analysis, as advocated by Kalyvas, denotes a soldier’s journey that is 
marked with a variety of motivations, logics and types of action.30 All these 
studies point away from master cleavages and closed caricatures of singular 
perpetrators or victims, and towards a localised and bespoke relational 
account of participants in violence and the formation identities.  
The features of genocide, picked out of Ntaganda and Nkunda’s 
fractured narratives, will be used to construct a conceptual narrative of these 
journeys.31 They will chart participant movement through the vortex that led 
to involvement in the genocide of Rwandan refugees. Soldiers’ narratives, 
connected to communal and larger regional public narratives of insecurity. 
Chief among these, according to some participants, was the looming threat 
of genocide that continued from April 1994 into 1996 and beyond.32 The 
intermediate space within which these participants situated themselves, their 
communities and identities, demonstrates the impact of socioeconomic and 
political marginalisation because of Mobutu’s kleptocracy, and 
autochthonous interpretation of who belonged in Zaïre and who did not. 
Destructive crises then feature as major plot points not only in participants’ 
ontological narratives, but also in the public and meta ones. All three of these 
narrative types operationalised the threats of forced removal and genocide. 
Woven into these features are the relational aspects of each soldier: their 
relations to threat; past, present and future security; and, how they 
participated from as early as 1990 in the RPF to the AFDL in 1996. These 
features of genocide, viewed through a relational lens, point towards the 
formation of complex identities. Fluid and performative identities were 
shaped by oscillating responses to danger and opportunity. Furthermore, 
these features structure the vortex, whereby participants account for their 
layered experiences of genocide.  
                                            
30 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 387-388; a similarly complex picture 
is presented by Chris Hedges in his review of the narratives of soldiers, political actors and 
news media as generators of identities in conflict, in Chris Hedges, War is a Force that 
Gives Us Meaning (Hachette UK, 2014).  
31 The features of genocide are explained in detail in chapters three and five.   
32 The following chapter will address participants’ narratives of insecurity as they 
pertain to their current situation.   
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Three Vignettes of AFDL/RPA Participation 
Existing accounts of participants who traversed the RPF and the AFDL, are 
limited and do not always offer a full biographical account of this initiation in 
to an early military career. The following three vignettes give a cross-section 
of Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge soldier journeys that this research aims 
to engage and build on. Furthermore, each demonstrates the above-
described key plot points in participant narratives.  
The Kadogo 
Papy Bulaya, a Congolese Tutsi soldier, was part of the AFDL and crossed 
the Zaïrian border in late 1996. He went on to dismantle and empty refugee 
camps. Under the command of General Ruvusha, Bulaya, as a fifteen-year-
old kadogo, was ordered to “drive out the enemy”.33 Distinguishing civilians 
from combatants was not the approach used by the AFLD/RPA in the camps, 
“Our Tutsi commander told us: they're genocidaires, they have to die. They 
would call out: ‘kadogo, kill this person’. And we had to obey; otherwise we 
were executed on the spot. We had to keep going all the time. A lot of 
Rwandans [refugees] were killed there back then.”34 Bulaya and those 
present were then ordered to return to massacre sites to dispose of the 
bodies by burning them with gasoline provided by a supply truck.35 Despite 
leaving the army after the capture of Kinshasa, Bulaya re-joined under a 
division of the RCD in response to the threat he perceived in the return of the 
RPA to Congo in 1998. This account of Bulaya’s traumatic induction into 
RPA camp clearing methods and disposal of bodies is taken from David Van 
Reybrouck’s Congo: An Epic History of a People. In Jason Stearn’s 
research, he interviewed several former kadogos with similar experiences, all 
recounting a distinct narrative of enlistment into the AFDL, some by force, 
but then initiating a cyclical involvement in armed groups since the early 
                                            
33 The Swahili phrased Kadogo or Kidogo is usually understood as “small one” or in 
this context a “child soldier”.   
34 Van Reybrouck, 424.    
35 Ibid.   
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1990s.36 Bulaya, like many others, became a soldier in a specifically RPF 
framed conception of threat and responses to that threat.  
The Abducted 
Ruffin Luliba was a young 11-year-old Bukavu football player. Bugera 
approached his team and offered financial support and moral 
encouragement.37 Bugera drove the team, under the ruse of collecting new 
uniforms, over the Rwandan border where they were transferred to a truck 
that took them to the edge of Akagera National Park and the Gabiro training 
camp. After his abduction in 1995, Ruffin moved through the violent and 
psychological reshaping of basic military training; he and his teammates 
were to be the “new liberators” of Zaïre. Ruffin counted up to 500 other 
children present at the camp, all brought to Gabiro under a similar ruse.38 
There he was taught the ideological underpinnings of the RPF and the AFDL, 
and buried those children who succumbed to disease as result of squalid 
conditions.39 After seven months of training, including a stint in Kigali, Ruffin 
was sent back to Bukavu on reconnaissance duties prior to the September 
1996 invasion. Over time, Ruffin was assigned to the Rwandan head of 
operations in Congo, James Kabarebe, as well as Kabila himself. After his 
first combat experience, he received a hundred lashes for refusing to return 
to the fighting. Although Ruffin was demobilised and did not re-join the 
fighting, his cohort of kadogo formed one of the key, compliant components 
                                            
36 Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 349n1; Junior Nzita’s experience 
recorded in his biography mentioned in chapter two also reflects this trend and violent 
involvement in the AFDL, see n84.  
37 In Van Reybrouck’s account, he names Bugera as the man who abducts Ruffin 
and other young boys and takes them across the border to Rwanda. In a separate account 
given by Ruffin to MONUC, this man is named as Masasu Nindaga. In field interviews when 
participants mentioned interaction with or knowledge of Bugera, conflicting accounts were 
given of his involvement and role in voluntary recruitment and abductions; Van Reybrouck, 
416, 418; Joelle Sabella, “DRC: Child Protection- The Story of a Demobilized Child- History 
of Congo,” MONUC, 16 November 2004, accessed on 12 April 2018, from 
https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rdc-protection-de-lenfance-histoire-
dun-enfant-d%C3%A9mobilis%C3%A9-histoire.  
38 Sabella, 2004. Another account relays how a child was taken by soldiers 
pretending to repair a broken-down vehicle. The boy was thrown in the back of the vehicle 
and never saw his family again, in AllAfrica, “Congo-Kinshasa: Child Soldiers Tell Their 
Stories,” 8 September 2003, accessed on 13 July 2018, from 
https://allafrica.com/stories/200309080953.html.  
39 Van Reybrouck, 418.   
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of the AFDL as it traversed Zaïre and the refugee camps, forcing the 
occupants out, returning some to Rwanda, and erasing those that 
remained.40   
The Technician 
Papy Kamanzi was interviewed by Jason Stearns in the early 2000s, and 
renders a full account of a soldier who was recruited into the RPF, and 
became an integral part in the camp clearing operations. Kamanzi also met 
Bugera, but in different circumstances, one more similar to those of 
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge recruits during the Rwandan civil war 
period. During the early 1990s, Bugera was active in North Kivu, operating a 
network of cooperation between local RPF cells and the main force in 
Rwanda. Kamanzi joined the RPF in March 1993 as a young adult, along 
with 172 other recruits.41 He was motivated in part by the ongoing localised 
conflicts in North Kivu at this time. This violent period saw Banyarwanda 
(Hutus and Tutsis) engaged in varying battles over access to land and 
resources, steered in some cases by MAGRIVI.42 Kamanzi made a 
connection, as did many other early recruits, under the guidance and 
propaganda of the likes of Bugera, between the insecurity and violence 
threatened against Banyarwanda in eastern Zaïre and the cause of Tutsi 
brothers in Rwanda. Such a connection was realised retrospectively in the 
promise of return, “we knew we were leaving to eventually come back and 
free our country.”43 Regarding the situation of “Tutsis” in the region, Kamanzi 
reflected on the necessary duty of communal defence against threat, and 
even against themselves, 
We Tutsi have many problems. We will do anything to protect our 
community, and it is true that many people want to destroy us. But 
there are also many manipulators in the Tutsi community, who will use 
                                            
40 Sabella, 2004.   
41 Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 73-75. Similar to participants 
interviewed in Bukavu, Kamanzi had previously attempted to join the RPF as early as 1991. 
This was likely a result of the peer pressure of seeing his four older brothers leaving before 
him.  
42 As discussed in chapter four this agricultural ethnic association-turned militia was 
foremost in pioneering links with the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, yet at one point did seek to 
represent the interests of both Tutsi and Hutu Banyarwanda in North Kivu prior to the mid-
1990s.   
43 Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 76.   
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that fear in their own interest. “Oh, we must fight or the Hutu will kill 
us! Oh, take up your guns or Kabila will exterminate us!” But you 
discover later that it isn’t true . . . . There, too, there are opportunists 
who use the Tutsi to mobilise people. So we are stuck in the middle, 
between extremists.44 
 
Motives and strategies for the protection of this community ranged from 
genuine to manipulative. Articulations of existential threat, by family 
members of existing RPF network members, intersected with these 
elements, giving these perceived dangers considerable potency. Narratives 
of insecurity are key to this articulation. The RPF relayed these “problems”, 
at least in the 1990s, through a specific lens. Situated in their public 
narrative, this lens identified political opposition and encouraged responses 
of extreme violence. This led to the development of a metanarrative of 
genocide ideology and articulation the genocidaire. The fate of Rwandan 
Tutsi, Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge in eastern Zaïre became closely 
thought of and linked through this network of contacts, propaganda, and 
exchange of support and recruitment. RPF public and metanarratives were 
likewise shared and adopted through these networks. Kamanzi recalled, in a 
slogan and song, the hopeful exuberance of 1993, “there’s nothing like 
having your own country. Il fallait tupate adresse. We needed to have our 
own address . . .  Don’t be afraid good Rwanda, don’t be afraid I am coming! 
The source of unity and peace.”45 
 Kamanzi trained in Rwanda during the genocide and lost two brothers 
in the fighting around Kigali in 1994. The continued flow of Banyarwandan 
and Banyamulenge refugees, from Zaïre in 1995 and into 1996, only served 
to reinforce the expediency of the promise of return and liberation. The 
deaths of his brothers and the forced removals and evacuations of his 
identified community were viewed through the RPF lens.46 When the time 
came for the invasion of Zaïre in 1996, he had been moved into the DMI as 
an operative directed by Rwandan commander Jack Nziza to erase 
                                            
44 Ibid., 79.   
45 Ibid., 75.   
46 Ibid., 75-78. Kamanzi attributed the cause of the violence to ‘bad politics’, 
referring to that brought by the Hutu Power division created in Rwanda, impacting eastern 
Zaïre, and that of the western, imperialist lens through which the RPF indoctrinated recruits 
to see the current context.  
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“subversives”.47 Such were defined broadly as former Habyarimana 
government officials, militia members, opposition to the AFDL, those 
identified because of prior personal conflict with RPF officers, or refugees 
who had remained and not returned. As a DMI technician, he was instructed 
and trained to execute those identified as threats with discrete, but bloody 
methods. In this way Kamanzi, whose journey started in 1993 North Kivu 
with hope and promise, continued through the violence of eliminating 
subversives: 
Thousands returned to Rwanda on their own. But there were some 
remaining in the area, those who couldn’t flee and couldn’t return 
home. The sick and weak. We lied to them. We said we would send 
them home; we even cooked food for them. But then we took them 
into the forest. We had a small hatchet we carried on our back, an 
agafani. We killed with that. There was a briefing, an order to do so . . 
. . We could do over a hundred a day . . .  We used ropes, it was the 
fastest way and we didn’t spill blood. Two of us would place a guy on 
the ground, wrap a rope around his neck once, then pull hard.48 
 
When challenged by Stearns for an explanation of these actions, Kamanzi 
indicated that those were the orders to be carried out under the threat of 
death, echoing Bulaya’s account. These commands were designed by the 
DMI, and on a larger scale, the RPF engineers of the AFDL, to create their 
social and political order, erasing the genocidaire.49 
* * *  
These three vignettes identify key elements of the soldier’s journey, as 
understood from participant interviews. Of import was the emergence of 
networks propelling soldiers physically and relationally. These networks 
facilitated the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge’s adoption of the RPF’s 
cause increasingly as their own. What narratives were then produced in this 
process? How do these narratives help in plotting the journey that resulted in 
the genocide of Rwandan refugees? How do they identify the vortex effect of 
these perpetuating experiences? The remaining content of this chapter will 
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address these questions and describe how identities as both fluid and 
performative, were shaped in this process.   
 The following sections underscore the features of genocide discussed 
thus far: narratives of insecurity, intermediate space and destructive crises. 
The three main sections of this chapter cover: the rise of the Banyamulenge 
community and the emergent persecution of the group; the departure and 
journey of Banyamulenge soldiers; and, the reoccurrence of the existential 
threat of genocide. These features are woven into the plot of each narrative 
presented by self-identified Banyamulenge participants. As laid out in 
chapter four, these participants were involved either as political operatives or 
soldiers with the AFDL. Crucially, their experiences and re-narrativisations 
replicate the above plot points previewed in the vignettes, as well as Nkunda 
and Ntaganda’s short stories. Overall, this demonstrates the process of how 
and when actors passed through the vortex, layering experiences and 
perceptions, and thus forming identities.  
In whose name?  
While each participant described himself as Banyamulenge, or Congolese 
Tutsi, with some direct familial or heritage-based relation with Rwanda, they 
regarded their Banyamulenge identity within a central tension. There was a 
simultaneous disconnect and connection to Zaïre, layered with a Tutsi 
identification to Rwanda and the RPF. The latter also had its own dark side, 
with many feeling a sense of bitter divorce from Rwanda resulting from the 
dismantling of the AFDL by Kabila and subsequent conflicts. The 
consequences of this trajectory are captured in Kamanzi’s depiction of the 
need for communal self-defence, and manipulation by political actors.50 The 
desires of early 1990s Banyamulenge recruits, coalescing with the regional 
security designs of the RPF and its allies, saw the First Congo War fought, 
and its atrocities committed, in their name. 
The accounts of both political actors and soldiers were deeply rooted 
in a sense of embedded disadvantage: a view of the past interpreting 
intermediate space through narratives of insecurity. The destructive crises of 
the Rwandan genocide and the mass exodus of Rwandan genocidaire forces 
                                            
50 This is further addressed in the Epilogue.   
 167 
and refugees further compounded this process. These personal narratives 
show the interaction of the features of genocide, and therefore the 
performativity of fluid identities.  
The First Rebellion 
For older participants, this process began with the Mulele Rebellion, or 
Simba War, in the early 1960s.51 As discussed in chapter five, the 
appointment of Bisengimana heralded a period of Banyarwanda and 
Banyamulenge integration into power under the Mobutu regime. Yet, prior to 
this was a period (foreshadowing Bisengimana falling out of Mobutu’s favour) 
exclusion and disadvantage. The advent of the Mulele Rebellion saw the rise 
of Pierre Mulele, Patrice Lumumba’s former education minister. In 1964, 
Mulele briefly united disparate eastern Congolese forces, Lumumbaists, 
Katangan secessionists, and those opposed to the Joseph Kasavubu’s 
government, and possibly even recruited some Banyamulenge youth into this 
force.52 In the narratives of older AFDL political operatives, this provided a 
crucial opportunity: “some of our youth felt the need of joining the Mulelists. 
Some of them [joined] so that they can . . . get training and come back to 
defend the community.”53 Whilst aware of the elite-level Cold War dynamics 
of the rebellion, Banyamulenge interaction and eventual siding with Mobutu’s 
Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), reveals the more local concerns of the 
community.54 A prominent group, the Centre de Regroupement de Africain 
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54 Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 62-63; Che Guevara noted, 
disappointedly when accompanying rebels through the Congolese forests, including 
Congolese tutsi, or “Rwandans” that Maoism, or any form of socialism, was not reflected or 
embedded in the ground troops, see Ernesto “Che” Guevara, The African Dream: The 
Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo (Harvill Press, 2000). One was more likely to 
encounter the tribal mysticism and practise of water-based protection famously practiced still 
today by various Mai-Mai groups, Van Reybrouck, 411-412; Mamdani, When Victims 
Become Killers, 258; Nzongola, 129, 242-243; Brabant, 80-85; Judith Verweijen, “Everyday 
violence and Mai Mai militias in Eastern DRC,” in ed. Marta Iniguez de Heredia, Everyday 
Resistance, Peacebuilding and State-making: Insights from “Africa's World War” 
(Manchester University Press, 2017), 127-152. It was in fact these Cold War and more so 
neo-colonial machinations of both Belgium and the US that decided the war, solidifying 
Mobutu’s endorsed position as would-be head of state, see Ludo De Witte, “The 
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(CEREA), also gained Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge support in this 
period, representing the latter groups’ interests in the Kivus.55 A turning point, 
and moment of political awakening and initial generation of Banyamulenge 
identity, as such, came when localised looting by Mulelist rebels of 
Banyamulenge cattle started in 1964.56 As described by Koen Vlassenroot, 
this period represents the advent of Banyamulenge, their ethnogenesis: their 
realignment to a land-based identity and belonging in Congo. Investing in the 
ANC as a structure entailed adopting a language of power with ties between 
land and ethnicity.57   
Moise, an AFDL political operative, deployed the lifeblood symbology 
of the Banyamulenge cow. The rebels knowingly turned on the 
Banyamulenge, “After the rebels became weak, they went against the 
Banyamulenge because we had cows. We were living much better life than 
them. Those rebels turned their sights against the Banyamulenge so that 
they can take away our cows.”58 He continues by emphasising the security 
and peace that came with aligning with Mobutu in response to this threat: 
After what had happened, they started a war among the groups . . . : 
the Bafuliro, the Babembe, the Nindu, the Simbas. We fought. We 
joined the Mobutu regime. They gave us guns . . . . That body of 
Banyamulenge volunteers, the one that fought with other groups, this 
is our community’s right to defend our cause . . . . We fought and 
defeated them because we were also getting support from the 
government. That passed by. Peace came. Life was more normal. We 
started observing a period of peace.59 
 
Moise’s retrospective of the Banyamulenge’s turn against the Muleleists 
picks out the heavy price that would be paid by gaining “peace”. Thierry, 
another political operative, added the following about relations between his 
community and neighbouring groups the Babembe and Bafuliro, “Those 
people . . .  started taking everything by themselves and everything they 
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thought belonged just to them. In addition, the other reason is that the 
Banyamulenge were supporting the government of Joseph Kasavubu and 
Mobutu as part of the army back then. Those rebels were also fighting with 
that government.”60 His community was empowered by Mobutu and the 
ANC, as well as central government via recognition of their regional 
significance as an ally. Yet, the division sown into the fabric of South Kivu 
communities would contribute to exclusion in the end, not only locally, but 
also on a national level after the fall of Bisengimana.61 The conflict that 
ensued locally prompted the persecution and displacement of some 
Banyamulenge groups during the late 1960s.62 In the words of Bonte, an 
early RPF recruit, “During the time when the Banyamulenge were in the 
government they were strong. They chased the Babembe. Even when the 
war ended, the hate and grudges remained up to today.”63  
Moise recalls that this was a period marked by the spread of disease 
because displacement into squalid conditions without supplies.64 However, 
the newfound empowerment of the Banyamulenge and their incorporation 
into the Congolese army, germinated the seeds of political recognition and 
some representation,  
That is why the government provided guns and gave training to our 
children so they can go fight those people because we knew the 
place. I will tell you something very important. The Banyamulenge 
were recruited and became soldiers of the government in 1968 . . . . 
After we defeated them, the government said, “these people they are 
just one tribe. They fight as one tribe. They speak the same language. 
They live the same way”.65 
 
This perception of advantageous utility was a theme in how many 
Banyamulenge soldiers saw themselves: the line of defence, beneficiaries of 
contemporary power relations. Yet, the caveat of this deal was layered into 
his interpretation of these events, “They said, ‘if we continue to keep them 
together, they may turn the guns against us. So let's have them scattered. 
                                            
60 Thierry, interview Kigali December 2017.  
61 Stearns, “Banyamulenge,” 16.   
62 Willame, 80.  
63 Bonte, interview Kinshasa July 2018.   
64 Moise, 2017; he described how people had to move from Haut Plateau area to 
Mid-Plateau, increasing their isolation and disconnection with resources.  
65 Ibid.  
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Pay them. Give them salaries.’ Therefore they were integrated into other 
battalions in the Congolese army so that we could not continue to grow in 
numbers, it was thought that they may even eventually come and fight 
against the government.”66 This echoed the statements of soldiers following 
the success of the AFDL and Kabila’s rejection of Rwandan involvement in 
Congo in 1998, where the potency of Banyamulenge political awakening was 
stifled by dispersal, and eventual attacks on soldiers.67 It was after this 
military integration process, according to Moise, that in 1970, “the war of 
Banyamulenge the other tribes it kind of, it therefore started officially.”68 This 
juxtaposition of a negative peace formed a key plot point for these narratives, 
and that of the Banyamulenge identity itself.  
Defining Intermediate Space: Doubtful Nationality 
In contrast to the complex configurations of localised conflict in North Kivu, 
among the Banyarwanda and their Congolese neighbours around land 
ownership, Banyamulenge narratives prioritise nationality, belonging and 
citizenship. These wants and grievances helped form particular regional 
networks and relations to neighbouring groups, especially the Babembe and 
Bafuliro. To capture this sentiment the phrase “doubtful nationality” was 
consistently used by soldier and political operative alike.69 The question of 
nationality and citizenship was one that served as a core plot point for 
Banyamulenge narratives across these periods, from the post-Mulele 
rebellion era to the twilight of Mobutu’s regime. Amani, a former AFDL 
operative, who refused to fight in 1996, but worked locally to bolster support 
and recruitment for the AFDL, echoed this narrative, “That defence was 
about our Congolese nationality; it is for the land. The land belongs to the 
culture. If we do not have the land under an authority that we manage 
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ourselves . . . , the government looks at us as if we are strangers or 
refugees. That is what we were seeking during Mobutu period, for us to get 
that nationality. That was the fight.”70 Land was an accessory to the conflict, 
which from the 1960s to the present, was about belonging, and political 
representation. Eugene, another political operative, also stated, “If you don't 
have the nationality, you don't have control over the land. You cannot do 
anything on it because you do not belong there. They can move you at any 
time.”71 The relation to the land was ordered by nationality, and in this 
description, a lack of control over security and subsistence.  
The historical context for this focus on national belonging, explained in 
chapter five, underscores a process of events from Bisengimana’s lobbying 
for and achieving the 1972 Citizenship Law, extending citizenship to all 
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, to the 1981 revision adding the 
requirement to establish pre-colonial (1885) residency. Escalation of anti-
Banyarwandan sentiment in Mobutu’s Zaïre came with the CNS and 
regionalisation of the Rwandan conflict, even before the arrival of the exodus 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe and refugees in 1994.  
 While studying public health administration at the University of 
Kinshasa in the early 1990s, Eleazar experienced the following, “The time 
that we are told to go back to Rwanda. They had even started to create, 
invent the slogan. The slogan of R-R-R which means Rendre, Rendre the 
Rwandans, return the Rwandans to Rwanda.”72 Leonard, also an AFDL 
political operative, recounted how his peers had been prevented from 
attending University because they had been labelled Rwandan.73  
 The burning of ballot boxes was another plot point, for many of the 
older political operatives and young RPF recruits, linking this tension over 
belonging. This moment served as a marker for both groups, signifying the 
intermediate space in which they occupied, again as a question of political 
underrepresentation and growing exclusion, as well as a demonstration of 
the need for communal self-defence. Balthazar, who would join the RPF in 
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72 Eleazar, 2017; Stearns, 63.  
73 Leonard, first interview in Bukavu, 2017. 
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1994, cited these attacks on polling stations in the South Kivu areas of 
Bihumba and Kissani as a seminal event.74 He was 12 years old at the time: 
“When I was growing up I saw that during that time there was election where 
we were denied voting as well as citizenship, so my parents decided to go 
and destroy the polling stations, that’s what made me aware of what we were 
going through . . . . It was attacked; they tore those ballot papers and just 
destroyed the stations.”75 This incident was part of a series of attacks, a 
response to the growing animosity produced by the 1981 changes in the 
Citizenship Law and continued breakdown in local relations since many 
Banyamulenge turned against the Mulelist Rebellion in the latter part of the 
1960s. Attacks on ballot boxes and polling stations occurred in 1982, 1984, 
and (according to participants) in the CNS transition election of 1992.76 
Edward, another political operative, cited the 1992 ballot box attacks as a 
demonstration of the conflicted position of the Banyamulenge. Their options 
seemed constrained to defending the community by rejecting the restrictive 
framing of nationality and the election, or do not respond and continue to be 
violently marginalised: 
[In the] 1991, or 1992, election in Congo, Banyamulenge [were] 
banned from voting, Banyamulenge had to defend themselves, and 
destroyed polling boxes. Only that time many were cast into prison, 
leaders were taken to prison. Families had to pay bail for release, the 
men returned. Because Banyamulenge were cattle keepers, people 
would take our cattle, they would do anything because we had no 
rights. Young men [were] motivated by this to join the RPF, and then 
to return and wage the same fight.77  
 
Further, Janvier, who would join the RPF in 1993, again asserted this major 
plot, even tipping point, of exclusion from the electoral process: 
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Yeah, you know, we were born and grew up, but we lived in that kind 
of condition, and it was not too much by then, but we knew that we 
were surviving by effort. By our own strength. We couldn’t even vote 
for the president, they were denied by telling them that they were not 
Congolese. Then our parents would go and burn all the polling 
stations. We grew up seeing all of that.78 
 
The exclusion reflected on by these early RPF recruits indicates again the 
lack of political representation and recognition. Doubtful nationality became 
the point of reference of not only the impact of the CNS, but also a 
confirmation of the relationship between the State and Banyamulenge, as 
they saw themselves and were ascribed by local and national authorities. 
Political representation of Tutsi interest groups was blocked. CEREA was 
shut down in the wake of the CNS’ anti-Banyarwanda drive.79  
 These increasingly violent responses to state policy widened the 
social distance between the Banyamulenge and neighbouring groups. 
Growing conflict with the Babembe and Bafuliro can be characterised by the 
identity-difference relation. The notion of who was an autochthon and who 
was of a doubtful nationality spurred further marginalisation and 
discrimination into the early 1990s. Janvier indicated that the spread of this 
labelling began to be embedded in schools, “After Banyamulenge graduated 
and came back [home] they encountered the mentality that they didn’t belong 
there, they should go back to Rwanda. And [Babembe] felt that their parents 
should not work for us as they used to, because they were our servants. 
They worked for us.”80 He indicates here an upset of a socio-economic 
hierarchy of relations in Minembwe. Not only did the intensity of the demand 
that the foreigners return to Rwanda grow, but it also altered power relations 
for the Banyamulenge.  
 Yet, other participants assigned a more varied timeline to the 
breakdown of neighbouring group relations. One would note that the 
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increase in cattle theft began as early as 1978.81 Leonard also discussed that 
even prior to the advent of the CNS Mobutu was favouring other groups to 
control the region.82 When asked about who was responsible for promoting 
exclusion and doubtful nationality, Leonard responded adamantly, “It was the 
very same people that were coming from within the community . . . . These 
people were raised within the Mobutu regime. They did not come from other 
countries, no. They came within the community. There are those that are 
raised and given power, given position in the Mobutu regime. They would 
start by talking negatively about the identities of Banyamulenge.”83 He went 
as far as to characterise this relation as a “manipulation” of Mobutu by these 
neighbouring groups.84 Others pointed towards specific communal 
incidents.85 Thierry recounted how local Bafuliro, in the Fizi area abducted 
over a dozen children from Banyamulenge families starting in September 
1996. Despite protests made to the government, Thierry claims that these 
children are still missing, and have most likely been trafficked into Tanzania. 
Furthermore, he recounted how, in August 2017, in this same area a 
Banyamulenge family (father, mother and three children) was burned alive in 
their house by a displaced Babembe male.86 For Thierry, these incidences 
connected to a significant portion of his narrative describing ongoing 
insecurity and marginalisation, even after various conflicts and armed groups 
purportedly defending and securing the rights of the Banyamulenge.87  
Describing intermediate space in the 1990s, Umwami, a political 
operative, recounted that the discrimination, exclusion from formal education 
institutions, and removal of Banyamulenge from public service positions. He 
claimed this was justified by the state and its allies and could be explained by 
an identity-difference relation, “They put on us what you call a doubtful 
political [status] . . .  meaning they doubted us, by saying that we are not 
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Congolese. It was called a doubtful nationality. During that time, they were 
exempted from participating in social and political life. They were started 
taking away our IDs, our nationality.”88 For many teens and young adults at 
the time, this would translate into an avenue for opportunity and 
empowerment. Joseph claimed that being labelled as strangers helped him 
relate the plight of this community to the offer of joining the RPF, 
For us, in order for us to go into the military [the RPF] . . . it was a 
cause. There was a problem. Because it was the torture and the 
struggle of the Banyamulenge. Until where it has reached here we 
were told we are strangers, that we should go back where we came 
from. We were denied nationality and citizenship. And they say there 
will be a census, but we will not be included. Then we saw that this 
may lead to us being terminated. There came to be a point whereby 
most of our chiefs of our villages were captured. [They] were 
arrested.89  
 
When Joseph left to join the RPF in the latter part of 1994, the situation in 
North and South Kivu had dramatically worsened because of the 
reaggregation of power and catalysation of violence against Tutsi 
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge. His statement above reflects the danger 
(“this may lead to us being terminated”) of this context. The census was put 
into place by the CNS, because of demands by parties associated with anti-
Tutsi sentiment.90 Decided upon in 1991, the census would seek to establish 
immigration and citizenship status within eastern Zaïre, based on the 1981 
Citizenship Law. This move sparked violence against and in defence of 
Banyamulenge and Banyarwandan in both provinces.91 It was a key 
recruiting tool for those like Laurent Nkunda working among the Rwandan 
Tutsi refugee and Banyarwanda populations of North Kivu.92 
Inscribing Intermediate Space on Banyamulenge Bodies 
Shaping and ascribing Banyamulenge identities was an identity-difference 
relation of doubtful nationality. When asked about the reasons beyond legal 
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and political exclusion, participants considered themselves targeted because 
of specific Tutsi-like “morphologie”.93 Gustav, a 1996 RPF recruit, summed 
up the “contaminated” ideology brought into Zaïre by genocidaire forces and 
the violence connected to this ascribed, ethnic identity, “morphologically, we 
were already victims”.94 The intensely subjective identification of who 
appears as a Tutsi or Hutu carried currency not only in Rwandan history, but 
also regionally, especially in eastern Congo. In a postcolonial context, the 
solidifications of socio-economic identity and ethnicity became a reification of 
identities utilised in the growing division between communal groups in both 
North and South Kivu.95 The reaggregation of power in both provinces, at 
local and state levels, further operationalised these characteristics as exiled 
Rwandan armed groups forged relationships. These were increasingly 
realigned against Banyarwanda Tutsi in North Kivu and Banyamulenge in 
South Kivu. 
 The experience of Matthias is illustrative of the ascription of 
Banyamulenge as Tutsi, finding themselves, often for the first time, 
connected with a broader, regional ethnic and political division. In 1990, he 
was attending secondary school in Bukavu, and would travel through 
Rwandan via Cyangugu to visit family. On one of these journeys he fell into 
the hands of FAR soldiers, 
I was arrested; the reason was that I was a Tutsi. In the other side of 
the border or in Rwanda, they say that I resemble the other Tutsis of 
Rwanda who had joined the [RPF] organisation in Uganda. When they 
arrested me they said I was Tutsi. It was my first time to know what it 
was like to be told that I was a Tutsi. Because at our home, we don't 
have the Hutus, we don't have the Tutsis. We really didn't know 
anything about that.96  
 
Aged 21 at the time, Matthias was not yet politically aware of such 
distinctions. Yet, his tall build, defined by the Belgian colonial powers as a 
Tutsi feature, made him a target for suspicious and marauding soldiers. 
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 For participants, morphologie aided in the explanation of how the 
1994 Rwandan refugees were able to integrate into Congolese society, 
reflecting on the ongoing presence and integration of the FDLR. Eleazar 
stated, 
It's racial, a racial problem. They [ex-FAR/Interahamwe] say that they 
were chased by the Tutsis and, and if they are here, they want 
revenge against the Tutsi that are living within the Congo. So, the 
Hutus here, in the Congo, according to the history, they call 
themselves brothers. And the very same thing still exists today. They 
are still very similar today . . . the Banyamulenge are still considered 
to be strangers. Others, the Hutu, they struggled, but they come here, 
they learn good Swahili, they get along very well, they're given 
citizenship, identity card, and just automatically become Congolese. 
Because even most of them, they look alike. They look like them.97 
 
Contrasting colonial and postcolonial inequality faced by Hutus in Rwanda 
with that of the marginalised Banyamulenge, he perceived how the former 
were able to avoid being ostracised, and were even welcomed on account of 
physical appearance. Leonard emphasised the same conclusion between 
Tutsi physical appearance and belonging in Congo, referring here to the 
removal order given by the South Kivu governor in 1996,  
So that governor was within the regime of Mobutu, gave an ultimatum, 
to chase us away that the Banyamulenge should leave the country 
and go to Rwanda. It was the same thinking of morphologie, that 
Banyamulenge are not Congolese. They are Rwandese. I wish that 
that logic, the logic that I am telling you, I wish that you also say or 
write the exact what I've said with honesty and with, with honesty and 
clearly what I am saying to you.98  
 
Patience, who joined the RPF in 1994, witnessed the destruction of the 
Rwandan genocide, the consequences of this “morphologie” perception, and 
the “ideology” that was carried by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe into the 
Kivus. It was that “the people that they killed were people that were looking 
like us, we looked like we had a similar morphologie, and Tutsis looked the 
same [as us]”.99 Expressed in a visceral sentiment, Umwami described the 
potency of the visual aspect of the identity-difference relation as, “It is just the 
                                            
97 Eleazar, 2017. Another participant offered a similar explanation about the 
integration of former-ex-FAR and now FDLR soldiers into the FARDC on account of their 
similar, or Hutu/Congolese appearance, Martin, interviewed in Goma, November 2017.   
98 Leonard, 2017. This removal order will be discussed in greater detail below.  
99 Patience, interview in Bukavu, November 2017.   
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hate, I don't know it is just the hate. They just wanted to finish with us. That's 
why they wanted to wipe out all of us.  It is just the hate that they have. I see 
the Burundais and Tanzanians are close friends to them, and a lot of FDLR 
are already in these countries; so when they see us with this morphologie, 
with the look of Tutsis, the hate multiplies.”100 Again referring to the 
integration of Hutus, perceiving them to be FDLR, difference in appearance 
produced a “hate”. Speaking of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, Leonard 
distinguished this behaviour of the Other as “inexorable hate”.101 
 Considering how these participants viewed the treatment and 
exclusion of their community in Mobutu’s Zaïre, how unique was this 
scenario? Indeed, whilst Mobutu ruled by manoeuvring, pitting contesting 
groups against one another, the Banyamulenge do appear to be placed in a 
unique situation, between identities. Being Banyamulenge, as such, does 
demonstrate the troubles of postcolonialism, and the specific space allotted 
for this group in the discourse of indigeneity and the reification of European 
notions of identities under Mobutu.102 The Mulelist Rebellion and various 
attacks on ballot boxes and polling stations demonstrate the willingness to 
resort to violence in agitating for political representation and recognition. To 
be Congolese, and recognised as such, was a primary part of the above 
element of these narratives. These plot points would cut a path for the 
soldier’s journey that many young Banyamulenge would undertake in the 
coming months and years. 
Having been recognised as Tutsi (by heritage, culture or appearance, 
as the Rwandan foreigner occupying Congolese soil), the Banyamulenge 
saw the opportunity to achieve these long-term aspirations through 
embracing this ascribed identity as inkotanyi.103 The intermediate space 
occupied by this community shaped their sense of belonging, and perceived 
paths to empowerment, beyond the marginalisation of the postcolony. The 
                                            
100 Umwami, 2017.  
101 Leonard, 2017.   
102 Court, 434.   
103 This Kinyarwandan phrase was used by most participants to describe the RPF, 
meaning “fierce fighters”. This valorising label features in formal party narratives (see 
http://www.rpfinkotanyi.rw/index.php?id=371), and celebrating in the recent documentary 
entitled with the same name, Inkotanyi, directed by Christophe Cotteret, Wrong Men, 2017.   
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narrative of insecurity, reconstructed by the above participants, self-identified 
Banyamulenge as occupants of intermediate space in Zaïrian society. This 
adaptation was solely a political problem interpreted through race and 
nationality. It was these framings and sense of insecurity that the younger 
generation of potential RPF recruits would take with them into the Rwandan 
civil war and the aftermath of genocide, only to foresee the same for their 
own people.  
“If you don’t give your blood to your country, the dogs will drink it for 
free”104 
Speaking with Rugira on three separate occasions about why he joined the 
RPF, and then subsequent armed groups, he offered a lengthy narrative on 
the intermediate space and insecurity of the Banyamulenge. This statement 
dramatically conveyed a call to action. After speaking about his role, as a 
trainer in the RPF Training Wing and his own RPF liberation-ideology 
training, it was the need to fight as a zero-sum calculation that stood out. The 
country he belonged to was changeable and fluid; it was an expression of 
identity. It was a product of the soldier’s journey that Rugira and his 
generation of Banyamulenge took, as they heeded the call of the RPF in the 
early 1990s.105  
 Moise, in his overview of the next phase of the narrative offers this 
synopsis and a view on the consequences of this recruitment. 
Lots of our children went to Rwanda to join RPF, but there were no 
meetings. They had other propaganda [networks] go to teach the 
Banyarwanda Tutsis in Uvira, in Uganda, in Tanzania, in Burundi, in 
Kenya. They didn't come all the way to [Minembwe] . . . . The youth 
they were unemployed. All of them. They all went away and joined the 
inkotanyi. After they captured [Kigali], these other tribes that we fought 
during the Mulelists, they said these people [the RPF] they have an 
agenda or a programme to come back and fight with us. The 
atmosphere became very bad among the tribes again . . . . It became 
even more worse than it was before. When they've captured Kigali, 
they went to live in Kigali . . . . A lot of youth, a lot of young people 
                                            
104 Rugira, second interview in Bukavu, November 2017.   
105 As to how many left their homes in South Kivu was hard for participants to 
identify. The clearest estimate was that about a thousand Banyamulenge left to join the RPF 
between 1990 and 1994, Alphonse, second interview, 2018; Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of 
Monsters, 344n17.   
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Banyamulenge, they fought in the in Kigali and were soldiers already 
in RPF.106 
 
Youth joined, according to Moise, for opportunity, and remained in Rwanda, 
before returning to Zaïre to liberate the country from Mobutu. This 
involvement led to further antagonism between localised groups, against 
Babembe and Bafuliro (“we fought with them during the Muleists”). This 
relation simultaneously worsened with the arrival of the Rwandan exodus in 
1994, and more Banyamulenge youth left for Rwanda.107 Yet, there are some 
inconsistencies in Moise’s account when contrasting it against that of Rugria 
and other soldiers’ lived experience.108 In fact, the RPF’s extensive early 
1990s network of fundraising and recruitment spread throughout the Great 
Lakes region, especially in both North and South Kivu.  
Leaving Home: RPF Recruitment 1990-1994 
Rugira’s journey began in early 1993 when abakadas, the RPF cadres, came 
to gather donations and recruits for the civil war.109 Rugira, as many others in 
the early 1990s, went as a volunteer. He was “sensitised” by the abakadas, 
who would frame the Rwandan conflict as a regional issue. Rugira recounts 
the interaction with these cadres, “We went as volunteers. Volunteers are 
hearing that your families . . . , your tribes are attacked, Rwanda’s problems 
[are yours too], let's go . . .  they were people who were in charge of 
sensitising us, they were the ones that were assisting us, that were driving us 
to places. They came and recruited us.”110 Alexis, who joined later in 1994, 
also said of the abakada, “Those people came before, during the war. They 
came down and showed the Banyamulenge how the Tutsi in Rwanda are 
persecuted. That motivated them, and moved a lot of them, to go into the 
RPF.”111 This active network contextualised the Rwandan conflict and 
                                            
106 Moise, 2017.  
107 The majority of the participants cited their joining the RPF in the latter part of 
1994.   
108 In addition to the research cited in the outline of this period in chapter four, as 
well the accounts noted earlier in this chapter.   
109 Rugira, first interview, 2017.  
110 Ibid. The phrase sensitise, or in French sensibiliser, conveys the raising of 
awareness or convincing persons to a point of view.  
111 Alexis, interview in Bukavu, November 2017.   
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presented opportunity and empowerment to these would-be soldiers. The 
deployment of RPF public narratives of their just cause in Rwanda applying 
to all Tutsis was reinforced by their appeal to a metanarrative of anti-
colonialism.112  
 In addition to the ground network orchestrated by the abakada, RPF 
radio Muhabura also promoted the work of “sensitising” Banyamulenge youth 
to join the RPF.113  
That radio was said [to be] in Rwanda but, but the fact is that radio 
was in the mountains of Muhabura. They were all there saying, 
broadcasting that people should go back to Rwanda, and there was 
no other way, [but] to go and fight. Because the government of 
Habyarimana had already put in place discrimination. Even though 
Rwanda was based on ethnicity of which these people are speaking 
the same language, now they were saying that all Tutsis should be 
killed. Therefore, although you are a Tutsi, but a Congolese, that 
motivated you to feel like you needed to intervene, where your Tutsi 
brothers are.114 
 
For Pierre, this radio broadcast indicated the regional nature of the threat 
against all Tutsi, or Tutsi brothers as described by Rugira (“your families . . . , 
your tribes”). Rugira made little distinction between family members, 
Banyamulenge neighbours who had already left to fight, and Rwandan and 
Ugandan refugees returning as part of the RPF, “So, yeah, that our brothers, 
or the neighbours had gone to support our brother, our Tutsi brothers. It 
made us to feel more willing to go and support Rwandese although we never 
knew what a Tutsi was or that there was a country where they lived.”115 Like 
Rugira, many others also felt this pull, as it was framed by the RPF relational 
narrative and network, embracing their local context of perceived 
discrimination, 
                                            
112 Reyntjens, “(Re-)imagining a Reluctant Post-genocide Society,” 69. 
113 Gatete, interview in Bukavu, November 2017. Bonte also recalled hearing about 
the conflict more generally via BBC, RFI, and Tanzanian stations, interview Kinshasa July 
2018.   
114 Pierre, interview in Bukavu, November 2017. The location of the Muhabura 
Mountain sits on the borders between Rwandan and Uganda, and is part of the Virunga 
Mountains; in Kinyarwanda’ the word Muhabura means “guide”. In the early 1990s, the 
station itself was viewed by RPF soldiers and civilian listeners alike to be heavily 
propaganda-based, promoting the party’s anti-colonial narrative, see Darryl Li, “Echoes of 
violence: considerations on radio and genocide in Rwanda,” Journal of Genocide Research 
6, no 1 (2004): 12-16.    
115 Rugira, first interview, 2017.   
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Rugira: Going to the RPF was caused by two things: the first thing 
was that there was a lot of discrimination down here in Congo. We 
knew we had to work on getting more power during the Zaïre era. 
Secondly, it also felt like we should join [RPF] so that we can be able 
to help those refugees that have been chased from their own country 
and to be able to reintegrate back to their own country. 
 
Interviewer: Why was it important to help the refugees? 
 
Rugira: It was a general problem because it was about the identity of 
Tutsis. If one Tutsi have gotten a problem, then, and there has been a 
lot of injustice, then if it will reflect on many of us who are living during 
that time.116 
 
The need to defend the Rwandan Tutsi seemed to coalesce with the need for 
security at home in the face of growing marginalisation and discrimination. 
Affinity to Rwandan refugees (albeit more decisively in the case of 
Rwandans in exile in Uganda since 1959) presented to young recruits a path 
of overcoming the intermediate space.  
Matthias presents a more nuanced picture of an emerging closed loop 
of perceptions and narrative, 
We said we must stop this, we needed to do something about it. And 
at some point we [also] felt insecure . . . . It's kind of in a way of saying 
that there's more confusion in the way that [the conflict] was framed 
and said the Tutsi of this side [in Zaïre] look alike physically, that is 
what made [us] go and fight. Without, forgetting the RPF that was 
going down to sensitise the youth, they would be sensitised by the 
Rwandans. The Banyamulenge that were friends to the Rwandans, 
they also were massively persecuted, and labelled as the same group. 
That's how the youth embraced the path of RPF.117 
 
Again, he reflects on the ascribed Banyamulenge-Tutsi equivalency. RPF 
abakada portrayals of the conflict fed into Banyamulenge senses of their 
intermediate space, connecting them via ascribed identities to persecuted 
Tutsi in Rwanda. Yet, for these young recruits it became increasingly difficult 
to see where their ontological and public narratives ended and where RPF 
narratives began. Pierre saw this because of a Tutsi identity that as fixed, 
recognising the Banyamulenge as part of this wide regional group, 
Those people that were dying [in Rwanda], they were killed because 
they're Tutsis. In Congo, and we were a minority and just Tutsis that 
                                            
116 Patience, 2017. 
117 Matthias, 2018.   
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were living . . .  near Masisi. I mean if you are not stupid and ignorant 
you have to think about it. And you do not create yourself . . . . I just 
found myself with this identity, my father and my mother, they mated 
and I was born. I am this way. And if you are born and you know that 
there is a problem ahead, you have to use all means you'll have to 
defend it, if it is even to die, you can die, but you are defending it, 
you are fighting for it.118 
 
This fatalistic approach to identity connects the crucial strands at the 
beginning of the soldier’s journey around narratives of insecurity and 
intermediate space. Identity, although characterised by Pierre as having 
some permanence, was indeed the product of these factors; shaped by the 
relation to and experiences of postcolonial violence and genocidal 
processes.  
 These soldiers expressed some conflict with their parents who felt 
they were losing a generation to what they saw as a foreign war. Many felt it 
had nothing to do with the Banyamulenge, but a few had most likely been in 
favour of and adopted RPF public and metanarratives through existing 
networks. Pierre noted that his parents, upon his decision and that of others, 
to leave were already mourning his death and that of his fellow recruits.119 
He credited his generation with foresight of the increasing dangers ahead, 
again further markers of the RPF narratives about the potential 
regionalisation of the conflict, “If you see a lot of youth, they are more 
intelligent than old people. Because for them [their parents] just to hear that it 
was in Rwanda, they didn't know that these things that were taking place in 
Rwanda could have an impact on them as well. But, the youth, we could see 
that.”120 The divide in perspective and awareness of the threat faced was 
more pronounced in these young men when compared with the presumed 
view of their parents. Alphonse recalled that their parents “did not feel good 
about it. But they didn’t know what was really happening. We never asked for 
consent from them. We kind of escaped.”121 When Alphonse was pressed on 
this divide and how older generations must have responded to the abakada 
messages, he stated, 
                                            
118 Pierre, 2017.   
119 Ibid.  
120 Ibid.   
121 Alphonse, first interview in Kinshasa, July 2018.   
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Our parents were not very much concerned about the Rwandans 
because they felt that they do not belong to them. They thought it was 
not their war, so they felt they should not be part of it. But the young 
people, they had that energy. That zeal to go and join these people, to 
help those people and overcome or overpower the government. We 
could not have prepared our parents for us going to go fight with the 
regime of Habyarimana. Well, they were less-informed of what was 
happening. They didn’t know Rwanda. They didn’t know what was 
happening.122 
 
The divergence in views was put down to a lack of awareness of the 
perceived reality, or of the intermediate space that faced the community. If 
they had heard the messages, they lacked the willingness to appreciate the 
connections to their own situation. Crucially, it was the empowerment of 
knowledge given to these young men (“They didn’t know what was 
happening.”) via RPF public and metanarratives that created such a shift in 
self-awareness. 
Many, like Janvier, followed in the footsteps of peers and elder 
brothers. He made several failed attempts at entering the RPF transport 
network to get to a training camp in Rwanda. In his case, he was encouraged 
by his father, who saw the promise of return and empowerment for the 
Banyamulenge. His father would often speak to the family about the historic 
connection between self-defence and survival for their community. If the fight 
was now in Rwanda, then this is where they would learn to survive. He adds, 
My father would come and speak to us and say, “You people, you just 
sit, sleeping in, and staying close to your mothers. Where is your 
future?” So he never hid it, he was speaking in public. Time after time, 
we were hearing the same thing, it therefore starts becoming part of 
you and you would see Banyamulenge being shot. You see some of 
your people being beaten and being kidnapped and taken. So all of 
those things would stir that desire in you.123 
 
Again, the cause of a regional conflict expressed at home in South Kivu was 
a compelling feature in his narrative. His reflections also indicate a masculine 
rite of passage encouraged by his father. This parental support was 
uncommon among participants. Many political operatives who would agitate 
and recruit on behalf of the AFDL would have been part of earlier pre-1994 
                                            
122 Ibid.  
123 Janvier, 2017.   
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RPF networks, such as those run by Nkunda and Bugera in North Kivu. It is 
likely that these elders or parents, who were in favour of recruitment and 
direct support, especially in financial terms, were part of these networks. For 
some, the journey would include giving funding up front. Patience, one 
whose parents did not approve, stole a cow from his uncle to cover the costs 
of the journey. He was convinced that in the end his uncle would understand 
the need for this sacrifice.124 
 The clandestine RPF journey to training camps went through Burundi, 
Tanzania and Uganda arriving in eastern Rwanda.125 Balthazar left in a small 
group, only to be caught by Zaïrian authorities, and was then returned home. 
His second attempt managed to get him over the border in 1992, “I was 22. 
We went through Uvira. We were arrested, and were turned back to a prison 
where we were jailed for a few days and later on, we went back to our 
homes. That was the attempt when the first group made it through.”126 
Janvier made three separate attempts to cross the border and get to the RPF 
training camps. One attempt involved his arrest and ransom by FAZ soldiers 
(paid by his parents), and the final attempt saw him through Bujumbura to 
Tanzania in 1993.127 Following the exodus of Rwandans into Zaïre in 1994, 
this journey became increasingly dangerous, where potential recruits risked 
more than just being picked up by pliable FAZ or local police. After selling his 
uncle’s cow, Patience was able to join a covert transport network,  
In 1994, during those months, Rwanda had already been captured. So 
what we did, there were a lot of Rwandans that were already fleeing 
the country to Congo, there were lots of camps around, there were 
Interahamwe, ex-FAR, so to avoid that, as we could also be targets to 
them, we were all loaded in trucks and covered so that nobody could 
know . . . . We have in Uvira a man who used to have a lot of cars, 
and his cars were ready for transportation. This guy was assigned to 
take people to Rwanda. So we went through Haut Plateau then we 
passed through Uvira . . . to the training ground.128 
 
                                            
124 Patience, 2017.   
125 Gatete, Pierre, Leonard, 2017. Early 1990-1991 recruits recalled receiving initial 
training in Uganda, near the southern border, Alphonse and Bonte, 2018.  
126 Balthazar, 2017.   
127 Janvier, 2017.   
128 Patience, 2017.   
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These transport networks involved cooperation and coordination throughout 
the region, demonstrating the RPF’s commitment to recruitment in the Kivus. 
Rugira was 18 in the summer of 1993 when he also made the circuitous 
route around Rwanda, to be assigned to a camp under the RPF Training 
Wing. He confirmed that there were many that left before him, as early as 
1991. Jean, also 18, described a version of these events when leaving to join 
the RPF was his only remaining option. Following the theft of his father’s 
whole cattle herd, he reflected the following, “Life kind of stopped. You feel 
like there is no other objective. You’re not anticipating any kind of life. You 
think “let’s go there”. You don’t have a hope for life, sometimes you try to 
look to the other area even when you think you cannot get life. That’s how I 
went to the army; nobody told me to go.”129 Prior to his departure in 1994, his 
three older brothers left, again creating an impression and sense of duty to 
follow these older siblings as an obligation to family. Opportunity in the face 
of such persecution increased following the capture of Rwanda, where 
Banyamulenge youths could obtain military training and possibly even an 
education.  
Training “those who put an end to the Rwandan genocide” 
Upon arrival at the training camp, not all were inducted into the training 
programme, which included rigorous physical and combat training, as well as 
RPF political indoctrination. After months of manual labour and portering, 
Janvier recalled the induction as a violent process intended to instil fear and 
discipline from the point of entry, 
We were told to come and meet at a playing field. What I can 
remember is that I saw the instructors cutting sticks. We were all 
beaten from morning until evening. Then after that, that changed us. 
So, because we were living as - if you are hungry, you go look for food 
– but then, it changed us, and we started to change our perceptions 
and the way we were thinking about life. A lot of people were taken to 
the hospital. A lot. That was the introduction.130 
 
While Janvier’s harrowing introduction took place in an RPF facility in 
Tanzania, most (including Rugira, Patience, and Pierre) found themselves in 
                                            
129 Jean, interviewed in Bukavu, November 2017.   
130 Janvier, 2017.   
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the Gashora training camp sometime after it was captured by the RPF in 
1994. Patience also attested to the severe beatings that would form the day-
to-day business of Gashora. Called out of bed at 3 am they would be forced 
to run to collect firewood and return for 7 am sharp. Those that did not return 
suffered “heavy” consequences,  
Patience: We were expected to reach there, the training ground, at 7. 
So those that arrived, there would be food already cooked.  
 
Interviewer: What if you didn’t get back by 7 am? Did they still give 
you food? 
 
Patience: They punish you. They punish you seriously . . . . They 
would cane you. Your arm will have lots of stripes, they seriously 
caned you. Or make you roll in the mud or they will make you sleep 
with a load on your back. Just heavy, very heavy punishment.131  
 
This violent method extended into RPF-run training camps in eastern Zaïre, 
following the arrival of the Rwandan and Banyamulenge recruiters in mid to 
late 1996. Ikiyaga, a young AFDL recruit recalled, “It was . . .  brutal, it was 
hard, and whoever would try to escape, they were shot dead.”132 As referred 
to in chapter five, this brutal training, involved live ammunition and the sexual 
humiliation and subjugation of young recruits, forced to ejaculate into holes in 
the dirt of the training ground.133 This violence, although not intentionally 
connected to the masculinity previously instilled in Janvier by his father, 
connects as violent masculine experience and identity typical of many armed 
actors. 
Here within the Training Wing, young Banyamulenge men were 
reduced in their familial affiliations and worldly aspirations, as compliant and 
willing instruments in the hands of the RPF. Pierre described this as the 
engendering of a “virgin mind”, 
They were teaching us the techniques or war and ideology of a 
soldier. To take away [thoughts] you had from home, maybe your 
parents, houses and cars and everything, so they want to take that out 
                                            
131 Patience, 2017.   
132 Ikiyaga, interviewed in Goma, November 2017. Nzita’s account describes the 
ritual sexual humiliation of young recruits in AFDL training camps, the deaths of those during 
training covered up as runways, and the overall treatment that was an “appalling kind of 
routine”. Nsuami was abducted during an attack on his school by his would-be trainers at the 
age of 12 in North Kivu, see Nzita, 121-132, 144-164.    
133 Stearns, 148.   
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of you . . . , so you can be fresh, and as if you are from streets . . . . 
And then after it will be accompanied with canes, beating . . . . In fact 
they do that so what you had before should be taken from you. The 
spirits of the civilian should be taken away, washed away. They may 
find that you have some problems or hard times, and they may decide 
maybe to terminate your life. Maybe they would tell you to go and 
eliminate this one. Just go and kill that one. They take away those 
things that you come with, so that you now have a virgin mind.134  
 
In the above, Pierre narrates complex and conflicting statements (as will be 
seen below). This newfound military discipline would likely be tested with 
brutality and demonstrations of a capacity for lethal violence.135  
The production of a mind devoid of other attachments was a core 
output of this process. He continues on the theme of discipline, “The soldier 
cannot serve tribalism. Now I'm talking about a soldier who has been well 
trained. A soldier that has been very well trained cannot have any sort of 
tribalism in his mind. Although you may know that these are the people that 
killed your relatives or your family, you are obliged to protect him, and you 
forgive him.”136 The RPF was keen to establish its public narrative of post-
ethnic claims to unity and legitimacy.137 As discussed in chapters five and 
six, efforts were made to build a Rwandan coalition, a Kinyarwanda nation, 
although these later crumbled.138 “Tribalism” as a reified postcolonial framing 
was seen as non-progressive, and limiting to the overall cause of liberation. 
Rising above indiscriminate killing was indicative of this mission, yet 
mandated killing would be crucial to establishing the new order. Another 
former RPF soldier also demonstrated this distinction between legitimate and 
tribal violence. Of regular soldiers he said, “We don't kill innocent people, 
                                            
134 Pierre, 2017.   
135 In interviews with McDowell, he also describes use of disciplinary torture and 
beatings to instil compliance, second interview by phone March 2018. Jowell also describes 
the highly controlled environment of the RPF dating back to 1994, as particularly in response 
to the integration of participants in the 1994 genocide, “establishing draconian monitoring 
and control measures was essential for the RPF. Even today, the government monitors its 
military closely for acts of dissent, and reacts mercilessly to those it perceives to be a 
threat,” see Jowell, 284. 
136 Pierre, 2017.  
137 This was a common theme of Radio Muhabura broadcasts of RPF anti-
colonialism, casting ethnicity as a European invention and the RPF as the arbiter of national 
reconciliation, see Li, 15-16.   
138 The element of “sudden nationhood” was present here and arguably still is, 
where this ascent is “marked by antagonistic form of intensely felt collective solidarity and a 
simultaneous collective organisation of others as enemies,” in Bergholz, 272.  
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regular RPA are not supposed to kill people”. Conversely, technicians were 
appointed through the DMI to do the “dirty jobs” of targeted assassinations 
and execution RPF opposition.139 
 Up to the point of AFDL mobilisation, in the period between finishing 
their training and the conclusion of the genocide in 1994, many returned to 
formal education and employment under the new Rwandan state. All 
participants, who were recruits at this stage, remained in Rwanda. Others, 
went on to fill advanced military roles, furthering their journey into how this 
period would shape their lives and responses to the pending threat of 
genocide in eastern Congo. Pierre was one of the Banyamulenge selected 
out of the rank and file to engage in DMI commando training. After his time at 
Gashora, he was selected and sent to the Gako training wing, immediately 
east of Kigali. Here, he would receive instruction from Israeli-trained RPF 
officers.140 Similarly, Alphonse was also selected for DMI training. Although 
reluctant to share details of his DMI duties, he did confirm that many 
Banyamulenge were chosen to perform these roles because of being 
“trustworthy” and perceived ethnic solidarity with Tutsis.141 Rukema was 
selected out of his unit, following the genocide, and trained to serve as a 
police officer for the judiciary. This meant serving arrest warrants and 
documenting those identified as “genocidaires”.142 During the interim period 
of the mid-1990s, he witnessed the uneven hand of RPF justice,  
When we were arresting the genocidaires, we had something which 
was important to RPF. RPF would teach us not to be angry so that 
you can kill people instead of maybe to bring them to justice. Because 
                                            
139 McDowell, second interview, 2018. As discussed in chapter two, the RPF, as a 
result of the civil war and genocide, had built a robust network of DMI operatives, or 
‘Technicians’ working behind the scenes to create simultaneous order and confusion, see 
Rever, 60-67.  
140 Pierre, 2017. The Rwandan connection to Israel is complex, ranging from 
accusations of arms sales to the Habyarimana government leading up to the genocide, but 
then continuing this formal relationship with commando training to the new Rwanda regime 
post-genocide, even today, as a matter of established practice, Israel is a first choice for 
officer and specialist training in the now Rwandan Defence Force, see Jowell, 288. Gako 
camp was also used as a post-genocide hub for training former Rwandan government 
soldiers or militias, offering a visible symbol and location of the RPF national reconciliation 
efforts, and putting the military at the forefront of this strategy, see Shaharyan M. Khan, The 
Shallow Graves of Rwanda (I.B.Tauris, 2000), 159-162; Gilad Atzmon, “The Rwandan 
Genocide: The Israeli Connection,” 16 April 2016, accessed on 13 September 2018, from 
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some soldiers, which maybe I cannot name them, when they were 
arriving where many people had been killed, . . . they told me that “this 
one is a genocidaire instead of bringing him to court we will kill him”.143  
 
Beyond the training camp, in these new roles supporting the establishment of 
the state, recruits were embedded into the RPF means of dealing with 
adversaries.  
 Rugira was selected from among the rank file to work as a political 
commissar in the Training Wing, and then in an AFDL training camp in 
Fizi.144 During this time, he performed his prior RPF political training, framed 
by an anti-colonial metanarrative, focusing on imperialism as the root of all 
evil in the Great Lakes region. His role would then become integral as he 
educated new recruits for the AFDL, indoctrinating them with the principles of 
“revolution, liberation and social class”, and that, only with the correct 
ideology could a country’s natural wealth be utilised for the benefit of all.145 
The Pan Africanism inspired training he delivered replicated that which he 
had received about “the politics of how to better get on with the rest of Africa. 
How they liberated other countries, how the genocide that took place 
[compared to the] the Nazis, the Israelites, and the apartheid.”146 Direct 
parallels to Israel and its fight against its own genocidaire nemesis was a 
common theme throughout interviews, demonstrating the establishment of 
this metanarrative. Respect for the militarisation and responsiveness of 
Israeli politicians and the Israeli Defence Force was an admired quality 
among participants.147  
Working in this department, up to the time of the 1996 invasion, 
Rugira saw this as crucial in fostering the right kind of movement to protect 
his people, “We came to a country where people were not happy. When we 
took over the country, [I] was working in the department of patriotism, 
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teaching people to love the country, work for the country, and fight for the 
country, . . . so that there is nothing compared to your country. You may not 
have worth but long as you have identity, the country, you are rich.”148 Rugira 
highlighted the evolution of his own self-identification, leaving Minembwe to 
“support Tutsi brothers” and remaining in Rwanda, until circumstances 
entailed a liberation of Zaïre, as a Congolese. Identity was indeed key, but 
where and what immediate identification one was attached to was fluid for 
these young men. It was contingent on their circumstance and performance 
in that circumstance. In a later interview, Rugira would go on to express deep 
resentment against Rwandans for destabilising the Congo and looting its 
natural wealth for their own national interest.149 The section heading featured 
his comment, “if you don’t give your blood to your country, the dogs will drink 
it for free.” This sentiment, if applied back into Rugira’s narrative, 
demonstrates the essential connection of performance to belonging and 
identities. Response to threat was a zero-sum game, the rules of which were 
informed by this RPF training.  
Political education given by the RPF to these young recruits from a 
background of doubtful nationality and postcolonial marginalisation, was 
formative in a soldier’s relational journey of identity formation.150 Rugira’s 
experience here demonstrates the substance of public and metanarratives 
utilised and embedded by the RPF. National unity and the necessity of 
popular buy-in was defined by the existential threat of genocide. The latter 
being defined in very particular ways through the metanarrative of RPF 
training, i.e. jus ad bellum and the genocidaire Other.  The broader narrative 
of insecurity was woven into the fabric of State, its army, and these 
Banyamulenge recruits.  
 Rooted in the RPF’s historical narrative was their interpretation of the 
ills of colonialism and the distortion of the past still present in colonised 
histories. Balthazar commented on his training that,  
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We were given political education and we were taught how the 
kingdoms were established in Rwanda and that whatever else people 
were teaching them were lies. They told us how colonists came to 
Rwanda and how they were treated, and that ideology was just 
creating conflict among themselves. All these ideologies were brought 
by the Westerners. It is the [Habyarimana] regime that embraced 
these ideologies and then used it to separate people.151 
 
This resonated with young Banyamulenge who still saw themselves as 
victims of this same historical travesty. As discussed in chapter five, 
Mamdani refers to this framing that colonialism’s “greater crime was to 
politicize indigeneity in the first place”. The narrative and caricatures of 
settler and native were perpetuated in the region into postcolonial 
independent states.152 This strongly held RPF perspective formed a central 
pillar in the party’s worldview. Yet, it was still not without its own reification of 
identity using an Other as the movement engaged in an identity-difference 
relation with the genocidaire.  
Destructive Crises I: Exposure to Genocide 
Identification of the genocidaire took place in a variety of ways for these 
recruits, but mostly revolved around the genocide of 1994. Those who fought 
during the first half of 1994 witnessed first-hand the resultant devastation. 
Gatete, who arrived in Rwanda in 1991, fought through the civil war and was 
present at the capture of Kigali in July 1994. As with many who were 
wounded, Gatete’s narrative was inscribed on his body with the circle of scar 
tissue from a gunshot wound he had received in July near Kigali in Ribero, 
and another injury that left him “lame”.153 He added that upon entering ex-
FAR and Interahamwe held areas he witnessed death, “I saw a lot of people 
piled [up], dead, a lot of corpses, dead people. Piled in houses. I’d move into 
a house, and find a family, the mother, who had been starved and died, and 
the little child was at her back, who had just died because of hunger. I saw 
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her die myself.”154 At the age of 18, Rugira expressed a familial identification 
with those killed by the Interahamwe, “The effect on me to see the brothers, 
friends, and people that have died or killed? . . . . Taking a child from its 
mother’s womb. That is what really affected me and I think it will never go 
away. It was my first time to see people dying at that extent. And I was still a 
youth back then.”155 Matthias also described how upon entering one house 
he found a mutilated child and mother, “The killing was beyond human 
convention. I saw a lady who had been pregnant, they made holes here [left 
thigh] and holes here [right thigh], they took her eyes, ears, and they joined 
them. They had taken [the baby] out and removed it, and pushed the rest of 
it through the mother’s sex organ, and it goes through the vagina of the 
mother, so they put them together.”156 Reflecting on this level of atrocity, 
Matthias concurred there was a deep and lasting impact on all soldiers who 
had witnessed such violence. Matthias went on to refer to what he saw as 
the propensity of soldiers to engage in revenge killings. The issue of revenge 
is addressed in chapter eight. 
The relational impact of this exposure was profound in shaping 
identities, especially in the context of this viscerally presented existential 
threat. Janvier further described this destruction,  
Like in the place where we were at, our training field in Gashora. 
There were only corpses, dead bodies that were everywhere in the 
mountains and the hills. If you go to fetch water all you’d see was 
bodies of people everywhere. We used that water later on, but we had 
to take those corpses, those dead bodies and bury them . . . . How 
could a person kill others to this extent because of it? And you start 
thinking what it is that you can do. I am fighting with you and that 
person, the other person who is there who does not know the cause of 
the war, he now becomes a victim, children, women. The fact is you 
cannot-, there’s no way that you cannot be affected with that.157  
 
Like Janvier, many others would be placed on duty to remove and dispose of 
corpses because of the genocide, embedding a formative and bodily way of 
demarcating victims in the conflict. Jean also described the dual sense of 
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devastation and loss, offering a fertile ground for the interpretive power of 
RPF ideology and training, 
We would go and remove the corpses or the body of people. Children 
that had families, children that were left after their parents were killed. 
We would take those children and put them in army barracks. The UN 
and international organisations would come and try to find their 
families. It made me very, very sad, that a person could be killed just 
because of how he looked. That made me feel like I need to protect 
everyone wherever I will be, and I have the capability to do so.158  
 
Most placed in their conceptual narrative of how these sights and 
experiences were interpreted through the lens of their own community’s 
persecution and, at this point, soon to be pending threat of genocide: they 
“felt the need to stop this so it cannot happen again”.159  
 In addition to witnessing this on the battlefield, training centres like 
Gashora were equipped with video players and televisions to show fresh 
recruits what genocide looked like. This approach utilised a specific process 
where public narrative shaped the metanarrative, by defining the victim and 
the 1994 genocide. Pierre notes “you would see on television some skulls of 
people that were killed.”160 Adding context, he describes the following, 
emphasising this universal front again genocide, 
They would bring a television and would show us people that were 
killed, they would even show us those actual killings on televisions. 
You know people that were dug out from holes, I witnessed that 
myself. But when we are training they only bring a television and we 
see people being killed and people are running are shouting . . . . That 
ideology that was put in us it was that these things that took place 
during the Habyarimana regime should not take place anywhere 
else.161 
 
By ensuring recruits were exposed by video, combat, or corpse removal, the 
impact of genocide were purposefully embedded into their training. This 
substance of the RPF metanarrative allowed for the emergence of a 
definition of genocide that tied together jus ad bellum and prevention. The 
morality of the RPF cause was defined by relating dead victims and the guilty 
genocidaire.  
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RPF Approaches to Integration 
What is documented above is reflected in Marco Jowell’s research on RPF 
socialisation. He traces an established practice referred to as Ingando. This 
three-phase process starts with combined intensive military drills and political 
education, as described above. Secondly, “joint deployments” would be used 
to integrate disparate recruits from across the Great Lakes region. In the 
case of 1994, this often meant managing internally displaced populations, 
targeting identified enemies of the RPF, and leading national reconstruction 
following the genocide, including the removal of corpses. Thirdly, now trained 
soldiers would be sent back to their communities to promote the political 
messages and national ideology of the RPF.162 Many of those coming to 
Rwanda for the first time from Uganda or eastern Zaïre, they would remain in 
Rwanda, often living in Kigali to take up employment or education.163 Jowell’s 
reading of the RPF, and the current Rwandan Defence Force (RDF), 
describes an institution that seeks to promote integration among its soldiers 
through shared experience and a strong political narrative. For early 
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge recruits from, respectively, North and 
South Kivu, this resulted in a relational network. This was where those 
marginalised in Zaïre would find a “political identity”, giving a frame of 
reference crafted by the RPF. It was grounded in the regional threat to Tutsi 
existence and empowerment in the face of such a challenge.164 It is further 
apparent that, within this structure of discipline and punishment, the RPF 
recruitment networks may have manipulated previously disparate groups.165  
The Promise of Return  
Nzongola argues that the pro-RPF Banyamulenge youth were being used by 
Kigali “in an expedient manner for purely political ends or pecuniary 
advantage”, and that their own allegiances were not aligned to the RPF’s.166 
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This may be accurate in some cases, as participants demonstrated an 
adoption of RPF narratives and cause, as discussed above. Yet, this 
allegiance was expressed as more of an alignment with the promise of return 
to Zaïre and defence of their home communities against perceived anti-Tutsi 
threats. Among the variety of above motivations, was the confluence of 
narratives of insecurity and the intermediate space from which most young 
Banyamulenge RPF recruits situated themselves. This promise of return was 
vital in the narratives produced by participants. However, exactly when this 
promise of intent to return germinated is difficult to identify. In some cases, 
this was discouraged by RPF trainers and commanders when raised by 
Banyamulenge recruits. For others there is debate about whether or not this 
was an original intent when leaving South Kivu in the first place, where some 
adamantly claimed this was the case from their departure point in the early 
1990s.   
 As a result of Janvier’s logistics role as a secretary to the Operations 
Officer, his narrative offers a longer view of this particular strand.167 He 
recounted the following discussion with his trainer in Gashora, “We were 
feeling that our parents may even die before we come to save them. We 
were talking to the teachers, the instructors we were telling them, that they 
should train us hard and don’t give us any kind of training they feel is not 
needed, and therefore they should give us equipment so that we can go back 
and support our parents.”168 Despite the transactional appearance of this 
comment, those who shared this retrospective also saw an urgent need to 
return and protect their families. Some went as far as adopting the broader 
RPF narrative of liberation. Rugira, as a political instructor, embraced this 
ideological perspective, and placed the promise of return in this context. 
Speaking about the impact of the ideological training he received, and would 
later give, he states, “It started giving us the hope that we can also liberate 
our people. And we are very few, but we feel we should go, we are to go 
back and sensitise other people, other tribes and other Congolese to join us, 
so that we can overthrow the dictatorship government and start a 
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government that will be of all tribes.”169 Jean spoke of a tacit agreement, or 
understanding between the Banyamulenge recruits and their Rwandan 
trainers, again promoting the notion of liberation, regionally, and the 
reciprocal nature of Rwanda passing on this practice to Banyarwanda in 
Zaïre, “It was in the agreement we had before we joined the army. Because 
when we with Rwandese, they came from Uganda, they also came with 
Ugandans, the Ugandans helped them. After they helped them, the 
Ugandans went back. They say that the Congolese we are the one, and they 
may give us support. That’s how we know we had a mutual agreement.”170  
For some participants this promise of return was implied by the RPF’s 
own rise to power. The relationship between the Ugandan government, the 
NRA and the RPF was demonstrable of a type of rolling liberation throughout 
the Great Lakes region, bound by shared trouble and regional ethnic 
identity.171 Alphonse believed that, “Museveni, the Ugandans, had to help 
them to go and overthrow the government. You see Kagame; those people 
are Tutsis, the people of their tribe. So they came to sensitise us so then we 
have to go and help them.”172 This sent a clear message, articulated by 
Rukema, that there was “the hope to come back. That’s what I’m telling you. 
After helping the RPF to catch power in Rwanda, they would also help us to 
come back and protect our area.”173 
Rugira, again emphasises this point, reflecting on the years he spent 
in Rwanda, seeing the end of the genocide in 1994, up to 1996, “And once 
they have taken the country they told us it's time to come back and take over 
this Congolese, Mobutu regime that he has ruled for thirty-two years, to finish 
his dictatorship. So they said, ‘since you have assisted us, we will also assist 
you to go back’.”174 Whilst there is some coherence here about this promise 
of return, although fractured across these narratives and framed through the 
lens of each participant's own situation between 1994 and 1996, some still 
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viewed this promise of return with scepticism. Alexis confirmed that no 
Banyamulenge recruit left Zaïre based on this promise, and that the 
Rwandan recruiters did not use this as a lure.175   
  Pessimistically, Gatete noted the following, whilst also reflecting on his 
own injured state and current unemployment, “I knew that, I felt that, having 
gone into the military in Rwanda, I would come back to my home and have 
security. That never happened.”176 Yet, he did also note, despite his 
resignation, that the hope was to join the RPF and replicate their success, 
“The cause is that in here, I was not a Congolese. We were denied of that, 
we lacked security, and there were our brother refugees, Tutsis, which were 
in Uganda, who also did not have rights to go to Rwanda. So I felt that I 
should go, join them, in order to bring about peace in Rwanda, which would 
eventually come back and also provide security and secure our parents.”177 
Here he combined the issues of intermediate space and a common regional 
Tutsis cause. The fluidity and ascription of ethnicity is reflected on (“I was not 
a Congolese”), and used as an ordering principle of identity. Emphasis is 
given to the events that followed his enlistment in the RPF, offering 
performative meaning to who he sought to become, someone who would 
bring back and enjoy peace and security. 
Based on this wider view in Gatete’s narrative, insecurity was 
perceived by many as a permanent structure and perhaps exacerbated by a 
history of failed action. Balthazar attributed the eventual return under the 
AFDL to a personal motivation to save the families in his home village. 
Connecting this with his witnessing of the genocide in Rwanda and his 
perspective of the intermediate space he had come from in Zaïre, he 
reflected that, “It came from my own desire, but seeing all of that maybe 
enhanced the desire that I had. But I was thinking about as I was 
sympathetic to [Rwanda]. But initially I had a desire to go because I grew up 
seeing all these things happening.”178 This salient, although simple, comment 
articulates the key connections these young soldiers made across the 
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narratives of insecurity they both brought with them from Zaïre, and those to 
which the RPF connected them. This weaving of narratives created a 
networked understanding of the insecurity and regional threat faced by Great 
Lakes Tutsi.  
 Despite Rukema’s earlier stated articulation, he realised, as he 
agitated his Rwandan superiors in 1995 to deliver on this promise that things 
were not as he had hoped. Speaking with his Banyamulenge colleagues 
during that year, he asked them, “‘What do you think if today we go back to 
Zaïre and we are led by RPF officers? It is not ourselves who will be 
prepared to go back. Do you think we will gain something from that war? 
That war which we are not prepared for? The war which we do not know their 
[RPF] interests they have to go to Zaïre?’”179 This view draws out a theme far 
more common in reflections about current security and the now deteriorated 
relationship with Rwanda and the RPF. For Rukema, there was a misplaced 
faith in those whom he had considered brothers, 
Even to think that they can protect the Tutsis, it was not, at that time 
we would not think about it because we know that all of us, we are 
Tutsi. The Rwandans are Tutsi, we are Tutsi. We are thinking that we 
are the same. That we are thinking about, which was not in their mind. 
What we are thinking, the Banyamulenge, we are thinking that we and 
RPF, the Tutsis from Rwanda, are the same, which was not in their 
mind of the RPF. We will feel as brothers, which was not the same to 
their side.180 
 
This reflects to some extent the initial comments by Nzongola, that 
Banyamulenge, along with Banyarwanda from North Kivu, were mere pawns 
in the hands of the RPF. Yet, the picture here is somewhat more complex, 
and indeed shaped by individual soldiers’ experience with their Rwandan 
brothers and their current situation. For Rukema, despite growing distrust, a 
bond of solidarity was realised and common narratives were established, 
articulating the reasons for their shared persecution, and the remedy. Such 
post ex facto judgements are inevitable in narrative analysis; however, this 
indicates a distinct journey for the identities of these soldiers as having been 
sensitised and empowered to stop genocide. 
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 Janvier’s narrative continues to detail the process by which the 
promise of return materialised into action. Following the taunting of his RPF 
instructors, and increasing stories of how the Interahamwe were threatening 
his community, he and some fellow soldiers even considered escaping in 
1995.181 In his new position, and despite the discouragement from his 
immediate superior, Janvier gained access to and networked with other 
Banyamulenge officers. This brought him into contact with a Lieutenant 
Nicolas Kibinda. Nicolas was killed in the first fighting of 1996, but was 
remembered by Pierre, Rukema, and Ikiyaga as a key Banyamulenge 
officer.182 In April 1996, Janvier and other Banyamulenge officers began 
networking through Nicolas, connecting to DMI operatives, running supplies 
and reconnaissance missions back and forth across the border. Rugira was 
also involved in these operations, referred to them as the “Mafia”.183 In 
September of that same year, “They used the shortcut . . .  so that they could 
come to the Haut Plateau. They would come with us, we were young, having 
guns in our coats. We were the mafia you know. We had the look, we 
appeared to be Banyarwanda.”184 Other participants also recall involvement 
in such operations, some even adding that this was a key purpose in their 
original recruitment, that the Rwandans needed their local knowledge and 
understanding of the FAZ in order to eventually attack Zaïre.185 
 Janvier, and this RPF Banyamulenge cohort, after a period of formal 
organisation under the DMI, then were taken to Cyangugu, at the Rwandan 
border and were met by a group of Rwandan officers, including James 
Kabarebe and Caesar Kayizari, who were respectively first and second in 
command of the AFDL forces.186 Here two companies of Banyamulenge 
were organised with RPF officers and supplied with guns. Janvier recalled, 
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“They told us that these guns were given to support our parents, ‘We will give 
you people to escort you. We will give you soldiers who will go with you to 
support and guide you. After we reach there, then we will come back. And 
you will fight on your own; you will fight for yourselves like we fought for 
ourselves here.’ We were very happy.”187 According to Roessler and 
Verhoeven, these first units were part of the core of 6,000 Congolese Tutsi 
forming the backbone of the AFDL. It was also clear at this stage that a key 
strategic purpose for the invasion, and consequently the promise of return, 
was to dismantle the refugee camps and force a return of Rwandans back 
into the new order of the RPF.188   
During the summer months of 1996, Janvier and his company ran 
covert reconnaissance operations, until the larger forces joined them as part 
of the AFDL, moving from Bukavu, to Uvira and Fizi. During this time, his 
company would come under the command of various Rwandan, RPF 
commanders, including Eric Murokore and Alexis Kagame. Upon reaching 
Haut Plateau in September, Janvier and his unit commenced the renewed 
work of recruitment among the families of their home villages, “After the 
meeting was held by the parents and civilians, they said, they decided that, 
in every family it’s only one boy who should remain in the family. The rest 
should join the army. All those boys they were given to the military were 
sensitised by them.”189 This was not a new recruitment drive. It was part of 
an ongoing use of established RPF networks throughout both North and 
South Kivu. Both Umwami and Eugene, as political operatives, further 
described how recruitment of young Banyamulenge men steadily continued 
from 1990 into 1996, when the rebellion arrived at their doorstep.190  
Ikiyaga was 15 years old when he was recruited in April 1996 from his 
home in Haut Plateau.191 “The Banyamulenge people that went to support 
Rwanda, they went, they came back. They came down with Banyarwanda. 
So, they gave what we call kipindi, a speech, or told the families, if you have 
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two or three boys, you should give up two.”192 Ikiyaga’s account of the rise of 
the AFDL attributed the purpose of the return of these Banyamulenge 
soldiers to the liberation of Congo from under Mobutu’s reign. The specificity 
of the promise of return for older RPF Banyamulenge recruits fades into the 
motivational messiness and ontological narrative points. It seems that the 
protection of their families and kin in South Kivu quickly merged into the 
overarching RPF narrative of liberation and political identity for their Tutsi 
brothers in Congo. This entailed the removal of an existential threat posed by 
the myriad of forces threatening another genocide and allying with FAZ and 
various local militias.  
“We were expecting another genocide”193 
This was the description Christian articulated during the ratcheting up of 
tensions leading to South Kivu Deputy Governor Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji’s 
removal order. His announcement made on 8th October 1996, stated, “I 
demand the population in the highlands to descend to the shores of the lake. 
We will consider everybody who stays in the Haut Plateau as rebels”194 
Moments following this announcement, a journalist stopped Lwabanji and 
asked for a deadline on this ultimatum, to which he hastily uttered one week, 
and then bustled off to meet with provincial military leaders.195 This 
announcement had massive repercussions on narratives of insecurity and 
shaped the current longue durée of conflict in eastern Congo. As discussed 
above, and outlined in chapter five, by October the AFDL and RPA invasion 
of key places in eastern Zaïre was already well underway. This statement 
was undoubtedly recognised as a relevant step in escalation and defence 
against invasion. Yet, for Christian, and many of the other interviewed 
participants, this moment constituted Deleuzian event horizon: the visible 
point that rises out from the undercurrent of genocidal processes. Christian 
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noted that “as the Tutsis here were massacred during the genocide [in 
Rwanda], we were expecting another genocide which had been announced 
by the governor in the South Kivu province.”196 This moment saw the 
realisation of decades of narrative building and interpretation of the 
intermediate space occupied time and again by the Banyamulenge.  
Destructive Crises II: The Escalation of Violence 
The destructive crisis of the Rwandan exodus into Zaïre in 1994 ushered in 
the reaggregation of power, aligning localised conflicts against the 
Banyarwanda Tutsi in North Kivu and Banyamulenge in South Kivu. In turn, 
this constituted a reinforcing of participant narratives. Mugenzi, another 
political operative, summarised this impact, “The Interahamwe and ex-FAR 
had started to kill the Banyamulenge already and they started to shoot their 
houses in our town and killed some people already so if nothing could have 
been done, they could have killed all of us.”197 The perception of this 
emerging alignment of militaries and militias embodied the threat central to 
narratives of insecurity. Jean recalled the destructive nature of arrival of 
Rwandans in mid-1994, 
It was when they fled from Rwanda, when they were living here. They 
wanted to carry the genocide to our people. Because they look at us in 
the image of the RPF soldiers . . . . They joined together with the 
Mobutu soldiers, the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, were telling the soldiers 
that the Tutsis will chase them. Then therefore, they will tarnish our 
image in that way. There was nothing that would have stopped them 
from killing us, they would have gone ahead and killed people here.198  
 
The potency of the Rwandan genocidaire is that this was an articulation of 
genocide as an outcome and reality. This ascription was based on RPF 
training, and exposure to genocide and the present threat, as it was seen 
through the narrative of insecurity.  
A conspiracy of foes aligned in such a cause was a recurrent theme 
and plot point at this stage of the narratives. Eleazar described this anti-Tutsi 
front as an infiltration of the minds of Congolese youth, tipping them over the 
edge of persecution into genocide by ex-FAR and Interahamwe 
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“sensitisation”.199 The perceived connections between the FAZ and the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe seemed ubiquitous to Banyamulenge in the mid-1990s.200 
Eugene also recounts the benefit and relationship of a well-armed and 
uniformed set of Rwandan forces allying themselves with existing, marauding 
FAZ units. 
For them when they ran to here, they came with everything . . . . 
Remember that it was the military that had all the weapons, so they all 
came with it. And I remember during that time. Ex-FAR had very 
fabulous uniforms and they would come here and maybe exchange 
them or serve them to Mobutu soldiers because they were very nice . . 
. . They were the ones that were fighting for Mobutu almost 
everywhere.201  
 
The FAZ, various ethnic militias, including Hunde and Nanda in North Kivu 
and Bafuliro and Babembe in South Kivu, were perceived to be collaborating 
with the Interahamwe and ex-FAR.202 Eleazar, labelled this growing 
organisation of force as a “campaign of intoxication”. This campaign was 
purposefully executed when these Rwandan forces amplified existing 
“discrimination” of Tutsis, and took advantage of this emergent power 
relation.203 Janvier added that the Rwandan military groups were roaming 
across the Kivus “sensitising” local militias, and especially Banyarwanda 
Hutu, to join the effort against the Tutsis.204 Indicative of this observation is a 
documented occurrence of ex-FAR/Interahamwe recruits going to Congolese 
Hutu groups in February 1996, in the Masisi area of North Kivu. Following 
these rounds of recruitment, action against local Tutsi populations, in the 
forms of hostage taking and direct violence, increased. In one case, a Masisi 
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village was surrounded to contain the population, and those trying to escape 
or going to work in their field were killed by recruited Congolese Hutus.205 
Eugene pointed to a series of killings in Baraka orchestrated by this 
nexus of foes, who in this case were the FAZ and local Babembe militias, 
The Zaïrian people were supporting Mobutu, because Mobutu was the 
closest friend to Habyarimana. They were intimate friends. Therefore, 
what proves they were preparing a genocide is the war began in place 
called Bibokoboko in middle Plateau, there in a place called Baraka. 
Then Babembe told the Banyamulenge they should flee toward them 
and be rescued by them by Babembe. All of them that managed or 
decided to run toward them, all of them were killed. A lot of them were 
killed in villages and places.206 
 
These moments were situated within narratives of insecurity tracing 
connections between Mobutu and Habyarimana (posthumously), and their 
perceived forces on the ground. This easily connected explanation by 
participants made this narrative portable and usable in understanding what 
was an inherently complex and varied conflict. Among some of the South 
Kivu advance parties was Bonte, who apparently deserted his post upon 
hearing of a reported massacre near his home area. He confronted a 
Babembe roadblock and pushed on to find two hundred and twenty 
Banyamulenge hiding in the forest. He arrived into Rugezi, near Minembwe,  
I found that they had already killed 87 people. And that is where I 
found my father. He was also killed among those people. I found that 
they have killed 16 from my own family. Some who survived, I helped 
them. I found my mother, she was still alive. I found the wife of my 
elder brother. And some of the children also survived. I took them with 
me in a place called Rugezi. When I reached there, I settled them and 
then I returned to my battalion.207 
 
Bonte’s dispassionate recitation of this incident indicated a level of 
acceptance and numbness to the conflict that had now engulfed his home. 
This soldier demonstrated a hardness and acceptance of the genocide that 
was upon his community, much has he accepted with the missing middle 
finger on his left hand, as a scar of battle. 
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Attacks by FAZ and Babembe in September, around Baraka and 
Lueba, resulted in killings of hundreds of Banyamulenge, men, women and 
children of all ages, many of whom were also raped prior to their execution. 
Some were burned alive in locked buildings, others exploded with grenades 
and some attacked with knives and machetes.208 I challenged Eugene for an 
explanation of why this group was targeted and the connections of Zaïrian 
allegiances to Habyarimana and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. He sensed this 
increase was down to ethnic affiliation and the reaggregation of power that 
had been emerging since the exodus of 1994. Rwandan elements 
“influenced all these other tribes”, as well as promoting “revenge” for RPF 
actions in Rwanda.209  
From mid-1995 into 1996, violence across both North and South Kivu 
continued to align under this reaggregation of power. By mid-summer, 
according to a North Kivu census, 250,000 Tutsi Banyarwanda had become 
internally displaced and 16,000 had fled to Rwanda.210 A prominent example 
of this can be found in the Bukombo attack in March 1996, in the Rutshuru 
zone of North Kivu. A grouping of Banyarwanda Hutu and ex-
FAR/Interahamwe approached the town, looting and burning Tutsi homes; 
eleven were murdered on 4 March. In the following weeks, attacks on Tutsi 
intensified and saw the coalescing of local militias around Rwandan 
elements, targeting Tutsis in Rutshuru and Masisi into that same summer.211 
On 12 May, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces surrounded the Mokoto 
Monastery, where monks had sheltered up to a thousand Congolese Tutsi. 
Hundreds fled, adding to the internal displacement of thousands in the 
province. A hundred were killed, many of whom were burned in the 
monastery buildings or cut to pieces by the militias.212 
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Throughout South Kivu, similar violence proliferated in 1996, as 
discussed in chapter five. Attacks by a conglomeration of FAZ units, 
Babembe militias, ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Burundian Hutu armed groups 
spiked in September of 1996. Attacks ranged from Bukavu down along the 
border and shore of Lake Kivu into Fizi.213 Leonard recounted a relative’s 
beheading in Uvira as part of a growing campaign of violence against 
Banyamulenge. He described how Banyamulenge were targeted on the 
streets, or when travelling outside of their home communities, particular 
travelling on the road between Uvira and Bukavu. Many were dragged from 
vehicles when allegedly spotted by those wishing them harm; “There are 
those that were beheaded and then they would hang his head alongside the 
road . . . . I've seen the corpses . . . . One of them, he was married to another 
lady of our community in Uvira . . . . He was beheaded and his head was 
hung on trunk of a tree and they were all singing that ‘look we have killed a 
Banyarwanda’.”214 By singling out individuals because of ascribed identities, 
such violence was an escalation of decades of tension, living in the 
intermediate space of Zaïrian society, and now imminent existential threat. 
Leonard situated these attacks in a larger emerging, coordinated effort to 
target Banyamulenge.215 
The killing of hundreds of Banyamulenge during the summer of 1996 
was reported internationally.216 Concurrent to this was the forced expulsion 
of nine hundred Banyamulenge into Cyangugu and Cibitoke.217 Removals 
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often precipitated direct violence and murder. These occurrences provided a 
context, via fractured reports, to the Banyamulenge officers waiting in 
Rwanda or already over the border performing reconnaissance. Many 
civilians were targeted on the basis of suspected collaboration with the 
RPF.218 Whilst individual cases are hard to verify, it is clear from the above 
narratives that this collaboration was indeed taking place up and down the 
border area. Yet, for these young RPF, and later AFDL, soldiers, their 
perception of an all-out attack against their people and homes was very 
apparent. Gatete captured this with a clear-cut, and demanding assessment, 
“We were told [by the RPF] that the Interahamwe are also killing people here. 
They say that these people, when they were here, maybe encountered Tutsi 
Banyamulenge, Banyarwanda around here. They would be killed 
immediately. So, we felt that we should come down and protect these people 
from the ex-FAR.”219 The RPF would utilise the continued threat against the 
perceived regional community, and reinforce the narratives of insecurity 
generated by Banyamulenge soldiers. This was based on their initial reason 
for leaving South Kivu: the RPF public and metanarratives presented to them 
during training and residence in Rwanda, and the promise of return. 
Many participants in narrating their engagement with military forces 
and objectives going into October and November of 1996 noted the 
discovery of plans to kill Banyamulenge on an allegedly total scale. Christian 
referred to this as a “fixed date” when the Banyamulenge would all be 
killed.220 Eugene notes how in September a discussion with local leaders 
yielded the following revelation, “These other tribes, from us they don't keep 
secrets. If they know there is going be something happening, they will come 
and tell you. They were holding meetings. In that place I mentioned called 
Kamombo, they were chiefs for the posts. Then, after the meetings, some of 
them would come and tell us their plans or some of their plans. And also they 
were influenced by Interahamwe that fled Rwanda.”221 The presence of the 
Interahamwe was enough to promote an apparent spreading of this message 
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that Banyamulenge were to be targeted as Tutsi were in 1994 Rwanda. 
Matthias’ recollection of these plans had a real and symbolic meaning,  
I'm sure that the Banyamulenge could have been killed, all of them. 
And that we know. We know, and I just say I know and say that as 
myself, because I was among them and I saw document that 
demonstrated how they would go about the attack. . . . A small book in 
the camps where they planned to carry out their attacks. Attacks all 
the way from Goma all the way to Kalima [in Maniema]. They call that 
side, that land as Hutu land. The land of Hutus. The decision was to 
clear out all the Tutsis that were in that area.222  
 
Whether this was a discarded propaganda tract or actual map for the 
domination of the east, it served as a clear validation for Banyamulenge 
soldiers as they marched forward.223  
Patience also identified Kamombo as a location where physical plans 
were discovered following the invasion in late 1996. This below description 
also notes the view most participants held, that despite the escalating 
violence, the total removal and destruction of their community was 
interrupted.224 This threat was validated by Patience, when he stated, 
In a way, they had not yet started to kill them, but when we came in, 
we saw all the evidence. They had a map and the techniques that they 
were using and everything was recorded on their paper and they had 
documents on how they would execute all the Tutsi and 
Banyamulenge here . . . . Yeah, I saw those papers myself. I 
witnessed that . . .  [in] Kamombo, that is where we were able to find 
the papers and agenda plans on how they will go to Minembwe and 
terminate our families.225 
 
The parties involved in this proposed destruction in Minembwe are 
somewhat nebulous, and again most participants referred back to emergent 
conspiracy of Rwandan and Congolese armed elements.226 Feeding their 
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narratives of insecurity on a personal, local and larger regional level, these 
soldiers were poised and prepared to act in defence of home and family.  
The impact of the exodus and intensification of violence in South Kivu, 
in September, provided a crucial backdrop to Lwabanji’s declaration as a 
military response to the rebels. This salient moment featured in many of the 
narratives as a tipping point, further bolstering the conspiracy and threat of 
genocide. Many of the re-constructions of this event follow the descriptions 
outlined by Bernard, “The governor of South Kivu, he announced on air, that 
all Banyamulenge should be killed or driven back to Rwanda. During that 
time after he had declared that on air, the Congolese were furious to kill us or 
push us back to Rwanda.”227 This was a clear threat to life that Bernard and 
others recalled. Some narratives mix varied elements, including the above 
initial recounting of Lwabanji’s words by news reports at the time. Christian 
further elaborated on the precise consequences, introducing a threat of 
firebombing Minembwe,  
He gave an ultimatum to leave the mountains and go in Rwanda. As 
they were Tutsis, the Tutsis were fighting here, he said, “go back to 
your home” and he said, “if you are not going within six days, if you 
are not going within six days, I am coming with the jet who will burn 
your mountains, will burn you within your mountains.” It was an 
ultimatum. He asked them to leave Zaïre within six days otherwise, he 
will come with jet or plane and will bomb us, burn us.228 
 
This dire accusation conjured images of mass killing by air, in Christian’s 
case invoking the six-day war in the Middle East. To emphasise the 
coalescence of this narrative point, others described earlier narratives of 
insecurity making linkages to citizenship and the claim that Banyamulenge 
were merely Rwandan immigrants who had now outstayed their welcome. 
Eleazar noted the following, “Now in . . . 1996, the vice governor of South 
Kivu here, he gave the ultimatum, he gave the ultimatum of seven days. That 
they should leave the country, the natural place where they are born. Leave 
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Congo and go to Rwanda.”229 Leonard described a similar connection with 
reference to the Tutsi morphologie that was the basis of the targeting of 
Banyamulenge.230 Thierry further suggested that a route was planned out for 
Banyamulenge to return to Rwanda from Minembwe, or “straight to Ethiopia”, 
referencing the Hamitic trope.231 
 In discussing this articulation of genocide, Bernard prompted a lengthy 
discussion in his interview about how the word “genocide” was being used 
and what exactly it referred to. At first he sought to make a clear distinction 
between what had happened in 1994 Rwanda, and the ongoing conflict in 
Congo, “What happened in Rwanda is a genocide but what took place in 
Congo was a war, so there are people who say they just dramatize the 
situation but the fact is it cannot be compared to what happened in 
Rwanda.”232 Use of genocide was a purposeful framing in order to distinguish 
the severity of the conflict, but such was in Bernard’s mind unwarranted. 
Then, intrigued by the discussion, he sought clarify if we were talking about 
genocide in Congo, was it about the Banyamulenge or the Banyarwanda, 
meaning those who had arrived in the exodus of 1994? I clarified that we 
were talking about the threat perceived by the Banyamulenge: what he saw 
as the threat to his community. This clarity drew an instant association of 
violence against Banyamulenge with the 1994 genocide, “For Banyamulenge 
it is absolutely similar to what took place in Rwanda, the Banyamulenge were 
hunted from caves and everywhere and the orders come from above, from 
the high officials . . .  who were Congolese.”233 This comment, developing his 
earlier statement, offers a glimpse of RPF narratives received in training, and 
a framing of prevailing notions of genocide as a highly structured and top-
down organised killing event.  
 Embedded in this perception of impending genocide was an evolution 
of the intermediate space: an increasing exclusion interpreted through a 
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narrative of insecurity. Gustav joined the RPF because of these events and 
perceptions. He had a promising academic career ahead of him, having 
managed to pass through exams necessary to study medicine in Belgium.234 
His educational opportunities were sufficient for the RPF not to draw him 
away prior to 1996; he felt, “I must sit for the national exam. I did this in April 
[1994]. They [the RPF] took power in July; it was useless for me to go during 
the military when the war had already ended.”235 It was not until April 1996, 
that he found himself imprisoned in Uvira by local authorities as part of a 
round-up of Banyamulenge, and taken to the Rwandan border via 
Kamanyola. It was there that guards fired upon the group of prisoners, “the 
order was given that they should kill all of us”. Gustav, with a few survivors, 
was then freed to escape into Rwanda. After two days in a refugee camp 
somewhere near Bugarama, he sought out enlistment in the RPF. 
Considering why he joined when he did, compared to those that left mid-
1994, after the war was over in Rwanda, he noted,   
No one will tell you why they have gone, it was like an adventure. I 
had a future of going to school and pursuing much more education, 
and then went to a country that has already faced genocide, but I was 
captured. So there was no point for me to go . . . . Because of the 
Rwandan refugees that were in Zaïre, they were armed, and had their 
own weapons. Therefore me, being, looking like them [the Tutsi], you 
could not feel free in your own country . . . . It was total insecurity. 
They had every kind of weapon with them.236 
. 
Gustav was pushed from his home, taken from a promising career and finally 
confronted with the insecurity facing the Banyamulenge. Others had left at 
varying times before, and in his mind, some had left for the excitement and 
opportunity held for a Tutsi in post-genocide Rwanda. When his path to 
education was firmly shut and finding himself in a refugee camp, he joined 
the fight to protect and preserve this regionally shared Tutsi identity against 
the threat coming from the camps.  
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Formation of the AFDL: “Soldiers without frontiers”237 
The AFDL emerged in this increasingly tense context. Each constituent 
military and political group possessed its own agenda, many with ties to their 
own regional sponsor. For those Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda, the 
AFDL represented a twofold response. First was in the short-term to 
destructive crises in the arrival of the exodus of Rwandans in 1994, and the 
burgeoning threat of genocide in 1996. Second was in the long-term to the 
intermediate space of postcolonial marginalisation. As discussed above 
these responses were articulated in the public narrative of the RPF, 
capturing the conflict dynamics and actors for Banyamulenge soldiers. The 
public narrative was then undergirded by the metanarrative of the visceral 
identification of genocide and the imperative of its halting it at any cost.  
Perceptions of the wider issue of persecution and existential threat 
against Tutsis regionally were common. Rugira, for example, described his 
family’s presence in Congo going back some generations, but then also 
connected with a broader regional ethnic identity as experiencing difficulty, 
“our people or tribes have been going through hard times because of those 
countries. Then the country, I mean Congo; people were not considering us 
as people from here.”238 Throughout the long journey many had taken since 
the early 1990s, there is a fluidity of belonging and identities. Rugira, as well 
as others, considered himself as Congolese, but had a familial affiliation with 
“Tutsi brothers”. This shared, regional sense of identity was shaped by the 
existential threats faced, whether in Minembwe or Kigali. Patience also 
confirmed this notion, “It was a general problem because it was on the 
identity of Tutsis. If one Tutsi has got a problem, then, and there have been a 
lot of injustice, then if it is one, therefore it will reflect on many of us who are 
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living during that time.”239 This regional identity combined many soldiers’ fluid 
self-perception with a popularly ascribed Tutsi identity. Therefore, it was the 
AFDL, engineered by Kigali and Kampala, which was the vehicle for the 
expressions and performance of these identity-based threats. Yet, as much 
as chants of liberty and freedom accompanied the AFDL rallies across the 
country, and as Kabila swelled the ranks of this conglomerate of rebels, the 
motivations and objectives were varied.240 
Participants’ reasons for the formation of the AFDL ranged 
accordingly: “defend their family against the ex-FAR, the Hutu militias, and 
others,”241 “it gave us nationality, it gave us power,”242 or to “bring about the 
liberation of the country.”243 By virtue of his nascent political training and 
teaching, Rugira expressed succinctly and poetically, almost overlapping 
Kagame’s own words as mentioned in chapter five, “One of the objectives 
was to overthrow the government, one was to bring peace in the country, to 
bring poor people to love the country. And the other thing was also to chase 
away the Interahamwe that were received by Mobutu and were living close to 
the borders of Rwanda.”244 The AFDL’s purposes, and even its success, 
were looked upon by participants with mixed views, again pointing narratives 
towards the theme of continued insecurity and fluid identities. Many were 
convinced, though, of its potency in halting the impending genocide of the 
Banyamulenge, but perhaps not permanently.  
The promise of return was fulfilled. However, along this soldier’s 
journey from the cattle-grazing hills of South Kivu to training camps like 
Gashora, and back again, genocide was a recurrent theme. Use of 
“genocide” was an appeal to authenticity of threat; an association of 
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http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/db32568c43a86fe429b265ced89f5391.   
241 Eleazar, 2017.  
242 Eugene, 2017.  
243 Janvier, 2017.   
244 Rugira, first interview, 2017.   
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belonging in a regional brotherhood, an authoritative claim on suffering. Yet, 
not all considered this claim as valid. As a Rwandan and former RPF and 
AFDL soldier, Kalisa McDowell’s reflection on his Banyamulenge colleagues 
and the claim of existential threat was doubtful. When asked about whether 
or not the AFDL was about stopping another genocide, he remarked the 
following, “I have heard many people talking about genocide, Mobutu was 
not for genocide, this is stupid. When you want to make your case you bring 
something big, you bring something you don’t understand. The genocide 
wasn’t Laurent Nkunda, he was following his bosses. This word genocide is 
like a business in the Great Lakes. If I profited from that I would use it.”245 
Referring jointly to the long-term threat articulated by the likes of Nkunda and 
Ntaganda against Tutsi in eastern Congo in the 2000s, as well as that 
against the Banyamulenge in the 1990s, it was a more complex affair, but 
not one captured by the term “genocide”. His interpretation of the escalation 
of violence in 1996 and the Lwabanji order as “responses to recruitment and 
threat of invasion . . . . A big mistake by Mobutu”246 The intersubjectivity of 
the use of this term (genocide) is crucial in the formation of perceptions and 
identities around the soldier’s journey.  
Conclusion: “The Congolese looked at us as strangers”247 
If they were strangers in their own land, then who were the Banyamulenge 
soldiers that left home to seek opportunity, belonging, power and support for 
a domestic cause? Participants’ narratives and plot points try to untangle and 
reflect on this contested notion of belonging. This cohort’s early adult frame 
of reference was that of their parent’s experiences, or their own childhood 
recollection of marginalisation under Mobutu. Framed by exclusion from and 
absence of political representation, the RPF offered a multifaceted lifeline. 
From 1990 to 1994, Banyamulenge left to join the fight against those who 
would become labelled genocidaires targeting their regional family. Once in 
the clasp of the RPF as an institution, identities already ascribing a 
connection to Rwanda injected into this fluidity a subscribed Rwandan 
                                            
245 McDowell, second interview, 2018.   
246 Ibid. 
247 Amani, 2017. 
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connection. This included the performance of military training, ideological 
education, and witnessing of genocide. The promise of return developed in 
response to the emergence of anti-Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge 
violence in North and South Kivu, following the 1994 exodus. This promise of 
self-defence, engaging in a conflict viewed by the community as at least 
questionable, echoed from involvement in both the Mulelist Rebellion and the 
ANC, up to the RPF and AFDL. Generations of Banyamulenge saw peace 
and security as an outcome of this essential involvement in conflict and in 
some cases a zero-sum arrangement. Overall, the perceived existential 
threat of genocide in 1996, germinated from the moments that these soldiers 
began their journey east to RPF training camps.  
The three features of genocide identified in the plot points of these 
narratives indicate the flow of participants through the vortex of genocide. 
Their narratives generate a set of self-commentaries and self-identifications 
as they moved through experiences of genocide. As Banyamulenge soldiers 
journeyed through these events, they cast themselves performatively as 
Rwandan, RPF, Congolese, AFDL, demonstrating a mixture of ascribed 
identities as well as their own self-framings. These often created an 
intersubjectivity of identities. Narratives of insecurity allowed participants to 
interpret their situatedness in the intermediate space. In the postcolony of 
Zaïre, political representation and the question of nationality provided ample 
grounds for the RPF to sow conceptions not only of where Banyamulenge 
and Banyarwanda belonged, but also an identity-difference relation to the 
genocidaire.  RPF public narratives identified emerging expectations of who 
belonged where, and how that belonging was enforced. Historical narratives 
were therein shaped and used to interpret the notions of colonialism, 
liberation and nationality. Metanarratives defined genocide and genocidaires 
within a moral and legal framing.  
The gaze which RPF recruits were trained to use in viewing the 
genocidaire was shaped by these exposures. Crucially, the intersubjective 
element of this dynamic is where the gaze is returned, either through captive 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe, or through the empty eyes of the dead. These 
interactions ironically brought to life and gave added context and meaning to 
narratives of insecurity brought from Zaïre, and the reinterpretation of such 
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by the RPF. In seeing the genocidaire and the dead, they started to sense 
who they were in reference to their own narrative baggage.248 This relational 
understanding of themselves and the genocidaire was reinforced by the 
witnessing of genocide in Rwanda, and later contextualised into the 
intermediate space and narratives of insecurity both in the Zaïre of the past 
and in their mid-1990s present. The reaggregations of power, discussed in 
chapter five, solidified relations not only between anti-Tutsi forces in eastern 
Zaïre, but also in the RPF framed perceptions of the genocidaire. As 
Ntaganda noted, these were some of the ones that stopped the Rwandan 
genocide, and in so doing, identified the genocidaire. 
Networks, structuring the physical and relational journey of the soldier, 
shaped identities and provided constraints and choices for young 
Banyamulenge. The robust RPF networks, developed throughout North and 
South Kivu, provided a connection, and ultimately an antecedent cause to 
perform the identities already formed by the narratives of insecurity and 
interpretations of intermediate space. Like Ntaganda and Nkunda, they 
would become soldiers, both professionals with a code and rebels with a just 
cause. The networks that propelled these recruits into Rwanda fed, clothed, 
beat, and armed them. They educated them within the RPF framing of anti-
colonialism, and formed the genocidaire in both concrete terms if they fought 
in 1994 Rwanda, or viscerally through the exposure to corpses in mass 
clean-up operations.249 These were not passive acts of national 
reconstruction, but performative relations to the genocidaire; attempts at 
clearly defining victim and perpetrator by using public and metanarratives.  
What then did it mean to be a Tutsi for the Banyamulenge recruits? 
The answer should reveal the limitation and liberation of such ethnic 
ascriptions and subscriptions. These young men, who grew up ascribed as 
Rwandans embraced this identity out of desperation, opportunity for 
                                            
248 Gill, 72-74, 269-270.   
249 Bergholz also indicates the impact of interaction with corpses of family or 
neighbours as having a profound and deep psychological effect, “They [the Other] all 
somehow appeared responsible for the deaths of these relatives and neighbours, whose 
mutilated corpses were now being unearthed and put on display for identification. The 
combination of emotional forces at play was extremely destabilising.” These can then lead to 
mass categorisations of the Other, as would happen in the AFDL-RPA experience in the 
camps, in Bergholz, 91, 231-232. 
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improved life chances, and/or seeking a strong sense of performative 
belonging. However, this identification was a parallel alongside other 
identities, especially in the retrospective narratives of these soldiers. Had 
Rwanda not pursued its own citizens into Zaïre, it is quite likely these recruits 
may have remained in Rwanda, pursuing long-term employment or 
education. Doing so in a similar fashion to the many Ugandan-born RPF 
recruits that descended in the early 1990s into Rwanda. In this way 
perpetration was not determined. Joining the RPF did not set these 
Banyamulenge on a predestined path, but provided networks and narratives 
to take-up and continue an RPF journey. It was a journey involving not only 
trends and uses of violence, but also specific understandings of the latter. 
The crucial role of the RPF in this period was that it constructed an identity-
difference with deep contextual connections to lived experience of the 
intermediate space in Zaïre. The inception and development of the 
genocidaire by the Banyamulenge ordered their moral and existential 
universes. As combatants, it would prove to be fatal for many, engaging 
them in decades of armed conflict. It also would facilitate the destruction of 
hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees ascribed as genocidaires. 
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Chapter VIII: Formed in the Vortex: Encountering the Genocidaire 
Most men appear to think that the art of despotic government is 
statesmanship, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in 
their own case they are not ashamed of practicing towards others. . . . 
Such behaviour is irrational; unless the one party is, and the other is 
not, born to serve, in which case men have a right to command, not 
indeed all their fellows, but only those who are intended to be 
subjects; just as we ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food or 
sacrifice, but only the animals which may be hunted for food or 
sacrifice, this is to say, such wild animals as are eatable.  
--Aristotle, Politics1 
 
Introduction 
The soldier’s journey undertaken by young Banyamulenge men establishes a 
consistent pattern of narratives of insecurity being used to interpret 
intermediate space. They encountered destructive crises either as young 
RPF soldiers in 1994 Rwanda or whilst under the threat of genocide against 
their own families in South Kivu because of the 1994 exodus. This 
destruction was both creative and crisis ridden, resulting in vortex-formed 
identities: Banyamulenge soldiers were at once foreigners in their own 
country, ascribed as regional Tutsi and existentially threatened, as well as 
RPF liberators fighting the genocidaire.  
In a vortex structured by the above features of genocide, these men 
had experiences of genocide and built identity-based narratives in relation to 
the former. Having moved through the vortex with each destructive crisis, 
they were about to do so again. Encountering the genocidaire in the context 
of liberating Zaïre was a sequential plot point for participants, yet one of a 
profoundly different experience to that of their journey so far. Their 
progression from the Kivus to Kinshasa continued this relational and physical 
journey. Direct contact with the perceived Other, or genocidaire, intensified 
this identity-difference relation and the resulting production of violence.   
This chapter is divided into five sections. It follows participant 
narratives on this next phase of their journey, into the distinct context of the 
                                            
1 Book 7, Chapter 2  
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refugee camps across Zaïre and the roads between them. Yet, these 
narratives contain limited detail on the process of physical obliteration 
deployed by the AFDL/RPA from mid-1996 into 1997. In the first section, 
some quantitative observations of genocide in this case are made, in addition 
to a theoretical consideration of violent spaces. The second section also 
looks at some of the ideas discussed in the preceding chapters, with the aim 
of framing how the camps and the roads between them became sites of 
obliteration.  
The third section discusses the turning point of the Mugunga camp 
attack and subsequent massive return. This section focuses on the 
classification and framing of camp inhabitants as genocidaires. It relies on 
views from participants, and their use of coded language in the challenge of 
differentiating targets. This discussion included how bullets were perceived 
as indiscriminate, killing combatants and refugees alike. Another use of this 
terminology is in how participants perceived the mass of ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and refugees as embodying genocidaire ideology and 
therefore as an existential threat. This section ends with a brief note on the 
dynamics of disease and starvation in this case. 
In the fourth and fifth sections, participant narratives will be used to 
discuss the movements of AFDL/RPA, centring on the southern axis through 
the Bukavu area and across to Shabunda and Kindu, in Maniema. Most 
participants claimed only to have followed this axis (see Figure 5). However, 
in order to give a more comprehensive picture of the obliteration of Rwandan 
refugees, the northern axis from Goma to Mbandaka, in Equateur, will also 
be discussed. Most participants explicitly stated that they did not follow this 
axis. Both routes, and their documented massacres, are retold as part of my 
conceptual narrative of this genocide. As discussed in previous chapters, the 
vortex is not an attempt to capture the cyclical nature of violence from 1990 
Rwanda to 1997 DRC. It is a heuristic device used to understand the 
exposure to genocide and an evolution of identity. As highlighted in chapter 
three, the conceptualisation of this case as part of a cycle is problematic. 
This view is largely hinged on the characterisation of actors switching within 
a victim and perpetrator binary. Yet, it is the purpose of this research to 
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acknowledge how actors sense themselves, and how identities are layered 
and formed in the vortex of exposure to and experience with genocide.  
 
Figure 5: Participant reported locations from 1996-1997, Google, “First 
Congo War,” Google Maps, 2018, accessed on 28 September 2018, from 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?mid=14HpL1SZ1yZ480IjvEdUUn6KJL_
Y&ll=-5.8393171157481545%2C16.443252524539503&z=6. 
Quantifying Erasure 
The widely referenced number quoted in this dissertation, that captures the 
erasure of Rwandan refugees, is pegged on Emizet Kisangani’s assessment 
of UN refugee documentation from the period. This figure of 233,000 refugee 
deaths is supported in other discussions of this case. Many scholars attribute 
Kisangani with having produced the most credible figure to date.2 Included in 
this overall lumping together of refugees were Burundian Hutu refugees, as 
well as various armed groups waging guerrilla warfare on the Tutsi-led 
                                            
2 Kisangani, “The Massacre of Refugees in Congo,” 178-179; see citing Kisangani’s 
work are Reyntjens, The Great African War, 93; Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 
136; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 148, 409n200; Roessler and Verhoeven, 208-210; Straus, 
Making and Unmaking Nations, 103. The report submitted by Roberto Garretón in 1998 
notes that 180,000 refugees were still unaccounted for, see UN, E/CN.4/1998/65, 22. 
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government.3 Beyond this depersonalised number, the Mapping Report 
documents 104 separate incidents, with the possibility of “tens of thousands” 
killed by AFDL/RPA forces.4 The report itself was spurred by the FARDC 5th 
Brigade’s discovery of mass graves around Rutshuru, namely in Mugogo and 
Bunagana in September 2005.5 MONUC staff in the area, already confronted 
with numerous reports of massacres and mass graves, decided to 
investigate.6 Following the initial site visit and interviews with local residents, 
a description emerged of how, in the Mugogo market alleged genocidaire 
supporters were publicly executed with a spray of bullets and hammers taken 
to their heads. Evidence points towards AFDL/RPA soldiers carrying out this 
execution in 1996. Those killed numbered in the hundreds, perhaps even 
over a thousand, and were mostly local Banyarwandan Hutu.7 
The Mapping Report takes a more qualitative approach and 
documents the larger series of massacres from 1996 to 1997, within the 
limited framing of the UNCG,  
The majority of the victims were children, women, elderly people and 
the sick, who posed no threat to the attacking forces. Numerous 
serious attacks on the physical or psychological integrity of members 
of the group were also committed, with a very high number of Hutus 
shot, raped, burnt or beaten. Very large numbers of victims were 
forced to flee and travel long distances to escape their pursuers, who 
were trying to kill them. The hunt lasted for months, resulting in the 
deaths of an unknown number of people subjected to cruel, inhuman 
and degrading living conditions, without access to food or medication.8 
                                            
3 These groups had arrived between 1993 and 1995, and were mostly clustered 
around Uvira UNHCR. Precise numbers of Burundian citizens in South Kivu have been hard 
to identify 72n155, 80n177. A UNHCR estimate prior to October 1996, stated about 143,000 
to 219,000 of the refugees in the 12 camps around Uvira were Burundian, see Public 
Information Sector, “UNHCR worries over the fate of refugees in Zaire,” UNHCR, 6 
December 1996, accessed on 12 December 2018, from . 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/1996/12/3ae6b81438/unhcr-worries-fate-refugees-
zaire.html. Ndacyayisenga’s account of the Bivara camp in South Kivu indicated a mix of 
inhabitants, including civilians, soldiers, former government officials, and Burundian 
refugees, see Ndacyayisenga, 30.  
4 UNHCR, 9, 279.   
5 Staff Reporter, “Mass Graves Found in Eastern DRC,” Mail & Guardian, 14 
October 2005, accessed on 30 August 2018, from https://mg.co.za/article/2005-10-14-mass-
graves-found-in-eastern-drc.  
6 An interview with one of the authors of the Mapping Report, Luc Henkinbrant, in 
Bukavu, November 2017; Gahima, 228; UNHCR, 14n32.   
7 UNHCR, 123; IOL, “Mass Graves Discovered in DRC,” 2 October 2005, accessed 
on 18 August 2018, from https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mass-graves-discovered-in-drc-
254984.  
8 UNHCR, 279.   
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The report makes the significant claim that such attacks targeted “Hutus” as 
a distinct ethnic group, in a fixed geographical area, without any 
discrimination of culpability in the 1994 genocide.9 If one uses a UNCG lens 
to sketch this genocide, as presented in the Mapping Report, fulfilment of 
three of article two’s criteria is apparent: “(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) 
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; . . .”10 The findings of this section 
of the report are summarised with this dramatic, but tentative statement, “The 
apparently systematic and widespread nature of the attacks, which targeted 
very large numbers of Rwandan Hutu refugees and members of the Hutu 
civilian population, resulting in their death, reveal a number of damning 
elements that, if they were proven before a competent court, could be 
classified as crimes of genocide.”11 Because of the moral and political weight 
behind the notion of genocide, this claim is often pushed out of context. 
UNHCR’s work here is mischaracterised as an authoritative classification, 
not a first attempt at documenting the violence as it was intended.12 
Given the magnitude, but preliminary nature of these findings, I have 
sought to layer the documentation of attacks on Rwandan refugees in this 
period.13 Using additional international news media and NGO reports, and 
other written accounts, I have initially identified 114 incidents by location, 
date, and estimated number of deaths (see Figures 7-9). This rudimentary 
dataset seeks to consolidate these varied sources on these attacks. It will be 
used in filling the gaps left by participant narratives, somewhat in the 
southern axis, but more particularly in the northern axis, and will provide 
                                            
9 Ibid., 280.  
10 UNCG, 9 December 1948, United Nations Treaty Series 78, no. 1021, 280.   
11 Ibid., 281.  
12 Henkinbrant, 2017.   
13 Henkinbrant emphasised some of the difficulties in moving forward with the many 
recommendations made in the report. With the original data locked away in a vault in 
Geneva, Henkinbrant frustratedly described the whole report as itself, likewise locked away, 
“The problem is that it was put, this report was put in the fridge and we are very few, to 
speak about it even today. Very few people talk about it, and even the High Commissioner 
himself is not speaking about it. We are putting pressure on him to try, because this is only a 
part of the investigation,” 2017.  
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maps in the final two sections. Whilst this dissertation is a narrative analysis, 
the above supporting evidence is fundamental to connecting the journey of 
participants to the overall observation of genocide. The challenge remains to 
rigorously document these attacks and harmonise the figures given by 
Kisangani with other sources on the attacks.  
Space and Violence: The Camps and Roads between Them 
Many popular accounts of genocide are grounded in the problematic concept 
of neighbours killing each other.14 Indeed, the spatial relation of 
neighbourhoods or some level of communal living prior to genocide is a 
common theme to the mainstream portrayals of the Holocaust, Rwanda, 
Armenia, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia. As discussed in chapter 
two, the sometimes-limited cannon and traditional approach of genocide 
studies neglects colonial and postcolonial dimensions of this phenomenon. It 
is this latter set of dynamics, however, that brings together the varied 
populations of the Great Lakes in this particular case. Additionally, it is the 
layering of the RPF’s strategic priorities and the perceptions of genocidaires, 
as the killers of soldiers’ families and close relatives, which in many cases 
drove the violence against the refugees. Seeing genocide in the postcolonial 
space, as highlighted in the conceptualisation of the intermediate space, 
offers this deeper understanding of perpetration, and how actors sensed 
themselves and made identity-difference relations.  
 Situated within the layering of narrative identity, as captured in the 
vortex, is the space of encounter with the genocidaire. For many RPF 
Banyamulenge, this came in the form of direct and indirect interactions, 
either through fighting in Rwanda from 1990-1994, or through training or 
post-genocide duties in policing the genocidaire. This destructive crisis was 
then layered with the pending threat of and for some the advent of genocide 
in the Kivus. This section dedicates additional discussion to some of the 
theoretical considerations from Crossley, Powell, and Mbembe. It also 
introduces some additional perspective from Claudia Card on social death, 
and consults political geography on space and violence, focusing on the 
                                            
14 Prominent examples of this type of writing include: Gourevitch, and Jan Gross, 
Neighbours: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Arrow, 2003).  
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refugee camp. It will be asserted that the refugee camp and the roads 
between provided a site of performativity for these movements within the 
vortex.  
Relational Space and Violence 
The relational sociology that underpins the theoretical approach of this 
research is derived from the contributions of Crossley and Powell. Crossley, 
in particular, establishes an agency-structure balance and the fluidity of 
identity. These elements came together through the networks in which actors 
or groups find themselves. Within networks actors became situated and 
engaged in constructed figurations, by which they classify and sense 
themselves, other actors, and their environment. Above all, and returning to 
Levi’s “gray zone”, networks and figurations produce sites where actors 
perform identities, creating and perpetuating narratives while fluidly adapting 
to extreme circumstance.  
 Powell’s identity-difference relation of violent obliteration identifies the 
power relations occurring within networks, and impacting figurations. This 
relation produces destruction in a fundamental way: it destroys identity, 
group figurations, bodies, and memory. The core understanding of genocide 
in this research is that it is a process of social destruction, whereby actors 
creatively reshape their social world. The features of this genocide frame 
how and why many of the principal actors in the AFDL/RPA performatively 
engaged in this reshaping. In doing so, they not only moulded their social 
worlds, but also themselves and the genocidaire.   
 In terms of the violent impact of such reshaping, Claudia Card’s work 
on social death and the destruction of identity has had a significant impact on 
the field of genocide studies.15 Much of her perspective on the destruction of 
identity as a principle element of genocide agrees with Powell’s work. 
Groups are destroyed when their social connections are irreparably 
dismantled; this is the harm of genocide.16 These connections could include 
sustainability of identity, transmission of culture, or physical or symbolic 
                                            
15 James Snow, “Claudia Card's Concept of Social Death: A New Way of Looking at 
Genocide,” Metaphilosophy 47, No. 4-5 (October 2016): 607-626.  
16 Claudia Card, “Genocide and Social Death,” Hypathia 18, No. 1 (Winter 2003), 
66; Keane, 157-159; Short, 33-34.  
 226 
repositories of culture.17 Card’s field-shifting position is that physical death is 
not the prime marker of this level of destruction, but a dire compliment.18 By 
framing culpability in terms of “reasonably foreseeable consequence”, Card 
evolves the understanding of intention in the same way as other post-liberal 
genocide scholars.19 The characterisation of targets demonstrates a pattern 
of specific violence, and even indicates a process of destruction. The latter 
can be identified without using the post-hoc measurement of whether killing 
has resulted (whole or in part) in group destruction.  
The networks and relational narratives within which Banyamulenge 
and Banyarwanda were engaged provided a path that brought them to the 
threshold of deeper perpetration. Led by the RPA, these actors arrived at 
sites where their figurations produced the violent destruction of the camps 
and the performance of the identity-difference relation to genocidaires. The 
dynamics of these sites are captured by Mbembe’s necropolitics discussed in 
chapter five. Kigali’s view of eastern Congo has long been conceived by 
many as colonial; a colonialism characterised by a security buffer zone and 
emergent economic interests.20 Comments made by a Rwandan minister in 
1996, capture this view of a combined Rwanda-Kivu state, “the enlarged 
country would make it possible to distribute land to everyone; the bulk of the 
Interahamwe and other genocidists [sic] would be in the field of investigation 
of Rwandan justice again; the military threats of the ex-FAR would be 
neutralized.”21  
One way in which this view has some purchase is in the type of 
warfare waged from 1996 to 1997 and onwards. Mbembe’s description of 
                                            
17 For more discussion on the latter two elements in this list, see Donna-Lee Frieze, 
“The Destruction of Sarajevo’s Vijećnica: a case of genocidal cultural destruction?” in Jones, 
New Directions in Genocide Research, 57-75.  
18 Card, 69, 73.    
19 Ibid., 78.   
20 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 220; Reyntjens, The Great African War, 226-231; 
Richard Dowden, “Kagame and Congo: how long can he deny Rwandan involvement in the 
East?” African Arguments, 17 July 2012, accessed on 30 August 2018, from 
http://africanarguments.org/2012/07/17/kagame-and-congo-how-long-can-he-deny-rwandan-
involvement-in-the-east-by-richard-dowden/; Godfrey Mwakikagile, Identity Politics and 
Ethnic Conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi: A Comparative Study (New Africa Press, 2012), 53.  
21 Quoted in Frederic Fritscher, “In Kivu, a war that does not say its name since 
early September,” Le Monde, 2 November 1996, accessed on 3 August 2018, from 
https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1996/11/02/au-kivu-une-guerre-qui-ne-dit-pas-
son-nom-depuis-debut-septembre_3752340_1819218.h.  
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colonial warfare is an ideal type that holds empirical value in this case 
“colonial warfare is not subject to legal and institutional rules. It is not a 
legally codified activity. Instead, colonial terror constantly intertwines with 
colonially generated fantasies of wilderness and death and fictions to create 
the effect of the real. Colonial wars are conceived of as the expression of an 
absolute hostility that sets the conqueror against an absolute enemy.”22 The 
narrative of insecurity produced by the RPF governed the war on the camps 
and their residents. Interwoven with this fabric of threat were individual’s 
intermediate space framed perceptions contained in the ontological, public, 
and metanarratives of AFDL/RPA participants. The identity-difference 
relation to the genocidaire governed the logic of interactions with refugees.23 
 The camps that were already present at the point of invasion in 1996 
provided the AFDL/RPA with a ready platform for further exclusion and then 
obliteration. Mbembe articulates a “management of the multitudes” that the 
existing camp space provided “as a political category, populations are then 
disaggregated into rebels, child soldiers, victims or refugees, or civilians 
incapacitated by mutilation or simply massacred on the model of ancient 
sacrifices, while the ‘survivors,’ after a horrific exodus, are confined in camps 
and zones of exception”.24 Within this categorising principle is a tension 
present between biopower as discipline, and biopower as direct violence 
upon bodies. Biopower in some cases facilitates shifts disciplinary 
apparatuses into producing massacres.25 The moment of encounter, and 
especially in the space of the camp, was one already constructed as a zone 
of existential threats before the trickling invasion of the summer of 1996. The 
evolution of RPF/A violence between Byumba, Kibeho and Mugunga 
developed simultaneously in narratives and relations. Having engaged in 
managing populations since the early years of the RPF in eastern Rwanda, 
the practices described in this chapter were already in place, but lethally 
                                            
22 Mbembe, 25.   
23 Straus’ view of how genocidal elites frame their enemies as unwinnable, as those 
past redemption by the ideology and cause of the elite helps link Mbembe’s concept, see 
Straus, Making and Unmaking of Nations, 121. Colonial comparisons could be taken further 
using Lawson’s assessment of the nature of settler violence and genocide as an integral part 
of colonial, perpetrator society identity, see Lawson 27, 162-164.  
24 Mbembe, 34.   
25 Mitton, 210-211.   
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developed across the refugee spaces of Zaïre. RPF had already been willing 
to kill its opposition from 1990-1994, however, from 1994 onwards they were 
able to legally and ideologically identify an enemy, and classify them through 
an identity-difference relation.  
Social Geography of the Camps 
As sites of violence, refugee camps do not just produce violence against 
refugees. This subsection considers some theoretical input from social 
geography on the space and place of camps, and the specific relational 
environment contained therein. As demonstrated by this case study, refugee 
camps up and down the border became sites of entrenched violent actors. 
The ex-FAR leadership was able to seriously consolidate their cause both 
materially and ideologically as evidenced by the attacks into Rwanda and 
within the Kivus.26 Indeed, for the RPF it was the fundamental nature of their 
own situatedness as refugees and their rejection by Ugandan society in the 
late 1980s that saw the rise of a more militant generation, trained and 
equipped by Museveni’s NRA.27 Other research, including the reflections of 
Mbembe as he applied them to Palestinian urban camps, has gone to great 
lengths to discuss and draw out the dynamics of violence and identity 
formation in refugee camps.28  
Before delving into the social geography and violence of refugee 
camps, James Tyner’s overview of space and violence is worth applying 
here. He frames direct violence in the context of specific institutions, 
                                            
26 These will receive further, but brief discussion in the Epilogue.   
27 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 175-184. An additional example can be 
found in the ethnogenesis of Nubi, or West Nile mercenary and traders groups, from the 
nineteenth century slave-soldiers to revolutionaries under Idi Amin, see Mark Leopold, 
“Legacies of Slavery in North-West Uganda: The Story of the 'One-Elevens',” Africa: Journal 
of the International African Institute 76, no. 2 (2006):180-199. 
28 Mbembe, 35-39. Work on Burundian refugees in Tanzania demonstrates the 
development of memory and identity within camps, see Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: 
Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (University 
of Chicago Press, 2012). Other work addresses the gendered violence within camps, from 
which Hyndman’s chapter is used in this chapter, see Wenona Giles, Jennifer Hyndman 
(eds), Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (University of California, 2004). The 
political dimensions as noted above by Terry’s piece on the ex-FAR run camps in eastern 
Congo, are often understated both by analysts and international decision makers, see Sarah 
Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of 
Humanitarian Aid (Cornell University Press, 2015).  
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presenting a geography of violence, space, and place.29 He indicates some 
of the dynamics of violence already explored in this dissertation: biological, 
or the interrelation of bodies; interpersonal, exposure to violent social 
relations and the impact on narratives; situational, how interactive behaviour 
creates a shared environment; and, societal, where the interplay of society 
creates levels of inclusion and exclusion which in turn legitimises violence 
based on such.30 He adds, that here space is a given spatial arrangement, 
and place is the active, or relation to or within a space.31 Thus, we are 
presented with a view of the camps as humanitarian or ad-hoc constructed 
space that can become a place of violence.32 Tyner further underscores the 
formative impact on identities in these spaces and places. Performance 
forms identity, and violence is often used to maintain coherence of 
problematic or challenged identities, reinforcing violent places.33 
Looking at urban serial killers in this schema, Tyner picks out how 
individuals reproduce social Othering, or “cultural coding” in violent ways.34 
Such actors encounter victims in “spaces of opportunity”, or sites that 
represent the ills of society that require cleansing.35 Often these spaces are 
the domain of the victim, or are seen to be shaped and corrupted by them as 
sex workers or vagrants. The reproduction of this Othering or specific social 
ordering turns these spaces into relational places of murder. As the 
AFDL/RPA encountered the genocidaire, they perceived a revitalised force in 
the camps, engaged in attacks on Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda, and 
insurgency into Rwanda. This perception easily reproduced tightly packed 
narratives and perceptions. Relevant here is Gill’s articulation of the 
Foucauldian gaze, as noted in chapter seven. The gaze by which the 
genocidaire was constructed came through RPF and AFDL training as 
                                            
29 For a further review of these dynamics as they are understood here, see Simon 
Springer and Philippe Le Billon, “Violence and Space: An Introduction to the Geographies of 
Violence,” Political Geography 52 (May 2016): 1-3.  
30 James A. Tyner, Space, Place and Violence (Routledge, 2012), 6-11.   
31 Use of the notion of space somewhat overlaps here with the feature of genocide 
used throughout this work: intermediate space. Whilst the use of this term does in part relate 
with the assessment of camps as space and place, it is intended as a separate concept.  
32 Ibid., 16.   
33 Ibid., 83-88.   
34 Ibid., 102-103.   
35 Ibid., 115.   
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destructive crises were framed through the narrative of insecurity. Such was 
particularly acute as Banyamulenge and other early RPF recruits interacted, 
violently or viscerally, with the genocidaire and their victims. The camps 
provided a place where this gaze became intense and seemingly perpetual. 
Kalyvas captures this element in his treatment of irregular warfare as a 
production of barbarism. The dynamic of “spatial distribution of violence” is 
demarcated “where armed actors are most vulnerable, they are most likely to 
use violence.”36 Sensing one’s world from a narrative of insecurity is a 
foundation of the regional Tutsi subaltern identity. 
This logic of the camps as places of violence, or the threat of, 
inevitably connected those in the camp to the perceived ideology and agency 
of the genocidaire. Camps and the roads between them became ever-
increasing spaces of opportunity as targets were more easily justified and 
less resistance was given. This is what made the Mugunga mass return such 
a point of transition: the internationally reinforced idea of good, or genuine 
refugees leaving, and the bad or guilty remaining, only increased the 
reproduction of the genocidaire logic. The longer refugees remained, the 
greater their perceived involvement and complicity.  
Broadly, refugee camps are violent places, filled with relational action, 
resulting in a transformation into a “state of exception”.37 Giorgio Agamben 
describes camps (ranging from Auschwitz to Guantanamo) within a 
perceived legal principle of exception at an institutional level. Such becomes 
especially acute in terms of civil war or rebellion. Camps present a particular 
framing of residents, refugees, prisoners, detainees, or otherwise, as 
stripped of citizenship and other legally protective dimensions of identity.38 
This state of vulnerability, or bare life, as articulated by Butler, is where lives 
reach a maximum intermediacy and become valueless.39 However, unlike 
Butler’s claim the lives of Rwandan camp inhabitants’ still had a specific 
value for the AFDL/RPA, whether it was through production of compliance, or 
                                            
36 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 85.   
37 This key phrase is largely derived from Carl Schmitt's critique of states of 
exception, see Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (University of Chicago Press, 2008), 1-
4.   
38 Ibid.   
39 Butler, Frames of War, 25  
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removal of threats. Here the concept of intermediate space takes on a 
second currency. In preparing for the larger onslaught of the camps, the 
inhabitants were placed in an intermediate space through the reproduction of 
postcolonial identities in RPF ideology and narrative, as well as from their 
general abandonment by regional governments and the UN. Their 
occupation of intermediate space had a performative value to the AFDL/RPA 
soldiers trained to remove and eliminate threats to regional Tutsi identity, or 
the genocidaire.40 Within the vortex, the refugees joined these soldiers in a 
particular production of identity in destructive and involuntary ways. 
Refugees also retained the ascribed and subscribed identities relative 
to the camp, again relying on the exclusive and inclusive logic of place. 
Similarly, Amartya Sen describes this as a “charged attribution”, where the 
ascribed target category becomes the only category by which the target is 
known.41 In discussing Burundian camps in Tanzania, Simon Turner pushes 
Agamben’s approach into the intersubjective realm, “refugees themselves 
also conceive of the camp as an exceptional space— a temporary 
suspension of moral order— they are constantly working on constructing 
their own political subjectivities— their own sovereign decisions.”42 The flight 
of elements of the Rwandan population occurred because of events like 
Kibeho, and made real by the individual experiences of many refugees, 
many of whom had been on the move since 1993.43  
As discussed above, the political dimensions of camps are present, 
but often ignored by international organisations.44 This, in a way, was Primo 
                                            
40 Mitton, 251.   
41 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence (Penguin, 2006), 7.   
42 Simon Turner, “Suspended Space--Contesting Sovereignties in Refugee Camp,” 
in Thomas Blom Hansen, et al., (eds), Sovereign Bodies : Citizens, Migrants, and States in 
the Postcolonial World (Princeton University Press, 2005): 255.   
43 For examples from Umutesi’s detailed account see, 23-28, 51, 130-140; Niwese, 
91-92; Terry, 165-166; AI, “Rwanda and Burundi, The return home: rumours and realities,” 
(February 1996): 12-26. As an example, in Kibungo, south-east Rwanda, December 1996, 
5,460 returnees were arrested, some illegally, and others were poorly treated, around the 
same time as the conclusion of a genocidaire trial and civil unrest, see Le Monde, “More 
than 5,000 refugees arrested on their return to Rwanda,“ 9 January 1997, accessed on 3 
August 2018, from https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1997/01/09/plus-de-5-000-
refugies-arretes-a-leur-retour-au-
rwanda_3744756_1819218.html%3Fxtmc%3Dzai...&ust=1537261740000000&usg=AFQjCN
HU2X1fltZ9rSC5eR9RWRkIiR1sIw&hl=en-GB.  
44 Ibid., 262-263.   
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Levi’s contribution to the study of violence in specific spaces: a call to 
understand the relational identities and agencies within a gray zone, or 
exceptional and violent place. These layered subjectivities come from within 
and without the camp. Furthermore, these become intersubjectivities in 
relations and networks.45 Again, it can be seen that this metamorphosis of 
the camps reveal these as places pregnant with threat and violence. 
Certainly, these refugees entered a state of exception for the AFDL/RPA 
camp clearers; however, these were not vacuums or simple execution sites 
(if such a thing is even possible). The camps were places of encounter. The 
genocidaire - already constructed by narratives and the ongoing threat of 
genocide - was further determined after Mugunga to noncompliant with initial 
drives to return and understood as guilty.46 The RPF’s practice of 
securitisation and militarisation of political problems entailed clearly justifiable 
deployments of violence, and increasingly so during the 1996 to 1997 camp 
clearings and hunt for genocidaires.  
Attacks on the Camps 
This section will outline elements of the attacks on the camps using 
participant accounts and additional literature. It will include the impact of 
refugee identification post-Mugunga, the indiscriminate nature of violence, or 
soldiers’ bullets and associations between genocidaires and ideology, as well 
as a note on starvation and disease. (An overview of the initial attack on and 
aftermath of Mugunga was given in chapter five.) The following two sections 
will address the southern and northern fronts. The latter will be more reliant 
on non-participant accounts.47 It will be shown how the AFDL/RPA worked 
their way through the camps systematically seeking out the genocidaire, and 
responded with overwhelming force.  
Mugunga: The Turning Point 
Following the emptying of Mugunga in November, those who trekked across 
Zaïre in large groups were increasingly made up of unarmed non-
                                            
45 Ibid., 269.   
46 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 171.   
47 It was noted most clearly by Rukema that Banyarwanda in North Kivu supported 
the northern axis and the Banyamulenge supported the southern one, Rukema, second 
interview, 2018.  
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combatants. At this point, according to Prunier, 170,000 fled along the 
northern axis toward Kisangani, 100,000 southward toward Shabunda. It is 
further estimated that about 100,000 remained embedded in the hills of 
Masisi and Walikale. The armed and organised ex-FAR/Interahamwe fighters 
spread themselves across the country, some among these refugees, others 
making their way north toward sanctuary in Sudan.48 As discussed above, 
the logic of remaining in Zaïre versus returning was one intersected by 
experience with and rumour of past RPF violence. For those who returned 
prior to November, most repatriated at gunpoint, confirmed this use of 
violence. Shelters were summarily dismantled, light arms fire was used 
indiscriminately, and camps were surrounded. At this point the AFDL/RPA 
only let refugees escape towards the border.49  The methods deployed by 
the RPF trained forces to disperse, isolate, select and kill suspected 
collaborators and genocidaires in Zaïre echoed those of post-genocide 
Rwanda discussed in chapter five.  
The sudden, violent attack on Mugunga reinforced for many the 
danger of returning. The fighting that did occur in Mugunga was a result of 
the concentration of soldiers in the camp.50 Participants often characterised 
Mugunga as the place where both the refugee and ex-FAR/Interahamwe 
gathered. This implied that those who stayed after this point accumulated 
and deepened their complicity in the genocidaire agenda. Gatete confirmed 
this about those who remained, “It was the Interahamwe, the ones who were 
soldiers, the ones who resisted, that refused to go back. So, they ran with 
their wives toward Kisangani.”51 Other participants, when asked about what 
was intended by the RPF in the camps, claimed to have no knowledge of 
what happened. Although some indicated rumour or knowledge of the 
massacres, they were coy in that acknowledgement, to whatever degree it 
was given. Moise noted the following, 
                                            
48 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 143.   
49 HRW, “Zaire: Transition, War and Human Rights,” vol. 9, no. 2 (A) (April 1997): 
26-28.   
50 According to witnesses cited in the Spanish indictment, present at the Mugunga 
camp at this time was the RPA’s 21st Battalion led by Major Gashayija Bagirigomwa, see 
Juzgado Central De Instrucción No. 4' Audiencia Nacional, 132. 
51 Gatete, 2017.   
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Interviewer: Did the RPF go to the camps where they [ex-
FAR/Interahamwe] were hiding? What did they do at the camps?  
 
Moise: That is more political. I don't know how to say it. If you want me 
to say that they did a genocide that, I cannot say. I cannot say it 
because did not see it. If you go to Tingi-Tingi, there is a camp, the 
camp of Mugunga there were almost about a million refugees. . . . We 
understand that they had been suffering, but saying that was 
genocide? That there was a genocide there, I do not know.52 
 
This response was typical. Both political actor and soldier alike positioned 
themselves away from the rumour of massacres. Many claimed that these 
things only happened in the north. Thierry further adds, when asked more 
directly about international UN reports on the attacks, 
The RPF wanted so much to bring back the civilians and have them 
join them [in Rwanda], rather than killing them. Secondly, the inkotanyi 
that were supporting the AFDL, they didn’t have any jealousy or envy 
of anything, or feeling to revenge to anyone in Congo. . . . In my 
opinion they wanted everyone to go back and eventually they did. I 
didn’t see anything that could make the inkotanyi kill anyone in 1996. 
Nevertheless, in war there will be one killing the other or if guns shoot, 
a lot of people are killed.53  
 
This final disclaimer, however vaguely it was stated, was a recurrent theme 
for soldier and political actor participants. Given the weight of evidence 
behind the fact that massacres took place on both the northern and southern 
axes such a seeming generalisation cannot be ignored. This is further 
addressed in this section.  
Following initial victories against their opponents, Rugira recalled how 
the Interahamwe were chased northward to Mugunga. In his view - one 
shared by others - the north was seen as more hospitable to these enemy 
forces “As they were running toward the north, a lot of them were dying on 
the way and some of them were killed, but others were also infiltrating with 
other civilians.”54 North Kivu for many participants was considered a 
genocidaire haven as a “lot of Hutu people that live there and Interahamwe 
                                            
52 Moise, 2017.  
53 Thierry, 2017.   
54 Rugira, second interview, 2017.  
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also went to Hutu tribes there.”55 They were seen as being able to blend in 
with the existing Hutu Banyarwanda population.  
What made Mugunga a further turning point was Kagame’s success at 
the UN in staving off and removing the possibility of MNF deployment. 
Rudasingwa, as chief diplomat in the US at the time, claimed there was a 
conscious “political calculation” at work in preventing this intervention.56 
Comparing the situation to the stalemate prior to the 1994 genocide, this 
agenda was to “prevent an increase in UN presence, as this would freeze the 
military situation and retain Ashura,” allowing UN involvement would “block 
the [RPF] political agenda”.57 The Rwandan ambassador to the UN 
expressed this strategy by likening the proposed MNF to the failed Operation 
Turquoise. The only likely outcomes, he claimed, would be a further propping 
up of Mobutu’s regime, and another free pass for the ex-FAR/Interahamwe to 
escape justice.58  
Rudasingwa was given specific talking points by Kigali that advanced 
the theory of the refugees as ex-FAR/Interahamwe hostages. This notion 
was reinforced by the apparent liberation of Mugunga. Yet, as described in 
chapter five, Mugunga’s growth in population leading up to November 1996 
was a result of violent emptying of surrounding camps, resonating a fear of 
RPF, now AFDL/RPA tactics. These prior attacks had closed all routes from 
these camps except to Mugunga, which was surrounded by the AFDL/RPA 
and bombarded with artillery on the afternoon of 13 November. Two days 
later, troops had entered on foot and directed the camp inhabitants at 
gunpoint back to Goma and the border.59 This carefully timed reverse exodus 
occurred just prior to the pending UN Security Council Resolution 1080 to 
establish the MNF.60 However, with Mugunga, the largest camp at the time 
now supposedly emptied, Kigali’s allies were able to dissuade the Security 
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58 Roessler & Verhoeven, 203-204.   
59 Cooper, 40.   
60 Simon Massey, “Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention That Never 
Happened,” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 15th February 1998, accessed on 31st 
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Council of the necessity of “Operation Assurance” by early December.61 The 
refugees as hostages thesis confirmed the approach of the AFDL/RPA of 
dealing with the guilty who remained.62 In the words of the commander on 
the ground, James Kabarebe, “It was like a wave, a mass of people moving. 
It was very fascinating. And to me it was a very big achievement, because 
we had done what the UN had failed to do.”63 By carefully building a case 
with allies against the intervention, the AFDL/RPA was able to maintain 
control of the West’s perception of the conflict, and construct a convincing 
reality on the ground.64 To a degree, this representation as hostages 
removed a measure of agency from these camp inhabitants. They were 
subjects of the genocidaire agenda. This was a crucial accomplishment for 
the continued Othering of this group. The acceptance of hostage 
characterisation up to November, allowed for the remaining refugees and 
armed actors to be lumped together as genocidaires.65   
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63 El-Tahri, 2000.   
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unarmed and armed inhabitants. See Terry, 173-176; Ndacyayisenga, 80. A further editorial 
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Accounting for Refugees and Violence 
How did participants account for the remaining refugees? Amani gave the 
view that accusations of the AFDL or the RPA killing refugees are hard to 
answer because of the context (“Any war is a war”).66 Within the hostile 
environment “thousands” more died as a result of “famine and poor 
conditions”.67 Some claimed not to have seen any refugees during the 
course of combat from 1996 to 1997.68 Others, such as Ikiyaga, clearly 
stated that the ex-FAR/Interahamwe were specifically hunted, “Yes, we came 
down here to hunt for them. Those that resisted, they were killed. And those 
that surrendered, they were captured and taken back.”69 Balthazar made a 
similar comment on the context of war. Those who remained in the field of 
battle were classified as the enemy, “It is a war. It is nothing less. The 
Interahamwe were there, but most of the people were Interahamwe and ex-
FAR.”70 It was understood that if the ex-FAR/Interahamwe were found they 
“would be put to death.”71This commentary demonstrates the qualified 
acknowledgement by some participants of refugee deaths in the course of 
combat, missing out any further detail.  
Admission of refugee deaths at the hands of the AFDL was also 
redirected towards the Rwandans. Leonard described this dynamic: “It was 
not the Congolese; it's the RPA that attacked and killed the Rwandese 
refugees. And these refugees were also mixed with the ex-FAR.”72 Given the 
command structures, and the interconnectedness of Banyamulenge in the 
RPA, it is continually unclear how and when motivations and involvement 
can be differentiated. Janvier described an example of such violence against 
the genocidaire, where one RPA soldier exacted revenge on a captured foe, 
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That soldier, he came, after he had seen that we had captured them 
alive, he had a bayonet, a knife, and he stabbed one Interahamwe. 
After he had done that, he licked the blood on his knife. Then I asked 
him, “Why did you do that?” He said that he [the Interahamwe soldier] 
is from Rwanda and they have killed his father, his mother, and 
everyone. There was total destruction of everything. The soldier said, 
“Now you are telling me that I should let them go?” I remember that he 
was arrested and taken.73 
 
This description typifies the way in which revenge was a factor, as according 
to the participants. Matthias offers this explanation of how revenge motivated 
such incidents, 
These young soldiers in RPF saw their parents being killed. They went 
back to their village and find that everyone was killed. They had killed 
everyone. Some killed themselves; others went and killed others, as 
revenge. Also after revenging, they would come and kill themselves 
too. It was inevitable that something happened of course, there were 
errors and mistakes that we cannot help from happening, even here in 
Congo; there were some serious problems as the AFDL was moving 
forward . . . . In general, in war, any kind of war is not good.74  
 
Matthias went on to refer to “errors” on other occasions to explain why 
accusations were made about the killings of ex-FAR/Interahamwe and 
refugees, “There were people that were captured and those that were not 
captured, I think the officers of RPF were, who were having that mind-set 
and running off and chasing them somewhere, maybe they made some 
errors, and that happens in war.”75 Within the context of war many 
participants considered this to be inevitable; yet, a special circumstance was 
granted in this case because of the past genocide (in 1994) and its continued 
threat. 
 Christian also attributed the possibility of revenge attacks, described 
by participants as isolated and punished, to a level of education and 
awareness of international norms. Many Banyamulenge, he believed, did not 
get involved in massacres of refugees. This was only done by “uneducated 
people” who “committed human rights abuses by killing people”.76 He 
claimed that,  
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There was some Banyamulenge and some Rwandese who were not 
educated and they were at the top, but there were few officers. Most 
of the top officers who did the massacres were Rwandese and 
uneducated. Some Banyamulenge were educated but were very few 
and didn’t have command. They couldn’t create influence, as the 
others were retaliating against their own people who had killed their 
brothers. We couldn’t say no.77  
 
The position crafted for the Banyamulenge soldier was one caught between 
violent forces, but not knowingly misstepping outside of international law. 
There was also the issue of command. Many participants claimed they were 
“only privates”78 and lacked the ability to prevent such atrocities. Christian 
further acknowledged the danger in doing so. This explanation of atrocities 
from Christian typifies the problematic nature of Banyamulenge positioning 
as passive actors. It was demonstrated in the previous chapter how many of 
Banyamulenge, especially those who joined around the 1991 to early 1994 
period walked the same footsteps and had the similar post-basic training 
development in commando training, logistics, intelligence, and policing as 
their Zaïrian Banyarwanda and Rwandan compatriots. If these then went on 
to form the backbone of the first waves of the AFDL, it is difficult to relegate 
their roles to mere untrained foot soldiers.  
Where killings of refugees were considered ad-hoc, avoiding 
retaliatory attacks was seen as interrupting a process of grieving. Again, 
Christian emphasises the Rwandan-RPF revenge dynamic,  
They were killing the people who had killed their brothers and had fled 
to Congo . . . . As we were advancing, we captured them and then the 
RPA brought some here and some killed them. The Rwandese were 
committing such abuses as a kind of retaliation. It was not organised. 
It was some Rwandese soldiers who retaliated against the militias who 
killed their brothers in Rwanda.79  
 
Given Christian’s earlier visceral description of pending destruction against 
the Banyamulenge (“he [Lwabanji] will come with jet or plane and will bomb 
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us, burn us”), and the fact that many considered the 1996 intervention too 
late, it is equally problematic that Rwandans’ motives are made unique in this 
manner.80 This is especially the case when many established a deep social 
bond and shared plight with, in Rugira’s words, their “Tutsi brothers”. 
Bernard’s comparison of 1994 Rwanda to 1996 South Kivu (“absolutely 
similar to what took place in Rwanda”), and Bonte’s discovery of the 
massacre of his family after returning, point toward a similar tragic 
experience by the same genocidaire. Furthermore, the revenge framing 
obfuscates the systematic value of violence described in this chapter. 
The narratives of insecurity and the threat of genocide were deployed 
to frame any admissions of attacks. Martin recalled what happened in some 
camps, “Most of them [the refugees] were killed. A lot of them were killed and 
when they came from Rwanda. The Tutsis that were here, the 
Banyamulenge and others were afraid that they would come to kill us as well. 
So, when these attacks were carried out, it is known that most of them were 
killed.”81 The narrative of insecurity and destructive crises formed a zero-sum 
scenario. Here Martin confirms the resulting implication: kill or be killed.  
The capture and release of ex-FAR/Interahamwe and refugees was 
prominent in participants’ retelling of these events. This process entailed 
handing Rwandans over to RPA officers, or international agencies.82 Like 
many, Patience recalled, “By then, the Rwandan soldiers [ex-FAR] were 
many. So, we handed them over to the [RPA], and put them in the trucks and 
drove them to Rwanda. We were also working with the UNHCR, and other 
international NGOs, assisting the refugees to go back to Rwanda.”83 The 
rounding up and pursuit of refugees added in an equally dangerous measure 
to the atmosphere of structural and direct violence on the ground. To cast 
this process as purely humanitarian would be misleading at best. 
The sensitisation of returning refugees by convincing them to come 
back to Rwanda and reintegrate into society was also crucial. Many, like 
Matthias, attested to this element of the process, “Those that were captured 
                                            
80 Patience, 2017; Janvier, 2017.   
81 Martin, interview in Goma, November 2017.   
82 Pierre, 2017; Rugira, first interview, 2017.  
83 Patience, 2017.   
 241 
were taken back to Rwanda to be reformed, and reintegrated back into 
society. Reform them and reintegrate them.”84 Such comments provide a 
veneer of legitimacy to the actions of the AFDL/RPA. Again, Banyamulenge 
soldiers were cast as operating within international norms bound processes, 
whilst excesses were happening around them. Even if their encountering of 
the genocidaire was limited to handing refugees over to the RPA, such acts 
increasingly resulted in refugees being erased and not returned home. 
“Bullets did not select”85 
The above descriptions of the context of war reveal an environment where 
the killing of civilians was an unavoidable dynamic of the campaign. Whilst 
unwilling or unable to recount interactions with refugees in significant detail, 
a consistent narrative theme from 1996 to 1997, was the notion that within 
warfare their bullets did not choose their targets. Packaged within this 
generalised disclaimer, was the conundrum of how persons were 
differentiated as these soldiers moved in and out of the camps and 
encountered the genocidaire. Many presented this as a simple practical 
challenge. Alphonse stated that despite being able to triangulate sources and 
information about locations of refugees and armed actors, when both groups 
began to flee this task became very difficult.86 
 Proximity to ex-FAR/Interahamwe was often cited as a reason for 
civilian deaths. Although differentiation was difficult, there was a clear 
element of guilt by association for being found in the camps. Balthazar 
acknowledged that he felt detached from the challenge of separation, “When 
you are a private in the army, a young soldier, it is quite hard to differentiate 
who is who, but all of them were soldiers and we called them Interahamwe it 
was a just name they were given during liberation in Rwanda, but in fact all 
of them were soldiers.”87 As noted above by Gatete (“ones who were 
soldiers, the ones who resisted, that refused to go back”), there was an 
emergent logic, supported by a charged attribution. This view is documented 
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in the Mapping Report, and other field investigations. One of Roberto 
Garretón’s reports on the situation in March 1997, sought to confirm this 
attribution, “Moreover, the rebels [AFDL] view the refugees as enemies, on 
the assumption that they are all armed, and this makes it undesirable, or at 
least unsafe, to provide assistance. Even aid is interpreted as support for the 
extremist refugees.”88 MSF also captured this perspective in a remark from 
an unnamed AFDL/RPA commander around March to April 1997, “all ex-
FAR and Interahamwe had to be eliminated - it is unfortunate if they are 
using women and children as a shield. . . . All those in the forest are 
considered to be the enemy.”89 MSF further note a comment from the 
Rwandan UN ambassador that by February 1997 there were no more 
refugees, about only 40,000 Interahamwe still in Zaïre.90 Such logic was 
simultaneously used to limit access to NGOs and scrutiny of AFDL/RPA held 
areas. It reinforced the dire conditions of life that resulted in the deaths of 
camp inhabitants.  
After Mugunga and the mass returns of refugees, the longer 
Rwandans remained in the camps or with the armed elements inside them, 
the greater their perceived complicity. Alphonse reinforced this problem and 
how it could not be resolved, “The truly original [refugees] some of them 
reported themselves back to Rwanda. Some have mining companies here. 
They got married to people here. They look alike. . . . You cannot identify 
them. Some threw away their military uniforms and put on normal attire. They 
are now very rich people here. When we were attacking, it was a war. We 
didn’t have time to distinguish people. They had arms. How could we do 
that?”91 The ability to blend with local populations was again part of the 
perceived likelihood of conspiracy described in the previous chapter. If ex-
FAR/Interahamwe were able to shed uniform and arms, which participants 
cited as key distinguishing features, then what remained were the 
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accumulated ascriptions of who appeared Hutu in the heat of battle.92 
Patience also noted the association and thereby blanketing of complicity, 
“You know when there is a war, many died or happened to die during the 
war, even Interahamwe. . . . If you look at the history of Interahamwe, they 
were not soldiers, they were just civilians. It was them who grouped 
themselves and start killing others - these militias.”93 The Interahamwe were 
defined by their perceived past actions, again layered by these soldiers’ 
exposure to genocide in Rwanda.94 The status of militia, soldier, or civilian 
was less relevant than the connections made within the narratives of 
insecurity.  
 Long-time Congolese human rights investigator Guillaume Ngefa 
described how the RPF had a single agenda for the AFDL mission. In an 
interview with Howard French he stated, “You can call it a war, if you like, 
because there is some combat, and yet anyone who follows the itinerary of 
the rebels knows that this is a campaign to exterminate the Hutu refugees. 
The Tutsi thesis is that all of these people are Interahamwe, and now, those 
who suffered a genocide are committing one in their turn.”95 Ngefa invokes 
the spectre of the double genocide, as assessed in chapter six. Despite the 
short-handedness of this comment, he attempts to convey the nature of the 
identity-difference relation towards the refugees. They were considered 
Interahamwe for two reasons: the lived experience of exposure to genocide 
of AFDL/RPA; and, where and when the refugees were found. This 
encounter, viewed inside the vortex, came at a crucial layering of narratives 
of insecurity and destructive crisis for Banyamulenge participants.  
 In some respects, the bullets of these liberators became the 
embodiment of selective, and eventually, indiscriminate killing in the camps. 
In this interpretation of weapons, agency is distanced from the actor. Amani 
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observed, “When the RPF was facing the genocidaire, the bullets did not 
select.”96 After successive encounters and undoubtedly the capture and 
return of some civilians, those remaining tied themselves to the fate of the 
genocidaire, “Because they were mixed, the Interahamwe in the camps, the 
bullets, they do not choose. So, after the group came, we captured and killed 
some of the people there, and they surrendered. . . . They started to go, the 
Interahamwe and the civilians.” Ikiyaga also reproduced this logic, “it’s only 
those people that were leaving with the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR when 
the soldiers are shooting, and a bullet could not select who it hits. So, in that 
case, there were a lot killed.”97 Gustav echoed this further when asked 
directly about accounts such as the Mapping Report, “If I said that they [the 
refugees] were not killed, that would be just hypocritical. There were 
thousands of Rwandese refugees that were there so we can’t say all of them 
went back; neither can we say that they did assimilate themselves in 
neighbouring countries. But we can definitely say that there were some that 
were killed, and others that went to different places.”98 Although a 
generalisation, this response further confirms the potential for refugees to 
have blended or returned, but clearly recognises the fate of many as it is 
documented in such reports.  
 The practice of entering larger camps, like Mugunga, with the spraying 
of light weapons fire is broadly documented. This will be discussed below in 
the separate routes of the campaign. What is significant here is the 
narrativised use of indiscriminate bullets as a misdirection of agency: a result 
of the frontline combat, and violent place of the camps, responsibility for 
these deaths was detached by the bullet that did not select. According to 
Kalyvas, the problem of indiscriminate fire in this type of environment is 
common in a variety of civil war cases.99  He further goes on to frame the 
“identification problem” in irregular warfare. This classification increasingly 
captured the campaign after the closure of the initial camps and the early 
dispersal of ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces. While escalating violence in hostile 
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places can help develop an understanding of high death tolls, it is not a 
singular explanation.100  
As noted above, the closer to perceived vulnerability, the easier it 
became for soldiers to use indiscriminate violence. Again, Browning’s work 
serves as an appropriate example of the alienation felt by soldiers in a 
foreign space, and then ordered to engage in violence in the specific place of 
Orthodox Jewish villages, then in hunting down Jews who had escaped from 
camps. This echoes Kalyvas’ earlier comment, noted in chapter seven, about 
the extreme action taken by actors in extreme environments. The camps 
were viewed by the RPA/AFDL as violent places where the genocidaire was 
located. Indiscriminate fire occurred in this scenario, because of the place 
and its occupants. 
Eliminating Ideology 
Because of the networks already situating many RPA/AFDL soldiers, 
association with “bad ideology” often underpinned the identification of the 
genocidaire.101 Mitton discusses how socialisation into violence that is 
personalised to past feelings of shame and inadequacy leads to an 
identification of a civilian as an Other. This process makes the targeting of 
civilians for extreme violence increasingly likely, reinforcing the identity-
difference relation.102 The bodies of Banyamulenge had already been 
ascribed as Tutsi, and therefore targeted for genocidal violence.103 From a 
subaltern perspective, such physical ascriptions could be inverted back to 
those in turn ascribed as holders of bad ideology. As discussed in the 
previous chapter the early and crucial phase of RPF training in the early to 
mid-1990s was the ideological training. What made this so potent were the 
visceral and graphic connections the RPF was able to make through the 
clearing of bodies, and combat against or detention of the genocidaire. In a 
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Manichean sense, there was good ideology that led to national liberation and 
freedom from colonial oppression and bad ideology that replicated colonial 
labels and genocide against the Tutsi.104 The latter label was used by 
participants and resonated with RPF public and metanarratives of 
perpetration and genocide. 
 Participants expressed this label as a charged attribution of actors in 
the camps: carriers of bad ideology in violent places. Matthias reflected on 
this ascription with layering of prior experience and current narratives of 
insecurity, “The Hutu that were in Rwanda and then came to Congo already 
had in mind that they have to kill all of the Tutsis. It was there in their mind. 
The Banyamulenge had one hundred percent of a reason to defend 
themselves. . . . They [the Hutu] wanted to destroy their enemies in 
Congo.”105 Matthias went on to further the logic of this existential threat, “Bad 
ideology must be eliminated; immediate action should be taken to eradicate 
it, and eradicate hate from the Congolese population.”106 Such a commission 
to remove this kind of ideology was widely supported, and fostered by the 
Rwandan public and metanarratives. 
 For some, such bad ideology was connected to the hatred with which 
the Banyamulenge felt they were identified as Tutsi. Some, Gustav and 
Matthias in particular, spoke of how this bad ideology had contaminated the 
population.107 Patience’s examination of bad ideology demonstrates these 
connections, “The Hutus that already have fled here, and they knew that they 
had run away after the genocide in Rwanda. Although it was not all of them 
that did it, all of them had a bad ideology to hate Tutsis. Because of their 
ideologies, they continued to lie to other people, other citizens, to run away 
from the soldiers because they were told that those that have killed their 
people will come back and kill them too.”108 Regardless of actual 
perpetration, those who had fled marked themselves with a measure of 
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culpability, carriers of a system of thought that was inherently genocidal. The 
impact of the presence of this ideology spread and affected Congolese 
citizens now exposed. 
This description of what the Rwandans’ brought with them after their 
arrival in mid-1994 is demonstrated in the previous chapter. Some labelled 
this as sensitisation, others as intoxication.109 Mugenzi reemphasised the 
scale of this threat, and the role of bad ideology in its reach. Speaking about 
the period around Lwabanji’s removal order, he claimed, “They had prepared 
troops to invade our villages and they started approaching some people by 
telling them bad ideology so that they kill us. So it was certain that if nothing 
was done, we could have been exterminated.”110 The logical response to 
such an insipid threat was to remove the ideology. The ascription of the 
refugees, ex-FAR/Interahamwe, and those Congolese seen as their allies, 
meant that ideology became embodied in these actors.  
 There are two salient points that arise out of this type of 
characterisation, or charged attribution. First, as indicated throughout the 
soldier’s journey, a networked framing of the genocidaire arose out of the 
soldiers’ own identity formation in the vortex. The identity-difference relation 
provided a social space and category which embodied the most recent 
pending genocidal threat following the arrival of the exodus and continuing 
up to the 1996 invasion. Networked understandings of responsibility for prior 
massacres framed the dynamics of violence in the moment. Whether or not 
presumed guilty or responsible parties, refugees were dealt with in a lethally 
reciprocal manner.111 Agamben’s state of exception points to this utilisation 
of intermediate space. AFDL/RPA soldiers performatively acted from their 
situatedness in this postcolonial zone, but in doing so conceived of camp 
inhabitants in their own intermediate space to the extreme point of 
obliterating many of them. 
Second, the narratives of participants presented in this section on 
eliminating ideology and the earlier one on the indiscriminate nature of 
bullets, revisits the dichotomy of AFDL/RPA violence. On the one hand, the 
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training mandated that murdering civilians was prohibited, or in McDowell’s 
words, “we don't kill innocent people”. On the other, carriers of bad ideology 
had to be removed. At first, this seemed straightforward enough, when 
thousands willingly returned to Rwanda or were terrorised into so doing. The 
magnitude of the wave of returnees, up to and including Mugunga, provided 
grounding for an increasing logic of guilt. Those who fled into Zaire embodied 
bad ideology, and were perceived as exponentially less innocent as the 
campaign progressed. AFDL/RPA soldiers, including veteran and recent 
Banyamulenge recruits were situated within the violent place of the camps, 
and engaged in Kalyvas’ indiscriminate violence and actor vulnerability on 
the frontlines. As such, they increasingly turned from indiscriminate to 
selective violence when encountering the genocidaire. Participants’ 
explanations as to what happened to refugees are indeed varied. Although 
most ventured on the southern axis, avoiding the more well-known and 
reported killings from Kisangani to Mbandaka, none accounted specifically or 
personally for the violence place upon the 100,000 refugees on their route 
toward Shabunda and Kindu.  
A Note on Starvation and Disease 
Some participants did explain the deaths of refugees through the lack or 
absence of resources. As will be shown with the more detailed description of 
the campaign, this was indeed a result of the chronic lack of relief for 
refugees, but also as a conscious dynamic of cordoning and keeping aid 
agencies out of areas where camp clearing operations were being pursued. 
From very early on, these sites were marked by death because of diarrheal 
diseases, like cholera and dysentery.  
 In the camps around Goma within the first months of the arrival of the 
exodus, mortality rates during July and August 1994 shot up to somewhere 
between 28 to 45 percent per 10,000 daily. This yielded a minimum body 
count of 48,374.112 Mortality rates improved following this period; however, 
disease continued to mark the refugee experience, especially for those on 
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the run after the forced closure of Mugunga.113 A survey of surviving 
refugees in Ndjoundou, offers stark data about those who had survived. Of 
the sample of 530, there was a 2:6 male to female ratio, with a median age 
of 24 years old. Of those reporting family members that were originally with 
them in a Kivu province camp, “19.7 percent were reported killed, 59.6 
percent had gone missing during the flight, and 17.5 percent reached 
Ndjoundou between May and June, 1997.”114 Overall mortality calculated 
from this period of flight reached its highest rates in November 1996 (36.6 
percent), and May 1997 60.7 percent (both per 10,000 daily).115 Whilst this 
brief note on disease and ill health related deaths is not exhaustive, what can 
be extrapolated here is instructive. Although based on incomplete and often 
minimal numbers, both in Goma and Ndjoundou, these reports indicate 
higher mortality rates because of increasingly hostile conditions. The further 
across the Congo refugees ventured the more likely their deaths became. 
These deaths increasingly resulted from an environment where execution 
and disease were frequent occurrences. In this horrific period from 1996 to 
1997, camps in and around Kisangani also saw similar suffering. Due to 
exceptionally poor health conditions, a constant scattering of refugees, and 
the blockade of humanitarian assistance, the mortality rate reached 25 
deaths a day per 10,000 refugees, increasing in one case to 89.5.116 
The Rwandan government’s response to claims of genocide contrasts 
with the body of information attesting to the obliteration of refugees. These 
arguments weigh in favour of “collateral damage” or a more passive version 
of “starvation and disease” as the most likely causes of death.117 This view 
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does not of course take into account the sociological perspectives favoured 
in this research, or a close examination of the lethal impact of blocking or 
preventing aid from reaching the camps. Fein’s concept of genocide by 
attrition is helpful here in bridging the legal and sociological perspectives on 
this matter. Using UNCG’s article two (c) focus on creating conditions of life 
that bring about destruction of the group, Fein identifies that “hunger and 
diseases attributable to starvation and poor living conditions” result in the 
same “genocidal outcomes” as direct killing.118 Samuel Totten in his prolific 
work on the Sudan has focused on a case study of genocide by attrition in 
the so-called Nuba peace camps. Removed from their mountain homes, 
Nuba groups were resettled into these camps where they were denied 
access to food legally, ideologically classified as outside of the protection of 
the state, and bombed by government planes as security threats.119 
Classifying such methods of population control and eradication as indirect or 
collateral damage only obfuscates what Card earlier described as reasonably 
foreseeable consequences.120 Whilst not a comprehensive review of this 
potentially expansive and under-researched area of this case study, this is 
another distinct element of the genocidal process at work because of the 
conditions set and perpetuated by the AFDL/RPA.  
* * * 
The remaining sections of this chapter reconstruct the movements of the 
AFDL/RPA and attacks on camps using participants’ accounts, UN, NGO 
and other international reporting.121 It should be noted that whilst a level of 
detail is reflected in the following narrative, it is not a comprehensive account 
of all recorded acts of violence or massacres committed by the AFDL/RPA. 
The next two sections cover respectively the southern front from the border 
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at Kamanyola to Kindu, in Maniema (see Figure 7), and the northern front 
from Goma to Mbandaka (see Figure 8 and 9). A overlapping of participant 
views and additional accounts of camp attacks demarcate these groupings. 
Generally, participants conceived that these attacks only took place in the 
north.  
 
Figure 6: The Flight of Refugees (1996-1997), UNHCR, 79. 
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South Kivu: From Kamanyola to Kindu 
 
Figure 7: Attacks on refugees and camps from the southern border to Kindu, 
from mid-1996 to April 1997, Google Maps, 2018, accessed on 28 
September 2018, from 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?safe=active&mid=14HpL1SZ1yZ480Ijv
EdUUn6KJL_Y&ll=-3.5964668707561858%. 
After assembling at the border near Bugarama, at the southwest tip of 
Rwanda, around 20 October 1996, Banyamulenge units made their way 
across the Ruzizi River. Rukema recalled the night of the crossing, “The river 
is somewhat wide and it’s deep. So, when crossing we were maybe 1,000 or 
2,000, it took us the whole night and the day. After crossing, we reached the 
place called Wegera. We started fighting on the same day. We fought the 
whole day. Maybe around 2 am in the night we stopped and the next 
morning we started fighting again, but then we divided [our battalion].”122 
Jean recalled the immediate firefight with the FAZ that occurred when 
crossing the Ruzizi River, “They did not resist because they were fearful. 
They had a fear and just ran away. They fled from us. We shot them as they 
ran from us. They could not support themselves.”123 Reportedly, the forces 
that crossed here divided north towards Bukavu, and then south towards 
Uvira; the latter was captured by 24 October. Within days, they would reach 
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as far south as Kalemie. The AFDL/RPA would then arc south-west towards 
Lubumbashi, capturing this city on 9 April 1997.124   
The AFDL/RPA started, as they would end up proceeding, with little 
resistance, but facing the dilemmas of encountering the genocidaire in the 
violent places of the refugee camps. For many including Patience, 
Kamanyola had been the site of escape from South Kivu to join the RPF. He 
was 19 years old when he left family and uncertainty in Haut Plateau. Since 
that point, he had re-identified himself as an inkotanyi, and had witnessed 
the violence of genocide. All of which had been framed by his and RPF 
narratives of insecurity.125  
 As described by Jean, those crossing at Kamanyola were immediately 
confronted with the camp in town. Only a month earlier, both a 
Banyamulenge community leader, and more than a dozen people gathered 
at the border to flee towards Rwanda had been executed by FAZ troops.126 
On 20 October, AFDL/RPA soldiers entered the camp and shot at the 
inhabitants. The bodies were then dumped into the site latrines.127 
AFDL/RPA checkpoints allowed for consolidated control over movement in 
the area. In the process of doing so, refugees were stopped with Swahili 
greetings and those that replied with a Rwandan accent were shot on the 
roadside. Local inhabitants were then pressed into burying the bodies. These 
refugees were fleeing the dismantled Kamanyola camp towards Bukavu. In 
all 648 refugees were killed in these two attacks.128  
 Targeted violence continued as these units spread south. In the 
village and nearby camp of Lubarika, on 21 October, thirty refugees were 
burned alive in a locked house, and the general camp inhabitants were 
prevented from fleeing. These attacks both occurred following the defeat and 
flight of the FAZ soldiers in the village.129 A few kilometres further south on 
the N5 road, the camps around Kanganiro were shelled, followed by soldiers 
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on foot shooting at refugees.130 Returning to Rukema’s narrative, presumably 
after attacks on the camps in Kanganiro, the soldiers arrived at Wegera. 
After defeating the FAZ, 51 local residents accused of helping refugees were 
killed by AFDL/RPA troops.131 On 21 and 22 October, the next major camp 
was attacked at Luberizi. One witness described how the camp was 
cordoned off during the night, with the refugees awaking to soldiers’ gunfire 
around 7 am.132 Again, after mortar fire soldiers entered, indiscriminately 
killing at least 60 refugees. At this point camps like Luberizi had received 
refugees fleeing from earlier attacks. Those who had survived at Luberizi and 
Wegera, who were caught around 28 October were gathered by AFDL/RPA 
soldiers on the pretext of repatriation to Rwanda. They were then taken to 
the ravine at Rushima and shot.133 In most of these instances throughout 
October between Kamanyola and Uvira, local residents dug mass graves. 
Rukema reports that in Luberizi his unit met with others who had crossed 
from Chibitoke, adding to troop numbers, thereby making such operations 
possible. 134 Attacks demonstrated immediate turns toward more targeted 
violence after entering a camp. At the camp in Kibogoye, refugees were 
separated by sex, and the men were taken back to a Luberizi church where 
they were shot or stabbed with bayonets. Again, refugees were rounded up 
on the pretence of repatriation.135   
  Troops then crossed the border at Cyangugu into Bukavu, and further 
south from Kamanyola, others crossed from Cibitoke, Burundi as early as 
September.136 Here participants offer insight into the command structure 
within the ranks of the AFDL, and the extent of the RPA involvement. Most 
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133 UNHCR, 84.   
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135 UNHCR, 84.   
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insurgency. The lakeside Bivara camp was attacked by supposed RPF mortars, dozens 
were killed, and the camp was eventually deserted, Ndacyayisenga, 33-36.  
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claim to have been under the leadership of RPA Lieutenant Colonel Eric 
Murokore, at the time of crossing from Chibitoke.137 Janvier, Rukema and 
Patience all recall being under Murokore at one point or another.138 
According to the Spanish indictment, RPA Lieutenant Colonel John Butera 
also accompanied him at this time, under the wider leadership of RPA 
Colonel Caesar Kayizari as part of the RPA 157th Mobile Battalion.139 Also 
accompanying this battalion was DMI Captain Joaquim Habimana, 
overseeing a team of 11 operatives, receiving orders from Karake Karenzi 
and Kayumba Nyamwasa.140 Alphonse also notes the presence of RPA 
General Kayonga, leading another group of 3,000 AFDL soldiers, again, 
mostly Banyamulenge.141  
RPA Lieutenant Colonel Alexis Kagame, who reported to Kabarebe, 
led the group crossing via Cyangugu. Under Alexis Kagame’s command was 
the RPA 101st Battalion. They then joined the southwest progression towards 
the key strategic objectives of Lubumbashi and eventually Kinshasa.142 
Janvier acknowledged that this group also contained a further 1,000 to 2,000 
RPA trained Banyamulenge soldiers.143 The group proceeded into Bukavu 
after a day of shelling from Cyangugu around 28 October. A Rwandan officer 
on the ground, interviewed by an Associated Press (AP) reporter stated, “We 
were forced to retaliate, we retaliated by two means - one by shelling them 
using mortars and anti-aircraft and when they resisted we sent a force to 
destabilise them and push them far from where they could really affect us 
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and (far from) where they could continue harassing our population”.144 Many 
of the refugee camps along the border were fortified and under the command 
of ex-FAR General Gratien Kabiligi. Some fortifications had included their 
own heavy weapons installations. Yet, the ex-FAR were defeated within days 
of the rebellion entering Bukavu.145  
 Many participants then recalled the joining of Murokore and Alexis 
Kagame’s forces in Uvira around the time the city fell on 24 October.146 
Following the slow leak of escaping refugees, FAZ, ex-FAR/Interahamwe, 
the AFDL/RPA quickly took the city with the same indiscriminate combination 
of mortar and small arms fire. Residents of the city described the littering of 
corpses on the streets and on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Thousands 
more took to the road out of Uvira, fleeing the liberator’s violence towards 
Tanzania and Zambia.147 Due to the advance presence of many 
Banyamulenge units of the AFDL/RPA, a catchment area was set up 
between Uvira at least 60 km south to Mboko. Here AFDL/RPA screening 
roadblocks turned around escaping Uvira residents and refugees. Many were 
shot as they attempted to board boats bound for Tanzania, or as they tried to 
swim to shore after one of the boats had sunk.148 In addition to those that 
had arrived in Tanzania, and the 24,000 who were repatriated back to 
Rwanda by late 1996, many fled north towards Goma or Kisangani, or 
northwest towards the town of Shabunda.149 It should be stressed that many 
of the repatriations occurred under this threat of violence.  
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 The roadblock system established from south of Uvira, northward to 
Bukavu, and then west to Shabunda not only allowed for the screening of 
refugees, but also for the control and manipulation of NGOs and 
humanitarian works in the area.150 The AFDL ensured that workers in 
controlled areas of South Kivu had a facilitator accompanying them to glean 
information about camp locations and further control the movements of such 
workers.151 Attacks continued into November. On the N2 road heading 
southwest out of Bukavu in both directions between late October and 
January, AFDL/RPA soldiers killed hundreds of refugees. Temporary camp 
accommodation was destroyed and those not fast enough to evade the 
soldiers were shot or stabbed.152 Further into the Kahuzi Biega National 
Park, the Chimunga camp was attacked, where AFDL/RPA soldiers killed 
anywhere from 500 to 800 inhabitants around 18 November.153 Refugees 
were gathered in the camp on the pretence of registration, receiving aid, and 
safe repatriation. Mass graves were later found in this area where local 
residents had been enlisted in the disposal of bodies. An eyewitness 
reported that after being assembled, the refugees were fired upon with 
machine guns and grenade launchers.154 
  According to Kisangani’s assessment of UNHCR figures, 
approximately 52,500 refugees made it to Shabunda around December.155 
From this point and up to the spring of 1997, thousands were driven 
northwest into Maniema and Oriental provinces. After the 5 February attack 
on the town, 28,000 were accounted for in Kalima (120 km west of 
Shabunda), leaving just under half of the December figure missing.156 Like 
other, large camps on main arterial roads, Shabunda had accumulated its 
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thousands of temporary residents from attacks on others camps in the 
preceding weeks and months.157 MSF in the area between Wangulu and 
Shabunda reported several mass graves, some dug by local residents, other 
still guarded by AFDL personnel, in early 1997. MSF also documented where 
remains had been cleared from the main roads, often leaving refugee 
belongings and roadside mass graves.158 Other reports further confirm 
attacks on hundreds in the area surrounding Shabunda in February, 
including the localities of Kigulube, Mwpe, and Katchungu.159  
 One well-documented incident near Shabunda, leaving the above-
described remains was that at the Ulindi Bridge. Similar to the bridge over 
the Ruzizi River at Cyangugu/Bukavu, it is composed of a metal frame, 
planked with one hundred metres of criss-crossing, weathered wooden slats. 
The bridge was in such a state of disrepair that it swayed as people 
crossed.160 The broad Ulindi River moves fast underneath, covering a rocky 
bed. On the day Shabunda fell, 5 February, AFDL/RPA soldiers chased 
refugees west from their camps to this bridge on the other side of Shabunda. 
The FAZ soldiers that were present forced their way onto a departing Red 
Cross plane, threatening the workers on-board.161 Those able to run made it 
to the bridge around 10 am, but were followed by AFDL/RPA soldiers. Some 
were shot at this point before the troops returned to destroy the camps, 
limiting the options for the inhabitants and killing some of those left behind.162 
Those that died either by drowning in the river from jumping, being thrown 
from the bridge, or shot, were buried by local residents pressed into service 
by the AFDL/RPA.163 In all, 500 refugees died at the Ulindi Bridge that day, 
including at least 200 refugee children who had fled with them.164 Soldiers 
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then led captured survivors back towards the camp, where they were 
executed the following day.165  
 Alphonse, who was DMI trained in the interim between 1994 and 
1996, recalls being present in both Shabunda and Kindu. He would not give 
any further information about when he was there and what he did.166 
Considering the integral involvement of the DMI in the AFDL, it was possible 
that Alphonse was aware of or present at attacks in the area of Kalima from 
February to March, which also involved DMI Captain Habimana and his crew 
of 11 operatives.167 According to McDowell, soldiers were specifically trained 
for these operations, and were involved with the DMI and Network 
Commando. If soldiers were present in the camps, they were sent with “one 
order: make sure they [the refugees] enter Rwanda, if not you kill them”.168 
Limited attacks on refugees were reported around Kindu in March, but not at 
the scale from Bukavu to Shabunda.169 Others with specialised training 
recalled being flown between cities in the south, from Lubumbashi and Mbuji 
Mayi in April, and then onto Kinshasa in July.170 Although not reflected in 
participant narratives, the route followed by Banyamulenge soldiers was not 
as free from abuses as they tried to convince me it was. Following the 
emptying of camps around Shabunda, inhabitants then fled further northward 
towards Kasese, Maniema (see Figure 6). 
 Of the thousands heading towards Kisangani, most were aware of its 
transport links and increased possibility of aid or rescue. On 17 April, 
AFDL/RPA units landed in Kisangani and headed south towards Kasese, in 
Maniema province, adding pressure for refugees to turn back from the main 
city.171 The UN proposed airlift for inhabitants at Kasese was opposed by the 
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AFDL, demanding the refugees be repatriated on foot.172 At this point, the 
two ad-hoc camps had swelled to holding 50,000 inhabitants; mortality rates 
were soaring to more than a hundred a day because of disease and 
exhaustion.173 As the AFDL/RPA arrived on 20 April, they banned all aid 
agencies from the area and attempted to entice out any armed elements with 
offers to join the ranks of the rebellion.174 Local residents, at the 
encouragement of the AFDL/RPA, attacked and looted the camp in an 
attempt to push the inhabitants back further from Kisangani.175 On the 
morning of 22 April, the soldiers awoke inhabitants, including the thousands 
unable to move due to extreme ill-health, and forced them onto the road 
again at gunpoint. Most sources indicated that 200 were shot at this 
juncture.176 According to Niwese’s account, those able to march onwards 
were stopped after several hours of walking, and asked to prepare food. 
Shortly thereafter, the soldiers again opened fire on the amassed 
refugees.177 Local villagers were then pressed into service using shovels and 
bulldozers to bury the bodies around the village of Kasese and its camps.178 
The southern campaign, seeing most participants from 1996 border 
crossings to Lubumbashi and Kinshasa, involved a concentration of killings 
in South Kivu, into Maniema. Interviews and documented movements of the 
AFDL/RPA indicate a clear command structure of RPA officers and 
Banyamulenge soldiers, with varying experience and specialisms, some 
enlisting as early as 1991, or as late as 1996. It is likely those such as 
Janvier, Alphonse, and Lieutenant Nicolas Kibinda, and others who received 
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commando training, blurred the lines between Rwandan officers and 
Banyamulenge as self-proclaimed privates. A pattern of violence in 
approaching camps and once inside them also emerges on this front. 
Mortars were used to scatter and terrorise the camps, dwellings were 
destroyed, and indiscriminate fire was used upon entry. Selective violence 
was then used increasingly as AFLD/RPA moved the front further forward. 
Whilst repatriation was certainly an aim, it was forced at gunpoint, with both 
casualties and executions. Yet, the less willing refugees were to return, and 
the more they fled in the opposite direction of Kagame’s Rwanda, the more 
their fates were sealed: death in the camps or the roads between them. 
 Disease and starvation were less significant on this front, as many 
refugees up to the end of 1996 had previously had access to some supplies, 
especially when fleeing medium-term residences in the border area of South 
Kivu. When the refugees reached Shabunda and locations in Maniema this 
factor became more relevant. What is clear is that from the early attacks on 
places like Kamanyola and Wegera, these camps were increasingly 
approached as places of violence, viewed through threats and vulnerability of 
AFLD/RPA experience over the previous several years. Bullets did indeed go 
before the soldiers, yet it is difficult to accept indiscriminate fire as un-
purposeful, it was at the very least being used to force repatriation. Soldiers’ 
performativity in this southern campaign indicates a range of tactics aimed at 
removing bad ideology as it was embodied in ex-FAR, Interahamwe and the 
refugees. These ascribed genocidaires were increasingly pushed to the limits 
of survivability and intermediacy, or into their own intermediate space. Yet, it 
was purposeful as both an expression of frontline and existential vulnerability 
as well as a part of the overall strategic priority of removing the genocidaire. 
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North Kivu: From Goma to Mbandaka 
 
Figure 8: Attacks on refugees and camps from the Goma area to Lubutu, 
from early 1996 to March 1997, Google Maps, 2018, accessed on 28 
September 2018, from 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?safe=active&mid=14HpL1SZ1yZ480Ijv
EdUUn6KJL_Y&ll=-3.5964668707561858%2C2. 
Recalling the invasion of Goma in October 1996, Bugera reminisced on the 
united front of the AFDL, “We went through Gisenyi to enter the city of 
Goma. I remember it was night-time, about 10 pm. We were with the 
Rwandan officers. We were with James Kabarebe. I remember we were in 
line like soldiers. It was raining. They were young soldiers who were ahead 
of us, and then behind we had a Rwandan soldier alongside a Congolese 
politician . . . in line.”179 On 31 October, the AFDL/RPA made this triumphant 
march across the urbanised border area of Gisenyi/Goma.180 The southern 
front was already well underway, with many initial border camps having 
already been destroyed and emptied. Prior to the northern invasion, some 
clandestine military activity had taken place in the latter part of the summer. 
Reportedly, 200 ADP troops (one of the pre-existing armed constituents of 
the AFDL mentioned in chapter five), had infiltrated areas in North Kivu.181 
Significant here were the preliminary attacks on refugee camps around 
Goma. The entrance into Goma demonstrated the juxtaposition of the AFDL. 
Officially it was a well-publicised popular front against the corruption 
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embodied by Mobutu and armed elements among the camp inhabitants. 
Unofficially, it was the machine poised to violently dismantle camps and 
obliterate genocidaire occupants. 
North of Goma, into the Rutshuru area, bookended by the Virunga 
National Park’s southern portion and Lake Edward, attacks on camps and 
alleged areas of anti-Tutsi violence resulted in mass graves that would later 
be discovered (as mentioned earlier in this chapter). It is possible that the 
earliest of these incursions into Zaïre came via the Ugandan border. In 
Bungana, in early June 1996 RPA and Ugandan soldiers, supported by local 
Tutsi Banyarwanda, killed between 28 to 36 Hutu Banyarwanda.182 Attacks 
such as these on the Hutu population accompanied attacks on camps and 
those Zaïrian citizens considered to be aiding the genocidaire.183 In step with 
removing themselves from massacres of refugees, participants also 
characterised their North Kivu compatriots as more willing to kill refugees, 
making associations with well-known characterisations of both Nkunda and 
Ntaganda (as discussed in the previous chapter).184 
The camps in Kibumba and Katale were foremost in this northern area 
of Rutshuru. Around 25 October, the RPA’s 7th Battalion bombarded both 
the localities of Kibumba and Bihumba with artillery stationed at the border. 
These 200,000 camp inhabitants soon fled south despite additional FAZ 
support being flown in from Lubumbashi.185 It is likely that between late 
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October and January, thousands were killed by bombardments, gunfire, or 
agafani.186 Around this same date, the camp in Katale received similar 
treatment. Mass graves found in the area of the camp and where bodies 
were dumped in the latrines on the site, demonstrating that inhabitants were 
executed with a bullet to the head.187 
Screening stations were then established by the AFDL/RPA, following 
these infiltrations. These spread across the Rutshuru and Masisi areas, 
controlling and manipulating humanitarian and NGO access to the areas at 
various times from October 1996 into April 1997.188 The attacks on Kibumba, 
Katale, and later in Sake, all occurring within this growing network of 
AFDL/RPA control drew fleeing refugees into Mugunga.189 As already noted, 
it was from this point on that the refugee population, comprising those fleeing 
from both North and South Kivu camps, split into two groups: those returning 
in large numbers, and those scattering west. The remainder of this section 
follows those who fled westward seeking refuge in the forest and eventually 
across Zaïre’s western border. 
From the southern tip of North Kivu northwards, a triangular area 
cornered on the east by Masisi and on the west by Waliakle forms the next 
zone of attacks from November into December.190 Following this series of 
events refugees fled again northwest toward Lubutu and the Tingi-Tingi 
camp (see Figure 6). The violence in this area is largely characterised as 
being carried out with a variety of cold weapons, involving extremely bloody 
encounters for both refugee and AFDL/RPA soldiers.191 The events in 
Hombo around 9 December demonstrate this pattern.  
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Prior to December, the Hombo camp had been the recipient of 
250,000 refugees reporting in from Bukavu. Due to their more than 80 
kilometre march, trapped inside the web of AFDL/RPA humanitarian 
blockades, many arrived ridden with starvation and disease. During this initial 
arrival period, 480 to 960 died each day.192 The camp was then attacked 
around 9 December. Several hundred people, including women and children, 
were shot escaping via a bridge crossing the Lowa River.193 The AFDL/RPA 
then fanned out into the area to find any additional refugees who had 
avoided these initial attacks. One group was found and locked into a building 
and burned alive. Another group, after being assembled on the pretence of 
repatriation to Rwanda, was raped and then executed.194 Instances of sexual 
violence were not a common feature of the attacks on refugees; however, 
they did occur.195 Amnesty International reported that both FAZ and 
AFDL/RPA soldiers in this period engaged in acts of sexual violence, 
including rape and beatings. It is noted generally that FAZ acts of sexual 
violence were part of a use of force, in the same way as looting was an 
attempt to survive and maintain power locally.196 The AFDL/RPA deployed 
sexual violence in the context of camp clearing and their encounters with the 
genocidaire.197 Presumably, this was with mixed motivation, but chiefly the 
purpose was to terrorise and cow the population into submission and erase 
their social power. Also within a few kilometres of Hombo, another group 
cornered by the AFDL/RPA, was bludgeoned to death with hammers and 
thrown into the Lowa River. Again, this group was gathered on the premise 
of repatriation.198  
AFDL/RPA forces arriving by plane to Kisangani, as described above 
prior to the Kasese attack in April counteracted pressure for refugees to 
move westwards. By December, Tingi-Tingi had been recognised as a 
growing camp and combined with nearby Amisi camp, there were 170,000 
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inhabitants.199 According to MSF, inhabitants in January were dying at a rate 
of 120 a day due to malaria, malnutrition, and then later cholera.200 Prior to 
the AFDL/RPA shower of mortars on 2 March, 2,000 had managed to 
escape via an airlift, and dozens had already been killed in the area as 
smaller camps were picked-off by the soldiers.201 For some time before this 
date, humanitarian organisations had been blocked from the camp and this 
continued until the beginning of April.202 The bombardment commenced, 
followed by soldiers entering into Tingi-Tingi on foot, spraying bullets towards 
those not fast enough to run.203 Prior to the attacks, some had attempted to 
escape via the Lubutu Bridge, but were also confronted and scattered by 
shelling and light weapons’ fire.204 Footage from an AP report on 5 March 
shows a mostly deserted camp, burned out buildings, and a collection of light 
weapons and ammunition presumably left by fleeing ex-FAR/Interahamwe.205 
The Lubutu Red Cross buried in mass graves those who had been shot by 
indiscriminate fire and stabbed with knives.206 
Tingi-Tingi resonated with many participants, some claiming to know a 
little, others noting a family member or colleague that was present in the 
AFDL/RPA ranks at the time. Eugene, whose brother was present in the 
Banyamulenge ranks of the AFDL, notes the problem that it presented,  
It was a refugee camp that was also hosting militaries, soldiers. So 
when the RPF attacked them, they were resisting and there was 
fighting. A thousand people died there. You see in refugee camps, the 
civilians also died. Children and women also died. They fell victim, 
because ex-FAR was using civilians in their war, and it was a military 
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camp that was assisted by UNHCR. It was impossible to separate 
soldiers from civilians. So they would just go and fight them.207  
 
The challenge of differentiation is a key component. Combatants and 
civilians are distinguished, but the environment of the camps as violent 
places limits the capacity to actively recognise any distinction. This dynamic 
invited a shared fate to refugee and armed actor alike.  
Matthias goes a step further in acknowledgement, but cautiously 
points towards a lack of discipline as a factor for the massacres around 
Tingi-Tingi, “It is true that in war, these things do happen, but for me 
personally I did not really see that. . . . Nothing, nobody has ever given out a 
briefing of what really happened. And also, we captured those people and 
released the civilians but the institution [the AFDL] was terrible. The 
discipline of soldiers in RPF, of which I am aware, was difficult.”208 It is this 
observation that prefaces Matthias’ earlier comments on his own exposure to 
genocide whilst in Rwanda in 1994, where he saw a woman and child 
mutilated. The connection being how soldiers who witnessed or fought in the 
RPF during the 1994 genocide, “If you see me as Tutsi who had seen 
genocide and killing in Rwanda, this is not a joke, it's something we saw. It's 
literal; we can describe what we saw. It was horrible. Myself I still have 
images that I have failed to remove from my head of what the Interahamwe 
did. This thing has never was done in the world, not even Hitler did such a 
thing.”209 This background framed camps like Tingi-Tingi for AFDL/RPA 
soldiers carrying such narratives of insecurity.  
Similarly, Christian also acknowledged and presented Tingi-Tingi in 
the larger context of the war, “those people [refugees] ran away because 
there was a militia, Interahamwe, they were pushed by the RPF. They 
reached a certain place called Tingi-Tingi. They [the RPF] took people, put 
them in the road, and pretended to bring them back to Rwanda. Those 
people killed people in Rwanda. Tutsis in Rwanda. And then RPF took them 
and assaulted them in a massacre.”210 Those who had been compelled by 
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the genocidaires to leave became attached to them, again because of the 
association of genocide in Rwanda. Soldiers understood the threat embodied 
in the camps and responded as trained by the RPF. Civilian status was 
superfluous to the goal of removing the ex-FAR/Interahamwe presence from 
the region.  
 
Figure 9: Attacks on refugees and camps from the Kisangani area to 
Mbandaka, from March to May 1997, Google Maps, 2018, accessed on 28 
September 2018, from 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?safe=active&mid=14HpL1SZ1yZ480Ijv
EdUUn6KJL_Y&ll=-3.5964668707561858%2C2. 
After the obliteration of Tingi-Tingi, those refugees that were able to 
flee moved north; many were presented here with further death and disease, 
but some were evacuated. After the reopening of the Kisangani area to 
humanitarian organisations following the closure of Kasese in late April, the 
postponed UN airlift finally took 45,000 Rwandan refugees back home.211 At 
this time, Kabila issued an order: the AFDL would not be held responsible for 
the safety of any refugees remaining after 60 days. This threat was later 
retracted, yet, the pursuit continued across Oriental and Equateur 
provinces.212 The day after this order was given, the UN levelled accusations 
that Kabila was intentionally or unintentionally overseeing the slaughter of 
thousands of refugees. Kofi Annan described the situation as a “slow 
extermination” where refugees were being directly killed or aid was being 
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withheld through AFDL blockades.213 Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees, toured the camps around Kisangani and issued a call for 
investigation of possible massacres and other abuses of human rights.214 
Various massacres continued around Kisangani, including those at 
Biaro, Bengamisma, and Ubundu, from March through to the winter of 1997. 
These attacks involved the deaths of dozens to hundreds at any one time, 
and in many cases, the bodies were disposed of into mass graves or the 
Congo River.215 Concurrently, some groups had made their way as far west 
as Boende, hundreds of kilometres from Kisangani. It is from this location in 
March through to May that the final large-scale killings of refugees still on the 
run took place.  
Boende, a port town along the Tshuapa River, saw the gathering of 
some 2,000 refugees, many waiting for transport by boat further west.216 
From December through to April, groups of 50 to 200 had been arriving, 
containing refugees with ex-FAR/Interahamwe armed guards. The 
AFDL/RPA arrived in the area mid-April and fought off the remaining armed 
elements in the groups at Boende. Then on 22 April, after the latter had fled, 
the AFDL/RPA commenced shooting those waiting for their river transport, 
with many drowning as they tried to escape.217 One account notes that a 
group of thirty refugees were tied together and crushed under the wheel of a 
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transport vehicle.218 Killings of refugees in this area continued further north in 
the locality of Lofonda where unknown numbers were lured out of hiding with 
promises of repatriation, but instead were tightly wrapped in plastic sheeting 
and burned alive.219 Those that made it further west to the Lolo area where 
the Tshuapa River and the N8 road converged were killed as they sought 
refuge in these smaller villages.220 It is likely that these attacks were carried 
out by soldiers who had arrived ahead of some of the refugees, travelling in 
jeeps or land cruisers.221 
When the AFDL/RPA arrived in Mbandaka, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe 
had already fled. Upon arrival on 13 May, they asked local residents where 
the refugees were hiding, in response they pointed towards the harbour.222 
Bullets were sprayed over the dock to force them out of hiding, at which point 
some drowned trying to escape. Soldiers lined up along the dock shooting 
those attempting to swim away. Later that afternoon, refugees were then 
taken by the soldiers in several small groups and beaten to death with clubs 
and sticks.223 Other attacks happened simultaneously around Mbandaka. On 
13 May, in nearby Wendji, refugees were trapped by AFDL/RPA arriving 
from the south and those already present in the village. Upon arrival at the 
camp, they opened fire on those inhabitants still present.224 The hundreds 
killed here were then buried in mass graves around the camp.225  
Reports confirmed the presence of graves around Mbandaka, 
containing somewhere from 500 to 2,000 of those who had been killed.226 Of 
those swift enough to evade or not become cornered by the AFDL/RPA, 
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13,000 were evacuated out of Mbandaka around 22 May, and over 10,000 
able to cross the Congo River settled in to camps in and around 
Brazzaville.227 The June report to the UN Security Council summarised these 
later episodes as being clear-cut examples of violence targeting refugees, 
“To some extent the return was voluntary, since many genuine refugees had 
been prevented from returning by the military elements in the camps. 
However, it also is clear that, at some times and in some areas, the attacks 
on former camp populations which fled westward into the interior of Zaïre 
were not intended to force them to return, but simply to eliminate them.”228 
The pattern of violence that continued on this northern front distinctly 
mirrored the uniformity of attacks on camps and refugees in the south. 
Camps were often besieged with mortar fire, followed by gunfire on the 
ground as the AFDL/RPA entered. The centrality of Tingi-Tingi, both in terms 
of narrative and geography, demonstrated an ongoing effort to prevent the 
spread of genocidaires, and obliterate those not fast enough to outrun their 
advance and encirclement of camps. The hundreds of kilometres covered 
and coordination required for a campaign like this evidences a level of 
commitment to a course of action. As AFDL/RPA increasingly encountered 
disease and starvation laden camp inhabitants, it is also apparent that the, 
degree of quarter given to any person found in the camps, or on the roads 
between them was either very limited or completely non-existent.  
Conclusion: Whither the Violence? 
As identified above in the analysis of each front of the rebellion, a pattern of 
violence emerges that not only indicates when and how refugees were 
marked for death as genocidaires, but also demonstrates a performativity in 
ending another genocide by AFDL/RPA soldiers. It is possible to extrapolate 
from these massacres, limiting of aid, cordoning off areas to humanitarian 
organisations, and relentless pursuit that regardless of the front 
Banyamulenge soldiers were on they continued their soldier’s journey 
alongside RPA comrades in earnest. Further research is certainly needed to 
broaden the voices of those involved, as well as Banyarwanda Tutsi soldiers 
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to act as comparators to the Banyamulenge in the AFDL. Additionally, 
quantitative analysis is necessary to assess the cumulative figures of refugee 
deaths and repatriations resulting from direct and structural violence across 
Zaïre from 1996 to 1997. The Mapping Report also goes on to document the 
continued violence, including AFDL attacks against Zaïrian citizens and 
Rwandan refugees beyond the AFDL victory in July.229 Given the reasonable 
assumption that no genocide immediately stops, it should be noted that 
killings of refugees continued just as much as the targeting of Banyamulenge 
and Banyarwandan Tutsi did into 1998. Indeed, the vortex of these relational 
experiences goes beyond July 1997.  
This chapter demonstrates the positive correlation of vortex 
performativity. Specific narratives of insecurity accumulated by participants 
since coming of age in South Kivu included witnessing or exposure to the 
genocide in Rwanda and adopting RPF framing of regional Tutsi persecution. 
The identity-difference relation that Banyamulenge soldiers in particular 
engaged in, was one grounded in past and present threat. For many, this 
threat was realised as they returned to South Kivu, some finding family and 
neighbours already dead because of the continuing Hutu Power campaign 
against Tutsis. Here in the vortex, they identified with a charged attribution of 
the genocidaire. According to participants, it was mostly the Rwandan RPF 
soldiers or Tutsi Banyarwanda that engaged in ad-hoc attacks of revenge, 
often framed as a lack of discipline or an overwhelming drive to exact their 
own justice. Yet, witness accounts and reams of humanitarian and 
journalistic reporting document a series of massacres that were purposeful in 
removing a threat in a patterned and planned manner. The camps 
themselves took on a meaning as a place of violence, where inhabitants 
symbolised the ideology identified in RPF training as diametrically opposed 
to liberation and empowerment of the both Rwandan and Congolese 
peoples. The genocidaire was a physical and ideational embodiment of a 
contamination of bad ideology that was perceived as spreading in the Kivus 
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because of the destructive crises of the 1994 genocide and the exodus from 
Rwanda.230  
A key question that should be raised at the end of this account of the 
northern and southern fronts: what was the end of AFDL/RPF violence? As 
discussed at various points throughout this dissertation, AFDL/RPA violence 
has been classified in many different ways: targeted assassinations, revenge 
killings, undisciplined chaos, coercive violence, and highly organised. In 
many ways, these characteristics link to early RPF violence during the 
Rwandan civil war and genocide. Returning to Žižek’s model of subjective 
and objective violence noted in chapter three, one can start to parse the 
approaches to AFDL/RPA actions. RPF detractors and supporters have both 
utilised subjective descriptions of this period. The former highlight the 
intentional destruction of refugees, as a straight line continuing from pre-
1994 RPF tactics.231 This approach relies on, as some participants did, the 
ad-hoc, vengeful, expressive violence that did not characterise the whole, but 
a few unruly exceptions.232 An objective violence viewpoint garners a deeper 
sense of these actions, turning to the systemic and symbolic. The outcome of 
the violence used was partly to scatter genocidaires away from the border, 
but also to corral the population back under Rwandan control. Distance from 
the border dictated the practicality of returning refugees as opposed to 
obliterating them. This is where the encounter resulted in the organised 
killing: forced repatriation through this use of terror or the creation of 
unbearable conditions. Those resisting, and in doing so expressed their 
complicity, were obliterated. In many ways, refugees were caught in an 
Aristotelian hunt where they were seen as consumables to a set of strategic 
and ideational goals; their pursuers saw refugees as “eatable”. The value of 
the refugee was in regaining control against the genocidaire threat.  
As noted by Bergholz, the claim of revenge killing is a consistent 
mischaracterisation of symbolic violence and is more appropriately 
considered an attempt at dealing with loss, pain or suffering. Such 
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deployment of violence brings relief, and the kind of closure tacitly 
advocated, or at least understood by some participants.233 According to 
Mitton, this self-reinforcing use of violence processes past humiliation and 
projects an assertion of power.234 In some ways, this converges with the 
transgressive or undisciplined actor approach to genocide, as a release 
beyond social norms and limits.235 Yet, given the RPF trajectory of violence, 
and the highly structured nature of the 1996 to 1997 attacks, the 
transgressive does not fit. Additionally, the framing of killings as revenge, 
misdirects analysis away from the consistent nature of camp attacks and the 
production of violence as the AFDL/RPA moved from east to west. 
The weapons used in these attacks on the camps and the roads 
between them do not bear immediate significance. These were military 
trained soldiers using the tools of their craft. The range of weapons 
described in this chapter reflects this: light artillery, rockets, grenades, guns, 
bayonets, and the agafani axe. What can be extrapolated from this chapter is 
the order in which the weapons were used, in most cases, and therefore the 
process used by the AFDL/RPA. Heavier weapons were used on approach 
to the camps to scatter inhabitants. As the distance closed light weapons 
were used. Inasmuch as this is quite intuitive, it demonstrates a patterned 
ordering of the escalation of violence in each instance. Furthermore, a 
propensity to escalation and executions is apparent. If heavy weapons were 
not sufficient to drive the genocidaire onwards or back to Rwanda, then light 
weapons were used to coerce, and then kill those considered too far from the 
border or too irredeemable as guilty parties. Although more evidence is 
required in this particular dynamic, it seems that the use of particular 
weapons did not carry any significant social meaning, beyond accomplishing 
the task at hand.   
The heuristic tool of the vortex helps in obtaining a picture of the 
processes at work, and how actors sensed themselves. Being propelled by a 
specific narrativisation of destructive crises, Banyamulenge and other 
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subscribed Tutsis found themselves in places of violence: the vulnerable 
environment of the camp as a violent place. Performance was structured by 
the vortex, and the drive of the AFDL/RPA to remove the genocidaire threat. 
This campaign of removal did not escalate into one of obliteration, but was 
performed as such from the beginning in Kamanyola, all the way to 
Mbandaka. Participant identity formed in the identity-difference relation: 
sensing the genocidaire as they encountered them, and sensing themselves 
as ones empowered to stop another genocide by the means provided to 
them. Returning to Crossley’s notion of networks, the means given to the 
RPF, both, symbolic (narratives and memory) and tangible (weapons and 
training), framed the vulnerability faced when encountering the genocidaire. 
In Crossley’s words, “networks of interaction [are] demarcated by their 
participants’ mutual involvement in specific sets of activities. . . . [Social] 
worlds equally centre upon the content of interaction, however, and the 
identities adopted by parties to them.”236 Seen through the vortex, actors 
formed which were continually reshaped identities from the training grounds 
of Gashora to the camps of Kisangani. The formation of their world was 
coherently and logically shaped by these networks and their interactions.  
Aristotle’s assessment of a double standard in mistreating a governed 
population was allowed an exception: those “born to serve”. Those less than 
human can have a purpose in fuelling an asymmetrical power relation. The 
value of the refugee as genocidaire was incorporated into the performativity 
of AFDL/RPA soldiers responding to fundamental threats to a then held 
regional Tutsi identity. This Aristotelian logic served the AFDL, RPF and their 
allies in responding to the threat of the genocidaire with overwhelming and 
consuming force.
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Chapter IX: Conclusion: Narratives, Identities, and Conflict Transformation 
Even though genocide orphaned me 
But let it not make me lose empathy for others 
Their lives too, were brutally taken 
But not qualified as genocide 
Those brothers and sisters 
They, too, are humans I pray for them 
Those brothers and sisters 
--Kizito Mihigo, Igisobanuro Cy’urupfu1 
 
Introduction 
This concluding chapter will return to the problems posed in this research 
and the central research question given in chapter two. Analysis will then be 
given of how these have been answered, and a review of how identity was 
formed through the vortex of genocide, in the context of the features of 
genocide. Additional thought is added on the impact of this research in terms 
of memory, justice, and potential future research on peace narratives.  
The Problem and the Vortex 
The problem presented by this research was twofold: the inadequate 
language of victims and perpetrators replicated into comparative genocide 
studies; and, the troubling notion of cyclical violence in the Congo, as 
presented by the Mapping Report. These issues have been addressed 
sequentially, and in the narrow context of Banyamulenge participation in the 
RPF and later the AFDL. It was proposed that instead of committing to labels 
of victim or perpetrator, a notion of a social actor be used to assess the 
relational uses of knowledge and agency. This contribution to genocide 
studies follows the relational turn in this field, using post-liberal views as a 
departure point. Seeing perpetration through the analysis of social actors can 
help provide a clearer sense of conflict and genocide in the Great Lakes 
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region. Allowing social actors to moralise themselves, whilst not condoning 
violent views, can offer a view of how they sensed themselves, built crucial 
relational networks and narrative identities.  
The question posed in chapter two asked by what processes did 
genocide in the Great Lakes region produce socially constructed identities for 
AFDL/RPA soldiers? In answer to this question, three features of genocide 
relevant to this period and place were identified. Narratives of insecurity, 
destructive crises, and intermediate space flow together and interact to 
create a social environment where exposure to and experiences with 
genocide shape identity in profound and violent ways. The heuristic device of 
a vortex captures this process (see Figure 2). This framing offers a visual 
approach to understanding genocide and perpetration outside of set 
characteristics or categorisations, allowing for the layering of victim- and 
perpetrator-oriented experiences and perceptions. Banyamulenge soldiers 
were not acted upon, but utilised, as social actors, knowledge and capability 
as they moved through the vortex. This necessity for layering existing identity 
planks with new ones only increased as they entered into the RPF social 
world. Banyamulenge soldiers, and by inference many Banyarwanda and 
Rwandans, were moved through intermediate space and destructive crises, 
using narratives of insecurity to interpret such. The developing metanarrative 
of genocide as a legal and moral concept reinforced RPF public narratives of 
guilt and the genocidaire. 
RPF practices of violence reinforced these specific public and meta-
narratives. These were consciously used to shape the personal ontological 
narratives of Banyamulenge recruits, with their own experiences of 
discrimination in intermediate space. Their soldier’s journey was a 
performative layering of narrative co-option and interpretation. The identity-
difference relation to the genocidaire took on ever more violent and visceral 
meanings, whether in direct combat with the Interahamwe or the FAR, or in 
the presentation of genocide in the corpses around them or the newsreels of 
the genocide. This is where the encounter with the genocidaire began, in the 
course or aftermath of this first destructive crisis.   
This encounter continued with the relation to the genocidaire. The 
Banyamulenge came under threat from reaggregated power relations in the 
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wake of the destructive crisis in the 1994 Rwandan exodus into Zaïre. The 
emergent 1990s conflicts in both North and South Kivu were realigned 
around this arrival and the impact of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. This group’s 
organisation, supply of arms and explanatory ideology, provided opportunity 
and agreement with trends of anti-Tutsi violence in Zaïre. Most participants 
believed they and their families were about to be wiped out, and, in some 
cases they were, as violence escalated throughout 1996. The genocidaire 
would have to be responded to with extreme force, and the RPF provided the 
pattern for this.  
As discussed in chapters five and eight, the pattern of violence that 
emerged from RPF practices was systematic and targeted. Since 1993, the 
RPF has engaged in organised, but reactive massacre. Opponents were 
identified by direct or inferred connection to the genocide. Place was a key 
determinant of whether or not individuals were guilty. As soldiers, like 
Patrick, moved from Uganda into unknown Rwanda, and then many years 
later into Zaïre, they encountered the genocidaire in hostile and threatening 
environments, only increasing the likelihood of extreme force. The term 
genocide has been consciously not applied to the emergent trend of RPF 
killings from 1993 to 1995, yet, has been applied to the attacks on the 
refugees. This violence should be seen on a continuum, an evolving 
commitment to remove the genocidaire. RPF trajectories of violence do 
indicate a level of coercion; this is how the massive return from Mugunga 
came about. However, both prior to this return and afterwards refugees were 
perceived as genocidaires and obliterated as such. Not seeking out 
perpetrator intent, leaves this analysis with the array of perceptions, 
responses to threat (in persons and environment), and deployment of 
symbolic violence. In particular the latter, if seen as Bergholz argues a 
method of processing loss or suffering, or by Mitton as an exertion of power 
overcoming humiliation, was facilitated by RPF practices and at least verbally 
condoned by participants. The institutional penchant for dealing with political 
problems with military force and extreme violence created a performative and 
narrative path for perpetration. Escalating violence (whether by the RPF 
efforts or that of others), from the civil war period into Zaïre only played into 
the hands of RPF narratives practices.  
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The genocidaire relation was carried into the camps and the roads 
between them in the AFDL liberation project. Consequently, 233,000 
Rwandan refugees were pursued past the point of exhaustion. Camp-
clearing tactics could no longer be out run, in many cases, on both the 
northern and southern fronts’ refugees where they were specifically gathered 
for execution. This movement through the vortex shaped the fates and lives 
of all participants. The Banyamulenge themselves added to layers of identity 
and perception. Like that of Theseus’ ship their identities were purposefully 
remade up to this point and beyond, allowing the performance of narrative 
identity I have interpreted in my conceptual narrative. Banyamulenge soldiers 
saw themselves as protectors of their people, liberators of Congo, embattled 
Tutsis, unwanted Congolese, and those who ended or stopped genocides. 
Use of this heuristic device is limited to this case, and requires further 
testing to build on its utility. Any attempt at developing this approach and 
features of genocide should be applied to cases with multiple experiences of 
genocide within a postcolonial context. Identifying and operationalising these 
features of genocide demonstrates use of Lemkin’s concept as an ideal type. 
Future studies of genocide would likewise benefit from this type of 
application. In doing so, the heuristic device deployed in connection with 
these features may be further tested. This vortex has facilitated an 
understanding of seemingly cyclical violence in the Congo by presenting the 
layering impact of exposures to and experience of genocide.  
Memory, Justice and Peace Narratives 
By not subscribing to the cyclical interpretation of conflict reported in the 
Mapping Report further questions could then be opened up about the future 
of the Banyamulenge, and other conflicting groups and perceptions in the 
region. As noted in chapter six, Rieff makes a compelling case for forgetting 
atrocity, instead of memorialising or becoming fodder for the terror of history, 
framing the future through the past. After the review of the varied 
conversations with participants, this option seems unlikely to be chosen by 
the embattled generation of soldiers who still sense threat and insecurity 
around them. Any attempt at dealing with the genocide of Rwandan refugees 
rests with future political actors and future regimes in both Kinshasa and 
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Kigali.2 Further distinction between forgetting, forgiveness and reconciliation 
must also be brought to bear. Questions about engaging with the past 
constructively, although inevitably difficult, manner must be answered.3  
 The pursuit of justice for RPF crimes is similarly elusive. Perhaps only 
a future regime in Kigali would ever consider prosecuting crimes dating back 
to the civil war. Given the high value placed on the legacy and reputation of 
the RPF as an institution, even many RPF dissidents would be hesitant to do 
this.4 Attempts at prosecuting Kagame, or any others have fallen flat because 
of the status quo enjoyed by the RPF. The dividends of RPF memorialisation 
(as discussed in chapter six) only serve to reinforce this privilege. Despite 
the emergent tide of Rwandan dissident voices, or the release of alleged 
genocidaires, a radical shift in power would need to occur to allow for a 
reconciliatory assessment of Rwanda’s past.  
 Inclusive narratives that more fully support a given state’s diversity are 
an advocated path for conflict transformation and genocide prevention.5 The 
need for transcending the disciplinary boundaries of these fields is key to 
preventing mass violence in the long term.6 Having identified some of the 
networks and nodes of conflict supporting narratives, it is tempting to 
advocate a straightforward reversal of these into narratives for peace. Pursuit 
of peace education in post-conflict, even where mass violence has been a 
feature, is a growing practice subject to much debate.7 The power of peace-
oriented education that liberates and empowers offers a promise of 
transforming relationships.8 Yet, constructing such narratives and education 
is a long-term endeavour fraught with contentious processes.9 Adam Curle’s 
notion of “awareness” demonstrates that an interaction of perceptions of the 
past and attempts to fashion a vision of the future are always going to be 
                                            
2 Luc, 2017.  
3 Nigel Biggar, ed., Burying the Past: Making peace and doing justice after civil 
conflict (Georgetown University Press, 2003), 307-309.    
4 Rever, interview by phone, July 2018; Gahima, 230-236.    
5 Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations, 322-325.  
6 Johan Galtung and Charles Webel, “Peace and Conflict Studies: Looking Back, 
Looking Forward,” in Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (Routledge, 2007), 398.  
7 Alicia Cabezudo and Magnus Haavelsrud, “Rethinking Peace Education,” in eds. 
Johan Galtung and Charles Webel, Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies, 279-296.   
8 Adam Curle, Education for Liberation (Tavistock, 1973), 53-62; Paulo Freire, 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014).   
9 Biggar, 309.  
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problematic.10 Attempts at this in the DRC have been overburdened and 
aborted due to an unsettled political landscape and too many meddling 
actors with conflicting interests.11 Truth commissions require a host of 
supporting political and economic measures, but can offer substance to the 
construction of conflict-specific peace education and narratives.12  
What then of local peace education and narrative construction? If a 
relational and systems-based approach is used, attention can be focused on 
delivering and facilitating learning that reaches those close to but not yet 
incorporated into existing conflict narrative identities. Reaching out to a new 
generation of Banyamulenge young people, and intercepting the 
transmission of existing narrative identities, could create avenues for peace 
education.13 For John Paul Lederach, this means making a space-specific 
social interaction, 
This is the challenge of restorying: It continuously requires a creative 
act. To restory is not to repeat the past, attempt to recreate it exactly 
as it was, nor act as if it did not exist. It does not ignore the 
generational future nor does it position itself to control it. Embracing 
the paradox of relationship in the present, the capacity to restory 
imagines both the past and the future and provides space for the 
narrative voice to create. As such, the art of imaging the past that lies 
                                            
10 Adam Curle, Mystics and Militants: A Study of Awareness, Identity, and Social 
Action (Tavistock, 1972), 92-109.  
11 Eduardo González, “Set to fail? Assessing tendencies in truth commissions 
created after violent conflict,” Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions 
Strengthen Peace Processes? (International Centre for Transitional Justice and the Kofi 
Annan Foundation, 2014), 5. Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable truths: Transitional justice and 
the challenge of truth commissions (Routledge, 2011), 197; Elena Naughton, “Democratic 
republic of the Congo: Case study,” Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions 
Strengthen Peace Processes? (International Centre for Transitional Justice and the Kofi 
Annan Foundation, 2014), 54.   
12 Priscilla Hayner discusses the tension between sequencing transitional justice 
before reconciliation and truth-seeking activities. She claims that capitalizing on the period of 
transition is essential to keeping truth and reconciliation alive and imaginable in the minds of 
people and in obtaining crucial evidence; holding off on a truth commission until after 
prosecutions also denies the centrality of victims’ justice and truth, see Priscilla Hayner, 
Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (Routledge, 2000), 116.  
13 Joseph Rayle, “Peace Education: Building a Systemic Framework,” in Andrew 
Fitz-Gibbon ed, Positive Peace: Reflections on Peace Education, Nonviolence, and Social 
Change (Editions Rodopi, 2010), 59-65. International Alert provides this type of intervention 
in South Kivu rural areas, teaching young people leadership and critical thinking skills and 
doing so across typically conflicted groups, see International Alert, “Supporting young people 
to achieve peaceful socio-political change,” 29 October 2018, accessed on 15 May 2017, 
from https://www.international-alert.org/stories/supporting-young-people-achieve-peaceful-
socio-political-change. Brabant describes the choices of most young people in the Kivus as 
choosing a future between armed groups, international organisation or mineral extraction 
companies, see Brabant, 212, 222-232.    
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before us holds close the deep belief that the creative act is 
possible.14 
 
The performative process of restorying and building transformative 
connections to the past and the future offers this kind holistic systemic 
approach. If the process of narrative identity formation can build networks 
and create social collectivities, then positive or peace-oriented figurations are 
possible.15 
* * * 
The words of an ageing preacher in Bukavu summarised the challenge of 
approaching peace, narrative and memory. He spoke of how they as 
Banyamulenge positioned themselves in the context of Rwanda’s shaping of 
the past. “A proverb says to remember is killing. Our brothers keep 
remembering things that I cannot talk about. They meet in their memorials, 
but cannot talk about things that truly happened. It is as if you are hanging 
yourself, so it is better to come and find a solution as brothers. We will have 
a difficulty. They commemorate tomorrow, but do not prevent the whole 
situation from repeating.”16 Rwandans are fatally binding themselves to the 
past. As Tutsi brothers, the Banyamulenge were unwilling captives to this 
memorialisation and locked conflict. Rugira, who took me to this Sunday 
service, seemed to regret doing so, and privately censured the preacher for 
speaking so recklessly. Despite his response, and the complex environment 
underpinning it, the preacher’s call to action was a salient one: understand 
the problem and find a solution for themselves.
                                            
14 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace 
(Oxford University Press USA, 2005), 149.  
15 Christopher Powell, “Anti-genocide.” in Sam Totten, ed., Last Lectures on the 
Prevention and Intervention of Genocide (Routledge, 2017), 268-273.  
16 Preacher in Bukavu, November 2017.    
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Epilogue: Ashes and Fire 
What we can add is that you can speak on our behalf to the 
international community so that they can look after taking into 
consideration the problem of our people. Our lives are in danger . . . . 
We cannot be secure wherever we are because we are still 
persecuted. The tendency of the people we live with is to wipe us from 
the map of Africa.  
--Umwami1 
 
Introduction 
One of the hardest questions haunting the research and writing of this 
dissertation was where did a soldier’s journey begin and end. The fact that 
Banyamulenge have a reputation for wearing their history as a marker of 
identity only made this problem more compelling. How was the ontological 
narrative of these soldiers’ experiences with genocide to be demarcated? 
How was I to shape and reconstruct such broad narratives? Perhaps most 
challengingly: how was I to represent views where it was increasingly clear 
that silence formed a substance of the narrative? The silence of 
Banyamulenge soldiers on their involvement in the attacks on the camps was 
to be expected; however, now that my own conceptual narrative has been 
formed this absence was conspicuous. What was missing from my own 
narrative of this journey is the current state or aftermath of the collapse of the 
AFDL. Participants were all too keen to describe how they had subsequently 
been chased out of the new DRC by Kabila and his Katangan and regional 
allies. In Gatete’s words, insecurity persisted even after being hailed as 
liberators, “They could call us revolutionary, we feel like we have brought 
about peace in this country, in this region. Definitely that’s not the case, 
because we still have a sense of insecurity.”2 
 It was increasingly apparent that the subsequent phases of their 
journeys, for both soldiers and political actors and the larger Banyamulenge 
grouping, were fraught with insecurity and for some the continued threat of 
genocide. The narratives of insecurity traced in this research have seemingly 
                                            
1 Umwami, 2017.    
2 Gatete, 2017.  
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become entrenched over time. This epilogue attempts to account for a few 
more crucial plot points in participants’ narratives. It will address these two 
categories: (violent) places and people (assassinated and divided). The first 
will cover a few attacks on the Banyamulenge since the fall of the AFDL. The 
second will address some of the people concerned; in particular, those many 
participants claimed to have been erased in an attempt to put the 
Banyamulenge back into the intermediate space they sought to leave. A brief 
overview will be given of the successive groups participants in which were 
involved. In a way, this was the story that many participants wanted me to 
tell. It should be retold, as Umwami states above, because the genocidaire 
still lives on in their enemies.  
(Violent) Places 
In the same way that AFDL/RPA actors saw the refugee camps of Zaïre as 
dangerous and violent, this framing lends to an understanding of continued 
threat. However, use of this label demonstrates the intersubjectivities of 
violent camp spaces. The four places briefly focused on here include the 
Butare conference, the barracks of Banyamulenge soldiers in 1998, and the 
camps of Mudende in Rwanda and Gatumba in Burundi.  
 The gathering of Banyamulenge communal leaders by the RPA 
sometime around the end of 1996 in Butare was shrouded in some mystery. 
Both Moise and Janvier recounted how Alexis Kagame, Charles Kayonga, or 
Eric Murokore met with these leaders and presented an offer of resettlement 
to the community from Minembwe to Rwanda. Following hours of threats and 
pressure from the Rwandans, the Banyamulenge refused to give up their 
home. Moise described this as a threat of violence, “Deporting people to 
another country is another form of genocide. If you do that, you will again do 
the very same genocide that Hutus did to Tutsis. We separated. We were 
angry.”3 This failed negotiation had soured the alliance with the Rwandans. 
By the time Kinshasa was reached things had already began to fall apart. 
Rugira in our first meeting retold how he and other Banyamulenge 
soldiers were specifically targeted and hunted down by the new Kabila 
regime after Kabarebe and the other Rwandan officers were told to leave in 
                                            
3 Moise, 2017.  
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July 1998.4 In August 1998 when the first mutiny broke out in Goma 
precipitating the Second Congo War, Congolese officers’ stationed at the 
Kamina training camp were shot.5 Alphonse, Balthazar, and Thierry, all noted 
this attack as a clear betrayal by Kabila and his new Tanzanian and 
Katangan allies.6 Ikiyaga was among the soldiers who were able to escape 
and eventually he re-joined the Rwandans and the RCD for another sweep 
on Kinshasa.7 Attacks on perceived Tutsi, soldiers and civilian alike were rife 
in the capital throughout August. The military barracks of Kokolo and 
Tshatshi were targeted. During this brief period, soldiers from the East were 
arrested, disarmed and shot.8 
The following two attacks on camps were pointed to by participants as 
further evidence of the Banyamulenge being under threat. The Mudende 
attack occurred late at night on 22 August 1997. There 148 Congolese Tutsi 
refugees were killed in a manner reminiscent of the 1994 genocide. Their 
temporary dwellings burned to the ground. The camp was located just miles 
from Goma into Rwanda, making it a prime target for ex-FAR/Interahamwe 
forces.9 However, according to Rever, this and other incidents during the 
counter-insurgency were allegedly false flag attacks committed by DMI 
technicians in the area.10 According to Tim Reid, a UN investigator also in 
the area such practice was common. Additionally, the Rwandan authorities 
were not supportive of the refugees being within their territory in first place.11 
To date there are 20,000 Congolese Tutsis, many Banyamulenge included, 
refugees living in an unintegrated limbo across three camps in Rwanda.12 
                                            
4 Roessler and Verhoeven, 347.  
5 Ibid., 295; Rugira, first interview, 2017.    
6 Balthazar, 2017; Thierry, 2017; Alphonse, 2018.    
7 Ikiyaga, 2017. In Jouris’ The Rebel’s Hour she recounts this actual escape through 
the book’s muse, 137-141.  
8 UNHCR, 154-159.    
9 Africa Rights, The Insurgency in the Northwest (1998), 151-158; Barbara 
Crossette, “120 Reported Killed in Attack On Refugee Camp in Rwanda,” The New York 
Times, 23 August 1997, accessed on 21 November 2017, from 
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/23/world/120-reported-killed-in-attack-on-refugee-camp-
in-rwanda.html.    
10 Rever, 142.     
11 Tim Reid, interview by phone, August 2018; see Rever, 140 for further discussion 
of false flag attacks during this period.  
12 International Refugee Right Initiative, “Shadow of Return: The Dilemmas of 
Congolese Refugees in Rwanda,” Citizenship and Displacement in The Great Lakes Region 
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The 13 August 2004 attack on the Gatumba camp in Burundi was a 
salient point for many participants. This camp was composed largely of 
Banyamulenge refugees. Christian, Eleazar, and Umwami promised to 
provide the names of those killed in the attack. This was offered in the hope 
that I could report it to politicians or international agencies to raise the profile 
of Banyamulenge suffering. During the attack, 152 Banyamulenge refugees 
were killed, again in a similar manner to those at Mudende. Gatete recalled 
how his cousin was a survivor of this attack, and went on to imply this as 
genocide, “Although they say it was a massacre, that’s not true. There is a 
debate that is going that is defining genocide and massacre. Because in this 
case, it was a specific ethnic group.”13 In Umwami’s account, there were 166 
that died and over a 1,000 injured. Who was to blame? In RPF narrative 
fashion, it was the international community that had allowed this to happen. 
In a further effort to explain he resorted to similar tropes and narratives of 
insecurity raised by other political colleagues, “It is just the hate. They just 
wanted to finish with us. That's why they wanted to wipe all of us out.  It is 
just the hate that they have. I see the Burundais and Tanzanians are close 
friends and a lot of FDLR are already in these countries; so when they see 
us with this morphology, with the look of Tutsis, the hate multiplies.”14 
Matthias in speaking about the Gatumba massacre, showed me photos on 
his phone, shared around his social media accounts, of FDLR soldiers 
stockpiling weapons in the Congolese forest. The genocidaire was indeed 
alive and well. 
These perpetuating narratives of insecurity were sometimes a 
reflection of the individual's own material circumstance at the point of 
interview. Those like Gatete, Alphonse, and Balthazar had very pessimistic 
outlooks and saw insecurity as an existential, economic and social 
conglomeration. Their own under-employment and lack of resources bled 
into narratives about the past.15 Some participants like Matthias and 
Rukema, shared the same view of insecurity, but had fared better in material 
                                            
Working Paper 6, July 2011, accessed on 2 November 2018, from 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/53b3dc834.html.   
13 Gatete, 2017.  
14 Umwami, 2017.   
15 Gatete, 2017; Balthazar, 2017; Alphonse, 2018.  
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circumstances. Many, as a result of successive reintegration into the army 
and length of service, had acquired significant rank, but were without 
commissions or reliable pay.16  
People (assassinated and divided) 
The name Nicolas Kibinda echoed in a ghostly manner in almost all 
participant narratives. Eugene summarised the veneration of Nicolas in his 
usual poetic manner: “Nicolas, he was a brave man, a leader, unfortunately 
killed without accomplishing his mission. For the Banyamulenge soldiers he 
was the number one.”17 This young RPF-trained Banyamulenge officer never 
made it to Kinshasa along with his fellows. It was clear he died in some of 
the first fighting of October 1996 as noted in chapter seven, but the 
suspicious nature of most participants was apparent on this topic. Was it the 
Rwandans who were responsible for letting him die? Alternatively, were they 
the ones who pulled the trigger? The significance of this one death cannot be 
overstated. For most, this was another point of departure of Banyamulenge 
from the Rwandans. 
 Most pessimistic of all participants was Rukema. His articulation of the 
sins committed by the RPA and Kagame was the most forthright of those I 
spoke with. According to Rukema, it was in fact his former RPA commander 
Eric Murokore who ordered the execution of Nicolas.18 Others like Patience 
and Janvier at least shared a suspicion of Rwandan involvement in his 
death.19 There was a silent hope in many narratives that perhaps things 
might have been different if he had survived. This was implied about the 
deaths of other key figures, all treated with a measure of suspicion. Two of 
these figures were Kisase Ngandu and Masasu Nindaga. Both McDowell and 
Rukema gave detailed second-hand accounts from eyewitnesses about the 
assassination of Ngandu. A simple car bomb orchestrated by the Network 
Commando was used to finish off this troublesome AFDL founder, and 
Kabila rival.20 Masasu was another figure associated with Congolese Tutsi, 
                                            
16 Matthias, 2018; Rukema, second interview, 2018.  
17 Eugene, 2017.   
18 Rukema, second interview, 2018.   
19 Janvier, 2017; Patience, 2017.   
20 Rukema, second interview, 2018; McDowell, second interview, 2018; Roessler 
and Verhoeven, 215-217.    
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and was executed after a string of arrests and imprisonments. He was 
allegedly guilty of collaborating with Rwanda and fomenting unrest in the 
Kivus. Following his execution in November 2000, as ordered by Kabila, 
kadogo considered loyal to Ningada were also rounded up, with some also 
executed.21 
 Many participants, by the time I spoke with them had circuitously 
found their way into the FARDC. Some, like Jean, Matthias, and Rugira 
happened to find themselves in the Mouvement de Libération du Congo 
(MLC) largely as a result of the route they took out of Kinshasa in the 
summer 1998. Many others joined the RCD or the FARDC, and diverged into 
Pacifique Masunzu’s Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF). This small 
scale movement ended after taking large sections of South Kivu’s Haut 
Plateau. From the early 2000s to 2011, the FRF operated deep in Minembwe 
and other hilly areas of South Kivu. By the end most were re-integrated with 
higher ranks as part of a Banyamulenge-dominated division from Bukavu 
down into Minembwe.22 Most participants esteemed the FRF with the highest 
regard and unique legitimacy. This group was symbolic of the honesty and 
necessity of resorting to arms to protect the community where either 
Kinshasa or Kigali refused to act or were the guilty party.  
* * * 
Like tandem movements, both the militarisation of the Banyamulenge and 
the threats making such actions necessary, seemed to rise and fall as part of 
a fatalistic ebb and flow. Being Banyamulenge meant being a Tutsi and living 
under the genocidaire threat. Now they were stranded in an intermediate 
space between both Kigali and Kinshasa. The Congolese conflicts of the 
past decades, since the mobilisation of this generation in the early 1990s, 
                                            
21 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 252-253. Prunier also discusses how this wave of 
violence against Nindaga’s perceived followers sparked the assassination of Kabila himself 
on 16 January 2001; see also Reyntjens, The Great African War, 252-253.  
22 Judith Verweijen, “Guest Blog: The FRF armed group,” 10 August 2011, Congo 
Siasa, accessed on 2 November 2018, from http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2011/08/guest-
blog-frf-armed-group.html; IRIN, “DRC: IRIN Interview with Banyamulenge leader on fighting 
in Minembwe,” 3 May 2002, accessed on 2 November 2018, from 
https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/drc-irin-interview-banyamulenge-leader-fighting-
minembwe.   
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offered opportunities and necessities that according to participants were 
elusive at best.   
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Appendix I: Interview Guide 
1. Please could you tell me about yourself and your family? 
2. What was life like for you in the early 1990s? 
a. What threats did you face? 
3. Did you join the RPF? 
a. Why did you join? 
b. Who recruited you? 
4. How were you affected by the genocide in Rwanda? 
5. How did the arrival of Rwandans affect you? 
a. What was the impact of the arrival? 
b. Why might they have been considered to be a threat? 
6. What threats did you, your family, and your community face at this 
time? 
7. What do you know about the 1996-1997 war? 
8. Describe your involvement with the AFDL or the RPF 
a. Why did you become involved? 
b. Who recruited you? 
9. How were the camps emptied?  
10. What happened to those who fled? 
11. What do you know about attacks on Rwandans?  
a. Please describe them 
b. Who led? 
c. Who participated? 
d. Where did they happen? 
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Appendix II: Consent Form 
Participant Name: 
Location: 
Date: 
Research 
This research aims to understand the history of the First Congo War (1996-
1997) through the personal experiences and stories of those who 
participated in the AFDL. Former soldiers of the AFDL will be interviewed as 
individuals or groups in order to discuss their involvement in the movement 
and the war.  
Participation 
As researcher I will treat you with respect and dignity, especially considering 
the difficult nature of memories of war and violence. I will provide my contact 
details if you have further questions about the research or your participation. 
As participant you consent to audio recordings of the interview.  Audio 
recordings and transcripts of your interview will be kept securely under lock 
and key at all times. 
Furthermore, your participation can be anonymized. This confidentiality will 
be achieved by using coded names in the transcripts. At any point, you can 
withdraw your participation. If this occurs following the interview your 
recordings will be destroyed. All audio recordings will be destroyed three 
years following completion of the project.  
By signing this consent, you acknowledge that the researcher is not 
responsible for providing any need for treatment related to trauma arising 
from voluntary participation in interviews. Any compensation offered for time 
spent in an interview will be agreed upon by the participant and research as 
needed. 
Signatures 
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Researcher 
..………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Participant 
.…………………………………….……………………………………………… 
Contact details 
Christopher Davey, University of Bradford, Richmond Road, BD7 1DP, West 
Yorkshire, UK, email C.davey1@bradford.ac.uk   
If you wish to be kept updated about the progress and development of the 
research please indicate with a tick in the below box: 
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Appendix III: Timeline 
This timeline offers an accompanying overview of the varied historical 
processes and events covered by this dissertation. It is organised in 
chronological order, with specific dates and locations used as needed.  
 
1880s  
First wave of migration from Mwami Rwabugiri’s kingdom into what would 
become South Kivu. 
1885 
Congo Free State is established under King Leopold II. 
1908 
Congo is established as a Belgian colony. 
1918 
Rwanda and Burundi become Belgian protectorates under the Treaty of 
Versailles. 
1920s-1930s 
Belgian migration of colonial labour and tenant farmers from Rwanda into 
eastern Congo (another similar wave occurred in the 1940s in response to 
famine in Rwanda). 
1948 
December: The UNGC is signed into international law. 
1957 
Native Authority is disbanded, relinquishing many Congolese Hutu and Tutsi 
claims to land in North Kivu. 
1960s-1970s 
Successive waves of migrants from Rwandan and Burundi for largely political 
and economic reasons.  
1960 
June: Congo is granted independence from Belgium. 
1961-1963  
Exile of Tutsi Rwandans, including political elites into region, especially 
eastern Congo. 
1961 
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January: Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba is assassinated. 
1962 
July: Rwanda and Burundi are granted independence from Belgium. 
1964-1965 
Popular rebellion breaks out across Congo, including the Mulele or Simba 
rebellion. 
1964 
Increase in Mulelist raids on Banyamulenge cattle. 
1965 
November: Mobutu Sese-Seko takes power in a military coup-d’état.  
1972 
January: Citizenship Law passed under Barthélemy Bisengimana affirmed 
rights to Banyarwanda present in Congo prior to 1950. 
1981 
June: Another citizenship law is passed restricting rights to those able to 
trace ancestry presence to pre-1885 Congo, prior to colonisation. 
1982 
Reported Banyamulenge attacks on polling stations and ballot boxes, and 
would reoccur in 1984, and again in 1992. 
1990-1994 
First wave of RPF recruitment in Zaïre of Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge 
young men, and growth of RPF networks. 
1990 
April: The CNS is established by Mobutu in an effort to create a multi-party 
state 
October: RPF invasion into Byumba, Rwanda. 
1991 
CNS conduct census to establish citizenship rights, particularly of residents 
in eastern Zaïre. 
March: RPF and Habyarimana government agree ceasefire. 
August: The CNS begins a democratisation process in Congo. 
1992 
The RPF’s Network Commando is established.  
June: RPF regains control of Byumba. 
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1993-1996  
Violence in North Kivu erupts at various points, increasingly targeting 
Banyarwanda Tutsi. 
1993 
Hyperinflation spikes in Zaïre, and localised conflicts between groups 
escalates in North Kivu and Masisi with the rise of non-Banyarwanda militias 
and the Banyarwanda Hutu led MAGRIVI militia. 
October: Burundian President Melchior Ndadaye is assassinated, prompting 
the flight of Tutsis into eastern Zaïre. 
1994 
6 April: Habyarimana’s plane is shot down and the genocide begins, some 
RPF units remain behind enemy lines in the Kigali area. 
June - August: French led Operation Turquoise established an evacuation 
corridor from central Rwanda into eastern Zaïre. 
July: RPF capture Kigali, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans are internally 
displaced and over a million are become refugees in the region, mostly into 
eastern Zaïre; the ALiR forms as a political military organisation of the former 
Rwandan government and armed groups.   
August - September: Gersony fieldwork is conducted in Kibungo, Gisenyi 
and Butare. 
October: Gersony briefs UNHCR on the team’s findings and the report is not 
approved for release. 
1995  
The ICTR opens to try serious cases of human rights violations from January 
to December of 1994; hundreds of thousands of Banyarwanda Tutsi flee 
North Kivu into Rwanda; CNS adopts the 1981 Citizenship Law and seeks to 
enforce in eastern Zaïre.  
March: North Kivu governor Jean-Pierre Kalumbo orders forced removal and 
extermination of Banyarwanda in the province.  
April: Kibeho camp massacre in Rwanda; Vangu Commission reports to 
Zaïrian parliament recommending enforcement of citizenship laws and 
expulsion of Banyarwanda. 
September - November: In South Kivu, anti-Banyamulenge violence, arrest 
and seizure of property increases, and continues into 1996. 
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October - November: Increase in ex-FAR/Interahamwe insurgency attacks 
around the eastern Zaïre and Rwandan border. 
December: RPA agents bring Laurent-Désiré Kabila from Tanzania to 
Rwanda. 
1996  
12 May: Ex-FAR/Interahamwe massacre of Banyarwanda Tutsi sheltering at 
the Mokoto monastery. 
July - September: Early RPA led incursions into North and South Kivu, using 
historic Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge recruits. 
September: Increase in local militia, FAZ, ex-FAR/Interahamwe attacks in 
South Kivu up and down the shore western of Lake Kivu. 
22 September: RPA led attack on FAZ military base near Bukavu. 
October 1996 - May 1997: First Congo War; assassination of Nicolas 
Kibinda.  
8 October: Governor Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji issues removal order for 
Banyamulenge.   
18 October: AFDL officially founded by bringing together the ADP, MRLZ, 
CNRD, and PRP. 
20 October: AFDL Banyamulenge and RPA soldiers cross the border 
Rwandan-Zaïrian border at the Ruzizi River near Kamanyola. 
24 October: Uvira captured by AFDL. 
28 October: Bukavu captured by AFDL. 
31 October: Goma captured by AFDL. 
November: UNSC approves a Canadian led MNF for a humanitarian 
assistance to the refugees in Zaïre.  
15 November: Mugunga camp attacked, and hundreds of thousands of 
refugees return to Rwanda. 
December: Refugees start to move toward Kisangani, the Tingi-Tingi camp is 
established.  
13 December: MNF is formally withdrawn as the refugee crisis is determined 
to be concluded. 
1997 
4 January: Kisase Ngandu assassinated in North Kivu. 
February: Shabunda and Tingi-Tingi are captured by AFDL. 
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28 February: Kindu is captured by the AFDL. 
March: Garretón’s first mission to investigate crimes against humanity is 
abruptly ended by AFDL authorities. 
15 March: Kisangani captured by AFDL. 
April: Airlift repatriation from Kisangani discussed and delayed, thousands of 
refugees move deeper into Equateur Province; Boende is captured. 
9 April: Lubumbashi captured by AFDL. 
May - June: First groups of refugees arrive across the Republic of Congo 
border in Ndjoundou. 
13 May: Mbandaka captured by AFDL. 
17 May: Kinshasa captured by AFDL. 
29 May: Kabila is sworn in as president. 
July: Garretón report alleges crimes against humanity by AFDL, and calls for 
further investigation. 
August - October: Another investigation mission is sent to DRC and is 
blocked by authorities now in power in Kinshasa. 
December - February 1998: The investigators are redeployed and again 
obstructed. 
1998 
26 July: Kabila orders all Rwandans and foreign military to leave DRC. 
August 1998 - July 2003: Second Congo War. 
August: Mutiny of the Banyarwanda dominated brigade stationed in Goma; 
Rwandan supported RCD is formed; massacre of Banyamulenge and 
Banyarwandan officers at the Kamina training camp in Katanga. 
26 August: Massacre of Congolese Tutsi refugees at the Mudende camp in 
Rwanda. 
1999  
16 May: RCD splits according to Rwandan and Ugandan patronage.  
10 July: Lusaka Peace Accord signed. 
2000  
MONUC is established. 
November: Masasu Nindaga is executed by Kabila for treason, followed by 
the round-up and execution of kadogo recruited by Nindaga. 
2001  
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The FDLR succeed the ALiR as the leading political military organisation of 
the former Rwandan government. 
16 January: Kabila is assassinated. 
2002  
Sun City Peace Accords, UPC is formed. 
2003-2005  
DRC Transitional government 
2003 
August: Kagame is elected President, and wins an election again in 2010. 
2004 
13 August: Massacre of Banyamulenge refugees at the Gatumba camp in 
Burundi. 
2005 
CNDP is formed. 
September: FARDC discover mass graves in the Rutshuru area, these are 
further investigated by MONUC and later the UNHCR mapping team. 
2006  
December: Joseph Kabila is inaugurated as President. 
2007-2011  
FRF operates in South Kivu. 
2008 
July: Genocide ideology is criminalised under the Rwandan constitution. 
October 2008 - May 2009: UNHCR mapping report fieldwork.   
2009 
22 January: Laurent Nkunda placed under house arrest in Rwanda. 
2010 
August: UNHCR releases the Mapping Report. 
2012 
April: The M23 movement forms out of an FARDC mutiny of former CNDP 
soldiers. 
2013 
March: Bosco Ntaganda turns himself in at the US Embassy in Kigali. 
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